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12 May 2015

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**AUTHORIZATION FOR PUBLIC RELEASE OF REDACTED
VERSION OF THE SUMMARY INVESTIGATION FOR
FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT RESULTING IN SGT DOIRON'S DEATH**

Reference: Redacted CANSOFCOM SI Report ordered 8 March 2015
(enclosed)

A Summary Investigation (SI) was ordered by Commander Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) on 8 March 2015 to investigate the circumstances surrounding a friendly fire incident between Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members and Kurdish Peshmerga. The incident resulted in the death of one CAF member and injuries to three others. The summary investigation report was approved on 8 May 2015, and is authorized for public release as redacted at reference.

T.J. Lawson
General

Enclosure: 1

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SUMMARY INVESTIGATION REPORT

Ordered by:

Brigadier General M.N. Rouleau
Commander, CANSOFCOM

Date of Order:

8 March 2015

Topic of Investigation:

Friendly Fire Incident resulting in
Death – Sgt A.J. Doiron
Injury –
Injury –
Injury –

AISC 15-128

SECRET CEO LIMDIS (SECRET less Annexes)

I, the Investigating Officer, do certify that this document consisting of 22 pages, contains, to the best of my knowledge, a complete and accurate report on the matter of this Summary Investigation.

Signed at Ottawa, this 15th day of April, 2015

Investigating Officer (SN, RANK, INITIALS, NAME, DECORATIONS)	UNIT
	CANSOFCOM HQ

2/22

SECRET CEO LIMDIS (SECRET less Annexes)

INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the Terms of Reference (Annex A), the intent of this Summary Investigation (SI) is to quickly, but with rigor, investigate the circumstances surrounding the friendly fire incident that resulted in the death of Sgt Andrew Doiron and the injuries of [redacted] in Iraq on 6 March 2015. This SI will provide a clear understanding of the entire event, and will recommend applicable preventative measures, if any.

Proceedings

2. The SI into the death of Sgt Doiron and the injuries to three other personnel was conducted at Patrol Base [redacted] in Iraq. The Investigating Officer (IO) undertook the required Administrative Investigation Support Centre (AISC) on-line SI training on 10 Mar 2015. The IO established an office at Patrol Base [redacted] and following the planning phase, interviewed witnesses from 11 March to 14 April 2015. In total, the IO interviewed 22 witnesses. Further gathering of evidence, analysis and report drafting were conducted until 15 April 2015.

3. As directed by Annex A, the IO was required to ensure that the activities of the SI were conducted in such a manner as to strike an appropriate balance between the requirements of operational security and the classified nature of portions of this investigation, along with the wish of the member and members' representative in being informed of the progress of the SI. To that end, the IO was directed to use the Task Force Commander, [redacted] as the members' representative, and consequently briefed him on the aim and procedures of the SI in addition to providing daily updates.

4. Three other concurrent and complimentary investigations have occurred or are occurring at the time of submission.

a. The [redacted], as the superior headquarters in the Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) in-theatre chain of command, conducted an informal inquiry from 10 to 12 March 2015. The aim of this inquiry was to develop enhanced Situational Awareness in order to implement any necessary lessons learned or changes to Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). No formal Terms of Reference exist for this inquiry. From 10 to 12 March 2015, the IO conducted daily coordination meetings with the [redacted] Officer In Charge (OIC) to maintain complementary efforts. The OIC returned to Baghdad on 12 March 2015 and verbally back-briefed the [redacted] Commander, [redacted] on 13 March 2015. This briefing indicated that the CANSOFCOM SI would provide the necessary findings for [redacted] use, and that no interim measures were necessary for [redacted] purposes. [redacted] confirmed this approach with Brigadier General Rouleau on 9 March 2015.

b. The Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service (CAFNIS) commenced an investigation on 12 March 2015. The aim of this investigation was to determine criminal liability pursuant to the National Defence Act and/or Criminal Code of Canada. The IO synchronized activities with the CAFNIS while deployed in Iraq. Based on the requirement for impartiality and transparency between both investigative processes, activities and events were conducted primarily in isolation. The key activity which was conducted in concert was the interview of Peshmerga soldiers and leadership.

as well as the complexity of

conducting interviews through a translator.

