National Defence / Défense nationale

Canada

The Many Faces of ETHICS IN DEFENCE

Proceedings of the Conference on
Ethics in Canadian Defence
Ottawa, 24-25 October 1996
Sponsored by the Defence Ethics Program
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Contents

Introduction

Major-General Keith G. Penney

I am pleased to present the *Proceedings* of the first Conference on Ethics in Canadian Defence, which took place 24-25 October 1996 in Ottawa. This publication captures the formal presentations that were made under the theme of *The Many Faces of Ethics in Defence*.

It was gratifying to witness the extent and quality of the dialogue between the presenters and the 300 participants at the Conference. For the first time, a large-scale exchange of views could take place on the role that ethics play in the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence. The Conference was sponsored by the Defence Ethics Program of Chief Review Services at National Defence Headquarters. In addition to these *Proceedings*, videocassettes of the Conference are available in both official languages from the Pearkes Library at National Defence Headquarters (library code: OOND).

DND and the CF have the distinction of being the first department or agency within the Government of Canada to have established a formal ethics program, and we are proud of our achievement. Through the Defence Ethics Program and the active participation of leaders and managers throughout our organization, we intend to include ethics in our training and education activities, and indeed in all facets of our operations in Canada and around the world. As the *Statement of Defence Ethics* explains, members of the CF and DND employees are dedicated to their duty and committed to respect the dignity of all persons, serve Canada before self, and obey and support lawful authority.

The conference also provided a unique opportunity to launch the *Statement of Defence Ethics*, which appears on page vi. The *Statement*, which has received the approval of the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff, provides a clear indication of the positive steps DND and the CF are taking to promote an ethical work environment as well as ethics education.

In closing, I would like to thank those who gave presentations, helped organize the conference, contributed through their attendance and active participation in the discussions, and assisted through the production of these *Proceedings*.

Keith G. Penney



Major-General
Chief Review Services

National Defence / Défense nationale

Statement of Defence Ethics

As members of the Canadian Forces, liable to the ultimate sacrifice, and as employees of the Department of National Defence having special obligations to Canada, we are dedicated to our duty and commited to:

RESPECT THE DIGNITY OF ALL PERSONS
SERVE CANADA BEFORE SELF
OBEY AND SUPPORT LAWFUL AUTHORITY

Guided by these fundamental principles, we act in accordance with the following ethical obligations:

Loyalty

We dedicate ourselves to Canada.
We are loyal to our superiors and faithful to our subordinates and colleagues.

Honesty

We honour the trust placed upon us.
We value truth and candour, and act with integrity at all times.

Courage

We face challenges, whether physical or moral, with determination and strength of character.

Diligence

We undertake all tasks with dedication and perseverance.
We recognize our duty to perform with competence and to strive for excellence.

Fairness

We are equitable in our dealings with others.
We are just in our decisions and actions.

Responsibility

We accept our responsibilities and the consequences of our actions.

Canada

Opening Remarks

Louise Fréchette

Vice-Admiral Larry Murray

Opening Remarks

1. Louise Fréchette

Ms. Fréchette is Deputy Minister of National Defence. She holds a B.A. from Collège Basile-Moreau (1966) and a Licence-ès-Lettres (History) from the Université de Montréal (1970). Ms. Fréchette has served in a variety of foreign service positions, including Ambassador to Argentina and Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York.

It is a great pleasure for me today to take part in the opening of this first conference on ethics within DND. It is gratifying to see how many of you have come and that all of the components of the Defence Team — civilians and military personnel, headquarters and commands — have responded to General Penney's invitation.

Our concern about questions of ethics is not new, because they are at the very heart of the two institutions that work side by side within the Department of National Defence. Here I am speaking of the Canadian Forces on one hand, and the Public Service on the other.

Admiral Murray will devote most of his remarks to military ethics and values. I, on the other hand, would like to deal with the question from the standpoint of the Public Service, an institution that also defines itself in terms of values and ethical standards that are solidly rooted in its history and in that of our country. This country that we serve is a democratic, bilingual and multicultural country which respects the equality of its citizens and is concerned about their rights and well-being. The public service model that we have adopted, the practices that we have developed, the code of ethics that binds us are grounded in these basic values of Canadian society.

Let me take a few minutes to elaborate a little more on the fundamental values that define the Public Service of Canada.

First, I would mention the concepts of *neutrality* and *professionalism*. It is the legitimate role of elected officials, in a democratic society, to define the public interest and to act accordingly. Citizens will in turn signify their agreement or disagreement through their constant interaction with governments, especially at election time.

The duty of the Public Service is to serve and support loyally the democratically-elected government of the country, regardless of the political party in office. As public servants, we have the duty to give the government complete and truthful information, high quality analysis and our very best advice, even when the advice is not popular or welcome. But once decisions are taken, it is also our duty as public servants to carry them out faithfully.

Many countries have adopted a different model for their public service, one where important segments of their public officials share the political affiliation of the government of the day and often leave office when a government loses power. These officials tend to be actively engaged in the political debate and

can play an advocacy role which is incompatible with the neutral, professional character of the Canadian public service.

A second key concept is that of *loyalty*. Our loyalty as public servants is to the public interest or the public good as defined by the constitution, the laws and the decisions of the democratically elected governments. Loyalty to the public interest means that the interests of those we serve, our fellow citizens, necessarily come before our private interests or the interests of the public service itself. This loyalty is reciprocated by a commitment to fair and equitable treatment of members of the public service.

Needless to say, *integrity* is a fundamental value of Canada's Public Service. I do not know of any company that does not attach importance to the integrity of its employees. However, the issues in the Public Service differ from those in the private sector.

When an employee of a private firm commits an act of theft or fraud, his or her personal reputation is called into question. When a government employee commits the same offence, the entire institution suffers as a result because the confidence of the public is shaken.

For the same reason, the Public Service must act *impartially* and *equitably* and reflect, in its own behaviour, the values of the society whose mission it is to serve. A public service that tolerated favouritism, discrimination, and the pursuit of personal gain would rightly incur the wrath of the law-abiding citizens who contribute part of their hard-earned money in the interest of the community. And in this area, perceptions are often as important as reality.

The many rules and regulations which dictate how we carry out our duties in the public service are designed to serve two essential purposes: to ensure that the rights of citizens are respected fully, fairly and equitably and to protect the reputation of the institution and the legitimacy of its actions. To quote from a study on public service, values and ethics currently in preparation:

> Because they are responsible for public funds and because equitable respect for the rights of citizens is in question, public organizations must accept a range of controls, rules, procedures, formalities and guarantees greater than that which is required for private organizations in order to demonstrate that no element of favouritism or partiality enter into the judgement but only the requirements of the public interest.

This is not to say that rules are immutable and fixed for all times. Indeed, rules that are not regularly revisited can unwittingly become a *"carcan"* (straightjacket) that impedes the realization of worthwhile objectives and priorities. Furthermore, rules and regulations will never totally answer the complex variety of ethical issues that we face all the time in our work. The choices that we have to make are rarely between simple right and wrong — these are the easiest choices to make. More often than not, we have to balance a number of competing concerns.

In recent years, we have embarked in DND and throughout the Public Service on a vast effort of renewal. The emphasis is shifting from process to results, from control to empowerment and delegation, from risk avoidance to risk management. We are exploring new

kinds of partnership with the private sector. Public servants will have to determine how they can remain faithful to their values in the new work environment that is starting to take shape. In such an environment, public servants must be able to rely on more than a simple statement of minimum standards of behaviour. They must be guided by a common understanding of and commitment to a clear set of values and ethical principles which will help them decide on the proper course of action.

The Defence Ethics Program and the *Statement of Defence Ethics*, which we are unveiling today, are both intended as tools to help members of the defence team develop this understanding.

The *Statement*, which was elaborated by a representative group of employees from all parts of National Defence, must be a living document. It must be adapted to the specific realities that each component of the system faces and must respect the distinct heritage that each of the two institutions — the military and the public service — bring to the accomplishment to the missions we have been given.

This conference provides a unique opportunity to explore the concepts contained in the *Statement of Defence Ethics* and their application in specific situations. May you participate in many stimulating and animated discussions.

2. Vice-Admiral Larry Murray

Vice-Admiral Murray is Acting Chief of the Defence Staff at National Defence Headquarters. A graduate of Carleton University, he joined the Royal Canadian Navy as an officer cadet in 1964, and took part in the successful rescue of the Panamanian freighter Ho Ming Number 5 *off Newfoundland in 1983. Vice-Admiral Murray was appointed Commander Maritime Command in July 1994 and Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in July 1995.*

Introduction

I'm very pleased and honoured to be participating in the *Conference on Ethics in Canadian Defence.*

As everyone in this room is aware, the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence are experiencing a period of profound and dramatic change. We are responding to a variety of domestic and international pressures by doing things differently and more efficiently.

As part of this renewal effort, I believe that we also need to reaffirm some of our traditional strengths and to build upon them. The values and ethics that have been and are fundamental to the Forces and DND are an excellent example of this. More than ever, we need to rely on long held values to deal with change. More than ever, we also need to meet the highest ethical standards. The vast majority of us have done so in the past, and we must continue to do so in the future. The support of the Canadian people depends upon it, and so does the successful accomplishment of our important mission.

The Military Ethic

The mission of the Canadian Forces is to defend Canada and Canadian interests at home and abroad and to help to establish a climate of peace and security in the world. This is a weighty responsibility, and it can be entrusted only to a professional organization that serves society unconditionally.

In these circumstances, military personnel must adhere to a very strict ethic and code of values. This code is indispensable — I stress this — and it is just as important as any piece of equipment.

Of course, the military ethic reflects the values of Canadian society in general. We must not only defend the values that Canadians hold dear, we must also embrace them. This assumes particular importance given the fact that society's values are constantly changing. We, too, must keep pace with these changes. The Canadian public expects and deserves no less.

We must, however, place these common values in a context that is directly related to the professional performance of our tasks, which are often demanding. I would now like to say a few words about the fundamental values of our organization. They are summed up very well in the *Statement of Defence Ethics*, which has been prepared by representatives of the commanders of the commands and the group principals at NDHQ. I am talking specifically about loyalty, honesty, courage, diligence, fairness and responsibility.

Loyalty is central to the military ethic. I am thinking not just about loyalty to Canada but to all members of the Canadian Forces — and, under the wider defence team — our superiors, our subordinates and our peers. Loyalty embraces the traditional military concept of "service before self" — in other words, placing the mission and the team above personal interest.

It is this type of loyalty that allowed Warrant Officer William Johnson to work his way through an uncleared minefield in Croatia in 1993 to rescue a wounded soldier. In darkness, driving rain and strong winds, Warrant Officer Johnson cut trip wires to mines and cleared a path to the injured man. At one point, he and his comrades also came under fire. Yet they completed their mission, at great risk to their own lives.

Honesty is another critical component of the military ethic. It encompasses personal honour and integrity. We must respect the trust placed in us by the Canadian people and value truth and candour.

This is no easy task in a world that is becoming ever-more complex and challenging. As part of our current renewal process, we are creating a more flexible defence organization that delegates greater authority, increases responsibility and grants more freedom in decision-making. With more and more people having to make increasingly difficult and complex decisions, it is inevitable that honest mistakes will be made.

It is therefore extremely important that our personnel have the tools to meet this challenge and make sound, ethical judgements. Conferences like this one should help in providing the necessary skills and training.

Courage is a military value with which every Forces member can identify. Danger and risk are inherent features of military service, and we each must face them with determination and strength of character. It was courage that allowed Master Seaman Montgomery Penney to ignore intense artillery fire in Sarajevo in 1992, in order to drag three wounded people to safety and then attend to their wounds.

And it was courage that allowed Master Corporal Robert Fisher to be repeatedly lowered from *HMCS Calgary*'s Sea King helicopter to the deck of a sinking cargo vessel in the stormy North Atlantic last December. Each time he was lowered the wind threatened to smash him against the heaving ship's hull but, undeterred, he plucked off her entire crew of 30, one at a time.

But let me stress that physical courage goes hand in hand with moral courage and also discretion. For example, we must all firmly believe in the legitimacy of command and be obedient to superiors. However, it is also our individual and collective duty and responsibility to question or challenge policies, plans and practices that are legally, ethically or professionally flawed. Indeed, during this period of turbulent change and diminishing resources, it is essential that we do so if we are to come up with the best solutions.

Diligence is essential to the military ethic. We must perform our tasks with competence, dedication and perseverance, and strive for excellence. Canadian Forces personnel serving in Haiti have provided a shining example of dedication. They have gone well beyond the call of duty, devoting their spare time to building schools and hospitals and caring for the sick. Their efforts are making a real difference to the Haitian people.

And let's not forget the people here at Headquarters, or those serving in other headquarters or bases, who have diligently performed their duties over the past few years under intense and unremitting pressure. They may not be risking their lives on a daily basis, but in the face of difficult challenges they are ensuring that our defence organization continues to function efficiently. Their dedication and professionalism have continued to impress me in the course of my day to day activities. Indeed, and to be honest, the diligence and resilience of the folks — both military and civilian, at all levels — with whom it has been my privilege to work for the past few very demanding years, have kept me going personally, and generally, with a smile on my face.

Fairness is another military value that is essential to the success of our mission. We must show fairness not only towards the members of our organization and in our dealings with the public, but also in our missions abroad. I am thinking in particular of our peacekeepers, who must treat rival factions with respect and impartiality.

So far, I have talked about the military ethic to the extent that it applies to all members of the Canadian Forces. Needless to say, commanders at all levels must impart this ethic through their words and deeds. As one rises in rank, however, the burden of the ethic becomes heavier, encompassing other concepts closely associated with it, such as responsibility, accountability and liability.

Responsibility includes many of the concepts that I have already discussed. But military leaders must also be responsible to the government and the Canadian public.

Accountability is the sister of responsibility. Each of us must face the consequences of our conduct and actions. We must be able to look each other in the eye and account for our decisions. We must also be aware that our performance will be measured by our peers and those we serve. Accountability is a two-way street: it has to operate both up and down the chain of command if it is to work. But let me emphasize that accountability is not about blind or arbitrary punishment. Rather, it is part of a process by which we learn to perform our mission better.

Liability relates directly to breaches of duty and negligent conduct. When a member of the Canadian Forces falls short in the performance of a duty, it affects us all. We must therefore work together to ensure that such conduct doesn't happen again.

As I mentioned earlier, we are delegating more authority and encouraging better risk-management in our defence organization. Under these circumstances, good people will occasionally make honest mistakes, and we must be careful not to overreact to honest errors in judgement. Rather we must simply learn from them. At the same time, we cannot tolerate blatantly dishonest conduct. People who knowingly break the rules must and will suffer the consequences.

Pride and the Canadian Forces

The military values that I have discussed today must be part and parcel of the personal and professional attributes of every member of the Canadian Forces.

In my view, one of the most important effects of the military ethic is that it breeds professional pride. After all, you can take pride in your performance and your role in the Canadian Forces only if you are first convinced that you are acting ethically — in other words, that you are doing the right thing. Ethics and professional pride are inseparable.

Pride is, moreover, essential to the success of our mission. Without it, we lose faith and confidence in ourselves, in our organization and in its leadership. That is why it is so important that we continue to strengthen military values and traditions. To do this, we must draw our inspiration from our past — from the feats performed at Vimy Ridge, at Passchendaele, during the Battle of the Atlantic and in the Battle of Britain. But we can also draw inspiration from the present juncture.

Because let's not forget that we are doing fine work today — whether it is helping restore peace and democracy in countries like Haiti and Bosnia, or saving Canadian lives in search and rescue operations in the remote woods of northern Ontario or the Saguenay region of Quebec. The Canadian Forces are recognized worldwide for their leadership, professionalism and expertise. Indeed, retired American General Colin Powell has referred to us as "one of the finest armed forces on the face of the earth."

In the end, we must go back to what the Canadian Forces are all about. We are being asked to serve our country, to risk our lives to protect Canadians and their values. We are members of a highly professional organization that is performing an essential service for all Canadians. We should all wear the uniform of the Canadian Forces with a sense of pride and commitment.

Conclusion

We also need to remember that Canada's defence organization is made up of more than just the Canadian Forces. We are part of an exceptional Defence Team that includes both military and civilian members. And as the Deputy Minister has just mentioned, members of the Public Service bring to their jobs at DND skills and values that complement those of the military. All the values covered in the *Statement of Defence Ethics* — loyalty, honesty, courage, diligence, fairness, responsibility — apply equally to our civilian colleagues and are evident throughout this fine organization.

I know that the vast majority of people in this room perform their duties to the highest ethical standard.

I also know that the vast majority of you take enormous pride in that fact.

But we can all do better. We must work together to ensure that every member of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence understands the principles set out in the *Statement of Defence Ethics*, and takes pride in living them on a daily basis.

This week's conference is an opportunity for us to reflect on, reaffirm and reinvigorate ourselves in this vital area of our profession. We have an abundance of knowledge and experience in this room. Let's take advantage of it.

The Burden of Office, Ethics and Connoisseurship

Gilles Paquet

The Burden of Office, Ethics and Connoisseurship

Gilles Paquet

Professor Gilles Paquet is Professor of Economics and Public Management at the University of Ottawa and Senior Research Fellow at the Canadian Centre for Management Development. He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and a Member of the Order of Canada. Professor Paquet is the author or co-author of over 200 papers on economics, public policy, management, and Canadian society.

Introduction

The notions of *accountability* and *ethics* are poorly understood, and the inadequacy of existing frameworks for analyzing them may be regarded as responsible for much of our inability to contribute to more effective institutions of public policy (Uhr 1992; Dubnick 1996). While both terms are used freely by public administrators, academics and ordinary citizens, they are often misused or inappropriately used.

Many have denounced this intellectual fuzziness and the misuse of these concepts by legal, political, managerial and moral official authorities, claiming that their misuse is no less damaging than if the Bank of Canada were to issue counterfeited currency. At a time when there are so many public outcries that our society has lost its moral anchor, it has been claimed that the carelessness in the use of these words has become even more costly. This explains the quest for precise rules, standards, and norms capable of serving as precise benchmarks in establishing precisely in each circumstance what ethical behavior is and what accountability means exactly. We will try to show that this is a futile quest.

This does not mean that one cannot ground these concepts somewhat better in a reality capable of illuminating them. Indeed, that is precisely our objective in this paper. We would like to argue that accountability and ethics are fundamentally contentious because of the fact that the notion of the burden of office, on which they are built, is an *essentially contested concept*.

We begin by explaining what we mean by an essentially contested concept. Then we show how, once the notion of burden of office has evolved, the related concept of accountability and the notion of ethical conduct have had to evolve accordingly. Indeed, the complexification of the notion of burden of office has necessarily translated into a much fuzzier notion of ethical behavior, *and* into more uncertain performance gauges and less reliable means of assessing the nature of what might be regarded as acceptable justifications. We then speculate on the road to be travelled if a workable level of accountability and ethics is to prevail, and on the centrality of deliberation and ethos in developing this connoisseurship. Finally, we question the reductionist urge of certain officials, and their tendency to focus on individual blamability rather than on insufficient connoisseurship.

We suggest that this bias may be responsible for the poor performance of many judicial commissions of inquiry. In conclusion, we suggest that there is a danger that the current debates on accountability and ethics may be focusing on scapegoating instead of learning from our failures.

The Burden of Office as an Essentially Contested Concept

In a democracy, each citizen is an official, a person with duties and obligations. He has ruling work to do: he is not simply a consumer of governance, but a producer of governance. Indeed, it is only because citizens *qua* citizens have duties and obligations that they are entitled to civil rights that ensure that they are fully equipped with the power to meet their obligations. But there is not much meaningful debate about the nature of this burden of office, and when there is, agreement does not necessarily ensue (Tussman 1989).

The same fuzziness holds for more 'important' officials (i.e., those holding higher office — be they prime minister, chief of defence staff, etc.): they are persons with higher obligations and duties that are often rather ill-defined in our complex world. This vagueness is unfortunately unavoidable. It is a consequence of the fact that the concept of burden of office is socially-based: it is based on "a shared set of expectations and a common currency of justifications" (Day and Klein 1987:5) that are quite difficult to define consensually.

We underline this state of affairs when we say that the burden of office is an essentially contested concept.

W.B. Gallie has identified a whole range of concepts as essentially contested, i.e., concepts "the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of the users" (Gallie 1964:158). He has identified five conditions for a concept to be essentially contested. It must be (1) appraisive in the sense that it accredits some kind of valued achievement; (2) this achievement must be complex in character and its worth attributed to the achievement as a whole, but (3) variously describable in its parts with the possibility of various components being assigned more or less importance, and (4) open in character to the extent that it admits considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances; moreover, to qualify as an essentially contested concept, (5) each party must recognize that its own use of the concept is contested by other parties (Gallie 1964:161).

A good example of such a concept may be "championship" in a sport like figure skating, for instance, which can be judged in a number of different ways, with differential attention being paid to method, strategy, style, etc.

Our argument is that the notion of burden of office (like the concepts of democracy and social justice (Gallie 1964:178-182)) is an essentially contested concept, and that it is quite impossible to find a general principle to determine which party is using the concept best.

If the burden of office is an essentially contested concept, the notions of accountability and ethics are in some way infected. The fuzziness of the former concept projects some haziness in the definition of the latter two.

Accountability refers to the requirement to "answer for the discharge of a duty or for conduct." This presupposes an agreement on (1) what constitutes an acceptable performance and (2) what constitutes an acceptable language of justification for the actors in defending their conduct (Day and Klein 1987). But since in the complex world in which we now live officials are confronted with (a) many interfaces with different stakeholders with different claims to authority (hierarchical superior, professional colleagues, clients, etc.), (b) many types of accounts demanded (political, managerial, legal, professional, etc.), and (c) much complexity, heterogeneity, and uncertainty in the circumstances surrounding the activities for which one is accountable, the very complexity of the burden of office results in much fuzziness in the definition of accountability.

Ethics is a form of goodness-of-fit that evolves in and from reflection in action, deliberation or "argumentation — among particular people, in specific situations, dealing with concrete things, with different things at stake" (Toulmin 1988). Judgment is embodied in action. A *reflective conversation with the situation* resolves moral issues in the same manner as it resolves the problem faced by an industrial designer: in both cases, the challenge is to find a form that fits the circumstances given the constraints. When a designer interacts with a situation, this interactive process triggers the generation of a goodness-of-fit between two intangibles — a form that has not yet been designed, and a context that cannot be properly and fully described because it is still evolving (Alexander 1964; Cloutier and Paquet 1988; Paquet 1991, 1996). The notion of ethical fitness calls for the same fit between the standards defined by the burden of office and those that take into account the circumstances. And again, the essentially contested nature of the notion of burden of office makes it impossible for ethical conduct to escape a degree of fuzziness.

Dealing with Incommensurables

The fact that the notion of burden of office is essentially contested will not prevent contestants from claiming that their use of the concept is "the only one that can command honest and informed approval." Consequently, there will be different views about accountability and ethical behaviour. This is not without danger, for, as the essential contestedness of the concept transpires, there is always a *real danger* that those in authority may grow impatient with trying to persuade and be led to "a ruthless decision to cut the cackle, to damn the heretics and to exterminate the unwanted" (Gallie 1964:189). Then the conversation and the deliberation are interrupted, and democracy is in danger.

But even when the conversation does not stop, there is a tendency to search for ways to simplify the notion of burden of office in order to ensure well-behaved tradeoffs among the different interfaces with stakeholders. In fact, the burden of an official in a many-dimensional world of hierarchical superior, professional colleagues, clients, etc. amounts to choices among incommensurables. The search for simple rules can only result in formulas that claim to reduce incommensurables to commensurability. For that reason, it is hardly surprising that this approach fails.

A. Defining accountability in a single direction, or with reference to only one stakeholder, or without taking account of the context, is

extremely dangerous. It would amount to assuming that only one dimension is of consequence, and presuming that all other forms of accountabilities can be regarded as irrelevant or secondary in some sense. The famous 1919 case between the Dodge Brothers and Ford is a case in point. At the time, the court chastised Ford's corporate board for not paying exclusive attention to the interests of the shareholders in their decisions. This considerably limited their burden of office. This situation has evolved over the last 80 years, and the burden of office of corporate directors has now changed and become much more complex. As it stands now, a few dozen U.S. states have on their books legislation which clearly establishes that corporate boards *may* take into account other stakeholders' interests (de la Mothe and Paquet 1996).

Even though the burden of office of corporate directors has been prudently extended, the notion of accountability is still not widely regarded as a 360-degree process, i.e., as pertaining to all the stakeholders surrounding the official. And yet focusing on a single dimension is likely to be fundamentally contested. So, the only way to get an agreement about what constitutes *acceptable performance* and *acceptable justification* is through deliberation, and not through the unilateral imposition of one set of views.

B. The same may be said about ethics. Ethics is by definition "agonistic ethics" — from the Greek word AGON meaning competition, rivalry, conflict of characters in tragic dramas (Gray 1995:1). One must make moral sense in the presence of conflictive and incommensurable alternatives.

Consequently, moral reasoning cannot proceed on the basis of the comfort of universal ethical rules or codes. Indeed, it cannot rely on any simplistic theory that purports to provide answers to ethical dilemmas by pretending to gauge incommensurable situations with a single measuring stick. Non-trivial ethical issues involve rivalrous goods and evils and dilemmas that are insoluble, undecidable by rational reflection. The rationalistic normative theories (utilitarianism, contractarianism, rights-based principles, etc.) are futile, because they wrongly deny the existence of unresolvable conflicts, and because they are swayed by simplistic universalism (i.e. the belief that universal rules are discoverable that would arbitrate all moral dilemmas) (Clarke and Simpson 1989).