- c. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) appointed a senior government official on 11 March 2015 to liaise with the IO and provide support to the SI process. As the KRG efforts are in a support role only for the successful completion of this SI, further reference is omitted from this report.

STATEMENT BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER

Selection of Witnesses

5. The IO interviewed all applicable witnesses involved with this incident, including both Canadian, Coalition and KRG personnel. Numerous witnesses were available to the IO, however a significant number of these individuals were involved in this incident on the periphery only, and did not provide additional context of substance. The IO is satisfied that the number of individuals interviewed for the purposes of this SI is adequate to achieve the aims as outlined above. Interviews with _____ were not recorded.

6. A physical survey of the incident location was conducted on 14 March 2015 in order to obtain clarity and corroboration for interviews. Although the tactical situation did not allow full freedom of movement about the incident site, further investigation would not enhance the strength of the findings in this report.

Attribution to specific references during findings

7. The IO has accumulated a significant number of reference documents and first-hand reporting throughout this Summary Investigation. As a result of the breadth of information, the first three findings are made without specific reference to supporting documentation, as they are derived from many of the sources.

CONTEXTUAL NARRATIVE

8. Identifying Information:

Name	A.J. Doiron			
Rank	Sgt			
Service Number				
Gender	Male	Male	Male	Male
Component	Regular Force	Regular Force	Regular Force	Regular Force
Element	SOF	SOF	SOF	SOF
Military Occupation				
Unit	CSOR	CSOR	CSOR	CSOR
Date of Death / Injury	6 Mar 15	6 Mar 15	6 Mar 15	6 Mar 15
Location of Death / Injury				

4/22

9. SOTF Operations. Members of SOTF were ordered to conduct Advise and Assist operations in support of Host Nation forces in Sector being a portion of the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) proximate to Iraq. These tasks commenced on 15 February 2015 but began in earnest on 25 March 2015 following a [redacted] by Commander CANSOFCOM owing to the [redacted] SOTF personnel began to conduct [redacted] SOTF

During this timeframe, SOTF personnel built strong relationships with Peshmerga commanders and soldiers, and interacted with them along the FLOT, balancing the necessity to be forward against the requirements to advise and assist.

10. Language of Interaction. Although most Peshmerga understand basic English, the preferred language of interaction is Kurdish. Informal interaction is conducted through a rudimentary system of Canadians speaking Kurdish, Peshmerga speaking English, and a combination of hand gestures used by all. For more formal or detailed interactions, Peshmerga soldiers will [redacted] or SOTF would employ one of several Kurdish translators contracted by the Canadian government. Alternatively, conversations may occur in Arabic, which is the second language for educated or older Kurds, and is a common language skill for coalition linguists. In the case of SOTF [redacted]

In some cases, Kurdish and Arabic words are similar, thus simplifying comprehension for all involved. Of particular importance to this SI, the words for *vehicle* and *Canadian* are the same in both Kurdish and Arabic.

11. Battlefield Deconfliction. During missions on the FLOT, SOTF had develop a long standing but informal method of battlefield de-confliction. In many cases, SOTF personnel travelled forward to Peshmerga positions under the escort of a local commander or member of the Sector Headquarters (HQ). Without an escort, it was common practice to prearrange a time and place for linkup at a position, and coordination was normally conducted through [redacted] which are omnipresent along the FLOT. As travel in SOTF vehicles was common, the Peshmerga were able to identify them on sight, and were further able to deconflict through [redacted]

During movement at night, [redacted] between SOTF personnel and Peshmerga, although there was [redacted] Nevertheless, the system of battlefield deconfliction was highly effective and functioned well up to the night of the incident.

12. Preparations – 5 March 2015. On the evening of 5 March 2015, [redacted] SOTF Combat Outpost (COP) Commander, conducted mission planning and liaison for the following day's activities. He received a back-brief from [redacted] on his plans for the next day, which included a day and night engagement on the FLOT. [redacted] included these intentions in the Daily Situation Report (DSR). He did not conduct liaison with the Peshmerga, as this had been previously deconflicted verbally on 3 March 2015 with [redacted] a locally contracted interpreter and [redacted] was confident that the necessary deconfliction had occurred with the forward Peshmerga commanders based on this conversation.