In the name of utilitarianism, one falls into a total disrespect for the individual; rights-based approaches condone the most awesome inequities; as for the Rawlsian contractarian approach, it is silent as to the nature of the redistribution required to ensure a satisfactory allocation of the so-called 'primary' goods. Consequently, there are no clearly acceptable criteria for action that can be derived from these general principles because they are all too completely disconnected from a full appreciation of context and are therefore of no practical use (Paquet 1994, 1996).

Insistence on only one dimension of the burden of office or of the accountability framework (legal, organizational, professional or political) or a lack of prudence in balancing the moral push (to live up to one's values) and the moral pull (the need to respect the values of the other various stakeholders) can only lead to abusive, dangerous and truncated notions

of burden of office, accountability and ethics (Dubnick 1996). There is no easy way out: there must be discussion, dialogue and deliberation leading to social learning, and to an always imperfect and incomplete reconciliation of these different dimensions.

C. Value-relativism is often presented as the only alternative to universal principles: it is the world of "anything goes." To most people, this appears rather abhorrent. That is the reason why *pluralism that is regarded as a sort of halfway house* has acquired such a good press (Kekes 1993). Pluralism is first and foremost *against monism*. Pluralists reject the view that there is only one system of values leading to the good life. They must, however, agree to find *some grounds* to impose *reasonable limits* on what is acceptable, *and* some justification for imposing these limits on the possibilities that individuals may pursue. While relativists do not believe that any such limits can have an objective basis, pluralists do. But how can this be done?

It can only materialize through social learning, i.e., through the erratic process of bouncing off the limits of tacit conventions and of making the highest and best use of scandals, for scandals are events pointing to unacceptable situations or behaviors (Paquet 1994). This is not a process likely to yield a high degree of marksmanship. But it is only through an oblique process of this sort that the limits of the unacceptable are defined, that jurisprudence slowly redefines the boundaries beyond which the convention in good currency does not hold. In the same way, scandals act as *révélateurs* to signal that certain limits have been transgressed, but there is some randomness in the scandal-generating process. Learning is recognizing the difference between what is expected and what happens, and embracing this error as a way to evaluate and adjust action (Michael 1993).

But this learning can only occur under some conditions: (1) if the conversation with the situation is conducted within a context where the ethos is sufficiently rich and supportive (i.e., the sum of characteristic usages, ideas and codes by which a group is differentiated is strong enough to make up a robust appreciative system), and (2) if the conversation, deliberation, and accumulation of judgments is conducted with tact and civility with a capacity to span boundaries and to synthesize multiple logics. Without a supportive "communitarian" fabric and a fruitful and open conversation, it is difficult to see how learning can occur effectively, and how a somewhat objective basis can be arrived at that might define the reasonable limits pluralists need to agree on (Kingwell 1995; Paquet and Pigeon 1995).

Moral Reasoning and Intermediate Cases

We are then confronted with two very different accounts of ethics and morality: *the one* that seeks "eternal, invariable principles, the practical applications of which can be free of exceptions and qualifications," and *the other*, "which pays closest attention to the specific details of particular moral cases and circumstances" (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988:2). The first is an *absolutist version* that oversimplifies the discussion of moral issues: the dogmatism of codes and rules does not allow any middle way between absolutism and relativism. But the *pluralist version* is not without generating major challenges also: it relies on human

perceptiveness, appreciation and discernment; it does not prohibit rules, but it condemns them to a limited and conditional role in moral reasoning. This pluralist stand has been under attack by those who, from Pascal on, have labelled it casuistry or case ethics, and denounced any moral reasoning based on 'cases' or 'circumstances' as "an invitation to excuse the inexcusable" (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988:11).

Indeed, the pluralist position tries to avoid both absolutism and total value relativism by a rehabilitation of casuistry as the practical resolution of particular moral perplexities. It cannot ensure, however, that the conversation with the situation carried out by the citizens and other officials in the forum, and the bearing of the burden of office working itself through in the context of habits, patterns and institutions (making up the appreciative system and the ethos) will necessarily lead to effective social learning. But double-looped learning (i.e., not only a learning of better means to reach given objectives but also a learning of new goals, values and objectives as circumstances change) is possible (Argyris and Schon 1974; Paquet 1991).

Ensuring that the conversation is conducted in a manner likely to foster social learning requires a process of adaptation of values, and an improvement of the "goodness-of-fit" between values and context. In order for the social system to adapt (i.e., to learn) as much and as fast as possible, some basic conditions must be realized. Some pertain to process, some to new competences, and others have to do with the robustness of the supportive moral contracts in the ethos.

A. In terms of process, Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) may provide some cues. For Wittgentein, understanding emerges from dialogue: it is mutual understanding. It materializes through looking at a multiplicity of cases, describing examples, drawing analogies, and "drawing attention to the *intermediate cases* so that one can pass easily from familiar cases to the unfamiliar and see the relation between them" (Tally 1995:108).

Tally notes that this practical form of reasoning is akin to the reasoning in individual cases in common law. This common-law view is typical of the Renaissance humanist culture. It is a commitment to listening to the other side, to accepting that the only way to develop reason as a practical skill is to compare and contrast, to exchange and negotiate alternative descriptions.

The sort of learning generated by dialogue does not necessarily congeal in formalized conclusions. It remains very much *tacit knowledge*, a capacity to deal effectively with matters of practice, and to deal with such matters in a timely manner and with a full appreciation of the local and particular context. Such accumulated tacit knowledge is predicated on the fact that through experience we learn much, and that at any time we know more than we can tell (Polanyi 1966). This is the way knowledge evolves in common law: case by case, and often in a tacit way.

Connoisseurship, like skill, is communicated by experience and examples, not by precepts. One cannot develop an appreciation of human physionomies except through a long course of experience. It is much like the way we acquire

the skill of a wine-taster, or the capacity to swim or to ride a bicycle (Polanyi 1958:54). There is no spontaneous emergence of connoisseurship. It emerges from the jointness of some basic capability and from a very extensive external exposure to a large number of intermediate cases. Through the assimilation of evidence, the individual's diagnostic capability grows. Connoisseurship becomes a form of accumulated practical knowledge capable of being translated into actions and choices in particular circumstances. The specific experience is the essence of connoisseurship, but its meaning and importance can only be determined by relating and comparing within a field of knowledge (Freedberg 1989).

B. *Connoisseurship* cannot be acquired through the application of simple explicit rules. It is a *tacit savoir-être* and becomes part of the fabric of the trainee. It generates instinctively a responsible decision in the face of complex and uncertain circumstances.

Learning values is like learning how to swim: it is done by eliminating misfits, by correcting errors, by continuous re-alignment to ensure goodness-of-fit between elusive standards and circumstances. But there can be no learning unless one recognizes and embraces error as a fundamental building block in social learning, as a crucial way to fuel fruitful deliberations. This is true as much for the citizen or the "simple soldat" as it is for military leaders.

The new competencies in such learning systems will develop, however, only under certain conditions. There must be: (1) an acknowledgment of the high level of uncertainty as completely irreducible; (2) an explicit will to embrace error as the difference between what is expected and what happens, for this is a condition of learning; and (3) a willingness to span boundaries across perspectives (Michael 1993).

C. A robust underlying ethos is also very important for effective social learning. It is embodied in a number of more or less explicit moral contracts linking the different stakeholders. One may underline for instance, as an example of such contracts, the two moral contracts (I) between the citizenry and the bureaucracy, and (II) between the bureaucrats and their leaders (Paquet 1991). What we mean by a robust ethos is a 'contextualist' one in which there are vibrant multiplexed relations of mutual interdependence and caretaking, a contextual fabric rich in networking and in social capital (Putnam 1995). The more trust and esprit de corps, the more effective the social learning.

But we know from experience that sometimes faster learning is a matter of survival. Our immune system is bombarded constantly by new viruses and it must learn and adapt fast if we are to survive. At times, there is even the possibility that our immune system may not learn fast enough, so it becomes necessary to use a vaccine, a lever to help it learn faster about the best way to fight a disease. The same can be said about any social system. And leadership is the lever in this case.

If the conversation is to be carried on truthfully, the leader must earn the trust of his followers by persuading them that he has their needs and aspirations at heart. The leader's ability to lead and to foster effective social learning is a byproduct of the trust he has earned by serving his followers as well as the capacity of the existing ethos to help generate such trust (O'Toole 1995; Paquet 1996).

For political leaders, the dual moral responsibility to both the citizenry and to their followers is quite daunting. For military leaders, because of the fact that there is always a potential life-and-death dimension to their decisions, the stakes are even higher than for politicians. They must manage high-stake *moral contracts*: (1) the citizenry must grant some latitude in the use of violence by armed personnel *against* a guarantee of higher moral standards by the armed personnel than what is expected from the ordinary citizen; (2) armed personnel must give a commitment to selflessness in the face of difficult circumstances *in exchange for* a guarantee of the appropriate level of financial, material and symbolic resources necessary to ensure that minimal casualty will ensue.

If these moral contracts between citizens and armed forces, and between leaders and followers, are explained, they may prove less difficult to implement than is generally perceived. For, as Akerlof suggests, there may be advantages for a well-identified group like the armed forces in instilling in its members certain moral values and certain virtues — that limit the pursuit of individual personal interests, but that improve significantly the probability of promotion within the ranks (Akerlof 1984). To the extent that this is the case, one may see how the two moral contracts (between the military and the citizenry, and between the leaders and the followers within the military) are integrally interconnected: the military offering to the citizenry a mixture of commitment to virtuous behavior as a *quid pro quo* for the civilian support of the military, *and* the military leaders offering their followers progress through the ranks on the basis of those very virtues that are important to the citizens (Ricks 1996).

Connoisseurship, Social Learning and Blamability

To foster a stronger ethical fabric, a three-pronged strategy is necessary: education, deliberation, social capitalization. Anything that provides greater moral connoisseurship and ethical sensitivity, *or* fosters a wider use of the moral reasoning and a more open deliberation process in the forum, *or* strengthens the ethos by endowing it with denser relations and a higher degree of trust — promote a more effective social learning and therefore the likelihood of a more robust ethic. Anything that generates blockages in these three directions can only slow down social and moral learning.

There are important impediments and stumbling blocks on these three roads. They may vary in form and intensity from time to time and place to place. However, one major distortion deserves special attention. It is the sort of "judicial usurpation of politics" that has distorted the whole social learning process and the fluid common-law-type emergence of an effective evolving ethic. This distortion is caused by the myopic search for blamability that has become the trademark of the judiciary.

Politics is free persons deliberating the question of how we ought to order our life together. When questions that are properly political are unduly narrowed, legalized or "speciously constitutionalized," the conversation is truncated, distorted and social learning falters (First Things 1996). It is an even more dramatic distortion when morality is declared "legally suspect and a threat to the public order," and when political deliberative institutions are undermined by the arrogance of those who insist on redefining judicially the political questions.

The main reason why judicial commissions of inquiry headed or fueled by the legal perspective have proved quite unsatisfactory has to do with the tendency of such bodies to be mesmerized by experts in the business of interrogating and punishing. Those persons are neither trained to analyze nor really prepared to handle issues of malfunctioning institutions or flawed administrative systems. As a result of their narrow legalistic perspective, the notions of burden of office, of accountability and ethics are redefined in a flawed and reductive way.

For them, error is not a source of learning, but rather a source of blame, and it demands punishment. Consequently, years after some of these commissions have been appointed, it is still unclear what was flawed in the system they are investigating. So the citizen cannot be sure that this flaw has been corrected. These commissions are in hot pursuit of culprits and persons to blame instead of trying to repair defective institutional architectures.

It is not sure that one can eliminate easily such a massive source of distortion in our political and administrative systems. Indeed, there are instances abroad where the judicial usurpation of politics has even progressed beyond anything we have experienced in Canada. But it would be unwise to develop a fixation on this sole blockage. There are other impediments to moral and social learning: a diminished role of moral connoisseurship in our education system, the presence of too many taboo topics that cannot be openly discussed, the social decapitalization denounced by Putnam, etc. However, this should not lead one to conclude that action to improve the moral fabric is not possible or condemned to be fruitless.

A. On the education front, the central concern is the explicit recognition that moral connoisseurship is not necessarily an innate quality. It must be learned by example as much as by training. It must also be reconciled with the rest of the value system defined by the ethos.

It is as unfair to demand moral connoisseurship from public servants or military personnel without the appropriate moral apprenticeship as it would be to ask one to fly an F-18 without training. Consequently, unless the public sector in general (and the armed forces in particular) begins to spend as much money as Toyota in selecting suitable recruits (be it at the enlisted soldier or at the student officer levels) and in allocating through their training period as much time to developing ethical sensitivity as it does to developing technical skills, it is unlikely that such connoisseurship will materialize.

B. On the deliberation front, the process of democratic participation in the production of governance has to be understood as a daunting task. When there is a problem of some magnitude revealed by scandals, it often cannot be easily understood and repaired quickly. In the case of a malaise in the armed forces, it may demand an overhauling of the corporate culture, a fundamental rethinking of recruitment practices, and nothing less than a sanitization of the 'traditional' way of life of the organization. Moreover, it may require no less than a full generation (some 15 years) to 'cleanse' the present ethos from its bacteria.

It is only too understandable that in the face of such a mammoth task, the tendency has been to turn one's attention to more tractable problems: for instance, blamability. There is a tendency when one is faced with a problem

that has no obvious solution to deny the very existence of the problem. This is the case in particular when acknowledging the problem may lead to one's having to admit that one does not know what to do. This explains why it becomes a *taboo problem* (Michael 1988).

C. On the social recapitalization front, the transformation of the context is bound to take time, and it is not clear what the contours of the new institutional fabric will be. Moral connoisseurship cannot simply be transplanted to the existing ethos: it can be fitted within it only by making major repairs to the ethos.

An ethos is a permanent construction site. It is evolving constantly, and represents a complex set of social armistices between geo-technical constraints and values and plans. A refurbished ethos may have to start with a few points being reiterated in the same manner as was done in the *Magna Carta*:

- *primum non nocere* as one of the few absolutes
- higher moral standards are required from the public servant than from the citizen
- a greater awareness of the basic moral contracts making up the ethos
- the essentially contested nature of the burden of office and the great limits it imposes on accountability and ethics consensus
- the fundamental importance of error-embracing and social learning
- the connoisseurship nature of moral reasoning
- the recognition that social and moral learning is bound to be a trial-and-error process.

All this is both extremely simple and yet extremely profound. It recognizes that any social recapitalization is bound to take much time and to require long and difficult deliberations. While it is quite easy to destroy institutions, it is quite difficult to construct an institutional order and often it requires both a major reframing of perspective and much effort to reconfigure the ethos, and even to neutralize or displace the present politics of denial that prevent any coordinated effort to mount a new construction site (Paquet 1995).

Conclusion

One of the most fundamental reasons why the problem of inappropriate moral connoisseurship has not been resolved is that leaders have been unwilling to acknowledge it as a problem. The denial syndrome emerged from the fact that the leaders have been regarding this issue as one they did not know how to cope with; so there was denial and the *real* problem remained a taboo topic. Consequently, scandals have been dealt with as aberrations, and bad apples have been removed (or regiments disbanded) as if such actions could deal with the issue. This was both futile and dangerous: futile because of the fact that the problem was simply occluded; dangerous, because the suppressed problem was ever present like a denied generalized cancer.

It is very difficult for civilians not especially well informed, except through the popular press, to understand how the apprenticeship of an Airborne regiment based on violence could not only lead to violence in a context requiring saintly tolerance, humanitarian

patience, and quiet diplomacy. Scapegoating the regiment, or some of its officers, without raising questions about the *ethos* of their training, and the *system of command* that led the military to assign a group so specialized in violence to such a delicate task, can only leave civilians puzzled. Disbanding the Airborne did not deal with the central issue; it allowed everyone to *avoid* dealing with it.

Conferences and papers about ethics may be necessary and useful, but are hardly sufficient to deal with the systemic problem at hand. They are at best a useful first step toward *admitting that there is a problem*.

It requires much courage to stop denying the problem when we have no solution. This is the sort of courage that has been witnessed recently in the military, but also in numerous other areas of the private, public and social domains.

Now that it has become possible to talk about these questions without being accused of treason, it is essential that the conversation not be derailed into trivial pursuits. The central questions are not the preparation of a compulsory three-hour course on ethics or the concoction of a code of ethics engraved on a plasticized card. The central concerns should focus on the burden of office of the different officials, and on the accountability and ethical frameworks that are required if officials are to perform their tasks in a manner that meets the expectations of the citizenry.

It may take 15 years of deliberation and the clarification of many moral contracts (between the citizenry and the military and between the military leaders and their followers, for instance) before the problem receives not a solution but a workable response. As David Nowlan remarked some thirty years ago, "puzzles have solutions, problems don't; problems have responses, and one man's response will inevitably give rise to another man's objection" (Nowlan 1968). No anodyne logic will do.

But 15 years is only a shade more than 5000 days. This is the time frame that the United States have accepted as the realistic time it would take to transform the ethos of their military establishment. And there are reasons to believe that this approach has proved effective (Ricks 1996).

Whether or not such a far-sighted approach can be adopted by Canadian officials remains to be seen. But, from time to time, these days, one senses that there is a growing awareness that the problem is unlikely to go away and that the process likely to be successful in resolving it is unlikely to be of the band-aid variety.

That is why I feel that I have a reason to hope — *not* to be optimistic but to *hope*.

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The Ethical Dimensions of Peace Operations

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I am honored as a practitioner and student of peace operations, to address such a respected group of experts and colleagues in this field. Canada, as a pioneer of peace-keeping doctrine and practice; and the US, which finds itself increasingly involved in peace operations since the end of the Cold War, have a mutual interest in exploring the ethical dimensions of military interventions across the spectrum of peace operations.

In this post-Cold War world, characterized by a proliferation of ethnic struggle, disintegration of states, manmade and natural disasters, and the prevalence of the international media to record it all (itself a post-Cold War phenomena) the combination of pressures to do something to respond to the horrors of genocide and ethnic cleansing, waves of refugees, and starving masses is unrelenting. Under international law, the ethical principles which guide response to these situations are themselves somewhat contradictory — protection of sovereignty versus international responsibility and right to intervene.

Even the United Nations Charter encompasses these inherently different views of intervention, thus further clouding the legal and ethical bases for the response to many of the conflicting challenges to peace, stability, and humanitarian cooperation. Chapter One of the UN Charter reaffirms the sovereignty of states and joins the principle of nonintervention to the concept of domestic jurisdiction with the burden of proof on the un to show cause to intervene. On the other hand, the tendency to focus on support to individual rights is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in Chapter 7 of the Charter which authorizes intervention to maintain or restore international peace and security (which can be applied to violations of human rights with effect surrounding nations as with the Kurds in northern Iraq).

With no truth system of international triage to guide response to many of the world's crises, an ethical framework for intervention is being forged by concerned nations to sort out the issues involved in contemplated interventions. This process, however, has included an increasing tension between the normative principle of nonintervention associated with sovereignty and the growing acceptance of the moral imperative to intervene to support

universal human rights. In practical terms, I believe ethical arguments concerning intervention must reconcile these two perspectives and, at the same time, be grounded in the realities of the complexity of the post-Cold War era.

Today I would like to share some personal thoughts on an ethic of intervention associated with peace operations and to address some of the general ethical issues faced once a just intervention has been undertaken. I believe a framework for ethical analysis of peace operations, analogous to just war concepts *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, is both possible and desirable for nations such as ours that aim to act on a high moral plane to stop conflict, alleviate suffering, and promote the rule of law.

An Ethic of Nonintervention

To borrow a concept from Father Brian Hehir, one of my professors at Harvard, the Westphalian presumption of nonintervention embedded in the concept of sovereignty, which is presently at the root of the international system, was necessary to manage anarchy in a system of sovereign states and could only be overridden within a narrowly defined contest — that of genocide. This norm does not now meet the needs of the post- Cold War era. The chaos of the present world, the erosion of practical sovereignty, the growing acceptance of a concept of universal human rights, and the expectations of today's international communities argue for the modification of this old norm of nonintervention.

This modification of the norm of nonintervention can be accomplished by increasing the number of recognized exceptions. In effect, this would blend the tradition of the post-Westphalian order with just war doctrine in order to address the tensions between the concept of sovereignty and the international community's obligation to support universal human rights. This new emphasis on universal human rights has already been reflected in the coalition humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq; the various Somali operations, involvement in Rwanda, and the multinational and UN operations in Haiti. The present Bosnia operation, as well as UNPROFOR before it, speaks to the wide array of legitimate factors in a "just" intervention.

This modified norm of nonintervention will have utility if it satisfies an ethical test by addressing:

- the *justness of the cause* to override the presumption of nonintervention. In addition to genocide, the international community has added ethnic cleansing, massive abuse/suffering, and refugees creating instability to neighboring states.

- these criteria can not be so broad as to invalidate the nonintervention norm, and they must be defined precisely enough to be of use under international law.

- the difficulty of gaining widespread agreement on the circumstances warranting an exception to the nonintervention norm is acknowledged — especially given the sensitivity of many developing nations to colonialism and intervention — but this must be negotiated for a modified norm to be effective.

- each potential participating state must then weigh national interests and the moral duty to assist when possible to do so.

- the *authorization* by competent authority (historically, the head of state, more recently the UN Security Council or regional organizations) to protect against abuse. A multinational intervention serves this purpose better than an unilateral one since it lessens the possible perception of a disguised intervention of a solitary state for its own benefit.

- the *exhaustion of other means* — while for peacekeeping the true consent of the belligerents for the intervention makes this nonapplicable, for other types of interventions the last resort test is appropriate.

- the requirement for the intervention to *adhere to the international law of war* — noncombatant immunity, proportionality, etc. for peacekeepers, their status under international law, the guidelines of the law of land warfare and the Geneva and Hague conventions, and especially rules of engagement (ROE) are important considerations.

- the prerequisite for the mission to have a reasonable expectation *to do more good than harm*, or at least meet the Hippocratic injunction to "above all, do no harm."

- the need for the intervention to have a *reasonable chance of success* — do the resources applied match the mandate and circumstances, is there a defined end state, and is there public support for the operation?

Compliance with certain aspects of this non-intervention norm would be easier to determine in cases of traditional peacekeeping in which the intervention takes place within the context of an invitation as an impartial third-party. But even in this instance, the consent initially given may be withdrawn, or the peacekeeping operation may evolve into a peace enforcement mission. The application of the norm becomes more difficult in peace enforcement actions and in certain cases of humanitarian aid in nonpermissive environments. These issues are further blurred when dealing with failed states in which the issue of sovereignty is at best tenuous.

Finally, once a peace operation is deemed ethical, one must also consider certain ethical issues in the actual conduct of the operation akin to *jus in bello* factors in combat operations.

Ethical Considerations During Peace Operations

Peace operations, like other military operations, have a general requirement for ethical conduct which ranges from the individual soldier's own ethical code to the ethical considerations inherent in issues of state. In addition, for peace operations, there are other considerations which shape the ethical climate.

With respect to general ethical requirements, both the Canadian and US forces adhere to the principle that the military that serves our democracies best is one that is principled, ethical, and under civilian control.

- as defined by the US, a professional army ethic is based on the oath of office and includes the values of *loyalty, duty, selfless service, integrity, courage, candor, competence and commitment.*

- the exercise of these values does entail daily stresses and challenges — sometimes

greater in peace operations than combat — and ethical challenges become more prevalent as one's seniority encompasses greater responsibility.

In addition to the persistent requirements of ethical conduct, military elements in peace operations need to be sensitive to other ethical considerations in their operational environment. These include:

- awareness of how *contact* with various indigenous groups may effect political and economic relationships in the host country.

- the requirement to be *impartial and fair* in dealings with all parties — some of who may not be too worthy of admiration.

- the *stress* of peace operations (where there may be a high degree of risk, but no definable enemy) and how stress may affect conduct.

- the unique *strain* of working under officers from other nations whose ethical standards may be different.

- honest involvement with the *press*; and the need to convey information while being sensitive to that part of a story which may not be able to be shared to protect sources or for operational security reasons.

- an awareness of the *different agendas* that may be operating among members of the peace operations community — political leaders, various military contingents, liaison officers, NGOs, contractors, the parties to the conflict, etc. These often less than subtle differences may entail ethical dilemmas as different groups advocate different actions for different reasons.

All of these unique aspects of peace operations place a larger than normal burden on military members and thus make more difficult the task of, at all times, conducting oneself in accordance with the highest ethical standards. We, both Canadians and Americans, know what happens when the standard in peace or war is not adhered to as a motivator of conduct as at My Lai in Vietnam.

I do believe then that countries as principled as our own can agree to an ethical framework for peace operations which identifies the proper circumstance of intervention, and does so in a manner which offers the best chance for ultimate success. This framework can combine the Westphalian norm of nonintervention in use since 1648 with a broader array of agreed-upon exceptions appropriate to the contemporary world to determine when and where to intervene, and then use our present standards of ethical conduct to ensure our good intent is properly fulfilled.

I thus applaud the organizers of this conference and all those in attendance for your willingness to explore the tough ethical issues so that we all can more faithfully ensure our actions comply with the ethical ideal. I find the most astounding thing about our democracies is not that we have occasional ethical lapses, but that we publicly face up to them and conscientiously impose corrective mandates for the future. It has been both an honor and a pleasure to speak to you today.

Ethical Dilemmas of Commanders on Operational Missions: Four Views

Major-General A.R. Forand
Major-General Guy Tousignant
Colonel Charles Lemieux
Colonel Don Matthews

Ethical Dilemmas of Commanders on Operational Missions: Four Views

1. Major-General A.R. Forand

Major-General Forand joined the CF in 1967, and has served in Cyprus, the Western Sahara, and Croatia. He has been awarded the Star of Courage and the Meritorious Service Cross. MGen Forand is currently commander of Land Forces Quebec Area.

My colleagues and I will each make a short presentation that will illustrate through a description of actual experiences, some of the ethical dilemmas with which we have been faced in our various missions. Before beginning these descriptions, I would like to establish a few points:

Soldiers have wrestled with the definition of ethics since time immemorial; yet, the precise meaning remains intangible and elusive. Ethics has been considered, debated, examined and theorized by generals, philosophers, scientists, mathematicians and, even NDHQ. DND has produced a *Statement of Defence Ethics* and this conference will further discuss the subject. One would hope that in trying to address this issue we will not create confusion and be counter-productive and muddy further the water. Specifically, and speaking from a military point of view, such a *Statement of Defence Ethics* should not be:

a. Annually amended to accommodate personalities;

b. Written in words unfamiliar to us;

c. So diluted and cumbersome that, in the course of trying to be all things to all people, they lose meaning and focus; and

d. So narrowly focused that several statements are needed to cover the various perspectives, thus causing the same loss of impact or a related diffusion of effort.

Another related question is: "Should the CF subscribe to a Department Code?" Public servants are not required to serve Canada before self, nor does their contract oblige them to do so. It seems to me that all statements below the departmental level should focus on soldiering and the efficient, effective administration which makes successful operations possible. Incorporating civilian employees into the effort is an important contributing, but subordinate, theme. Let's remember that a soldier is trained to kill. He can commit, in the course of duty, an intensely personal act, the memory of which may haunt him for the rest of his days. These days, not only the public, but also, of course, the soldier is now far more aware and far better educated than in the past. He tends to be more quizzical of authority. Consequently, whether he likes it or not (and he may not), he answers to a more acute and demanding conscience. Conscience could be described as a fallible moral judgement which, if acknowledged, produces action and which, if ignored, merely produces guilt.

I believe that once a soldier's conscience is aroused, it defines a line he dares not cross and deeds he does not commit, regardless of orders, because those very deeds would destroy something in him which he values more than life itself. However, the possibility of a clash between conscience and duty, through ignorance and misjudgement, is still very real. All the while, the soldier's actions are exposed to, and his principles questioned by society as never before. In many ways, the soldier is closer to that society than ever before, yet he is still very isolated.

A soldier will better accomplish his duties if his mind is at peace. A quiet, yet active conscience is most likely to be found where esprit is high, where a sustained effort is made to enlighten and educate the soldier, and where leadership by persuasion rules. The conflict between morality and necessity is eternal. But at the end of the day, the soldier's moral dilemma is only resolved if he remains true to himself.

Before depicting some ethical situations that arose in Croatia in August 1995, I would like to raise the following point, that is, the pressures to which the moral rules of traditional military ethics are subject in theatres of operations conducted under United Nations auspices.

- the missions assigned to United Nations forces often end in failure because they are unable, wherever they are involved, to restore a lasting peace. This gives rise to a feeling that actions are futile and the mission has not been accomplished; this in turn results in a decline in the code which makes a moral doctrine of military ethics: useful action and service to attain a constructive objective.

- the armies of the countries in conflict in which UN forces are committed do not abide by the rules of warfare, as the soldier trained under the western military ethic does.

- the Blue Helmet witnesses in such countries immoral acts of violence against civilians and combatants, perpetrated by belligerents for whom killing an enemy is not enough. To be victorious, human beings, both civilian and military, must be made to suffer, and corpses must be mutilated.

- how, under these conditions, having witnessed these scenes and the weakness of the reactions of the UN force and of public opinion, could our officers and NCOs still believe in the rules of warfare that nonetheless constitute one of the foundations of the military ethic?

- finally, the soldier/Blue Helmet is inevitably led to make concessions, necessitated or only suggested by the logic of the lax atmosphere of UN organizations. The soldier endures these concessions as moral compromises that undermine military honour.

I would now like to give you a brief account of certain ethical dilemmas in which I was involved in Croatia. To provide some context, I was commander of the southern sector in Croatia in August 1995 during the attack carried out by the Croat army to retake the Krajina region which the Serbo-Croats had appropriated in 1991. I was in command of

approximately 5,000 troops, occupying over 2,000 square kilometres, consisting mainly of four battalions from Canada, the Czech Republic, Jordan and Kenya. My headquarters was located in Knin, which was also the capital of the Serbo-Croat government of the Krajina region. Our main tasks before the attack were to patrol and exercise surveillance over the zone of separation between the two belligerents and to protect 13 Croat villages located within the Krajina region.

When I arrived in Croatia in July, the possibility of a resumption of hostilities was very high. The previous May, Croatia had invaded the western sector and the UN troops had literally fled their posts. This incident had tarnished the reputation of the UN in the eyes of the belligerent factions and complicated our actions very considerably. I was determined not to repeat that mistake.

I therefore ordered that the protection of our observation posts and our ability to survive be improved and I specified very clearly my intention in case of hostilities to remain in position and not abandon any of these posts, to continue to fulfil our mandate at least until we knew whether it was still in effect.

However, I was afraid that there might be some conflict between the orders that I had given not to abandon the observation posts and possible instructions from Canada to the Canadian battalion that the observation posts were to be abandoned if war broke out. I was aware of the instructions given in June to CANBAT 2, in Visoko, to withdraw from certain observation posts. If the Canadians, who had the most secure observation posts, who were professional soldiers with adequate equipment and superior training were ordered by their government to withdraw, I knew that the troops of the other countries under my command would be very inclined to follow them. Moreover, my credibility would have been completely compromised by the fact that I had ordered everyone to remain in position, and I would have had no choice but to resign.

I had advised the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff of this in early July and had explained to him in no uncertain terms that if Canada were to evacuate its observation posts, I would be on the first aircraft back to Canada.

The war in the Krajina region began at 0500 hrs on 4 August and hostilities ceased on about 8 August. At about 2000 hrs on 4 August, a large number of refugees gathered at the gate of my HQ. The advice — I would even say entreaties — that I received from the representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was to not allow them to get inside because I would be fully responsible; that they were not refugees but displaced persons; that we could not accommodate them, we did not have enough food, etc. However, artillery shells were still falling on the town and their lives were in danger. I therefore decided to let them in.

I knew that as soon as I opened the doors, I could not close them again. I was, I think fully aware of the consequences and of my responsibilities to provide them with shelter, protection and safety, food, welfare and medical care, besides creating for myself an administrative burden and future problems with the Croats, but my conscience did not allow me to do otherwise. We eventually took in over 1,000 of them and allowed them to stay until 16 September.

On 5 August, we evacuated some Serb civilians who had been wounded by artillery shells that had fallen near our HQ, to the civilian hospital at Knin. When we arrived, we saw that the hospital had been hit by shells and that the situation was chaotic. Artillery shells were still falling on the town. I therefore decided to evacuate the wounded to my HQ. I went to the hospital for the final transfer of the patients. I refused to transfer the patients who required the support of medical apparatus. My reasoning was primarily that they could die during the evacuation, that I did not have the expertise to maintain or even move that equipment, and that I considered that they had more of a chance of surviving in the hospital. I therefore left four patients at the hospital under the care of a Serb doctor and completed the evacuation of the others. I never found out what happened to them afterwards, because as soon as the Croats arrived, we were literally prisoners in our camp for three days.

I have other examples that I could tell you about, but I have talked enough, and I will now give my colleagues a chance to speak.

2. Major-General Guy Tousignant

Major-General Tousignant is Special Adviser CF/DND to the Somalia Inquiry. He attended the Université de Sherbrooke and was commissioned with the Canadian Officers Training Corps at the Université de Montréal. A logistics officer, MGen Tousignant served as Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda from 1994 to 1996.

Introduction

Nowhere is the concept of military ethic more challenged than as a Force Commander of a UN peacekeeping force. At least I cannot imagine a theatre of operations which would offer a greater dilemma to the military mind albeit I never had to command troops in a classic theatre of war. My only experience relates to Rwanda as the Force Commander of a multinational force of a divisional size made up at least 30 different countries.

In the context of UNAMIR, I could have selected many examples where military ethic and the UN chain of command create a rather unique set of circumstances and issues. If you accept the principle that the justification for the maintenance and employment of military forces is the political ends of the State, that a commander is only given military resources to maintain and achieve the goals of that State, you only have to super-impose the word UN for the word State and you start to understand the problem. The military profession which acknowledges the Primacy of the Nation-State, at least in a democracy, must now transfer this conceptual approach in the UN context. The military profession now exists to serve the UN and the political dimension of this artificial state is far more complex for the military mind than it would be were a Force Commander serving his own State. It is easy to understand that the members of the Security Council are

representatives of States continuously competing against States and in a crisis such as Rwanda, competing interests among States intensify and only make the job of eliminating the causes of the war you are dealing with on the ground even more difficult for the soldier.

The responsibilities of the Force Commander towards the UN nevertheless remain the same as they would be for the same officer towards the State and they are threefold:

a. he has a representative function, he represents the UN and what it stands for;

b. he has an advisory function to the Secretary General and the Security Council; and

c. he has an executive function which is limited to the implementation of the UN decisions even if these decisions go against his best military judgement.

The UN sets the goal and allocates the resources to be used by the Force Commander to achieve that goal. In other words, the Force Commander who is seconded to the UN will have to be prepared to demonstrate as a professional officer the supreme military virtue of his profession which is obedience, obedience to the UN. Are there any limits to this obedience? This is what we will try to discuss through my experience at Kibeho, Rwanda.

The Kibeho Massacre

I had been in Rwanda for nine months when the Kibeho massacre took place in April of 1995. When I took over from General Dallaire, I was left with one and a half million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the southwest of Rwanda, a legacy of Operation Turquoise under the French. A simple definition of an IDP is a refugee who never made it outside of the country, never made it to Zaire or Burundi. In December of 1994, the Government of Kigali ordered all these camps to be closed. As all the IDP camps were being closed, one could observe that a large group of IDPs were not returning to their own communes but converging instead on the Kibeho IDP camp. I conducted a threat analysis and suggested to New York that there was an obvious possibility that the Government would eventually want to close that camp by force. I was requesting their advice should such a scenario present itself. The political advice that came back from UN Headquarters was to pull out of Kibeho. In a book which will shortly be published by the Brookings Institution, one will read the following:

> Instructions received from headquarters New York just before the Kibeho massacre forbade the Force Commander from using peacekeeping troops to intervene between IDPs and soldiers of the Rwandese army. Yet, despite this order from New York, the Force Commander felt morally obliged to keep UNAMIR's Zambian battalion at Kibeho to at least maintain a presence that might at least lessen potential tensions.

In brief, I did not and could not in my own conscience abandon these people, 125,000 of them, mainly women and children. When the massacre started, we did not pull out, none of my soldiers were killed, less than 4,000 Rwandese were killed, albeit far too many, and thousands of lives were saved.

Discussion

The question is: "Was this disobedience on my part and, if so, was it justified?" From my point of view, the answer is yes on both counts. To rationalize my decision we must examine the issues of conflict under four sets of parameters where a decision has to be taken by a Commander: Is it a political issue? Is it a military competence issue? Is it a legal issue? Or is it a moral issue?

a. If it is a political issue, as a rule there is no situation where the political judgement of a military officer will be preferred to that of a political adviser. It is simply a question of recognized competence.

b. If it is a question of military competence, particularly in operations, the reverse from above will apply for as long as you can demonstrate that what you are about to do is absurd in military terms if you follow political advice.

c. Is it a lawful command or not or is that person in a legitimate position to give you an order? The law is not as clear as for military orders but it is safe to say that it will work on the presumption that the political adviser is in position to order you to carry out policies.

d. Is it a moral issue? A question of moral standard? If it is, I consider the politician or representative of the state on equal ground here with the military. The moral judgement of an officer is as relevant as that of the politician. You do not commit genocide because he orders you to do so.

Conclusion

Rationalizing a decision not to follow directions from UN Headquarters on a moral issue does not in any way remove the question of ethical dilemma and certainly does not relieve the Commander of his responsibilities towards his superiors. Not to execute a lawful command is rarely justifiable and it is clear that I defied an order from New York at Kibeho. As a result the UN would have had the right to defy me to justify my behaviour. I was never asked to account for my decision and the fact that none of my soldiers was killed probably contributed to making this difference of opinion a non-issue.

As an officer, I was constantly reminded that with the position of command comes difficult choices and in my best judgement this was the best choice for the Kibeho situation. I also remain fully cognizant that a jury of my peers might question that choice since it is one of ethical dilemma.

3. Colonel Charles Lemieux

Colonel Lemieux is Director of Communications at Land Forces Command. He graduated from the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean in 1969 and the Royal Military College of Canada in 1971. Colonel Lemieux has served as a Platoon Commander in Cyprus and as UN Commander of the Bihac Area Command in Bosnia-Herzegovina from October 1994 to March 1995.

Introduction

I feel fortunate to have been asked to participate in the discussion of *Ethical Dilemmas of Commanders on Multinational Missions*. In the time given to me today, I will base my observations on ethical challenges that I faced as a senior staff officer in the UN Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (BHC) Headquarters in Sarajevo during the period March to October 1994 and as the UN Commander of the Bihac Area in Western Bosnia during the period October 1994 to March 1995.

I would like to describe to you first the principal tasks of UN Commanders in BH and the military-political situation in the country at the time. In broad terms, Commander UNPROFOR's operational imperatives were to enhance humanitarian assistance of the local communities, increase freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and humanitarian assistance operations, develop cooperation between belligerent parties and BHC, promote compliance of UN Security Council Resolutions, gain the information initiative, and improve the direction and organization of the UN effort in BH. With these tasks in mind, the following events focussed our attention:

a. The Serb offensive against the Gorazde enclave of April 1994 and the first time use by the UN of Close Air Support to deter the Serb attack;

b. The failure of the Contact Group's Peace Proposal of July 1994 which resulted in the Bosnian Serbs imposing greater freedom of movement restrictions on the UN forces;

c. The UN use of NATO air strikes in August and September 1994 to enforce the 20-km heavy weapons Total Exclusion Zone around Sarajevo, in particular;

d. In the period of August to October 1994, the defeat of the Abdic forces by the Bosnian Government forces in north-western Bosnia, the creation of about 30,000 displaced Abdic supporters in Croatia and local successes by the Bosnian Government's 5 Corps against the Bosnian Serb forces; and

e. The November 1994 Serb offensive against the Bihac enclave and the resultant four month Carter cessation of hostilities agreement of the end of December 1994.

Humanitarian assistance was our first priority. With the signing of the Washington Agreement between Bosnian and Croat leaders on 18 March 1994, the fighting in central Bosnia ended.

Therefore, the population that remained in the most urgent need of humanitarian assistance and whose lives were the most vulnerable to attacks by Serb forces were now in the

enclaves of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac. Based on my estimate in December 1994, in cooperation with the UNHCR Bihac Head of Office, UNHCR met its monthly assistance target in these most vulnerable areas at a success rate of over 90% for Sarajevo, over 30% for the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde and of about 5% for the Bihac enclave.

Politically, the international community faced warring parties who would mutually agree to very little: the Bosnian Serb leadership believed they had won the war at this point and now looked for ways to force a peace settlement, while the Bosnian Government was not prepared to consider peace until conditions were more favourable to them.

It is within this context that I would like to address today's subject. I will present three specific areas that provided ethical challenges to me and I will give you examples for each.

Act in Support of the Dignity of People

The first ethical issue I will address is that people have a right to be treated with dignity. I was impressed by the way the population of Sarajevo coped with the encirclement of the city. After the NATO 20-km heavy weapon Total Exclusion Zone was imposed around Sarajevo in February 1994, efforts by local authorities with the assistance of UNPROFOR were aimed at trying to establish some level of normality of life in the city. On 12 March 1994, the trams had been repaired and were running, and some of the litter of more than two years of war was being collected by UNPROFOR. On 11 March 1994, under UNSCR 900, a UN Administrator was appointed for the restoration of the essential public services for greater Sarajevo. For the Bosnian Serb leadership, these developments were unrealistic. As Vice-President Koljevic of the Bosnian Serb Government said to us in Pale in early August 1994: "Doesn't the UN Administrator for Sarajevo realize that there is a war going on, and the trams running in the centre of Sarajevo adversely affect the morale of the Bosnian Serb population a few hundred metres away?" Just over a month later, at about noon the Bosnian Government forces attacked the Bosnian Serbs with several medium mortars in support placed among the buildings in downtown Sarajevo. The attack was not successful. A month later in Bihac, the Government's 5 Corps attacked the Bosnian Serbs and was successful in dislodging them from their positions overlooking the city and captured a large territory to the east of the enclave. The Serbs vowed revenge on 5 Corps and its Commander and attacked the enclave from BH and Croatian territory in November 1994. UNPROFOR, as I, were quick initially to criticize the actions of the Bosnian defenders who were *exercising their moral right to self-defence* as it created tension in our negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs.

The ethical issue for the UN Commander was to be able to demonstrate an understanding of the situation for the population and not to prejudge a circumstance based on its impact on the UN agenda, therefore *demonstrating moral integrity*.

Demonstrate Honesty and Fairness, and Be Watchful of Manipulation by the Warring Parties

During the war, the warring parties did not view the UN as impartial. On the one hand, the Bosnian Serbs were sceptical of UNPROFOR's interpretation of the control of Government Bosnian forces in the enclaves, and on the other hand, the Bosnian Government accused UNPROFOR of not acting more forcefully to ensure the safety of the population of the enclaves and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to them. Mindful of this, there were many circumstances when UN Commanders in cooperation with others did act to demonstrate honesty and fairness, but remaining watchful of efforts of manipulation by the warring parties. Let me give you a few examples.

With the success rate of UNHCR assistance at 5% in the Bihac enclave, it was difficult to explain to the local population why the Krajina Serbs in Croatia would receive 100% of their UNHCR assistance entitlement when they were blocking access by road to Bihac. In a coordinated approach, I as the UN Commander Bihac Area and the UNHCR Bihac Head of Office made representation to our superiors to put pressure on the Krajina Serbs to allow convoys to enter the Bihac enclave. In late November 1994, the UNHCR Special Envoy agreed to link the delivery of UNHCR humanitarian assistance to the Krajina Serbs to its successful deliveries to the population in the Bihac enclave. This was quite a departure from UNHCR policy. I believe this policy eventually allowed the delivery of over 1,000 tons of seed to the Bihac enclave in April 1995, that would produce at harvest 10 times its weight or the equivalent of 100 UNHCR convoys of food.

In late November 1994, during the Serb offensive into the Bihac enclave, the Serb Forces advanced to within 800 metres to the Bihac City Hospital, which provided medical treatment to approximately 1000 patients. The Serbs had clear intentions of attacking the hospital based on their disinformation of the military situation on Serb radio during the week of 12 December 1994. I attribute the permanent deployment of a platoon of UN troops within the hospital perimeter and UNPROFOR's denunciation of the Serb disinformation program to their headquarters in Pale to have greatly contributed to saving the hospital from attack.

During the first week of February 1995, during an UNPROFOR Bihac Area Regional Joint Commission meeting, based on the Carter Agreement, the Bosnian Serbs with a letter of reference from President Karadic in hand proposed economic activity with the Bosnian Government representatives with the first transaction valued at over one million dollars. After examination, I disagreed to be part of an immoral transaction because humanitarian aid items were included in the transaction. The terms of the transaction were modified to exclude humanitarian aid items, reluctantly agreed to by the Bosnian Government representatives, but the Bosnian Serb authorities would not agree to the changes nor the publicity that was being proposed, so they left with their convoy of trucks. There was no will by the Bosnian Serbs to allow the free movement of humanitarian aid convoys as they had agreed to in the Carter Agreement and faced with one of potentially many lucrative transactions, they would not agree to proceed. It was obvious that this transaction was to the benefit of a few.

Be Loyal to Troops over Mission

In a traditional peacekeeping mission, UN troops understand the risks involved in separating the warring factions. In Bosnia at this time, the circumstances were much different. The professionalism of troops of many UN units made them persevere and take risks to provide for the most vulnerable of the population. But, if there was a choice to be made, where should the Commander's loyalty lie? During negotiations with the warring factions, I would tell them that if I were to die in Bosnia, I would have been assassinated; unlike them, who would die on the battlefield fighting as soldiers. UN soldiers performed their duties generally in full view of the warring parties and therefore vulnerable to the intentions of the warring parties.

On 4 December 1994, after six weeks of the Serb blockade of UN convoys to the Bihac enclave, without our complete complement of first line medical supplies and no surgical capability, no heat and limited fuel, with the death of one Bangladesh soldier, Commander Bosnia-Herzegovina Command agreed to my request to the temporary redeployment of 50% of the Bangladesh Battalion to Zagreb. For several reasons, the redeployment did not take place although the planning was in place. Under circumstances like these, the UN Commander has to be realistic about the risk to which he should expose his troops. The degree of risk should be judged on the type of equipment and training of the troops under his operational control and the local military situation; and, at the end of the day, the UN soldier should come first. I need to add that I accorded a similar loyalty to the local interpreters who shared the risk of their UN Commanders and military observers, as to the UN soldier.

Conclusion

In brief, the dignity of people, the fair and honest treatment of the population and loyalty to the UN soldier first were the *ethical principles* that governed me during my tour in BH. I believe I did go to the mission area with these principles engrained in me, but untested as they would be during my command of the Bihac Area. The *notion of accountability was also very present* with me: as a UN Commander, on the one hand, I was trying to assist the population as best I could under the circumstances, and on the other hand, *holding all warring parties accountable for their actions through publicity and accurate reporting.*

4. Colonel Don Matthews

Colonel Matthews, a fighter pilot with over 3000 hours of flying time, is Commanding Officer of the Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment at CFB Cold Lake. He graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a BA in Economics, and has a diploma in Theology from Thorneloe University. He recently served with the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti.

Ethics is about goodness and badness, it is about choosing between right and wrong. It is about logic and morality overcoming emotion and immorality.

An argument could be made that one merely has to follow the rules. Our nation will only employ the Canadian Forces in situations in which we are governed by the International Law of Armed Conflict (ILOAC) or Rules of Engagement (ROE). In all cases these rules are legal and binding according to Canadian and international law. Therefore, if we are on the just side and we are led by just laws it should simply be enough to follow the rules. This is true to a point. However, the majority of ethical dilemmas occur because of the laws, not in spite of them. The battle really occurs in the heart.

The decisions are personal ones, therefore one needs a personal set of principles upon which to base decision making. North American society seems to be grappling with ethics, sets of principles to guide in decision making (religion) and decisions about what is right and wrong. It is therefore healthy and natural that the segment of Canadian society that must deal with life and death situations in difficult environments often far from home should be assessing its own values and principles.

The rules we follow help us to reinforce ethical and moral behaviour; nonetheless, the moral principles that support the rules and therefore the behaviour must be personalized if the rules are to withstand the tests of emotion, deprivation, and war. As a benign example I cite the camp rules in Haiti. They were put in place to show that drunkards and fornicators were the lawbreakers not the trend setters. The moral decision not to be a drunkard or a fornicator is a personal one made by an individual for reasons other than fear of punishment. The vast majority of our people conduct themselves very well and for those whose values are not of such a high standard we have rules and penalties. Having stated that ethical dilemmas often occur because of the laws not in spite of them, let me provide some examples.

Case One

Many of the places we worked in Haiti suffered disastrous disease: horrific skin diseases, viral meningitis, dengue fever, and AIDS were common. One used risk-mitigating procedures to get the task accomplished with the minimum chance of contacting disease. Duty first whether the threat is bullets or disease.

However, the question arose as to how much exposure should you expect people to risk in accomplishing humanitarian assistance done outside of their normal duties.

I accepted a request for assistance in a particularly diseased bidonville called Solina. I had spend three hours walking in this shanty

town with a Haitian AIDS worker and was all too familiar with the horrors of disease in this area. My plan was to accept the work and then brief all volunteers on the disease in the area and allow them to decline gracefully. A number of people had informed me that they were ready to volunteer to work in the area building an office for the AIDS workers. Unfortunately our time in Haiti ran out and we could not do the work. The answer to the ethical dilemma was to work where the need was greatest but only with volunteers who could make their own ethical decisions.

Case Two

This case involves the issue of how to react to ROE violations outside your lines. Within your contingent it is relatively straight forward. Disciplinary action must be taken when ROE are violated. The use of military police in the investigation is crucial to maintain impartiality.

However, this is a case where someone else breaks the ROE and your troops are witness to it. Accusing the troops of another nation of ROE violations leads to a considerable amount of bad feeling and in fact brings you and your troops under as much scrutiny as the ones whom you are accusing. Regardless, the only acceptable behaviour is to make UN HQ aware of the problem and more immediately to rectify the situation in the field so that we are not partner to the violations. Our immediate actions when guards started to violate ROE at a camp our engineers were pulling down was to inform the guard commander that further actions would result in our engineers leaving the scene and reporting their concerns to me. Even though this threat stopped the ROE violations, the engineers asked to see me that evening back in our camp at Port-au-Prince. I took the issue up with UN HQ and the other contingent commander the next day.

The guards had started to use pepper spray on a kid already caught in the razor wire and to hold cocked weapons to the heads of Haitians outside the camp perimeter. The engineers actions were enough to stop the problem. The long-term solution was not as equitable. In a subsequent investigation the other contingent commander could find no evidence of ROE violations and the matter was dropped.

Case Three

It is acknowledged that to be successful at peace keeping impartiality is an essential quality of a contingent. This is true and also difficult to maintain. In Haiti the contempt and total lack of concern that the incredibly rich minority show for the incredibly poor majority is difficult to stomach. However, we are not there to judge, we are there to assist in the provision of a secure and stable environment to allow them to develop themselves. It requires wisdom and rigour to remember that and then to remain impartial in your dealings with the rich and haughty.