13. Daylight events – 6 March 2015. During the morning and early afternoon of 6 March 2015, [redacted] conducted mission preparations with the rest of his team. The Scheme of Manoeuvre for the upcoming mission involved a day time reconnaissance of the FLOT by [redacted] Call Signs (C/S) under his command. [redacted] personnel, were to escort [redacted] to the FLOT in order to set conditions for future operations.

5/22

had been reallocated from other tasks in the SOTF and were directed to augment in support of future Peshmerga operations. gave orders for this mission around 1215 hours, and elements departed approximately one hour later. During this mission, C/S visited numerous Peshmerga OPs, in all cases dismounting from their vehicles upon arrival and interacting with Peshmerga soldiers and local commanders. Positions along the FLOT under the command of the are known by naming convention,

During the day, the C/S spent time at two positions of importance:

- a. Position which serves as the first location for incoming friendly vehicles to transit past. The C/S dismounted and interacted with individuals at this position. The local commander indicated that the position was in multiple enemy contacts the previous evening, specifically at position which sustained This conversation,
- b. Position in the and the location of the subsequent friendly fire incident. The C/S dismounted and interacted with Peshmerga soldiers along with the local commander, known as The Peshmerga. These conversations took place and other Peshmerga soldiers. in response to and consistent with plan, indicated intent to return to position later that evening.

14. After visiting the the C/S proceeded westward and visited other Peshmerga locations along the FLOT. They received information that their convoy had been observed by the enemy, and that the enemy may attempt to attack the convoy by fire as an opportunistic attack against what they thought was either a coalition or Peshmerga convoy. Although this is a fairly common occurrence, and his personnel took note and intended on altering their plans that evening to avoid observation by enemy positions forward of the FLOT.

15. Evening Preparations. returned to COP just before 1800 and began preparations for a night mission. back-briefed on his plan, and provided confirmatory orders to the members of his team shortly thereafter. The plan was to have return directly to the positions concurrent to movement to positions further west. C/S would operate independently for a number of hours prior to linking up at position at the end of the missions and jointly returning to the COP. consisted of four personnel:

- a. Patrol Commander
- b.
- c.
- d. Patrol Team member, Patrol Medic

16. Actions by deployed from COP and moved by ground through the positions towards conducting standard and successful battlefield deconfliction methods at points along the way. They arrived at approximately 2000 hours and parked their vehicles about away from the position in order to walk forward dismounted. Upon dismount, the team noticed Peshmerga soldiers

6/22

approaching them on foot, and greeted them with the

The team proceeded to conduct approximately 2.5 hours of Observation Post routine with the Peshmerga, setting up and advising the Peshmerga on night routine in a defensive position. During this time, and discussed with the local Peshmerga commander, named the requirement to set up better night time recognitions signals to indicate the approach of SOTF personnel.

also indicated that he intended on moving to position later on in the evening, at which point indicated similar intent. As the team was preparing to leave position requested that call ahead to position to let them know of expected arrival. The team observed make a phone call, although the recipient of the call and the content of the discussion is unknown. departed position en route to passing position by using the standard battlefield deconfliction protocol. They arrived at position at approximately 2300 hours.

17. Actions by Upon approach to position ordered the convoy to stop short of the position in order to remain behind cover and decrease exposure to the enemy. Although this plan would conceal their approach from the perspective of the enemy, it would still allow his personnel to approach along the standard route from which all friendly movement arrived, and would be in full view of the Peshmerga soldiers. He conducted a radio check with COP upon arrival and indicated the patrol's location in the and their intention to continue on foot. On the approach, the four personnel walked along the main road in loose formation,

While setting off from the vehicle drop off location, they passed a Peshmerga soldier manning a checkpoint location on a on the left flank. participated in a collective greeting with him by greeting him in Kurdish and exchanging a wave. The team passed by a pack of barking dogs and attempted to quiet them down and disengage from them by speaking English and shooing them away. On the final approach to the position, at less than away, ordered his team to continue to speak loudly in English and Kurdish to alert Peshmerga to their arrival on position. He

to help further identify his position and himself to a Peshmerga soldier, on his right flank. When readied his weapon and pointed it at him, reacted by shouting in English. Up to the point of shots being fired, Upon being fired upon and wounded, by during the initial stages of tactical first aid.