Case Four

Many relief agencies in Haiti would come to us for assistance after they were turned down by the UN. How much could we do and yet maintain our obligations to the UN? This was a constant concern. There was a never-ending stream of requests and the need was obvious. Nonetheless, we had neither the people nor had we the money to help in all cases. We did an enormous amount and the Haitians were always thankful. Nonetheless, in such a country the need is a bottomless dry well into which

you can pour your mere buckets of water forever with little discernible impact. It is difficult to discern the level of need and then to make the appropriate decisions with limited resources on hand. No matter what you decide someone will go hungry. This became even more difficult when it was apparent that some agencies were less than truthful in their dealings with us. The dilemma, is it better to work with a known quantity that is less than ideal or should you take on a new agency? Our response was to build up longer term relationships that we could nourish and direct rather than spread ourselves too thin.

Case Five

The international law of armed conflict is very clear on what is and what is not a legal target. This example is not so much about an ethical dilemma as it is about the requirements for strict adherence to the law in the face of emotion which pushes you the other way. The American squadron we shared the ramp with in Doha lost three aircraft shortly after the Persian Gulf War started. We were all close and some of our pilots took it personally. On our sweep missions over Iraq we sometimes saw vehicles moving on the roads. One of my guys who wanted revenge for the deaths of two of his American friends asked me for permission to strafe anything he saw moving in Iraq the next day. Since this would clearly have violated a number of principles, all of which I outlined for him, the answer was no. Revenge is a most dangerous emotion and can not only cloud ethical decision making but even lead to illegal and immoral behaviour.

Another factor in the desire to seek revenge was that we had rumours that captured aircrew were being beaten and tortured. These rumours were in fact true, as I found out after the war, but once again no excuse for us to break the ILOAC or to jeopardize our own set of principles. In fact I found that when one is facing death, both personally and death for those you command, you feel a need of assurance that your personal values are of the highest order. Hand-in-hand with that is the desire of assurance that you and your nation have the high moral ground and that there is some ethical and moral apology for the taking of life.

Panel Discussion — The Different Faces of Business Ethics in Defence

Pierre Lagueux

Alan Williams

James Hunter

Panel Discussion — The Different Faces of Business Ethics in Defence

1. Pierre Lagueux

Mr. Lagueux is Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) at National Defence Headquarters. He obtained a diploma from the Royal Military College of Canada in 1971 and undertook graduate studies at the University of Western Ontario from 1977 to 1979. Mr. Lagueux retired from the CF as a Colonel in 1990.

As you can see by the composition of our panel, DND does not act independently in providing equipment to the Canadian Forces. In my capacity as Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), and as a major player in the acquisition process, I believe this forum will be an ideal opportunity to make you aware of some of the concerns related to our complex, multi-billion dollar business.

Alan Williams, my colleague at Public Works and Government Services Canada, will be giving you a brief summary of his responsibilities in the government department which has exclusive responsibility for the contracting for goods, and some of *their* potential areas of vulnerability in terms of work ethics. Last, but certainly not least, Jim Hunter, from KPMG, will be providing you with a glimpse of how industry deals with the issue of ethics.

First of all, let's make no mistake about it; DND is a big business. The Materiel Group alone spends about 3.5 billion dollars each year in contracts for goods and services. Commands, Bases and other NDHQ Group Principals spend another $2 billion per year. So we are talking about a lot of money, and a lot of people administering it.

In the Materiel Group, the acquisition of goods and services is handled by Equipment Management Teams, made up of Procurement and Finance Managers, Engineers, Life Cycle Materiel Managers, Supply Managers, and a host of other supporting personnel.

I don't suppose that anyone, not even our harshest critics, could expect DND to spend every penny of 5.5 billion dollars in an absolutely perfect, mistake- and error-free way.

However, I do want to make the point that I think that the ethical blunders we may from time to time commit, are *not* of the self-serving, "money in *my* pocket" type that we normally associate with the phrase *unethical behaviour*. I firmly believe that for the most part, in the overwhelmingly vast majority of situations, *all* of these people are genuinely trying to do their best for their customers, which in the case of the Materiel Group, are the CF. And, it is in their pursuit of what they believe to be best for the Forces, that they may sometimes find themselves in an ethically questionable situation by adopting a "the end justifies the means" philosophy and doing something which either skirts the edge of, or circumvents, the official process in the belief that the CF

will, in the long run, be better served by their actions. "The road to Hell is paved with good intentions," and these attempted shortcuts or "individual initiatives" invariably lead to Departmental or individual grief.

Remember, if you have circumvented the system or approved actions that are beyond the scope of your authority, then there could be dire consequences. At some point an audit, an unsuccessful bidder complaint, or the media will disclose irregularities which in hindsight are not defensible. Depending upon the nature of the violation, it is possible that a manager could have his or her signing authority revoked, or the individual could be transferred, demoted or dismissed. In extreme cases, if there has been a loss or wastage of public funds, then the manager will be held accountable for his or her actions by a Board of Inquiry or a Court. This is, as I said, Big Business, and it plays by hardball rules. The bottom line is, of course, that whether you're responsible for a $2,000 expenditure, or a $10 million contract, the rules and regulations are the same, and a breach of trust or of integrity carries a penalty.

There was in the past, I believe, somewhat less emphasis on ethics and morality in DND business than perhaps there should have been. Back in 1990, when I first took the job of Director General Procurement and Supply, I instituted an aggressive ethics awareness program which became the standard in the Materiel Group. Since 1992, we have incorporated a module on ethics awareness in materiel management courses such as the Project Manager, Life Cycle Materiel Manager and Capital Procurement courses.

Recently, this initiative has grown into a department-wide program, co-developed by Chief Review Services and my Materiel Management Training Centre. Beginning in November 1996, and continuing until March 1997, a pilot program will be run, consisting of half-day seminars which will look at the roles, values, needs and principles associated with *Ethics in the Workplace*. These seminars will be available to all NDHQ personnel. Following the completion of the pilot program, it is intended to distribute these seminars throughout the Department. Ethics awareness and practice must and will become an integral part of all of our daily work.

These ethics awareness seminars will help to bring a much broader understanding of ethics to all of us. As I said before, we are not just interested in the self-serving, shady dealing aspects of unethical practices. More and more, the ethics of the Department are coming under scrutiny. I believe our ethical treatment of he environment, our management of equal employment opportunity programs, our whole departmental morality will be more closely examined and questioned by a public demanding higher standards from all of its public servants.

On the subject of public scrutiny, I want to go back to a comment I made earlier about the inevitability that our sins will come out. As you are no doubt aware, Defence procurement is subject to massive private and public scrutiny. For obvious and good reasons. In every contract award, there is one winner and many, usually disgruntled, losers. Remember that winning contracts is how these people feed themselves and their families. Therefore each loser has a very personal axe to grind, and will take whatever measures available to win the contract.

It can be compared, in a way, to a condemned man facing a death sentence. All avenues and appeals will be pursued, because the consequences are so dire. So too with losing bidders. Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) appeals, letters directly to the Minister, Prime Minister, local MP, etc, can all be used to bring pressure on the Department. Only the existence of a squeaky clean, fair, ethical process will protect our contracting decisions from such attacks.

Now this does not mean that people involved in procurement cannot ever talk to, or meet with industry. What it does mean is that the Department must be completely consistent in its dealings with all potential suppliers. It is this equal treatment, or as it is currently referred to, level playing field, that all suppliers want, demand, and are entitled to.

In closing, let me give you some advice and guidance on how to conduct yourselves in the business of defence. Firstly, "use your common sense." If it looks bad, sounds bad or smells bad, it's either Limburger cheese, or it *is* bad. Secondly, use the "*Globe and Mail* Test." In other words, how much will you enjoy seeing your name and your actions reported on the front page of the *Globe and Mail*. If the very thought makes you squirm, it's probably not the right thing to do. And, when all else fails, and not *only* when all else fails, "Follow the Rules!"; they are there for everyone's protection, including yours.

2. Alan Williams

Mr. Williams is Assistant Deputy Minister, Supply Operations Service Branch, Public Works and Government Services Canada. He holds a B.Sc. from McGill University and an MBA from the University of Michigan. Mr. Williams, a Certified Management Accountant, has held a variety of management positions in the Public Service of Canada.

At Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), any discussion about ethics centres on the integrity of the procurement process. This is what I would like to talk to you about today — the role PWGSC and the client department play in the procurement process and the principles that must guide our actions.

What I want to emphasize is that one of the PWGSC's major responsibilities is procurement. As the largest purchasing organization in Canada, PWGSC issues 80,000 contracts totalling $8 billion annually on behalf of over 100 federal departments and agencies. Of that $8 billion, 37,000 contracts equalling $3.6 billion is for DND alone.

We have a long-standing tradition of working with DND's Materiel group on a full range of procurement matters, major acquisitions and basic acquisitions, which are more of a routine matter. Of course, this tradition has been advantageous to both of our organizations.

Before I go any further, first let me tell you my vision of PWGSC's role in procurement. My vision is for PWGSC to be recognized as

the leader in procurement services. I believe the key to success can be found in my management philosophy — "E^3" — which I have been instilling throughout the organization. The principles of E^3 are energy, excellence and enthusiasm:

Energy — urgency, client focus

Excellence — thoroughness, clarity, integrity

Enthusiasm — fun, creativity

As the federal government's main contracting arm, PWGSC exists as an independent contracting organization to ensure the integrity of the procurement process. As such, PWGSC is held accountable for the integrity of the procurement process. This is the fundamental principle that guides our actions.

Our mandate is very simple — we must ensure that our procurement actions are open, fair and transparent and that these actions respect our commitments under international and national trade agreements.

Openness, fairness and transparency are the guiding principles for how we do business with suppliers and contractors. Our approach is a very practical and visible example of this government's commitment to "Governing with integrity."

How do we do this?

One — We compete contracts. We do not allocate them on a "share" basis to particular regions. From the moment the client requisition is known it is our job to make sure that the requirement is defined in a way that maximizes competition and that the applicable trade agreements are applied.

Two — It is our job to provide fair access to government business through open and competitive bidding opportunities.

Three — It is our job to ensure the procurement policies provide equal and fair access to competitive bidding opportunities for potential suppliers from all regions of Canada. We must ensure that the rules are clearly evident in the Request For Proposal and that evaluations are done in a transparent manner.

Yes, this is our job and we take it very seriously.

But we cannot do our job alone. Procurement is a partnership.

Our role and these principles can only be truly effective when practised in full partnership with you, the client department.

To make these principles effective, they must form part of your job too.

PWGSC and DND must have a common understanding of the requirement, what you are trying to meet. This sometimes puts us at odds with each other. Client departments often feel they know how best to satisfy the requirement and who the best firm is to do the job.

But as our recent collective experience with the Canadian International Trade Tribunal has shown us, there is a clear need to work together ever closer. I will have more to say about our lessons learned from CITT cases later.

Early consultation with PWGSC to define the best procurement method, a well-defined and clearly specified Request for Proposal and a well-designed and defensible evaluation plan, will go a long way to safeguard the integrity of the process.

I think it is true to say that procurement is probably the government activity that is subjected to the closest scrutiny. When the government does business, it operates publicly. It is closely watched by Parliament, the Treasury Board, the Auditor General, the CITT, disappointed contractors, the media and the taxpayer.

The probing is constant:

- did the successful bidder win on the basis of value or political connections?
- is a particular province or region getting its fair share of federal procurement dollars?
- are we doing enough to help small business, high-tech business, minority business?
- is the system demonstrably fair?

Ultimately, the only way to satisfy a sceptical public is to have a system that *is* demonstrably fair. I use the term *demonstrably* because I want to emphasize that within PWGSC great efforts are always made to ensure that the procurement system is a transparent one, and that we are accountable for our decisions.

Important illustrations of this are Open Bidding, our Lobbyist Certification Clause and the bid challenge mechanism offered by the CITT.

Open Bidding is the key to helping Canadian firms do business with the Government of Canada. Open Bidding opens up the purchasing needs of federal departments and agencies to suppliers who then decide which requirements they want to compete for.

At the heart of Open Bidding is the Open Bidding Service (OBS), an electronic bulletin board that publicly advertises bidding opportunities for suppliers. The OBS is accessible, with a personal computer and modem, from anywhere in Canada. Equal access to business opportunities is one of the guiding principles of PWGSC's Open Bidding Service.

We are continually striving to improve this service. In fact, we view the OBS very much as a work in progress — one that has come a long way since it was introduced in 1989.

The OBS is just one of the ways in which we are working to make the procurement system as accessible, fair and effective as possible.

As many of you may be aware, all contracts issued by PWGSC now include a clause that requires all companies to certify that they have not hired a lobbyist to solicit award of the contract where any part of the payment to the lobbyist depends directly or indirectly on the client obtaining the contract.

In other words, contingency payments to lobbyists are unacceptable.

Integrity in procurement is also a reflection of the realities of today's international marketplace.

Our international trade obligations require that our government procurement practices and transactions be fair *and be seen to be fair*. There must be equal access to information about procurement opportunities, clear rules on how the process is conducted and there must be an independent appeal mechanism for suppliers seeking redress.

The CITT is Canada's third-party appeal mechanism established to hear complaints from suppliers who believe they have not been treated fairly during any stage of the procurement process for federal government requirements. The very fact the CITT exists as an appeal body should give the business community and taxpayers confidence in the integrity and openness of the system.

Do we make mistakes?

Sure. We are only human.

Do we learn from our mistakes and improve our processes?

Yes we do. For example, we chronicle our lessons learned from CITT cases and make them available to every employee through a Lotus Bookshelf bulletin board. In fact, CITT lessons learned were a major discussion item at our annual Directors' conference last week.

As well, we regularly hold training sessions and courses with our employees on such subjects as Conflict of Interest and CITT Policy Updates.

What does all this mean?

This means that your department and mine must always be able to demonstrate that our procurement decisions are made in the public interest and obtain best value for the Crown and Canadian taxpayers. As such, we are accountable to such parliamentary committees as the Standing Committee on Government Operations and must be able to account for our procurement actions.

In conclusion, it can be said that, at Public Works and Government Services Canada, contracting is our business. We therefore take the process very seriously. We take pride in our work and in the fact that we maintain thoroughness, integrity and fairness in the procurement process.

Integrity is an absolute. You can't have some integrity, or a bit of integrity. You either have it or you don't. It cannot take a back seat to any other consideration in the process.

3. James Hunter

Mr. Hunter is a Chartered Accountant and Trustee in Bankruptcy, as well as a partner with KPMG in Toronto. He has carried out investigations and risk assessment reviews in Canada, the US, the UK and the Caribbean.

In the Auditor General of Canada's report to the House of Commons in May 1995, it was stated:

> The Government needs to forthrightly communicate its core set of ethical standards to groups and individuals dealing with Government with a clear indication that it expects these standards to be respected.

Business ethics do not exist in a vacuum. Ethics is learned behaviour, which can be defined through internal policies and procedures and the organizational culture. Within any organization the ethical tone is also defined by the actual behaviour of the most senior people, and this tone is pervasive. The outside environment also affects ethical standards within an organization.

Government generally is in a period of transformation. This change is leading to outsourcing, alternative program delivery and more reliance on non-public service providers.

The Department of National Defence (DND) cannot ignore the standards prevailing in the private sector with which it does business.

How can DND procurement officers assess whether or not they are dealing with an ethical private sector organization? There sometimes are red flags which may signal to the alert individual that all is not well within the organization. Such red flags would include:

- a company dominated by one or more managers;
- management compensation strongly linked to short-term financial results;
- employees who are poorly managed and poorly paid;
- financial controls that are obviously weak or unmonitored and this is clear to outside individuals;
- employees who seem to have lavish lifestyles beyond the level of their salary;
- a high and continuing level of quality issues resulting in complaints against the organization from customers, suppliers or regulatory authorities.

Taken alone, none of these factors necessarily mean that a supplier is unethical, but taken together they may create some cause for concern. Unethical or corrupt organizations do not generally come straight out and offer bribes or publicize the details of their particular bid-rigging scheme. The approach is often gradual and insidious, but attention paid to some of these salient signs will help procurement officers to be on guard.

On a more positive note, there have been a number of developments in the past five years or so which have raised ethical standards within the private sector. I would like to comment on a few of these items.

1. Corporate Governance

In December 1994, the Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada issued a report entitled *Where Were the Directors?* This report has become known as the "Dey Report," from the Chairman of the Committee. The report consists of a set of 14 guidelines for improved corporate governance for listed companies incorporated in Canada. These guidelines send out a clear message that the day of amateur directors is past. Directors have to take responsibility for the stewardship of the corporation. They have to provide strategic direction, identify risk and be responsible for appointing, training and monitoring senior management.

In addition, in December of 1995, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants issued a document entitled "Guidance for Directors — Governance Processes for Control." This document states that the Board of Directors is responsible for "approving and monitoring mission, vision and strategy, and for approving and monitoring the organization's ethical values."

2. U.S. Legislation: The Uniform Sentencing Guidelines

In 1991, the United States introduced a new piece of legislation which has become known as the "Uniform Sentencing Guidelines." Where a corporation is convicted of some form of wrongdoing, the judge will assess the penalty based on a set of uniform sentencing guidelines.

To the extent management has taken steps to promote an ethical environment within the corporation, the sentence will be reduced. Alternatively, to the extent management is deemed to have allowed an atmosphere in which corruption will prevail to exist, then the sentence will be increased. This, of course, is U.S. legislation, not Canadian legislation. However, it has been said that when America sneezes, Canada catches a cold, and these U.S. standards will inevitably have an effect on best practice in this country.

3. Education

When I was training as an accountant 20 years ago, I was told that the *raison-d'être* of a corporation was to maximize earnings per share. That was the extent of my education in business ethics. Today most graduates of business school will have attended a course or series of courses in business ethics. Similarly, MBA candidates generally will have a component of business ethics as part of their education.

Thus, there is a much greater level of awareness of ethics in business. The current generation of business graduates are the business leaders of tomorrow and these people can be expected to set and accept higher standards of business ethics. They will be more aware of the severe consequences of unethical behaviour both in financial and human costs and so it is reasonable to be cautiously optimistic that one may see an improvement in the Canadian ethical environment.

4. Stakeholder Theory

There has been a considerable degree of academic research done in the area of stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory recognizes that there are a number of constituencies which have an interest in the welfare of the corporation. Extending beyond the interests of shareholders, it is recognized that employees, customers, suppliers, government and the community at large all have a legitimate interest or stake in the future of a corporation. There is some work being done on proposed

amendments to the Canadian Business Corporations Act which would afford some level of protection to directors who promote the interests of different stakeholder groups for bona fide reasons.

Where management attempts to reasonably satisfy the legitimate claims of the organization's stakeholders, it is likely that decisions will be made on a more ethically accepted basis than if only shareholder interests were recognized.

5. Use of Recognized Ethical Tools

Canadian businesses are adopting tools which help to promote an ethical environment. These tools include mission statements, codes of conduct and mechanisms to permit upstream communication.

Mission statements are generally documents which set out the set of values to which the organization subscribes. Very often these statements are ineffective because there is not much commitment from senior management or buy-in from employees. However, some organizations have been successful in adopting a set of guiding principles which have arisen from an honest look at what is important for the organization and where there is a high level of commitment from the employees.

Codes of conduct are basically the set of rules which may address such issues as conflict of interest, policy relating to gifts, and similar guidance matters. Employees need direction on these issues. If they are not told what is an acceptable set of rules, then it is inevitable that some of them may engage in unethical behaviour quite simply because no one has defined what is right and wrong in the corporate context.

There has to be a process of implementation and education. Management should continuously remind people of what is acceptable behaviour. It is important that the "right thing" becomes the "done thing."

Upstream communication consists of the avenues whereby individuals who see something wrong happening can speak up without fear of retaliation.

In the context of government, the federal government has tabled a Federal Whistleblowers Protection Act. This bill was tabled in June 1996 and has not yet been enacted. It recognizes that whistleblowers need some type of protection as there is a sad history of retaliation against people who blow the whistle. Many companies are attempting to develop their own mechanisms including the use of ombudsmen to facilitate the free flow of information.

In summary, what do all of these developments add up to? Probably the best term to describe what is happening is "transparency." In other words, it is generally recognized that by shedding light on the decision-making process, it is more likely that the ethical path will be followed. Society demands transparency from government and government agencies which buy goods and services from the private sector should demand an equal level of transparency from those groups.

Who is Responsible for Ethics in the Military?

Captain Wayne A. Ellis

Who is Responsible for Ethics in the Military?

Captain Wayne A. Ellis

Captain Ellis graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a B.Sc. Degree in 1991. He is currently Executive Assistant to the Base Commander of CFB North Bay.

The growing concern for the status of morality and ethics in the present Canadian military is by no means unique nor critical in today's society. The enormous impact of the various news media, however, does tend to magnify shortcomings when they occur (a phenomenon of the latter half of this century). It is, perhaps, this magnification, and in some cases, extrapolation, of ethical difficulties within the military that force it (as it is doing now) to quite literally tear itself apart trying to find the root of a cause that perhaps has no tree attached to it. The question that then must be asked is thus: is the existence of questionable ethical behaviour within the military intrinsic to its system or extrinsic (i.e., comes from outside)?

Although this paper will establish that both areas affect the moral character of any military, it will be shown that in most cases the military should be able to absolve itself from responsibility where events of questionable ethics occur. That in fact, it tends to be the responsibility of certain individuals or groups of individuals whose "scripts" *allow* them to act in immoral ways and that it is the *response* to the appearance of unethical behaviour that is the crux of the problem.

"Scripts"

"Scripts" are, of course, the patterns of behaviour passed to us by our parents, friends, co-workers, etc. Everything that we are exposed to has the possibility of being incorporated into our "script," or rather, of affecting the way in which we relate to our surroundings. For example, if a man had been a women-beater, a son of that man may also become a woman-beater just because of the exposure to that type of environment. And so, just like being born into a poor family means you will probably be poor as well, the possibility is strong that your ethics are affected by your "script."

One important thing to remember about scripts is that they can come from only two sources: the long term and from one or several significant emotional events. People act either from a script developed from exposure to an environment spanning ten to twenty years or from a script newly and abruptly written because of some tragedy or victory in their life. *People do not develop a script over the short term*. This fact will be important later.

What do I mean by "allow"? Just like the movie actor, we all have a choice of whether we follow or play out the script that was given to us. Most people recognize unethical behaviour, based on their type of society, and refrain from it, even though their script permits it. To varying degrees, we conform to the society within which we wish to be accepted, even though our inner values differ with that society.

And so, what I have just described are the extrinsic factors that affect the ethical make-up of the military: it is a combination of the deep-rooted, well-played script from our childhood and/or adulthood, and the "social" script that we recognize and follow to remain part of a group, and in this case part of the civilized group. The other part comes from the intrinsic effect of joining and existing within the military organization.

The Military Organization

Intrinsically, the military also develops and supports a social script in order to insure that members remain devoted to the organization. This process begins during recruit training and its goal is to subvert the individual for the sake of the group or team. It is hoped that through adversity, hardship, and teamwork, a cohesive bond will develop among the recruits that will solidify their ties to the military organization. In many cases, recruits find that they have to bury many prejudices and pre-conceived notions during their experiences with their fellow recruits. For example, a recruit that has a poor attitude toward women may develop a respect for them through their group training. Or perhaps the recruit learns to subvert his negative attitude because it is seen to be damaging to the group's performance. Only in the first case could we suspect that some change in that person's script is occurring.

Through training and initial experiences new members of the military organization learn new values and relearn some that they already have. Somewhere along the way the values of honour, duty, sacrifice, integrity, courage and others are demonstrated in the military context. One important thing to note is that, traditionally, recruit training is hard and many of the experiences are physically and emotionally draining and/or satisfying. The reason for this is obvious: the creation of one or more significant emotional events to solidify the military script. Without an attempt to instill a new script, the military might as well grab people from the street and give them a gun. Unfortunately, when recruits do not have the significant event and their scripts are not altered to conform with the military ethic, dangerous combinations of personnel may result, as seen recently in Somalia and perhaps to some extent in Bosnia. The problem for the military then, is not so much ethics, but leadership: the ability and nobility to recognize ethical shortfalls in others and to take measures to correct them if possible. Once personnel have been let through the door, the military can only be responsible for their actions, and not their morality.

Nevertheless, in many instances where events of questionable ethics occur, and where a group of individuals is involved, examination of the group composition often show that only a few of the "perpetrators" are immoral; the others are affected by the military script in which their desire to remain homogeneous and accepted in the group overrides their own morality. However, this is not a problem inherent to the military but just another example of common group dynamics.

Does the military have any ethical responsibilities? Of course. One responsibility comes at the recruiting stage. New measures must be taken to place an ethical yardstick to candidates in an attempt to obtain individuals of high moral character. Much emphasis has been placed on obtaining good leaders or individuals who might develop into good

leaders. Perhaps the right approach is to obtain potential good leaders who lead from correct moral principles. Such individuals should rarely lead men to commit crimes such as genocide, murder, and rape. The difference may even be that a leader with weak moral character succeeds by doing things right, but a morally-strong leader succeeds by doing the right things. In light of today's "global village," the importance of obtaining the latter individual seems all the more necessary for both military and public morale.

Secondly, the accepted ethical script from which the military must play must be continually reinforced through demonstration and example. Recruits who may have ethically-challenged scripts must be made to face the military script and in particular those areas of it that directly conflict with their own. Only in this way can potential problem areas surface and attempts be made to rectify them. Perhaps greater exposure to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols could clear up some "fuzzy" areas for personnel headed to a war zone.

Finally, the military, as always, is responsible for leadership. This leadership must be in many ways the most difficult to display because it involves, for many people, climbing above the pressures and pitfalls of group dynamics to assert themselves morally. In an organization created and trained and run on the basis of leaders and followers, and increasingly of managers and teams, the impulse to "stay the course" even in the face of ethically-questionable actions, is strong. Vehicles must be put in place to allow individuals to question certain actions while remaining within the military context and within the military chain of command. Commanders should welcome questions on morality from their troops as this is, in the very least, an indication that they are thinking about it; it may also serve as a reminder to the commander.

Summary

Values and ethics by their nature are very individualistic; no two people follow exactly the same path and end up as being the same person. Nevertheless, people are affected by their surroundings, not only physically, but also mentally and emotionally as well. These experiences, which include exposure to events and numerous interactions with people, begin to create a "script" for an individual. This script instructs the person to act in certain ways related to their experiences. Likewise, exposure to a value system where one perhaps was non-existent, naturally has to have an effect on that person.

Scripts are deep-rooted in that they either develop over the long term or they are greatly sculpted by significant emotional events. People enter the military with these scripts and then are made to learn and conform to the military script. In most cases there is little difference between the two scripts except that the individual is exposed to the values of courage, valour, self-sacrifice, and others, within the military context.

When ethically-challenged individuals do get into the military and are not made to face their differences, the potential for ethical "accidents" to occur exists. Further, because of group dynamics, of which the military script is built, these individuals can have a profound effect on others who otherwise would be considered to be ethically-fit. The end results of this are glaring questions about the military

morality, when in fact greater care should be taken to put the "blame" in the correct context.

The military cannot be responsible for the morality of any one individual. People enter the military with a script that has been developed for many years and that may be very different from the military one. It is only through long exposure to the military system, or until the individual experiences one or more significant emotional events while in the military, that the person may begin to look at the world in a different way.

One thing that the military can do is to put more effort into ethically-measuring people at the recruiting stage. Proper and thorough screening may prevent potential "problem" individuals from entering the system. Secondly, the military can strive to emphasize and demonstrate correct moral principles on a regular basis. This should especially be done for new recruits who, if ethically-challenged, need to face the differences and correct them as soon as possible. And finally, the military must act quickly and decisively when actions of questionable morality occur. They should be able to almost instantly bring out the "ethical yardstick" and place it beside the event; whatever does not measure up must be removed or reworked.

In many ways today's Canadian military is not very different from others around the world. Each one, at different times, experiences events that cause it to go "soul-searching" for the right answers. The American military went through it during and after the Vietnam War and perhaps the Canadian military is experiencing it with the Somalia affair. Nevertheless, it is the power of the media with its ability to magnify ethical difficulties, and even worse, its ability to extrapolate these difficulties that tend to cause the most pain. The military's duty, then, is to construct the "ethical yardstick" and act quickly to correct any misplaced extrapolations. This will improve not only public trust in the military, but also instill new confidence in the military leadership.

Ethical Failure: Principle Solution

Major Paul Roman

Ethical Failure: Principle Solution

Major Paul Roman

Major Roman is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Business Administration at the Royal Military College of Canada. He graduated from RMC in 1985 with a Bachelor of Engineering. Major Roman is working a Ph.D. from Queen's University.

Introduction

Recent and unfortunate events have cast a dark shadow over the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF). Rather than looking forward to an occasional favourable news story about the CF, some members now hesitate to open the paper, or turn on the television to watch the news for fear of yet more media sensationalization of what is best described as an ethical failure. The incidents in Somalia, and more recently Bosnia, have resulted in unprecedented peacetime public scrutiny of the CF.

Although it is difficult to view these events in a positive light, it is far better to recognize and deal with these problems rather than dismissing them as isolated incidents caused solely by a few bad apples. Commander Land Forces Command, Lieutenant-General Baril, has come to this conclusion and has been one of the first senior officers to suggest "a significant leadership deficiency" as an underlying cause[1] to these problems. This paper contends that although leadership may not be the only cause of the current ethical difficulties, it is certainly the best avenue we have available to resolve it.

Ethical problems and leadership difficulties are not limited to the CF. Indeed, all government departments and the private sector have very similar challenges to face. To deal with their own ethical challenges, "cutting edge" companies such as Federal Express, Hewlett-Packard and Saturn are undergoing leadership transformations in a growing trend of ethical business practices based on shared values or a principle-centred approach to leadership.[2] In addition to creating a much more satisfying workplace, these companies are enjoying increased profits as a result of the transformation. Similarly, the US Army is becoming what their Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer, calls a "Values-Based Organization."[3] In the end, decisions are made by individuals at all levels. Consequently, it is up to people, be they Generals or CEOs, Master Corporals or floor supervisors to make ethical choices.

Many agree that the greatest asset of the CF is the people in uniform. And while we can change our leadership strategy, structure and systems with a CANFORGEN, we cannot dictate shared values and synergistic team culture so easily. These ideals require time, training and reinforcement. A principle-centred leadership philosophy adapted to the needs of the CF would provide an excellent means to overcome the current crisis by drawing on our greatest strength — our people!

How Did We Get Here?

In his first bestseller[4], *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, Stephen Covey subtitles

his book *Restoring the Character Ethic*. In essence, character-based success is not something new but rather something lost that needs to be restored. In his review of 200 years of success literature, he suggests that it had, over the last 50 years, become superficial, based on quick fix solutions that:

> …addressed acute problems and sometimes even appeared to solve them temporarily, but left the underlying chronic problems untouched and left to resurface time and again.*

Covey argues that during the last half decade success, rather than character, has become more a function of personality. The resulting *personality ethic*, as he calls it, has manifested itself along two paths: human and public relations techniques and positive mental attitude. My own readings of this literature over the past ten years support these findings. The substantive writings of Benjamin Franklin, Dale Carnegie and Winston Churchill have been circumvented by recent authors emphasizing superficial techniques as the key to success. These techniques include things like "faking interest in others" in order to get them to do as you wish or learning how to use "body language" and "powerful phrases" to dominate others. Stressing the importance of attitude rather than character with catchy phrases like "it is your attitude and not your aptitude that will determine the altitude you achieve" are further examples of these techniques.

Covey further points out that parts of the personality approach are clearly manipulative or even deceptive, using techniques to get other people to do things you want even if they don't want to themselves.[5] Interestingly, this is extremely close to a definition of leadership that I recall during my military training. This is not surprising, however, since the members of the CF are recruited from the general population and as a result, reflect the norms and attitudes of the society from which they are recruited. Consequently this shift towards quick-fix influence techniques, power strategies, communication skills and positive attitudes that was occurring in both the Canadian private and public sectors has been necessarily reflected in DND and the CF. Consequently, we too have some chronic problems which have recently resurfaced time and again.

During my brief experience as a Squadron Commander, I was certainly guilty of practicing quick-fix influence techniques. I knew that due to the requirement to rotate as many officers as possible through the few remaining command appointments available, I would have at most two years in the job. Consequently, if I was to have any, what I thought would be lasting influence, I would have to be quick. One could argue then that the CF culture and its requirement for frequent postings tends to support such personality-manipulating techniques.

Other structural trends in DND may have served to perpetuate the personality ethic within the CF. For example, the recent emphasis on business planning and the adoption of best business practices have tended to civilianize the day-to-day running of the Department. NDHQ in particular has been forced to employ business planning methods in order to keep the Department fiscally responsible during a period of major downsizing in a climate of doing more with less. Although these business practices are very efficient at protecting the bottom line, they tend to shift emphasis; from

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people to money, from leadership to management, from effectiveness to efficiency, from integrity to image, from character to personality!

I experienced a more personal example during my training at the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College. The intense, five-month long Land Command Staff Course is a rare opportunity for pilots and land officers of every classification to study and rehearse the profession of arms together under the pressure and scrutiny of evaluation by the Directing Staff. During my course, I came to realize that *how* you presented a particular solution was perhaps more important than the solution itself. After all, although the plans I made could be hotly debated among the students during syndicate discussions, they would never actually be tested in combat.

The unfortunate result is that as I prepared my solutions, rather than debating the merits of a particular course of action, I became fixated on the best way to present it, sometimes selecting one plan over another because it would come across better when presented. This very issue was recognized and informally discussed many times among the students. And although the Directing Staff tried to strike an appropriate balance between content and style, the perception remained that how well you presented your plans reflected on how well you did on the course. This is not to say that the presentation of plans is not important, indeed the ability to communicate and pass on orders is critical. However, the "coursemanship" that results from peers competing for what are perceived to be a very limited number of high grades will also result in emphasis on image and appearances. Generalizing this example, one might argue that our PER system and the quest for the limited number of outstanding ratings results in a similar emphasis throughout the CF.

Restoring the Character Ethic

In stark contrast to the emphasis on personality in the recent success literature, Covey interprets the earlier literature to be focussed on what he calls:

> "…the character ethic as the foundation of success — things like integrity, humility, fidelity, temperance, courage, justice, patience, industry, simplicity, modesty, and the Golden Rule. …The character ethic taught that there are basic principles of effective living, and that people can only experience true success and enduring happiness as they learn and integrate these principles into their basic character.**

Again, that is not to say that elements of the personality ethic such as communication skills are not important. Indeed, many of these skills are vital to success, but Covey argues that these are secondary, not primary traits.[6] In analyzing my efforts as a student on the Land Command Staff Course, one might question whether the emphasis I placed on the presentation of my solutions reflected the primary traits of integrity, courage and industry. Or by emphasizing my presentation skills was I relying on personality techniques in a covert attempt to get the best grade possible? The answer to these questions, for me, lies somewhere in between. Consider however, the atmosphere of this same course fifty years ago. It is my belief that post WW II staff college students would be far more concerned about the quality of the solution — things like "does this plan minimize the number of deaths that

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will result?", rather than whether they are lucky enough to get a C+. The reality of war, in my opinion, made it much simpler to concentrate on the basic, primary traits.

I recall another example related to my experiences at the Royal Military College. As a high school student considering post secondary education at RMC, I was exposed to the time and war tested primary traits that make up the college motto — "Truth, Duty, Valour." As a recruit at RMC, I quickly learned the contemporary version espoused by many cadets — "Truth, Duty, Valour, and don't get caught." This particular example, coupled with recent unfortunate events in Somalia and Bosnia, might lead outsiders to believe that the CF pay only lip service to these primary traits.

Although I believe this characterization to be harsh-indeed, it would be virtually impossible for 16 to 20 year old university students to live up to these ideals one-hundred percent of the time, there is definitely room for improvement. The question then is "how do we transform from the personality ethic to the character ethic?" How do people "…integrate these principles into their basic character."[7] A tougher question still is, "what organizational changes are required to ensure the CF's leadership strategy, structures and systems are aligned with these principles?"

Before discussing how the CF can improve in this area, it is worthwhile to look at what other organizations faced with similar challenges are doing. During the 1990s, literally thousands of companies have been struggling to reduce their workforce, boost their productivity and improve quality — all at the same time. Like DND, these companies are coping by eliminating layers of management and "…delegating increased authority to permit managerial flexibility at all levels, balanced by attendant accountability for results and the manner in which they are achieved." [8] Recognizing that changing corporate culture in this way will never work unless employees and supervisors are ready to accept change in themselves, personally as well as professionally, over half of the Fortune 500 companies and many Government agencies have turned to Covey consultants for help:

> Managers must learn to trust workers and empower them to make decisions. Workers must prove that they are trustworthy, can take the initiative and won't abuse the power and responsibilities awarded to them. All must learn to cooperate — in Covey's language: to think win-win, understand one another and synergize. That's where the [Seven] Habits come in. They are considered the perfect compliment to a total-quality management effort and they provide people a code of conduct — a behavioural road map that shows employees as well as friends and family members, how to interact.[9]

What Can Canada's Defence Team Do?

DND and the CF are fortunate in that we have a very clearly defined, and noble mission — "…to protect Canada, contribute to world peace, and project Canadian interests abroad."[10] We have also recently enunciated our vision and management principles, all of which I consider to embrace a principle-centered approach and a character ethic mentality. My concern however, is that although these ideals look good on paper — indeed, I put them up

in my office — we can do a much better job of implementing them. How many CF members have read our military ethos let alone reflected upon it or more importantly still, tried to internalize its message? How many Commanding Officers have held professional development sessions on ethics in their units? The recently revised pamphlet *Leader Development for America's Army* points out that:

> Values are the bedrock of professionals. They influence leader attitudes, behavior, and decisions. History shows successful leaders are competent in and committed to the profession of arms; uphold the dignity and respect of all individuals; are physically and morally courageous; candidly and forthrightly deal with others; and are willingly responsible for the performance of their unit/organization and every individual entrusted to their care.
>
> Professional ethics set the moral context for service to the nation and inspires the sense of purpose necessary to preserve our nation and protect our worldwide national interest. Army ethics contain the values that guide leaders. …By their actions, leaders must display uninhibited loyalty, selfless service, unquestionable integrity, and a total commitment to fully performing assigned and implied duties.[11]

Throughout the history of the profession of arms, leadership and leader development have received virtually continuous attention. The development of competent and confident military and civilian leaders in DND is vital to the Department's long-term success. Developing these future leaders in light of decreasing resources and a smaller force challenges us to maximize every developmental opportunity.

A trained and ready CF will always require leaders who are professionals in every way, leaders who exemplify traditional military values and professional ethics. The challenge is to instill and maintain these values in a peacetime military in which the unprecedented level of downsizing is matched only by the level of media scrutiny.

The formation of the Defence Ethics Program and the CDS's recently held Single Issue Seminar on ethics[12], with virtually every General in the CF participating, are strong indicators that there is an organizational "will" to improve. The *Conference on Ethics in Canadian Defence* is an open forum allowing the rest of the chain of command and civilian employees to participate in ethical discussions with our leaders. The painful experience of having your non-DND neighbours ask your opinion of the last witnesses' testimony during the Somalia inquiry is serving to bring ethical questions to the attention of all members of the Department, making this an ideal time to institute meaningful change. But how do we do implement the kind of individual and organizational changes necessary to create shared values and a synergistic team culture for Canada's Defence Team?

One thing is for certain, there is no quick-fix solution. I have read Covey's books and personally try to incorporate *The Seven Habits* into my every day life but, like eating right, its very difficult to stick with it one hundred percent of the time. I have purposefully avoided describing them here because I hope to generate enough curiosity for readers to get their own copy and read it for themselves. The key is to generate interest for these issues on an individual basis. Covey's books are an excellent starting place and can help generate the kind

of commitment to self-development that will allow DND and the CF to become "…A dynamic, innovative Defence Team committed to excellence, continuous improvement and mutual respect…"[13] A Defence Team so empowered could easily create "…A defence culture which is responsive to change and restraint, reflects the values Canadian Society, and meets the needs of Defence Team members."[14]

Conclusion

There are many outstanding leaders in the CF. Our military history is a proud one and we continue to maintain one of the most professional armed forces in the world. However, the world has changed significantly in the last fifty years. The threat of global conflict has diminished significantly forcing all nations to consider downsizing their military forces. In such an atmosphere, we are forced time and again to justify our existence and to fight tooth and nail for adequate resources to carry out our mandate.

In the midst of all this change, I believe there has been a fundamental shift in our defence culture, a civilianization that supports a personality ethic as opposed to a character ethic. As a result, individual leadership has, in some cases, lost it's foundation in fundamental principles leading to a defence culture that, at times, places appearance over substance resulting in the current ethical failure.

In order to reverse this trend, there is a need for individuals to examine their own beliefs and question whether their behaviour is based on the primary traits of things like; integrity, courage, truth, duty and valour — or whether they have become forced into relying upon secondary traits such as cheap influence strategies to try and get ahead in a shrinking force. With proper guidance and training this individual attention can generate growing interest allowing us to examine our paradigms, processes and behaviours in a meaningful way. The resulting understanding will further help us critically assess our structure and organizational alignment with these principles, facilitating effective long-term change. It took over fifty years of relative peace for our current defence culture to evolve but it doesn't have to take that long to be improved.

Other organizations faced with very similar problems including the US Army are turning to basic, timeless principles in order align organizational missions and structure with individual values. The emphasis, and starting place, is with the individual. By stressing the importance of basic principles that apply — in war, as well as in peacetime — at home, as well as at the office, together, we can create a defence culture that truly:

> "…is responsive to change and restraint, reflects the values of Canadian society, and meets the needs of the Defence Team."[15]

I would like to close with a hypothetical example that illustrates my vision*** of the importance of principles to leadership. Consider the plight of a young leader on a peacekeeping mission. He has been extremely well briefed on the Rules of Engagement (ROE) which have been painstakingly developed at NDHQ in a noble attempt to try and eliminate ambiguity. The clearest possible set of rules has been developed in hopes of making it easy for this leader to follow "the letter of the law," in all situations. This same leader

*** Which I formulated with the help of Maj Rock Hau and many others, in and out of uniform, who reviewed this paper.

has been taught the importance of traditional military values like integrity, courage and obedience. He has made his choices throughout his career based on these principles. Today however, a situation has arisen where the letter of the law, in this case the ROE, appears to be in conflict with those principles. He is faced with an ethical dilemma where the ROEs appear to him to be in conflict with the spirit of the law, in other words, what his moral compass tells him is the right thing to do, and a soldier's life is on the line.

In my opinion, this leader should follow his moral compass. Later, when he has to claim *mea culpa* for having broken the letter of the law, he can do so with the moral conviction of having done what was, in his moral judgement, the right thing under the circumstances. He may very well be held professionally accountable, but if his training and its emphasis on the importance of principles was effective, his moral compass will be pointing to true north and it will be easy for us to support his actions. Ideally, any punishment will be tempered by an understanding of his actions allowing him to emerge with his integrity intact and his leadership will not have been compromised.

If on the other hand, we have let this young leader down and his moral compass points to magnetic north or perhaps the people evaluating his actions haven't set their declination angle yet, we will continue to face serious ethical problems for the future. Principles are timeless, and always point to true north. The challenge is to determine, both individually and as an organization, where our own compasses point and if necessary figure out a way to align with true north.

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Ethics and Communications: The Armed Forces and Canadian Society

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In an article on the media, Guy Carcassonne, who was press advisor to French Prime Minister Michel Rocard from 1988 to 1991, engaged in the following exercise: if Jesus Christ were alive, what questions would the media ask about him?

> Today, there would be a demand that Jesus Christ's income be examined. Was not the use of the stable in Bethlehem a non-cash benefit? Are we quite certain that attendance at the wedding in Cana did not make him guilty of receiving stolen property or misuse of public property? When the Last Supper was over, who paid the bill and whose campaign fund was it charged against?[1]

Through this amusing example, Carcassonne is endeavoring to show, in his own way, that no one is safe from the media. For the past several years, a revolution has been hitting the world of communications head-on. These days, no organization can operate without first developing a communications strategy for dealing with the media and informing the public. The ubiquitousness of the media makes them a force to be reckoned with because they ultimately influence the public and consumers who can quickly form an opinion, either positive or negative, and thereby decide the fate of a company, an institution or even a governmental organization.

Ethics, which is defined as being the science of morality, plays a particular role within organizations working in the field of communications. We often encounter not one but several ethics in a single organization, each having rules of conduct that stem from responsibilities associated with the position in question. Thus, in the case of the Canadian Armed Forces, the ethic of public affairs officers is based on very simple principles: tell the truth, provide journalists with the maximum amount of information in a minimum amount of time, and respect the right of the public to be informed. In any organization, public affairs officials have to contend with other groups that may see things in a different light.

The question often boils down to this: Provide information or withhold it, and if you do provide it, how do you do it? For government departments and agencies, the answer is quite simple, because the Access to Information Act will enable a member of the public to obtain the information that he wants if his request

meets the requirements of the Act. The private sector, on the other hand, is not answerable to anyone regarding the dissemination of information that concerns it. However, an incident always occurs whereby a company must face the public and explain itself. Cornelius B. Pratt, a professor at the University of Michigan, examined the case of Perrier, the mineral water company that distributed bottles of contaminated water in January 1990.

The public affairs and communications staff experienced several failures in this case. According to the author, the messages issued by Perrier created confusion in the mind of the public and were a source of embarrassment to the company. The study led Professor Pratt to conclude that:

> Research indicates that the public relations function is influenced by several variables, including organizational structure, technology, top management support and understanding of public relations, openness of the organizational system, and public relations' role in an organization's dominant coalition. …Against this backcloth, it stands to reason that the resolution of corporate problems and those of public relations does not lie solely with public relations staffs, but with the overall corporate environment.[2]

This means that public relations officers in the Armed Forces must base their decisions both on the principles that govern their attitude towards their work and on the orders received from their superiors. Could conflicts arise? Unquestionably, and public relations officers must rely on common sense to make the optimum choice. Ultimately, then, all public relations officers — be they civilian or military — face the same problems in their sphere of endeavour.

Let us now consider relations between the Armed Forces and the media. Relations between them have never been simple. During the Second World War, service personnel and journalists worked together for victory. Journalists in the theatres of operations could publish nothing without the permission of the military censors, and at home newspapers were required to comply with the Defence of Canada regulations governing censorship. It was total war and journalists had to play their part to ensure an Allied victory. After the war, the media showed an interest in military personnel only to the extent that the events were important from a media standpoint. All this was to change in the 1980s and 1990s.

The publication of the White Paper on Defence in 1987, our increased participation in peacekeeping missions, the Oka crisis, the Gulf War, the unfortunate events in Somalia and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia all served to focus the attention of the media on the Canadian Armed Forces. The persisting economic slump was also to have a significant impact on defence. Canadians who are having to bear the rising costs of raising a family, who have had to absorb considerable cuts in services and who hand over 50% of their incomes in income and other taxes will question the need to spend over $10 billion a year on the Armed Forces.

What have we in the military done to convince our fellow citizens of the importance of maintaining a credible defence capability? Have we

been equal to the task? In 1920, Rear-Admiral Sir Douglas Brownrigg, who was in charge of censorship for the Royal Navy during the First World War, wrote that publicity was not held in very high esteem by the officers:

> The attitude of the Navy towards publicity was very slow to change, and I think I can say today with a perfectly clear mind, that though the officers of the Navy may grudgingly agree that some measure of publicity is an absolute necessity, since the Fleet belongs to the nation (i.e. the public) and not to the Navy, they thoroughly detest it. The lower deck, perhaps, regards the matter somewhat more jocularly.[3]

These comments appear to provide an accurate description of the attitude that we see today in the Armed Forces. It is disturbing to observe that military personnel are not taking part in the discussions currently taking place in civilian society. Many believe that the Armed Forces have no need to explain themselves because, after all, the Department of National Defence is a permanent fixture in the service of the nation. This line of thinking has proven to be catastrophic. The problem is simple: If military personnel cannot express themselves on defence or other matters, who will? Some believe that it is up to politicians to speak on defence because, in a democracy, the political authority is supreme.

Yet nothing should prevent service personnel from speaking out, because in actuality, matters of defence are very often confined, among the politicians, to the amount of money spent in their ridings. Not everyone is an expert in matters dealing with strategy, geopolitics and the employment of the Canadian Forces. Dominique Wolton, director of the communications and policy laboratory at France's Conseil National de la Recherche Scientifique (National Scientific Research Council) examined communications during the Gulf War. To those who criticized the overly frequent appearances by military personnel on radio and television during these events he replies:

> If we do not see military personnel in the media in wartime, when will we see them? Why, in a democracy, would military personnel be the only ones not to have the right to express themselves? And why would we forgo their knowledge and comments when it is primarily they who are waging the war? Why would we forgo their knowledge in a situation where strategic and tactical analysis is of the essence and where the public's military knowledge is, on the whole, quite limited?[4]

In fact, the members of the Armed Forces have quite a job of education awaiting them in the years to come. This, however, will require that the political authorities agree to let military personnel express themselves, which in turn means introducing basic reforms needed to achieve this end.

To understand the relations between the Armed Forces and the media or the attitude of the media toward the Armed Forces, we must examine the ethics of journalists and identify the position of the media on the principal problems currently facing modern societies.

Steven Erlanger recently wrote in *The New York Times*:

> The collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist alternative has pushed the world's politics to the right. Not only is Marx discredited, but everywhere, from Sweden to India, there has been a turn away from giantism and faith in government and its smothering bureaucracy as the best engine for economic development and social justice.[5]

However, Erlanger fails to grasp the consequences of such a movement. The Ombudsman of Quebec, Daniel Jacoby, clearly identified the problems that democracy is experiencing in the current economic slump:

> Today, the public is powerlessly witnessing growing inequalities, yet in the West, the welfare state has endeavored to provide them with "equal opportunities," both economically and socially, while striving to promote individual freedom. However, the current economic slump is accentuating inequalities and revealing how fragile democracy is. We are seeing some of the attainments of the welfare state being challenged. Impoverishment and exclusion are becoming widespread: this is a paradox of the current democratic theory. The most essential aspects of life in society (health, education and justice) are affected by this phenomenon. Apart from its economic dimension, the slump has thus revealed a deeper failure — the inability or refusal to show consideration for others. …This decline in values has resulted in a lack of leadership and vision.[6]

This crisis of democracy has direct consequences on the media. Indeed, since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the media have undergone significant changes. Prior to 1989, there was a left that debated the problems of society with a right, and this fostered the advancement of ideas. The problem is that the fall of communism gave rise to an unprecedented expansion of capitalism, whose ideology is in keeping with the wave of neoliberalism. "Neoliberalism" is the fashionable ideology that promotes the maximum development of the forces of capitalism and advocates globalization, the downsizing of businesses, the use of subcontractors, the lowering of the cost of wages and benefits, and a reduction in the size and role of government. In other words, neoliberalism constitutes a return to dog-eat-dog capitalism. The effects of neoliberalism on the media are quite familiar: concentration of media vehicles in the hands of a minority, ideological leanings of the media, lack of courage to criticize capitalism and decry its excesses, use of information from one medium in another and finally, barrenness of analysis.