18. Actions by dismounted from the second vehicle and walked primarily on the left side of the road towards the Peshmerga position. He participated in the collective greeting with the Peshmerga checkpoint on the left flank while en route by speaking in Kurdish. Upon final approach towards the position, observed Peshmerga soldiers in the Machine Gun (MG) position to their front and greeted them in both English and Kurdish. He discontinued interaction with these soldiers when they observed the Canadian patrol and then went back to their duties. Immediately afterwards, observed He on the right flank ready his weapon and engage He subsequently observed the Peshmerga soldiers in the MG position rotate their MG 180 degrees and begin firing in their direction. received fire from both and the MG, resulting in a wound

In reaction to this fire, he withdrew under fire with to a position of cover, dropping his radio bag in process. He attempted to establish communications with COP on radio on his chest rig and inform them of the

7/22

friendly fire incident. [redacted] also attempted to establish communications with any available air assets on the [redacted] on his [redacted] radio, also on his chest rig. Although [redacted] was able to shout back and forth with [redacted] who indicated that he [redacted] he continued to be fixed in place due to another engagement of MG fire. At this time, [redacted] observed a Peshmerga [redacted] vehicle approach from the North, at which point he stood up, waived his arms and approached the vehicle to identify himself. When within close proximity to the vehicle and accompanying Peshmerga soldiers, [redacted] lay down on the ground and removed his helmet in order to expose his face to a Peshmerga soldier. Once positively identified by the Peshmerga, he directed the [redacted] vehicle to advance South down the road in order to provide cover from fire for himself and the remainder of his C/S. During this time, [redacted] continued intermittent communications on the [redacted] with a [redacted] identifying the presence of Canadian casualties and the requirement for evacuation. Upon coming abreast of the position of [redacted] observed [redacted] performing first aid. He continued on to the position of [redacted] and commenced first aid treatment, being joined by [redacted] once [redacted] had been evacuated. They jointly conducted first aid treatment, and [redacted] assisted in the ground evacuation of [redacted] in a Peshmerga truck to COP maintaining first aid during the movement by road.

19. Actions by [redacted] dismounted with [redacted] from vehicle one and proceeded on foot towards the Peshmerga position with the remainder of the patrol. He did not participate in the collective greeting to the Peshmerga checkpoint on the left flank, being preoccupied with attempting to disengage with the pack of dogs by shouting and stomping his feet. Upon final approach to the MG position, [redacted] heard shouting from the Peshmerga and observed [redacted] himself with [redacted] and verbally attempt to identify themselves to the Peshmerga. [redacted] received fire along with [redacted] and was wounded from either [redacted] or [redacted] from the MG. He communicated his status to [redacted] and [redacted] was unable to move to a position of cover but attempted to crawl despite his [redacted] wound. He was joined by [redacted] who provided first aid by adjusting his [redacted] Prior to being evacuated by ground as organized by [redacted] communicated with [redacted] and provided first aid advice for [redacted] wound. [redacted] was ground evacuated by Peshmerga to Sector [redacted] and subsequently moved to COP [redacted] He was evacuated by helicopter from COP [redacted] and further treated at the [redacted].