Jean-François Kahn, who founded *L'Événement du Jeudi* in 1984, believes that we are witnessing the development of "monolithic thought." "Counterthought that counts" is disappearing. According to Kahn, "…because of the collapse of communist ideas, self-managing utopias and liberal illusions, we no longer dare to think in any other way, and this in turn prompts us to adopt the correct ideology in which we find nothing to criticize."[7] Since "nothing of a dissenting nature can be said about capital, labour, exploitation, taxation, or inequalities, such things are said about women, morals, immigrants, ethics, homosexuality, ecology, safety, etc."[8] One might

also add the government and its institutions. It must be borne in mind that, according to neoliberal ideology, the government and its institutions are roundly disparaged because the private sector is supposed to do better for less, which of course is hogwash of the worst sort. Wolfgang Engler of the Berlin weekly *Wochenpost* observes that "journalists have gone over to the business camp en masse. Where is the press that challenges this disappearance of political activity and deals with social concerns…?"[9]

The press coverage of the Department of National Defence must be understood and analyzed in this context. It is surprising, indeed, to note the lack of depth in the analyses of defence matters, despite all of the scandals of which the Department stands accused. Of course, the objective is to sell newspapers, and sensationalism is the best vehicle for doing so. The example of the initiation of soldiers at Petawawa is typical. Photos of the initiation were shown repeatedly in the media. However, when the Université de Montréal's Faculty of Medicine cancelled the initiation of new students after the obscene songs that the future doctors had to learn were brought to their attention, a Montreal newspaper wrote that "the lewd lyrics of these teenage authors are unfit to be printed; we shall simply indicate that they extolled masturbation and dwelt in graphic detail on the suggested ways in which the new students could sexually satisfy the upperclassmen."[10] So, a double standard exists!

The incidents in which the Canadian Armed Forces have been involved in recent years can be explained in a number of ways. Lieutenant-General Maurice Baril has identified serious leadership problems which he intends to resolve quickly. However, in this crisis environment, it is also necessary to look at the problems affecting other armies. Take, for example, the U.S. Navy and the Tailhook scandal. "Tailhook" refers to the name of the US Navy pilots' association convention which took place at the Las Vegas Hilton in 1991. At that officers' convention, 83 women were sexually assaulted, resulting in the resignation of Lawrence Garrett, then Secretary of the Navy. In April 1994, 24 midshipmen attending the US Naval Academy at Annapolis were expelled for cheating on their examinations. In September 1995, a 12-year-old Japanese girl was raped in Okinawa by two American marines and a sailor. Admiral Richard Macke, Commander US Forces Pacific, resigned after saying that the servicemen should have hired a prostitute instead of committing a rape. Finally, there was the suicide of Admiral Jeremy Boorda last May when the press was investigating his decorations.

The Russian army, which has lost 10,000 of its soldiers in Chechnya, is also having its share of problems. The letters that service personnel send to their families illustrate the extent of the difficulties. Here are a couple of examples:

> You know, what they broadcast on TV is not really what's happening. I work at the command office, and we listen to communications over the radio. Such fierce fighting is going on, and there are so many wounded and killed. On TV they are always downplaying this. And when they say the situation in Chechnya is under control, it's garbage. They're pulling the wool over your eyes.

> This war has made millionaires of many. And all we could do was empty our machine guns; unlike the officers, we can't carry the stuff away with us. In general, so much stuff in this city has been senselessly destroyed, simply for fun — from private houses, to cars, to factories! It's a stupid war, and so is our army.[11]

For its part, the French army is analyzing the impact of discontinuing conscription. What will be the relations between the Army and the nation once professionals have replaced the conscripts? It is feared that a "loss of identity and gradual erosion of the military profession"[12] will ensue. One armoured officer fears that "a professional army risks becoming 'ghettoized', that it will 'shrivel up' while 'stewing in its own juice' and cutting itself off sociologically from the country as a whole 'to which it will bear no resemblance,' particularly as regards its ethics." Could this provide food for thought for the Canadian army?

Let us now turn to the ethics of the principal players in the world of the media. Many authors have been decrying the lack of professionalism among journalists for some years now. In his book entitled *Abus de Presse*, Laurent Duval writes that journalists report the news in a manner that is "spectacular or dramatic in order to impress the public" and thereby increase circulation or ratings so as to boost profits. To do this, the media use the following gimmicks: dramatic headlines, headlines that have little to do with the content, overexposure, underexposure, voyeurism, harassment of guests, exploitation of tragedies, etc. Laurent Duval quotes from the farewell editorial written by Michel Roy, who worked for *Le Devoir* for 25 years. Roy offers this criticism of journalism:

> …The greatest obstacle to the quest for and dissemination of information in this society is not so much governments, the public service and official agencies as journalists themselves, who are fonder of surprises than truth, prone to take the easy way out, and disinclined to carefully examine complex questions, conveniently pleading tight deadlines as a reason for failing to obtain the views of all parties to a dispute…[13]

Marc-François Bernier, a journalist with the *Journal de Québec*, has written a book with an evocative title: *Les planqués: Le journalisme victime des journalistes* (Playing it Safe: Journalism as a Victim of Journalists). The author shows how newspapers use the argument of the public's right to information purely to increase their profits. He gives the example of the lawyers for Quebecor who (unsuccessfully) pleaded the public's right to information to authorize their photographers to cover the wedding of Céline Dion and René Angelil![14]

This headlong pursuit of profit sometimes verges on irresponsibility. What are we to make of Joan Fraser's leaving *The Gazette* — she who was known for her conciliatory positions vis-à-vis the Francophone majority — or the unfortunate statement by Peter White, a member of Southam's board of directors, claiming that "*The Gazette* should see itself as a local paper rather that as a universalist, national paper of a major city." Service personnel who have spent time in the former Yugoslavia could discuss the role of the local media in the growing tensions between the ethnic groups, but they are rarely asked to talk about their experiences.

Criticism of the Forces should be understood in a much broader context — that of the public's lack of confidence in our national institutions. A survey conducted in February 1995 showed that 26% of Canadians had considerable confidence in the Armed Forces. The federal government enjoyed the confidence of only 11% of Canadians, the House of Commons, 8%, and the Senate, 6%. Newspapers, major companies, law firms and unions all came in behind the Canadian Armed Forces. Our situation is therefore not hopeless![15] Nonetheless, 26% is not very much, but it is up to us in the Canadian Armed Forces to conduct ourselves and act in such a way as to regain the confidence of our countrymen.

Those who believe that the media will lose interest in us once the Somalia Inquiry is over are making a monumental mistake. Today, the public wants government institutions to give them an account of their stewardship. This is taking place in all democracies. The editorial that appeared in the 18 August 1996 issue of *The New York Times* was entitled "Making the CIA Accountable." Between 1980 and 1995, the CIA injected over $30 million into the military intelligence services of Guatemala, knowing full well that that organization has never respected human rights. According to the author of the editorial, "the CIA cannot be trusted to police itself." We must have faith that we will be able to avoid that situation, and to do so, we will have to be open in our dealings with the media. Moreover, in closing, I would like to quote a passage from an article written by Richard Halloran, who covered military affairs for *The New York Times* from 1979 to 1989:

> After a dinner with senior officers at Fort Leavenworth several years ago, a colonel challenged a correspondent: "Why should I bother with you? My job is to train troops to go to war." It was a pertinent question. On the positive side, as General Eisenhower pointed out, the press is a vital channel of communication within Clausewitz's trinity of government, the army, and the people. The scribblers squirt grease into that machinery to help make it go. On the negative side, the scribblers can also throw sand into the machinery. If military officers refuse to respond to the press, they are in effect abandoning the field to critics of the armed forces. That would serve neither the nation nor the military services.[16]

Notes

1. Guy Carcassonne, "Peut-on gouverner contre les médias?" (Is it Possible to Govern Despite Media Opposition?), *Le débat*, January-February 1996, p. 57.
2. Cornelius B. Pratt, "Applying Classical Ethical Theories to Ethical Decision Making in Public Relations: Perrier's Product Recall", *Management Communication Quartely: An International Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 1, August 1994, p. 89.
3. Rear-Admiral Sir Douglas Brownrigg, *Indiscretions of the Naval Censor*, London, Cassell and Company Ltd., 1920, p. 40.
4. Dominique Wolton, War Game: *Information et la guerre* (War Game: Information and War), Paris, Flammarion, 1991, p. 51.
5. Steven Erlanger, "Off Their Marx: If Right Is Center, Where Is Left?", *The New York Times*, 18 August 1996, p. E1.

6. Daniel Jacoby, "Forum. Au programme : démocratie et citoyen" (Forum. On the Agenda: Democracy and the Public), The Ombudsman, *1994-1995 Annual Report to the Quebec National Assembly*, printed in L'Agora, October 1994.

7. Jean-François Kahn, "Anatomie de la 'pensée unique'" (Anatomy of 'Monolithic Thought'), *Le débat*, January-February 1996, p. 76.

8. *Ibid*., p. 79.

9. Wolfgang Engler, "L'Allemangne face à la pensée unique" (Germany deals with monolithic thought), *Courrier international*, No. 304, 29 August to 4 September 1996, p. 4.

10. Isabelle Paré, "Université de Montréal: La faculté de médecine annule *in extremis* l'initiation des nouveaux étudiants" (University of Montreal: The faculty of medicine cancels initiation at the last minute), *Le Devoir*, 22 August 1996.

11. "Word for Word / Russian Soldiers: All Disenchanted On the Chechen Front", *The New York Times*, 8 September 1996, p. E7.

12. Jaques Isnard, "Sa restructuration fait craindre à l'armée de terre 'un traumatisme majeur' pour des cadres" (The reorganization of the army raises fears of 'a major trauma' among the officers and NCOs), *Le Monde*, 7 March 1996, p. 7.

13. Laurent Duval, *Abus de presse : Critique du quatrième pouvoir* (Misuse of the Press: Criticism of the Fourth Estate), Montreal, Liber, 1995, p. 176.

14. Marc-François Bernier, *Les planqués : Le journalisme victime des journalistes* (Playing it Safe: Journalism as a Victim of Journalists), Montreal, VLB, 1995, p. 40.

15. Survey conducted by Thompson Lightstone & Company Limited, The Harris Poll – Confidence in the Canadian Armed Forces; Confidence in Institutions (February 1995).

16. Richard Halloran, "Soldiers and Scribblers: Working with the Media," *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, Vol XXV, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 152.

Psychological Perspectives on Ethical Development

Karol W. J. Wenek

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Introduction: The Psychological Point of View

In a forum such as this, designed to provide a variety of perspectives on ethics, perhaps my first duty is to explain what I mean by a psychological perspective and how it differs from such touchstone specialties as moral philosophy and leadership practice. Generally speaking, psychology's perspective can be distinguished from other points of view primarily in its objectives and methodology. Moral philosophy, for instance, is largely concerned with developing defensible definitions of right and wrong, identifying basic criteria of ethical conduct, building comprehensive theories of ethical obligation, and working out the implications of these principles in applied areas. Its tools are language, logic, and reason.

Leadership practice, on the other hand, in so far as it is concerned with ethics, has the objective of influencing others to accept and comply with the ethical norms of a particular group or organization. Leadership is based on power and the use of power in influencing others. Accordingly, leaders approach ethical imperatives through a variety of social-influence processes, including: clarifying performance expectations by making explicit statements of the organization's ethical norms (e.g., statements of ethical values, codes of conduct); providing appropriate ethics training for individuals and groups; overtly including ethical considerations in policy discussions and decision making; reinforcing ethical norms through the organizational reward system; and ensuring that their own behaviour reflects and models espoused ethical standards.

Psychology is concerned with the accurate and reliable description, measurement, and explanation of behaviour. The psychological approach to ethics reflects a similar orientation, that is, describing, measuring, and explaining ethical/unethical behaviour, as it is actually manifested in personal and shared experiences — how it develops, cause-and-effect relationships, and the boundary conditions under which key variables can be expected to be influential. The basis of such an understanding is scientific, which essentially requires that observations and findings be empirically verifiable and replicable by others.

If the psychology of ethics differs in one major respect from moral philosophy and leadership perspectives, it is probably this: moral philosophy and leadership are idealistic and prescriptive — they focus on what *ought* to be; psychology's first concern is to be

realistic and descriptive — it focuses on what *is*. As limited as this objective might seem, it follows that well grounded dependable explanations of ethical and unethical behaviour may be of considerable practical value in advancing the social ideals of moral philosophy and visionary leadership.

For the sake of simplicity, I propose to divide the domain of psychological inquiry concerning ethical behaviour into two broad areas. This partition reflects the distinction that can be made in moral philosophy between ethical theories that are primarily concerned with *what people do* (i.e., consequentialist and deontological theories) and those that focus on *what people are* (i.e., aretaic, or virtue, theories). One group of theories focuses on the nature of the act, the other on the character of the moral agent. In this paper, I will be dealing with the latter area, moral character. I will relate how psychologists define moral character, summarize some of the major theoretical views on character development, review empirical findings on the contribution of ethical education and training to character development, and conclude with an illustration of the limits of character as a determinant of ethical behaviour.

What Do Psychologists Mean By "Moral Character"?

In one of the few comprehensive discussions of the term, Robert Hogan (1973, 1975) likens the concept of character to the notion of personality, but restricts the meaning of *character* to those personality dispositions and traits that are subject to societal evaluations of right and wrong. In that context, he defines character as "the recurring motives and dispositions that give stability and coherence to … social conduct" (1973, p. 219).

His reading of philosophy and psychology leads him to identify five recurring dimensions, or facets, of character. The first is *moral knowledge*, that is, knowledge of moral rules and principles and the ability to apply them correctly. The practical value of moral knowledge is that it allows one to make moral judgements, and, when coupled with a capacity for feedback and self-criticism, provides a basis for self-control. As a cognitive ability, moral knowledge overlaps with intelligence and moral-reasoning ability.

The second dimension involves an ideological continuum anchored at one end by a view of morality as an instrument for and subservient to the preservation of social order and the state (*moral positivism*) and, at the other end, by a view of morality as an impartial body of natural law to be discovered by individual reason (*moral intuitionism*). Hogan suggests that these opposing views derive from competing beliefs about human nature, one emphasizing the Hobbesian aspects of life in human society, the other investing faith in humankind's natural benevolence. One's preferred orientation vis-à-vis these attitudinal poles is taken to reflect either an "ethic of social responsibility," which justifies morality in terms of its ability preserve law and order and thereby further the common social interest, or an "ethic of personal conscience," which justifies morality by appeal to a "higher" law than human law, which is indifferent to the larger social interest.* It is the tension between these positions that is at the heart of the ethical dramas in Sophocles' *Antigone* and Robert Bolt's *A Man for All Seasons*.

* Hence, in debating the ethical merits of using the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a positivist would probably stand by the argument that it saved a lot of American lives and therefore furthered the interests of American society. An intuitionist, on the other hand, would likely argue that this amounts to claiming that the lives of Americans are intrinsically more valuable than the lives of Japanese people, that this is contrary to the concept of the equal dignity of all human life, and that it was this kind of thinking that created so much of the devastation in World War II.

The third facet of Hogan's character model, *socialization*, concerns the degree to which one accepts the rules and values of one's family, society, and culture minimally necessary for social life. Socialized individuals are said to be well adjusted to their social environment and have a sense of belonging. Unsocialized individuals reject social rules and norms and feel more or less socially alienated. Socialization provides the foundation for social cooperation and harmony; its absence is likely to result in recurring conflicts with society.

Empathy, the fourth dimension, captures the idea of sensitivity to the needs and points of view of others. Figuratively speaking, it is the ability to walk a mile in someone else's shoes. Based on an ability also to identify with human frailty, empathy tends to soften the hard edges of rational judgment and to create a capacity for forgiveness.

The fifth dimension of Hogan's model, *autonomy*, "refers to the capacity to make moral decisions without being influenced by peer group pressure or the dictates of authority" (1975, p. 162). Because moral autonomy places a premium on judgments made independently and according to objective standards, social consensus is never the last word on what is right. According to this view, social communities and social leaders are not morally infallible but are subject to moral error; hence, "an autonomous set of moral standards serves to insulate one from the potential immorality of the community" (1973, p. 226).

According to a cross-section of research summarized by Hogan, these five dimensions of character appear to be fairly independent, or uncorrelated. One can score high or low on measures of any one dimension without necessarily scoring high or low on any of the other dimensions. Scoring high across the board on measures of moral knowledge, the ethic of personal conscience, socialization, empathy, and autonomy is taken to signify moral maturity, the *ideal* endpoint of moral development. Hogan observes, however, that high levels of development in all these qualities rarely exist in a single person.

What Role Does Heredity Play in Shaping Character?

Hardly a week goes by without a news report of some medical-research team finding the genetic marker for this or that disease, or some continuing controversy on the role played by heredity in some social characteristic. In the double-helix era, it is not unreasonable to ask if heredity also influences moral character. At first glance, perhaps it is unreasonable to expect a genetic influence. After all, ideas of good and evil are inventions of human culture, so that we should expect the primary mechanisms of moral development to be cultural and social. On the other hand, there is an overlap of interests between ethics and the operation of genetic variation and natural selection. Ethics is concerned, in a fundamental way, with social living. Hence, in so far as there is some survival advantage to social adjustment and social cooperation, genetic factors, as some socio-biologists and ethologists** have argued, will come into play.

The preferred experimental design for determining the heritability of any psychological characteristic is to examine the concordance rate for the trait of interest in monozygotic (identical) twins who were separated at birth and reared in different environments

** See, for example, the general argumant made by Frans de Waal in *Good natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals*, Harvard University Press.

(Willerman, 1979). Because identical twins have 100% of their genes in common, any differences between twins who have been reared apart can be safely attributed to the influence of non-genetic or environmental factors. Other designs involving fraternal twins and other siblings are much less conclusive in separating out genetic and environmental influences.

While there do not appear to be any studies of the inheritablity of moral character, behavioural-genetic research has been done on the *character disorders* of psychopathy and criminality. Psychopaths, or sociopaths as they are also called,*** are not only chronically in trouble with the law but their personality is marked by few emotional ties, impulsiveness, aggressiveness, recklessness, indifference to punishment, manipulativeness, and a lack of either empathy or remorse for the pain and discomfort they cause others (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1987; Willerman, 1979).

The available research suggests that psychopathy has an inherited component. But this finding must be qualified by two points. First, having a genetic predisposition to psychopathy does not mean that one is predestined to be a psychopath. As with heart disease or schizophrenia, the risk is higher than average for those with the relevant genetic marker, but risk is not certainty and other factors can either increase or offset the risk. Second, it is clear that environment has a very strong effect on the phenotype; this is readily apparent to anyone who has attempted gardening under varied growing conditions. That certain social environments have harmful effects on the development of character should not, therefore, be surprising: in fact, "a disproportionate number of identified psychopaths come from environments in which the rearing conditions are far from satisfactory. Broken homes, poverty, alcoholism, and other signs of familial maladjustment are common in the histories of psychopaths" (Willerman, 1979, p. 268). As the APA notes, quite apart from any genetic influence, "parents with Antisocial Personality Disorder increase the risk of Antisocial Personality Disorder … in both their adopted and biologic children" (p. 344) by virtue of the environment they create. Prevalence of the disorder in the American population is estimated at about 3% for males and under 1% for females.

*** The preferred clinical term used to describe this syndrome is Antisocial Personality Disorder.

How Does Character Develop?

Psychological theories of character development uniformly ascribe an important role to environmental factors. Where they differ is in the territories staked out for investigation, whether they are particular dimensions of character or the processes by which it develops. Thus, while a casual review of the literature might suggest competitors jostling for the front of the pack, Gibbs and Schnell (1985) view various theories of character development as more similar than dissimilar and hence as complementary and interdependent. That outlook is particularly helpful, I think, in considering the three theoretical positions I propose to review: Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory; Albert Bandura's social-learning theory of moral development; and Martin Hoffman's position on the role of empathy in moral development.

Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory

Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory (1969, 1976) is probably the best known work on moral development. First advanced in the

late 1950s, it is an extension of Jean Piaget's work on general cognitive development and moral development. The basic idea of Kohlberg's theory is that moral development involves transformations of mental structures, or schema, and that these transformations typically occur in an invariant sequence of stages (see Table 1). It is important to note that this process can be speeded up, retarded, or even arrested by social and cultural factors. Stages are hierarchically ordered, meaning that reasoning at higher stages tends to displace the pattern of moral justification at lower stages. However, people do sometimes apply the reasoning of stages higher and lower than their typical stage. Kohlberg concludes from his research that most adults operate at Stage 4 most of the time and estimates that only 15% of American adults function at Stage 5 and 6% at Stage 6.

Moral reasoning at the Pre-conventional Level, which typically covers the early childhood years up to about age 10, is governed by concerns about externally applied punishments and rewards. The child's world view at this time is essentially egocentric.

At the Conventional Level of reasoning, which emerges most strongly in the adolescent and early teen years, moral values are associated with performing appropriate social roles and meeting the expectations of referent others. This is consistent with the increasing importance attached to acceptance by, and membership in, various social groups at this age level.

At the Post-conventional Level of reasoning, which may show signs of development in early adulthood, consistency with personal principles provides the motivation for moral

Table 1
Kohlberg's levels and stages of moral development

LEVELS AND STAGES	DESCRIPTION
Level I: Pre-conventional morality	
Stage 1: Punishment orientation.	Compliance with rules to avoid punishment.
Stage 2: Naive reward orientation.	Compliance with rules to get rewards.
Level II: Conventional morality	
Stage 3: Good-boy/girl orientation.	Conformity to rules that are defined by others' approval/disapproval.
Stage 4: Authority orientation.	Rigid conformity to society's rules, law-and-order mentality.
Level III: Post-conventional morality	
Stage 5: Social-contract orientation.	More flexible understanding that we obey rules because they are necessary for social order but that rules can be changed if there are better alternatives.
Stage 6: Morality of principles and individual conscience.	Behaviour reflects internalized principles (justice, equality) to avoid self-condemnation and shame; may sometimes violate society's rules.

action. Social identity at this stage tends to be highly individuated and cosmopolitan and only weakly tied to tribal, ethnic, and other culturally specific identities.

Although sometimes accused of being a biological maturationist, Kohlberg takes pains in his writings to point out that the development of cognitive structure "is the result of processes of *interaction* between the structure of the organism and the structure of the environment, rather than being the direct result of maturation or the direct result of [conditioned] learning" (1969, p. 348). Moral schema are not, he asserts, solely the product of some innate pattern nor the reflection of a structure in the outside world. Nevertheless a key idea in his theory is the notion of *readiness* for learning (Sieber, 1980), which is a function of maturation. The extent to which readiness is capitalized on, however, is a function of the opportunities presented by experience.

The validity of Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory is supported in its broad features by independent theorizing and research on the development of pro-social values (Eisenberg, 1989). The strongest support for the theory's underlying assumptions, however, has come from cross-cultural studies, with the most compelling evidence compiled in an integrative review of 45 studies carried out in 27 countries (Snarey, 1985).

Bandura's social-learning account

Albert Bandura has been one of the strongest critics of stage theories of moral development generally and Kohlberg's theory in particular (Bandura, 1986, 1991). Among other things, Bandura asserts that Kohlberg's explanation of moral judgment presumes and requires a level and quality of cerebral activity which studies on the limitations of human information processing simply do not support. It also under-estimates the effects of experiential learning and the possibility that social behaviour is often learned without a great deal of thought or even any thought at all.

As a competing explanation of moral development, Bandura puts forward his own social learning theory. When first introduced several decades ago, social learning theory not only acknowledged that we learn directly, by experiencing the consequences of our behaviour (the principle of operant learning), but that humans acquire most of their socially relevant behaviours indirectly, or vicariously. Through the observation of so-called models, people at all ages and stages of life learn the appropriateness and inappropriateness of certain behaviours, and, through imitation, acquire the rudiments of complex behaviours and skills (e.g., doing drill by numbers). Models can be either real or symbolic. And symbolic models, whether in print or video form, can have as much influence as real-life models — which is why Plato wanted to ban poets from his ideal republic and why some books and films are suitable only for mature audiences. On the plus side, however, an entire training and development industry is based on behavioural-modeling techniques of instruction (Decker & Nathan, 1985). The influence and effectiveness of models, intended and otherwise, is also why *example* is such an important issue for leadership ethics: "the standards acquired through modeling are affected by variations in judgments displayed by the same model over time and by discrepancies between what models practise and what they preach" (Bandura, 1986, p. 492).

Unlike stage theorists, Bandura views the acquisition of moral standards as a much messier process. In terms of development, he will only concede a general tendency for processes of internal control to substitute over time for processes of external regulation and control, as a result of increasing competence in self-regulation. Even the most autonomous individuals, though, may, in his opinion, sometimes regulate their behaviour according to considerations of such external factors as anticipated rewards, punishments, or social reactions.

Hoffman's views on empathy

With Martin Hoffman (1979, 1981, 1991), the emphasis shifts from the cognitive and behavioural elements of morality to the domain of feelings and the particular role of empathy as the foundation for altruistic and other pro-social behaviours. In Hoffman's view, empathy plays a significant role in comprehensive moral theory (1991), and there is strong empirical evidence to support this opinion (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Defined as a partially involuntary, vicarious, affective response to the distress of others (Hoffman, 1981), empathy possesses, by its ability to arouse sympathetic distress, powerful motivational properties — witness the spontaneous outpourings of generosity to the victims of fires, famines, floods, earthquakes, and tornadoes, and the individual acts of heroism by strangers who jump into rivers and enter burning buildings to rescue others.

Although the empathic response may be biologically hard-wired into humans, as evidenced by the reaction of infants who cry to the sound of another's cry, researchers generally agree that the development of empathic behaviour is highly dependent on the quality of parental attachment and nurturing during childhood (Aronfreed, 1969; Hoffman, 1991; Sieber, 1980). Evidence from experimental primate research and naturalistic human-subject studies strongly suggests that the establishment and maintenance of a satisfactory emotional attachment with an adult during childhood lays the groundwork for later social attachments and caring behaviour. On the other hand, if no such attachment is formed, there is an increased risk of social maladjustment and psychopathic behaviour (Sieber, 1980; Willerman, 1979).

The child-rearing practices described as ideal for the development of empathy and other socially desirable behaviours are neither authoritarian nor permissive, but, rather, authoritative. These practices combine unstinting affection with clear rules and firm limits on behaviour, and emphasize the use of reason and age-appropriate explanations in the application of discipline (Aronfreed, 1976; Sieber, 1980).

Scholarly writings and research on moral development and behaviour have, as a rule, given short shrift to the role of feelings such as empathy and caring. Philosophers and psychologists have been more comfortable describing the intricacies of moral rules and moral reasoning. Carole Gilligan (1977), however, has been a prominent critic of the stranglehold of reason on ethics and has argued that the pre-occupation of Kohlberg and others with justice as the supreme value and criterion of what is right is misguided (Brabeck, 1983). Is the essence of ethics to be reduced to sophistry and soulless adherence to the dictates of a blindfolded woman

suspending life in a scale? The ethic of justice, Gilligan asserts, must be supplemented with an ethic of caring. And, as food for thought on that proposition, I would suggest consideration of this recurring idea in Western culture. In Christian tradition, it is found in the two commandments given by Christ: love God, love your neighbour. In Shakespeare, it is articulated in Portia's appeal to the court in *The Merchant of Venice* to set aside the strict requirements of justice under the law in favour of the "quality of mercy." And, in Dostoevski, it is dramatized, in the great parable of the Grand Inquisitor in *The Brothers Karamazov*, in which, after listening in silence to a lengthy rationalization of arbitrary power by the Grand Inquisitor, a condemned prisoner, whose identity is deliberately ambiguous, responds only with a gentle kiss.

How Do Education and Training Contribute to Moral Development?

Aggregated analyses of many research studies indicate that education and training foster moral development in at least two ways (Boyce & Jensen, 1978; Rest & Deemer, 1986; Schlaefli, Rest, & Thoma, 1985). Moral *judgment* is enhanced (1) by a general educational environment that is socially and intellectually challenging and that also encourages and rewards inquiry and achievement; and (2) not surprisingly, by focussed moral education programs that are at least 4-12 weeks in duration and that emphasize dilemma discussions or development of the social aspects of personality. Moral *autonomy*, the independence of judgment from external controls and sanctions, is developed through indirect training methods, such as interactive sessions that ensure the equal status of participants, and role-playing and modeling exercises that are effective in communicating discrepant information and provoking thereby some degree of cognitive disequilibrium.

Evidence for the effects of general education comes from a meta-analysis of studies comprising over 6,000 subjects, which shows age/education to account for 52 percent of the variance in moral judgement as measured by scores on the Defining Issues Test (DIT) (cited by Rest & Deemer, 1986). The results of a 10-year longitudinal study involving over 100 subjects (Rest & Deemer, 1986) are also strongly indicative of a functional developmental relationship between formal education and moral judgment (see Figure 1).

To explain this relationship, several waves of studies were undertaken by different groups of researchers. One examined the general interests and activities of the research subjects. Another collected data on their critical moral experiences. A third asked the research participants themselves to identify what, in their opinion, had contributed to the development of their moral thinking. None of these investigations shed much light on the relationship between formal education and moral judgment. However, when researchers asked the participants about their *attitudes* and *reactions* to their experiences in school, after school, and with friends,family, and significant others, and entered these data into the equation, they were able to account for substantial amount of the change in DIT scores over time. They summarized their findings as follows: "The picture we get from these analyses is that development in moral judgment occurs in concert with general social development. It is not specific *moral* experiences … as much as a growing awareness of the social world

Figure 1
Longitudinal mean DIT by education



and one's place in it that seems to foster moral development" (Rest & Deemer, 1986, p. 57). In short, people who are *engagé*, as the existentialists used to say, and whose engagement in social life is gratifying in some way, are more likely to develop the other-oriented values and consideration that are the hallmarks of moral character.

Convincing evidence is available that moral judgment is also facilitated by educational programs specifically designed with a moral-development purpose. The good news is that moral education works — but not all programs are equally successful. A meta-analytic review of 55 studies (Schlaefli, Rest, & Thoma, 1985), involving a total sample size of over 3,800, yielded the following results:

- When considered without regard to type of program, subject characteristics, duration of program, etc., moral-education programs averaged a significant but small effect (as indexed by Cohen's delta), in contrast to control groups and other general-education courses, which showed a negligible effect.

- Programs in which discussions of moral dilemmas figured prominently, or which were devoted to personal growth and the development of social skills, resulted in the largest changes and exhibited magnitude-of-effect sizes in the small-to-moderate range.

- Adults benefited most from these programs and junior high school students the least, this difference being attributed to differences in motivation and relevant life experiences.

- Programs of up to three weeks duration provided almost no educational benefit, whereas programs of 4 to 12 weeks proved to be optimally effective.

In examining more closely the developmental effects of moral-education programs, Boyce and Jensen (1978) indicated that studies which assess only moral *judgment* do not really say anything conclusive about moral *maturity*. Reflecting a view shared by many researchers, they invoke Jean Piaget's argument that moral *autonomy* is a critical component of moral maturity. Thus, while many training and education programs may successfully condition students to provide the expected right answers on being presented with various moral problems, they are inherently contaminated by the implicit threat of social and other sanctions for responding "incorrectly." To avoid the predicament of substituting didacticism for the development of independent thinking, Boyce and Jensen advocate the use of indirect approaches in learning experiences. Based on their review of a series of training evaluations, these include:

- social interactions and discussions that are characterized by mutual respect, open and free exchanges, joint problem-solving, and a willingness to compromise;

- behavioural modeling sessions in which the model provides any or all of (1) new information about a moral issue, (2) a demonstration of well structured and exemplary reasoning, and (3) discrepant views that motivate or provoke cognitive disequilibrium in the student; and

- role-taking exercises in which participants must develop a coherent moral argument that is either consistent with, or contrary to, their own views.

How Important is Character as a Determinant of Behaviour?

Much has been witnessed, said, and written in the past few years about moral decline in our institutions and society. Government, the military, the justice system, our teachers, the medical profession, and our religious organizations have all had their share of acute ethical embarrassments, and they raise important questions for the community. But are all these failings attributable to a societal crisis of character, as some claim (see Shelley, 1996)? And is moral re-armament of the character-screening and character-building type the solution (see Bennett, 1995)?

I propose to take an indirect approach in responding to these questions, essentially by highlighting a somewhat humorous, but ironic, piece of research reported by John Darley and Daniel Batson in 1973. They were interested in testing the relative effects of character variables and situational variables on Good Samaritan behaviour. The original good Samaritan, you may recall, was travelling on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho when he encountered a man who had fallen among thieves and had been robbed, stripped, beaten, and left for dead. Although others who encountered the man passed him by, the Samaritan stopped, bound his wounds, took him to an inn, and took care of him. Under a cover story of investigating religious education and vocations, Darley and Batson recruited 40 students at the Princeton Theological Seminary for the experiment.

At the first session, they administered questionnaires to the students which were designed to measure different aspects of religiosity — having personal instrumental value, having intrinsic value, or providing answers to the search for meaning in the social world. Certain kinds of religiosity and membership in a religious order could thus be interpreted as indicators of moral character.

In the follow-up experimental session, each subject was briefed in one building on the supposed purpose of the vocational study and was then asked to report to another building to record a spontaneous talk on one of two topics. Unknown to the unsuspecting seminarian, he would encounter along the way a confederate of the experimenters playing the part of a collapsed victim. The real question of interest to the researchers was whether and how the seminarian would help the victim.

To examine the effects of situational factors on the subjects' behaviour, subjects were assigned to one of two time-pressure conditions and to one of two task conditions. In one time-pressure condition, subjects were told they had adequate time to report for the recording; in the other, they were told they were a few minutes late and had better hurry. One group of subjects was assigned the topic of jobs in the religious profession; the other was asked — and this is where the experimenters' sense of humour and irony show — to give a talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan.

What were the results? Of the 40 subjects, 16 or 40% offered some form of direct or indirect aid to the victim. Sixty percent did not; some seminarians stepped right over the victim. The biggest influence on helping behaviour was whether or not the subject was under time pressure; 63% of the unhurried subjects offered help while only 10% of the rushed subjects offered any kind of help. The effect of the assigned talk was less marked; 53% of those assigned the Good Samaritan topic offered help while 29% of the others provided aid. Differences in religiosity failed to account for any differences in behaviour!

So, were the seminarians who failed to help "bad apples"? To come back to the original question about the relative importance of character, Darley and Batson offer some interesting thoughts: "It is difficult not to conclude …that the frequently cited explanation that ethics becomes a luxury as the speed of our daily lives increases is at least an accurate description… Conflict, rather than callousness, can explain their failure to stop. …How a person helps involves a more complex and considered number of decisions, including the time and scope to permit personality characteristics to shape them" (pp. 107-108). In short, character may be a necessary condition for ethical behaviour but it is not a sufficient condition. The bad news from behavioural research generally is that, for most of the time, most people are easily overwhelmed by the demands of the situation (Stead, Worrell, Spalding, & Stead, 1987).

As a qualifying comment, let me just add that to *explain* the behavioural failings of individuals and groups in situational terms is not to *condone* human errors or weaknesses. But, armed with an understanding of their situational origins, maybe something can be done to inoculate individuals against the sometimes-insidious effects of social and situational factors.

As a final twist on this issue of attributing responsibility for ethical failings, I must mention a well known phenomenon in social psychology which explains the way we apportion blame or responsibility in terms of whether the role we play in any situation is that of an observer or actor. Research and real life consistently demonstrate that, when we are actors in any of life's dramas, situational factors loom large in our perception and decision making. Especially when we come up short in some way, we have a very strong and very natural inclination to blame our failings on circumstances — circumstances that are implicitly or explicitly beyond our control. When, on the other hand, we are observers of the dramas and behaviour of others, we have an equally strong but opposing tendency to discount the influence of situational factors and to attribute culpability for wrong-doing or failure to the disposition or character of that person. This fundamental attribution error, as it is called, may also explain why we are so hard on messengers who bring bad news.

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Panel Discussion — Moral Actions and Moral Persons: Can Ethical Values be Taught?

Colonel Murray Farwell

Gabriel Chénard

Captain Eric Reynolds

Panel Discussion — Moral Actions and Moral Persons: Can Ethical Values be Taught?

1. Colonel Murray Farwell

Colonel Farwell was ordained to the priesthood in Hamilton in 1972. He enrolled in the CF in 1977, as has served aboard HMC Ships, on peacekeeping missions and at CFB Lahr in the Federal Republic of Germany. He is currently Director of Pastoral Operations and Chancery Services at National Defence Headquarters.

As a philosophical study, ethics is a science that treats information derived from the human being's natural experience of the problems of human life, from the point of view of natural reasoning. The subject matter of ethics is voluntary human conduct: this includes all actions and also omissions, over which one exercises personal control, because he understands and wills these actions and omissions in relationship to some end. What distinguishes ethics from other studies of human conduct is the ethicist's interest is in what constitutes a good human life, rather than what makes a person, for example, a successful carpenter or electrician.

So "ETHICS" can be defined, very simply, as moral principles of rules of conduct, actions or omissions performed with reason and freedom.

The aspect that we will consider today is the teaching of "ethical values." Can an individual be taught to behave or act ethically? Some experts would say yes ethics can be effectively taught to individuals, while others would not support such a claim and contend that we are influenced by our economic and social environment.

Aristotle, the Greek philosopher contended "that we develop the moral virtues (ethical behaviour) through habit and practice," doing right actions so that they become part of our identify — in other words our character. We become men and women of integrity, personal and professional integrity.

In the Canadian Forces we have a recruit school, Officer Basic training and a Military College. We certainly do not lack the structures to educate our men and women and to give them a sound military formation. We certainly hope that the virtues, and yes I say *virtues*, of loyalty, honesty, courage, dedication, and justice are being instilled and they in turn will live and act out these virtues in their interactions with superiors and subordinates. But the question always remains, is this is a reality or a wish on our part.

Let me share with you several real life experiences.

When I was a young chaplain one of my first postings was the Canadian Forces Recruit School at CFB Cornwallis. My Arctic kit was stolen from a locked room in the Officers' Mess. The room had been open for repairs

without my knowledge so I did not have the opportunity to move it to a more secure place. I reported the theft to the military police. In the ensuing investigation I was informed by two majors and one senior captain that I should not have reported the loss to the police. They suggested to me that I should now claim to have just misplaced the articles and lately had found them. If I followed their advice it would be written off with no cost to me. In my opinion there is only a short distance between a liar and a thief. These same officers had positions at the Recruit School and were responsible for teaching and forming our future soldiers. The question I asked myself was if they were giving the same advise to the young impressionable recruit. Can we teach unethical behavior?

Martin Buber the Jewish theologian said "All education that is worth it, is the education of character." It is not the lecturers about ethics, morality or values that count. However what does count, and is of paramount importance is how you treat people. What is important is that we have integrity and act on it. There is behaviour talked about and behaviour exemplified.

The other day I struck up a conversation in a restaurant with a young couple seated next to me. Both these individuals were professionals and involved with the public. Neither of them were aware that I was a military chaplain or had no connection with the military. In the course of conversation the man mentioned to me that he was a graduate of CMR and that although the quality of education was excellent the virtues of loyalty, honesty and integrity, which were taught and expounded over and over again at the college, were not practised by a sizable percentage of the cadets.

So we come back to the question *"can ethical values be taught."*

2. Gabriel Chénard

Father Chénard is Professor of Moral Theology at Université Laval. He received a Doctorate in Theology from Université Laval in 1975. He has also served on the Catholic Committee of Quebec's Conseil Supérieur de l'Éducation and as a member of the Theological Committee of the Assemblée des évêques du Québec.

Generations of human beings have long been passing on the torch of life, but they know that it is not enough to simply pass it on: steps must also be taken to prepare and fashion those who will carry it. This is the concern of parents, educators and professionals who work in various institutions — institutions that are prepared to invest time, resources and money to help young people attain adult stature, to perform their human role to the best of their ability. This slow and difficult growth of individuals toward maturity was called *paideia* by the Greeks: this guidance, this necessary coaching of young people to help them to gain wisdom, an art of living that will enable them to become citizens worthy of the name.

Is it possible to teach moral values? That is a central question regarding the moral education of the person. We can try to answer the question by situating ourselves in relation to two opposing traditions. The first, which extends from Socrates to Rodgers, maintains that it is practically impossible to teach values and virtues. This tradition holds that teaching has little or no effect on the qualities or moral abilities of an individual. It would be important for the individual to find the answers within himself. The second point of view, which claims to derive from the position of Skinner and the specialists in operant conditioning, among others, concludes that it is possible to provide training for any type of activity: nothing is impossible for the practitioner provided that adequate stimuli are used. In the moral education of a person, then, one could strive to inculcate proper attitudes, proper ways of thinking and acting. Emphasis is placed on the teacher and on appropriate learning methods.

My position on the development of a moral person lies somewhere between these two extremes. It is possible to learn and teach in a manner that is interactive, effective, realistic and respectful of the learner. This position, which maintains that it is possible and necessary to help a human being to obtain what he needs to live his life in a responsible manner, is generally accepted and is the presupposition of all moral education or training programs.

In the context of modernity in which we are living, in the mentality, the current culture, this wisdom, this art of living appears indispensable. To name just a few indicators of present-day culture: the advance of science and technology, the transformation of social and family ties, the increase in every form of violence, the increase in socioeconomic inequalities, the tendency towards immediate gratification of needs and desires, the possibility of trying everything, of having everything (if you have the money), the disintegration of institutions and communities…; all this and many other phenomena pose questions, force us to think about moral values, challenge people in the core of their day-to-day life. It is important to say it forcefully: an individual left to his own devices in this context will simply be caught up by the strongest current. Any individual who enters this jungle of opinions, proposed models and slogans without any preparation, without backbone, without ethical convictions, will quite simply be mesmerized and will conform to whatever strikes him as being the most satisfying and the easiest. These are the prevalent models that will serve as his ideal and motivation. These are challenges that society as a whole and educational institutions in particular currently have the task and the duty to take up by developing each individual's ethical abilities.

Many remain sceptical regarding this immense task and rightfully ask questions. Is it realistic to believe that a human being can situate himself in a responsible manner in this universe of infinite possibilities? How does one go about developing this strong-mindedness and rectitude, these convictions, in the present context? How do we go about helping our young people to make use of their human potential, to channel their dynamic force, their desire, their aggressiveness? How can we inculcate, pass on to them, these values that have been identified as being life-giving?

One thing must be clearly acknowledged: there is no innate morality (autopilot) in a human being. Nature gives him strength, potential, drive, but it is up to the individual to use, to manage that potential in a responsible manner. Moral conduct is not entered, or programmed, based on the child's biological capital. The potential is there, the potentialities are there, but this drive must be instilled, taught through prolonged integration into a whole system of educational activities. It is the parents, educators and other practitioners who will make this moral learning process possible, who will facilitate the progression to adult stature. The social sciences, psychoanalysis in particular, teach us that the make-up of the individual, the development of the personality, is a process that begins very early and develops through constant interaction with others. The moral person develops through the words, example and attitudes of others, the model projected by others.

In fact, a human being really becomes a moral person, that is, free and responsible, only through prolonged integration and an interplay of numerous influences originating with other people. This is how an individual's personality, his moral conscience, his ability to become responsible, develop. And this occurs very early… As soon as the child becomes aware of his surroundings, values are suggested to him, not through explicit exhortations, but through the environment, the atmosphere in which he is growing up. He will gradually situate himself in relation to these values that are suggested to him by living examples. He therefore comes in contact with the moral values that shape the life of a human being. Once again, these values that he perceives as being desirable derive much less from a theoretical code than from experience, life, the atmosphere of his surroundings. The development of the moral person is primarily based on these examples, these models. But this will have to be complemented during adolescence and postadolescence by explicit moral education incorporated into the school curriculum.

We have realized in recent years that generations of young people had not received adequate moral education; they have lived in a climate of de-socialization, systematic criticism of institutions, and a desire to break with traditional values. To remedy this deficiency, people are practising an ethic of distress, an ethic of emergency, which does not provide individuals with any training and is intended solely to ward off the most unpleasant consequences of irresponsible actions. The best example is the massive use of purely preventive means in order to avoid STD and AIDS, divorced from any real education. People are therefore setting their sights on the short term, pretending that anything can be tried provided that bad effects can be avoided, and they forget that while the education of a moral person requires time, effort, joint action, investment, it provides preparation for the long road of human life.

Over the past few years, various institutions have been wondering about the values that are at the heart of their educational mission, they are considering the ethical ability that they should be developing in the individuals whom they serve. Ethical ability does not develop by magic; it involves a series of concerted pedagogical strategies and activities. Ultimately, the ethically or morally competent individual will have the ability to maintain a critical aloofness from prevalent mores,

he will have a conscience capable of making decisions and choices relating to moral values, he will be able to adopt a responsible position vis-à-vis the ethical problems that arise and take a courageous stand according to his convictions. The development of this conscience which weighs the issues, assesses the arguments, evaluates the situation and makes an enlightened decision requires specific pedagogical activities. This involves the development of a whole range of aptitudes, attitudes, skills and abilities. No doubt the general climate of an institution, its educational plan, its regulations, the quality of the people involved contribute to the moral development of the person.

These values, when promoted and practised, constitute an ideal means of developing the individual but, given the extent of social change and the complexity of the situations that are arising, we cannot dispense with specific moral education courses. This is a necessity for educational institutions whose goal is the complete education of their student. These courses are intended to cultivate accountability and acceptance of others, reflection and commitment, the building of a system of values and the process of learning how to live better in a fast-changing world. Without this, the door is left open to all of the other proponents who will quickly fill this ethical vacuum. The normative vacuum fosters the spread of models: the individual thinks that he is free, but he is in the grip of codes, messages, that control his everyday life.

This specific, organized moral education is attained through the process of learning the great values which constitute a heritage, a moral legacy, which are at the root of individual and social life. They are, to name only a few: justice, truth, courage, loyalty, self-respect and respect for others, self-control, universal equality, respect for minorities, condemnation of torture, rejection of racism… This moral system of reference should be at the heart of a person's everyday choices, at the source of his actions. Values provide impetus, motivate. They appear as that which is worthy of being pursued. They appear as that which is important and desirable for the fulfilment of a person. They also have an ideal and imperative aspect, embodying such concepts as "must" and "should." That is why we often repeat that values must affect not only the head, but also the heart and concrete decisions. Man does not perceive the good with only his intelligence, but with his whole being, his affectivity and his heart. To become a moral person, one must acquire the interior predispositions, attitudes that will enable him to better appreciate what is a successful life, an authentic fulfilment of oneself, and he must also make an effort to actualize or apply these values.

Let me conclude by summing up my propositions.

1. It is not simply a matter of wondering whether it is possible to teach values. It is not only possible, it is a necessity and a duty. The French word for "teach," *"enseigner,"* comes from the Latin *insignare*, meaning "to show." There is no such thing as innate morality: it must be taught or learned. If values are not being taught by educators, they will be taught in other ways, through advertising, fashions, slogans…

2. In addition to diffuse teaching coming from significant individuals, emerging from the personality of educators, from

the general climate of an institution, any educational institution which is genuinely concerned about the education of the whole person should offer a specific educational framework to promote ethical ability. This will be accomplished through pedagogical activities with a view to a specific moral education. It must be considered that human conduct and moral development are aspects of basic education in the same way as the other abilities that we wish to see acquired. It is therefore important that, in an educational curriculum, learning objectives be identified with regard to this moral education.

3. Moral education, the acquisition of moral ability, should focus on moral awareness, moral judgment, moral intent, moral conduct. The student must first *be made aware* that behind the emotions he feels (e.g., spontaneous opposition to PCBs, to torture), there are moral principles, values involved. Why? On what grounds? Awareness of values. *Moral judgment* consists in identifying the various considerations associated with a given situation in order to determine ideally what should be done. It is the selection of the best possible solution. The next thing that must be done is to evaluate what motivates personal choice, based on the possibilities of the context specific to the individual: this is *moral intent*. A moral choice is an enlightened choice. The individual acts in accordance with his convictions or values and is prepared to bear the consequences of his actions.

The transition to action constitutes *moral conduct*. This is a matter of implementing the choice arrived at deliberately, based on moral principles, in accordance with the attitudes and convictions (James Ress, psychologist at Harvard, "A Psychologist Looks at the Teaching Ethics" [*sic*], *The Hastings Center*, 12, 1, 1982, pp. 299-36).

3. Captain Eric Reynolds

Captain Reynolds is Chapel Life Coordinator, Trinity Chapel (P), CFB Borden. He holds Bachelors' degrees from the University of Waterloo and Université Laval, as well as an M.A. in philosophy from Université Laval, and a Masters in Canon Law from the University of Ottawa. Captain Reynolds won the 1994 John Gellner Prize for an article on military ethics published in Canadian Defence Quarterly.

A man was driving on a country lane when he noticed a chicken running ahead of him. He glanced at his speedometer: 50 miles per hour, and the chicken was outrunning the car! The man increased his speed to 60 miles per hour, then 70, and still the chicken ran ahead of the car. At this point the chicken made a right turn onto a small farm and disappeared behind the farmhouse. The man was so intrigued by the chicken's performance that he parked his car and knocked on the farmhouse door. When

the owner appeared, the man said to him excitedly, "Sir, do you know that you have a chicken that can run over 70 miles and hour?" The farmer replied, "Oh you must mean our three-legged chicken. He's really fast. You see, I live here with my wife and my son. And when it comes to eating chicken each of us loves the drumstick. So we decided to breed three-legged chickens." "That's amazing," said the man. "How has it worked out? How does a three-legged chicken taste?" To which the farmer replied, "I don't know. We haven't caught him yet!"

That three-legged chicken can be wonderfully symbolic of the pursuit of ethical values in today's military. I would maintain that if we rely solely on the teaching of ethical principles and values, then whatever we're after is our three-legged chicken. We'll never catch up and we'll always lag behind.

In a relatively recent book entitled *20-Something: Managing and Motivating Today's New Work Force*, Lawrence Bradford and Clair Raines present what they believe to be the core values of the present generation:

> *Self-orientation*: the "what's-in-it-for-me?" generation.
>
> *Cynicism*: life will be harder for us that it was for previous generations.
>
> *Materialism*: even people are marketable commodities; we work to acquire wealth which, in turn, will give us easy access to status and power.
>
> *Extended Adolescence*: individuals marry at a later age, stay in school longer and, much to the chagrin of their parents, stay at home longer.
>
> *Quantity Time*: want surrogate parents (including supervisors, leaders, etc.) to spend more time with them.
>
> *Fun*: we work to live and don't live to work. Employment is a means of achieving a higher quality of life and pursuing outside interests.
>
> *Slow to Commitment*: cautious to commit to other people, ideas and values.
>
> *Indifference to Authority*: just because you are the boss won't necessarily gain you their respect.

We could almost admit that we are witnessing a "Balkanization" of our country — i.e. people identify themselves according to race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or affiliation with single political issues rather than with the nation itself at large. Perhaps in the acceptance of and a compliance to a pluralistic society, we have begun to accentuate our diversity at the expense of what we might have in common. What is most distressing is not the differences of opinion or even, at times, conflicting values, but that there no longer seems to be a common framework for discussion … a perspective as to the process of working issues, the kind of discussion that might suggest the existence of common core values. Living in diversity leaves us oftentimes in an "ethical vacuum" in that there appears to be no absolutes and the word "ethical" itself would appear to no longer serve as a useful term of reference.

It is in this context that we are tempted to come to the conclusion that ethical values cannot be taught. But let's be a little more precise in what we mean by "teaching." Depending on your philosophical or methodological bent, "teaching" can involve many things: for some, it involves the imparting of concepts or knowledge (what I would categorize as the *cognitive component*); for others, "teaching" involves not simply the passing on of information, but also the desire and motivation to go further … to bridge the gap between knowledge and action. I maintain that if we limit our concept of "teaching" to that of the cognitive (i.e. an intellectual grasp of ideas and concepts) then ethical values cannot and must not be taught.

As in the civilian world, our soldiers, sailors and air personnel are what their home, their religion, their schools, and the ideals of society have made them. From a strictly cognitive point of view, we cannot necessarily "unmake" what they have become by education, cultural indoctrination and example. In our modern industrialized and "enlightened" society, standards of right and wrong, of the good society are rare. Everything is almost treated as just a matter of personal preference. In such an atmosphere, ethical questions are seen as nostalgic; the way to deal with them is to simply change the subject.

Coupled with the society and its values from which they come and in which they share, our military personnel and our DND employees are constantly bombarded by the rapid rise of the "New Age" Movement … that blend of popular psychology, self-empowerment and religion into a life view that regards the individual as the ultimate authority for his or her own value system.

These are the challenges … and there are many more … that we face today. They are challenges that we face when we hire civilian personnel and when we recruit new members into the profession of arms. Ethics must not remain a simple academic exercise … a matter for philosophical discussion or simple cognitive transference. A bare knowledge of ethical values is important … but teaching ethical values is a useless exercise if it has no influence on the behaviour of individuals who are the recipients of the training. Ethical values cannot be taught … at least not in isolation from ethical activity. To teach someone that things are good, ethical and morally acceptable, is a far cry from influencing the behaviour of the individual to such an extent that he or she will act in an ethical fashion. If our teaching implies that the *knowledge* of ethical values means that people will act in an ethical fashion, we may be sadly disillusioned.

As a chaplain to one of Canada's military colleges, and as an instructor in military ethics, I was astounded to discover that while every Officer Cadet knew the college motto and its significance (truth, duty, valour), they added their own ethical imperative to it: "Don't get caught!" As military personnel, we know implicitly that truth is better than falsehood; that devotion to duty is better than self-serving egocentrism; that valour (and its associated virtues of honesty, candour, etc) is to be valued more highly than cowardice or lack of moral fibre. We *know* these things, but how do we *act* in individual situations?

I maintain that knowing that certain values are essential to our functions is not identical with inculcating those values in our military and civilian personnel. As leaders, we must not only teach ethical principles (i.e. that

certain things are right and proper), but we must also assist people to do what is right and proper. When there is a disconnect between what we believe and what we do then we only perpetuate the belief that the teaching of ethical values is a useless exercise and that it ultimately serves no useful purpose.

When doctors, lawyers, judges, teachers, government leaders, clergy and military professionals fail to live up to our moral expectations (i.e. they fail to do what we know is right), we somehow feel cheated. When a given society provides the differing profession with opportunities for education and training, when the existence of the nation itself might be at stake, then we expect our professionals not only to have a knowledge of what is right and proper, we expect them to act in a manner consistent with professional conduct. When people substitute personal gain for service to society, when they act in incompetent or immoral ways, then we react with outrage.

When members of any professional group exemplify ethical behaviour through what they *do* in accordance with what we all *know* to be right, they can have an enormous moral influence on society. We cannot hope to teach ethical values … at least not in isolation from ethical behaviour. And ethical behaviour can best be experienced in and through the personal example of others. Ethical training is more that the mere imparting of theoretical knowledge and a cognitive appreciation of what is right and wrong, acceptable and non-acceptable.

How many of us have appreciated the concept of keeping to a budget while in economics class and then failed to keep such a budget during a vacation on a shopping spree? Similarly, most of us are aware of the biological and physiological consequences of a fat and sugar-rich diet, but not all of us pass up rich meals. In short, there appears to be ample evidence that we need for more than just a knowledge of values … we must be able to translate those values into ethical behaviour.

Hey! We Are in a Revolution

Major-General Roméo Dallaire

Hey! We Are in a Revolution

Major-General Roméo Dallaire

Major-General Dallaire is Chief of Staff to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) at National Defence Headquarters. He obtained a B.Sc. from the Royal Military College of Canada in 1969, and has occupied a variety of command and staff positions. MGen Dallaire served as commander of the UN Observer Mission — Uganda and Rwanda, for which he received the Meritorious Service Cross and the U.S. Legion of Honor Medal.

[Song played: Bob Dylan, *The Times They Are a-Changin'*]

Can you believe that the marching song of the anti-establishment movement of the 60s is now a commercial for a bank? I never thought that change would be so radical. We're talking 1960s and late 60s, and what I would like to do is bring you from then to now, particularly the last five years and hopefully fling us all into a bit of the future by a recapitulation, or a feel from my perspective, of what is going on. And maybe an idea or two of what might be a projection for the future.

I will essentially speak in North American English and I didn't give a text to the translator so I didn't do like Padre Reynolds and create a subversive element within the organization. In 1964, the night before I left for CMR, my dad, who was a career soldier and Staff Sergeant, told me two things. First thing, "Roméo, never expect anyone to say "Thank You." And the second thing is, "If you're gonna do a career in the Canadian Army, change your name to "Dallairds." Well, in certain circumstances, he's been quite true, and in others, not at all. I learned English in east-end Montreal, in fact, by going to a Cub Pack on Tuesday nights in an English Protestant school and on Wednesday mornings going to Confession in the French Catholic church.

The most traumatic part of the year was the church parade, which was in the Anglican church. I was not excommunicated, however, I think, some will debate that today. The sixer decided to teach me English and he said "I will teach this French-Canadian English fast so he doesn't slow down the six, so we can win the "Aquela Pennant." He taught me this rhyme, and it goes like this — When you're out with your honey, and your nose is a-runny, don't think it's funny, cause it'snot. It took me a year and a half to figure that out.

I wish to go back to 1968, if I may and we'll use a couple of clips. Two of them, from the PBS program on My Lai. The first person you're going to see was at the time a Trooper, and his reactions to My Lai, he was there, he participated. The second person is a Staff Sergeant-cum-Sergeant-Major at that time and his reaction to that event.

Let me read you a quote from a book that I recommend you read by Professor Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*. It is

not Clausewitz's *On War* of the 21st century, however, it is a radical reassessment of what war and our commitment to war will be into the future. He does touch on the past of course. "While armies that were turned into raging, uncontrollable mobs, are not unknown, over the long run … like Vietnam, where regular forces are employed against guerillas and terrorists. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants will probably break down. Unable to go by the ordinary war convention, as expressed in the rules of engagement, all but the most disciplined troops will find themselves violating those rules. Having, by the force of circumstances, killed non-combatants, and tortured prisoners, they will go in fear of the consequences if caught. If caught, they are certain to blame their Commanders by putting them into a situation where they are "damned if they do, and they are damned if they don't."

The commanders, in turn, will hasten to wash their hands of the whole affair, claiming that they never told their subordinates to break the rules. There will be atrocities, as happened in My Lai, and attempts to cover them up. Where the coverup fails, a few low-ranking members of the military establishment may be turned into scapegoats as Lieutenant Calley was. Whereas their superiors will deny accountability and responsibility. With the men unable to trust each other, and their commanders, disintegration occurs. When this happened in Vietnam, tens of thousands went AWOL. And an estimated 30% of the forces were on hard drugs. Soon, such an army will cease to fight. Each man seeking, only to save "his conscience and his skin." Revealing, isn't it?

I also strongly recommend, as Karol Wenek did this morning, that you read a very interesting article in the June 1996 issue of *Canadian Defence Quarterly* by Major C.R. Shelley entitled "A Crisis of Character? Ethical Development in the Canadian Officer Corps." If that is a scenario of the past, what is the scenario of the present? And where will we be going into the future? Monseigneur Turcotte, Cardinal of Montreal, at the Council of Catholic Bishops, recently stated that he has finally finished his mourning of the old stable social structures in existence since the end of World War II. He reaffirmed his realization that we are in a new social order of change and that there is no going back.

So what's new? Where have you been Dallaire? In Africa somewhere? What IS new is that one of our social pillars, the religious structure, and its leaders, finally accepted how that situation around us has really changed and is in a state of continuous change. When I finished Grade 12, in the last month of school, the Brothers took us on a closed retreat for a weekend to think about our launching off into further studies or work, joining the work force. During that weekend, a very old and portly priest … VERY portly, with ketchup stains on his smock and so on, sat down and discussed things with me and asked me what I wanted to do. I said I wanted to join the Army. And he said, "The Army is very interesting. Very hard people on the outside, but inside they're really very soft and very human." He said, "However, it's a conservative institution, it's not the most progressive outfit in town." Paraphrasing the elderly gentleman. He said, "You know, people accuse us in religion of being five to ten years behind society, but do you realize that the army is usually five to ten years behind religion?"

And so, if the religious structure has moved and turned the page, have we really, us, the CF, turned the page? Have we accepted that we've got to turn the page, and face the change?

In the words of Monseigneur Couture, who is the Bishop of Quebec City, at the same eclesiastical conference, he states that the traditional identifiable reference points, that we had to adjust, to live with, and support us, have disappeared, they're not simply as clear nor as evident. The social values of our youth, the expected moral character of our leaders at all levels, be it outside or inside, whatever family milieu we have, have also been changed if not eliminated as serious criteria for social responsibility. It's also rather interesting that reporters are stating in regards to the current elections going on in the United States, that the population will probably elect Bill Clinton, but don't necessarily like his moral standing or moral character. It's a rather interesting expression of the democratic process.

So what is replacing moral character and social values? Well, Monseigneur Couture speaks again. He sees us evolving our moral reference points from a process of consultation among all the stakeholders. This produces a consensus solution that is both normally the lowest common denominator and is continuously required to be reviewed, rediscussed and redefined.

So is that what we have to work with to guide us through this all encompassing atmosphere of change? Is it enough? Will it do the job? And really is the situation that bad, that complex, that difficult to grasp, essentially to get a grip on? Can't we just produce a formula, some neat words, that would do the trick and we can get on with life?

Well, I looked at the ethical obligations that were published at this conference. And I also spent an hour with the Judge Avocate General, in attempting to comprehend the explanations and the full projection of what those words and those phrases that were attached to them and whether that was really consistent with what we are and what we're doing. Well, I'm not sure. In fact, I don't believe so. I don't believe we must rush into something so fundamental, particularly in these times, when other leaders in society are telling us that there no easy identifiable reference points out there.

That is why I wish to set the scene. What I mean is, how I see what is going on and how we should see our way out of it, which must include, I do believe, an articulated and disciplined expression of moral character and values. What makes us as persons act in a good versus an evil way? What will make us react in these times of stress, fatigue, complex problems and constraints, in a morally correct fashion by instinct let alone by pondered deduction? I will focus mostly on the military partners of the Defence Team. Or what I mean, Team Defence.

There are differences between us on this subject of Defence Team. The civil service virtues as expressed yesterday, by the Deputy Minister, are correct and they have been long standing in this nation. And service to the Government and to the country are still valid, and they've been applied in the past. Great civil servants have in fact guided our government in the accomplishments of its duties. But so has our military ethos.

Both are distinct and fundamental, complimentary in fact, in order to produce the best

defence capability that our government and our nation want for the resources they are making available or are considering essential for us to do our job. However, when we discuss this, the first question is "What is that military ethos again? What was that definition? What's it really mean?" Are we all on net with that, so that we can articulate the differences between that and the civil service civilian virtues? So that we don't feel fear of encroachment or imposition that is taking away some of the fundamental aspects of service before self that wearing the uniform brings forward.

I think those are valid debates that must be pursued and certainly we must pursue them, we in uniform in particular. It is interesting in my first meeting in NDHQ, since coming back, there was a discussion of dress on Fridays. And the discussion was whether we should wear our ties or not. Well, traditionally Fridays were usually the inspection day in the Regiment. So, why aren't we in Full Dress? I am not being paid by the hour, and so if I am having lunch til 1:30 or 2:00 with members of the staff, so what? It's a decision we can take. We are working extra hours, we are conducting our duties, and if we feel as a responsiveness to the team, that we do stay for lunch somewhere, then fine. And for that matter, why shouldn't the soldiers wear the combat uniform in a tavern in downtown Montreal? Why are we hiding ourselves? Why should they hide? If one acts like an idiot, who doesn't handle himself well, then let's take the appropriate action. But does that mean we must remain hidden in our garrisons and not encourage people to wear the uniform? So what is this situation? Let's hear the next song.

[Song played: Stompin' Tom Connors, *We Are The Blue Berets*]

Is that equivalent to the Second World War marching songs? Is that our War Song of today? Are we at war? The country's not at war, the government's not at war, NDHQ is not at war. However, significant components of the Forces have been at war for the last five years. Last night I was at Air Transport Group, thanking them for what they did for me in Rwanda. They were in a war zone. Those bullets were pumping holes in those Hercs even though the country did not declare war, and they were risking their lives. Have we recognized that fact? In fact, are we aware that we nearly have as many war veterans standing now in uniform as we did at the end of the Korean Conflict? Nearly the SAME number. Have we adjusted veterans' allowances, have we adjusted policies to respond to those who have already done the test and some survived and some have not. The test of the unlimited liability clause. Have we adjusted to meet that requirement?

I believe we are in a time that is more encompassing than change, than reform even. We are in the midst of a revolution that is creating both a breakdown of all institutions and tools and instruments, but is also offering a magnificent opportunity for breakthroughs for those who will continue to serve and to fight and who will encourage others to join us. We are in the midst of not one revolution, but three revolutions compounded with one crisis. Let me walk you through them.

We're going to be in coalition warfare in the future surely. We will use the classic methodologies that we've learned in our services to accomplish those tasks. The country may not be at war, but we will be on a war footing and we will conduct such operations in a classic all- arms integration. However, that will be

the exception. For the next fifteen to twenty years as futurists predict, and I state, for what it's worth, we're going to be involved in a lot more of the peace support, or operations short of war missions where it will not necessarily be high tech, but it will be facing drugged up, boozed up, totally ruthless threats from all sides. Belligerents who are quite prepared to use savagery, butchery and destruction of their own civilian populations to achieve their aims. We will find ourselves facing horrors to the scale that are unimaginable to us in our society as isolated as we often want it to be because we can always change the channel and we don't have to look at those bad things. The soldiers and sailors and airmen will smell, see and live amongst carnage that has not previously been seen in the modern era. They will continue to face those scenarios in the uncertainty of the new world disorder.

We will also face complex mandates. There will not be clear, concise mandates because the problems are not clear nor concise. The problems are complex and we need new multi-disciplinary skills in order to meet those complex problems and the skills include the preparation of our soldiers, sailors and airmen to face enormous moral dilemmas in which they will be called upon to react not always with the luxury of a pondered sort of fashion and conducting a written estimate, but often in an instinctive spontaneous reaction. Will we, will they make the right decisions? But what are some of those decisions that have already been taken?

Young engineer corporals on mission in Kuwait were helping the doctors saw off arms and legs of male Bedouin. Men and boys injured because Saddam Hussein had told them to go into the mine fields to get mines and he'd pay them a dinar for each. The young soldier assisting the surgeon was trying to save the lives of these people, but he realized one morning that there are no women or girls coming or being brought to the aid station. When he queried one of those injured Bedouin, where were the women and girls that we see in the mine fields also picking up the mines, he said "Well, you know of course that they cannot be seen by you, infidels. And so they are behind our tents, dying and rotting away."

What did the corporal do? Saw off the other leg? Saw off the other arm? He reacted under the discipline and the training and continued to support the disaster. But some of them still have problems living with the dilemma of helping someone who has taken the decision to let his wife or daughter die.

Did he really take the right decision or should have he reacted differently? Should we continuously send our troops through roadblocks risking their lives to save others? At what point do we stop doing it? When do we stop listening to the screams on the phone calls for help, and simply say that the safety of our troops and the accomplishment of the mission are in conflict? When does the mission continue to be accomplished and when does the security of our troops override that? Can we permit to debate the mission because there is a risk and as such not attempt to try it? How many of us have already gone through those traumas and those discussions and what are the parameters to finally decide that we cannot do anything anymore and to withdraw and let the slaughter go on!

When the Belgians were ordered to pull out of Rwanda, and when your boss tells you from New York to pull out also and when he has no answer to what do you are to do with the 30,000 Rwandans that are totally dependent on your protection, do you pull out? Even though we are told we would be massacred. Do you stay or pull out? There are cases of people pulling out and there are cases of people staying. There are cases of seeing officers run to the Hercs and leaving their troops under fire behind. Cases of NCOs hoarding food and water and medical supplies to keep them for themselves and not for their troops. Of forces being committed and getting lots of international publicity opening up the air field in Kigali, however not being allowed to leave the air field, to stay on it and to take no casualties and no risks. And as we have civilians dying by the dozens for lack of water, these same forces refused to give us water trailers they had on the airfield, even if we drove them ourselves. What do you do in such scenarios? How are we reacting in those situations?

Well, we are facing those dilemmas in the new generation of operations in which we're being committed, and they will not get simpler, they will continue to be complex and demanding on our moral standing, our moral capability of responding to those dilemmas. And so, that's the first revolution. The classic enemy disappeared, and he screwed up all our plans! We had them aced in the Fulda Gap. There were no more problems apart from making sure that you got to the right DP at the right time. And the minute that he passed that line, you blew him away and then it was open season. And don't harass me with Rules of Engagement, and yeah, I know a couple of articles in the Geneva Convention and that's about it.

And well for the last five we found ourselves in eras that we are not prepared for. Found ourselves by surprise in operations in which we didn't fully appreciate. And we found ourselves as peacetime forces at war. That revolution is still ongoing. Yet have we developed the new tactics and the new solutions and the new training, in order to meet these complex mandates and missions out there?

The second revolution is the revolution of resources. We've been chopped, hacked and maybe even butchered, for the last few years to the scale not seen since demobilization of 1945-46. Did we see it coming? Were we able to react? And how did we react? And what are the tools that we used to adjust to meet this demanding scenario, particularly on the human resource side of it? Did we fully recognize and are we fully recognizing that new practices of quantifiability may not be meeting one significant dimension of who we are, that is the human dimension of the human resource management entity.

It's fine to have the right number of sergeants with the right qualifications and the right age, at the right place in the right unit, and trained to command that tank. However, does that sergeant WANT to fight that tank to the extreme capability? Is he willing to risk his life once, twice, three times, four times? Is he being supported and given that sense of confidence that not only HE, if he comes back, in pieces or with all of the grey cells not lined up, but his family also is being supported and helped? And continued to be able to remain loyal to the commitment of what we are asking of him in this new generation of operations.

Did we identify, have we grasped the dichotomy of the leadership component of command which is risk taking and assessments often instinctively, and the resource management assessment, which is pondering and output-oriented. Did we tell officers that they need an MBA? And Staff College too in order to command in the modern era? And what is the balance between the two? And, then, have we, not in this whole exercise, not lost the most human of traits of command, compassion? It is true that the quantification of the resource management side of command dropped the human dimension and lost the compassion, the human entity of human resource management. Well that's the second revolution we're living through. Resources and our assessment of how we're adjusting to those resources, both in methodology of managing them and also in scale of reduction.

Have we actually responded to that? Are we fully conscious of what's out there? When we look at the track record, in regards to a war five years ago, is it really a priority, must we be sticklers? Are they all out there to try to have us? Was every Second World War vet out there to rip off the system? And some have and some will. Have we demonstrated the attitude receptive on our responsibility towards them? And met that criteria? And is that encouraging others to come back, missing an arm possibly or the grey cells not lined up and whatever? Have we grasped what's out there in our people and prioritized that in a human factor? Are we truly responsible in our assessment of our moral responsibility towards our own?

Well, here's the third revolution. The "transparency" revolution. My brother-in-law used to tell me the only time he heard from us was when we either were buying very expensive toys or we were in deep trouble. But now, there is more to it than that. Now the Canadian population wants to know more. Varying reasons why, but there is an interest out there. They don't want us locking ourselves in our isolated garrisons, that are not so isolated anymore. They want to see, they want to come in and see. They want to see how we do things and why we're doing them this way and that, are we meeting the requirement, which they're not too sure what it is.

The instrument that is being used is the media. And the media is NOT the enemy. Hopefully neutral, maybe an ally, but not the enemy. But surprise! Surprise! The media may not be necessarily playing "fair." This is what happened on the weekend.

The reaction to it, as I stated earlier today in my question, some of them are looking for Watergate 2 and Watergate 3 and Watergate 4. Somehow you have 2, 3 and 4. And so when the facts become available, this is the rebuttal. Do you get the impression from those statements, that they said 'Oh… No, it's our mistake, we overreacted? That we got the facts now and it's clear?' Or do you get the feeling that they're still saying 'Yeah, but are they still hiding something?' 'Is there still some camouflage? Is there still something not quite correct?' They don't play fair — What a surprise! But they are NOT the enemy, for they are still the window that our population uses to look at us. And low and behold, we are possibly not very effective and showing the right picture, if any picture. And more often than not, we're trying to close the blind and build a thicker blind or filter or whatever.

Have we been made aware of this revolution that's out there? And in the same time as they're demanding that requirement, our people have brought in some fundamental changes in national policy from access to information to gender integration to democratic multi-culturalism. These changes have either come in and have we reacted to them appropriately? And have we been able to handle those aspects?

There is currently a great series going on in Montreal on CBC regarding "fat recruits." And even though there's a tone saying 'Gee, does this make sense that we have these fat people trying to join in?' There's a tinge in there that's saying that maybe the military is overharassing the fat people, so is that fair? There was no question whether they should be entering or not, it's whether if we were harassing, that was the question. And how come they're allowed to enter? Well it's pretty difficult in the modern revolution that we're living in transparency to explain that 'No, that you're not allowed to let fat people enter or overweight people enter, even though there are several overweight people still serving.' So you're not allowed to be overweight when you start, but during your career, you're allowed to be. And how do you defend this in the current transparency, and how do you remain loyal, appropriate and take the right decisions throughout. And is that not affecting our operational capability?

Well, with those three revolutions there — Operations, Resources and Transparency — we've got a crisis. And the crisis is not like the French Revolution, where in fact you can close the gates, chop off the heads, sort this thing out and then punch out again and relaunch. We still have day-to-day operations on hand. We can't close the shop as this thing is ongoing. We can't stop the exercise so that we can sort it out and relaunch our forces in our department. So what is the solution in all this social structure change revolution and where do we go from here? How do we avoid in fact, falling into the same hole we did in the 1960s? There was a social revolt in the 60s. In fact, our major ally and neighbour had a war during which a number of lessons were learned. And some significant, draconian, even ruthless decision, were taken in order to reconstitute that capability, that military capability, give it pride in itself and to the nation of its ability to fight into the future.

Are we in that assessment mode now? Truly? Is our assessment as critical as this? Or is it simply a few people? Do we see a modern version of unification/integration invented by either ministerial dictum or commission of recommendations or recommendations of a commission? Is the integration of the military and civilians the next step in a grand strategy of integrating the defence of our society and making it an adjunct of the constabulary? Is that possible? Is there someone actually planning that out there? And have we assessed that, and have we articulated how we're projecting ourselves into the future? Making our way through the crisis, trying to survive the three revolutions?

It is interesting to note that the Catholic church is still trying to implement the very radical reorientations of Vatican 2. They're STILL trying to figure it out and implement it. And it was very poorly communicated to the Catholics, the rank-and-file. And many

people objected to it and refused some of those changes that were imposed. Vatican 2 started in 1965. Are we going to lose time and wait and possibly see an opportunity for reform, reorientation lost.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, I'm no genius, and surprise, surprise! Our system of selection, education and training does not guarantee that you will have a genius continuously available to guide us and orient us into the future. It does not exist. You have US! And we have ourselves! And what are we doing in order to reorient and go back and create those values and the orientation of our attitude to those values to project us into the future and gain a breakthrough to these revolutions that we are now living with. Well .. I would give you a simple answer. What I did is I went about 600 years back. Medieval times when it was said "Sans peur et sans reproche" (Without fear or criticism). I don't think we can produce a formula in a scenario of crisis to be able to move us all down the same road.

I believe there has to be a simple reference point to start with, expanding that to service before self, requestioning possibly whether we believe wearing these uniforms is still a vocation or is it a profession? Or is it a job? And I would think that you would have problems explaining to your wife how you're ready to risk your life a third or fourth time overseas when it's only a 'job.' I believe that we must encourage our leaders to get together and to start pondering in depth the subject matter we've been going through over the last two days. They must extract themselves from the day-to-day in order to go into that analysis process, and to assist and guide us with input into the future. And that would mean implement devolution to us of day-to-day activity, in order for them to do that. But it also means from all of us to have confidence in those to whom the authority and responsibilities have been devolved to. Or will we all still ask for the three star or the four star for the final arbitrary decision? Will we accept the devolved authorities and responsibilities as the decision points? Are we prepared for that as we say we need it? The authorities above us require that time. You can't simply solve it in a day at the Defence Management Committee once every six weeks. You can't bring us through this in that methodology. There MUST be thought. There MUST be debate. There MUST be discussions. There MUST be openness and frankness in all this mushy stuff that doesn't meet the philosophy of the hard business planning process, of quantifiable outputs.

The second element that I do believe that we need, are rules of engagement in the ethical, moral orientation of attitudes that we must project and bring forward. And I don't think it's by the words that we're going to be able to do that, I think a lot of it is by the war stories, exercise ans experiences. Yesterday afternoon with Alain Forand and others, you heard "Scenario-driven circumstances. Study them. Not just the ones in operations, but the ones in-house and go into the depth of them." The best soldiers who can apply and maximize the rules of engagement in operational theatres are those who are trained through scenario driven circumstances.

Not by the words and by the card, but how in fact you see them acted out and how they learned from the acting out and build that confidence to maximize the rules of engagement and not minimize them. And so in this

whole endeavour, we should have a pool — God knows it's out there — in both the managerial side and the operational side of scenarios to help us develop these ROEs. And through that, not necessarily produce a whole series of words, but maybe reorient through those war stories and those experiences, the projection of the philosophy and idealogy of our moral standing and our ethical values to move us into the future and beyond the current revolution and processes.

Ladies and gentlemen, we've got five to ten years of work in my estimation of absorbing what's going on around us and orienting us to meet those requirements. It's not because we're a bunch of failures, it's because we are smart enough to realize that we may not be as good as we think we are.