20. Actions by [redacted] dismounted from the second vehicle in the convoy and proceeded on foot towards the Peshmerga position, travelling primarily on the left side of the road. He participated in the collective greeting with the Peshmerga soldier in the checkpoint. Upon final approach to the Peshmerga position, he began to speak loudly in English and Kurdish while approaching the Peshmerga position. [redacted] observed [redacted] Peshmerga soldiers in the MG position, and greeted them but discontinued interaction with them when they appeared [redacted] in the Canadian presence. [redacted] observed [redacted] on the right flank and overheard [redacted] speaking in English, first in normal tone and then elevating to shouting. He heard rounds subsequently being fired and withdrew under fire. Once under cover, [redacted] called [redacted] to explain the situation and alert the Peshmerga to stop shooting. He communicated with [redacted] along with [redacted] learning that [redacted] had been wounded. In response, [redacted] laid down his rifle and attempted to walk from cover towards [redacted] shouting at the Peshmerga in English while doing so. He received incoming fire and withdrew to cover a second time, receiving a [redacted] wound [redacted] in the process. Upon movement of the Peshmerga vehicle, [redacted] sensed that the focus had shifted away from his position, and he moved to [redacted] to perform first aid. He arranged for a Peshmerga truck to evacuate [redacted] by ground to Sector [redacted].

8/22

communicating with the Peshmerga first in English, but finally in Arabic, as they did not understand his request in English. and was only done in the aftermath of the shooting. Once was evacuated, responded to request for assistance and moved to help perform first aid on While on route to COP established contact with and provided information required for the 9 line helicopter evacuation request.

21. Actions by was the second manoeuvre element under command and was concurrently operating in the battlespace at the time of the incident. They were conducting FLOT reces and assisting Peshmerga with night routine at positions West of elements, intending on linking up with them at Peshmerga position later in the night. Prior to the incident, had observed the FLOT, and had communicated this information to for to transmit higher At approximately 2305 hours, heard and observed the rifle and MG fire, and a few minutes later heard radio transmission to assisted by relaying information from at COP and proceeded to move to location in order to provide assistance. Upon arrival at Peshmerga position all Canadian personnel had already been transported back to COP retrieved all equipment they could locate from the incident site, and proceeded back to COP arriving just after evacuation helicopters had departed.

22. Actions at COP While the mission was ongoing, monitored progress at COP through radio communications with He monitored the information of and passed this info via to the SOTF HQ. He received a radio transmission from indicating location at the dismount point and intent to approach position on foot. He first became aware of the incident through a broken radio transmission on the tactical net from who was initially transmitting in the blind and subsequently making sporadic contact with Without being able to corroborate or clarify any of the information other than through relayed what he knew to the SOTF HQ at 2311 hours and attempted to refine the situation through radio and Concurrent to moving to the incident site, received a while en route to COP This informed him that was travelling to the Sector instead of COP and subsequently called to arrange for to move to the COP. also allowed to complete the 9-line evacuation request and transmit it to the SOTF HQ, which was accomplished via radio at 2335 hours. Both and were loaded on the first of two medical evacuation helicopters, with acting as escorts. The helicopter took off from COP at 0003 hours, landing at the at 0017 hours. As the helicopter left COP the element from COP having been activated by at COP deployed on order by the SOTF HQ. This element included a who assisted with the medical examination and treatment of He was treated for a wound and was for evacuation via road to the for further treatment.

23. Actions by SOTF HQ. The SOTF HQ was aware of the movements of friendly forces in the battlespace on 6 March 2015. They had received the COP DSR the evening prior, and had tracked movement throughout the day. the SOTF received final confirmation of evening plans prior to their departure, and collectively discussed the merits of the mission with the SOTF and the The SOTF HQ first became aware of the incident through radio transmission prior to 2311 hours (no more than six minutes after the

9/22

initial shots were fired), and indicated that a friendly fire incident had occurred in the SOTF log. ensured all key SOTF staff were aware of the situation, and with the began to compile the information required for medical evacuation. Meanwhile, called the in order to warn them of a potential request for medical evacuation via helicopter. While this was occurring, the SOTF to the was monitoring the situation from the He had moved up to this location at approximately 2310 hours to deconflict the and had established communications with the SOTF HQ via as a matter of course. He became aware of the incident through reporting from the SOTF HQ, along with reporting via phone call and with transmissions on the It took approximately for the SOTF HQ to receive enough information for a complete 9-line evacuation request, relying on information that was compiling through radio, and physical arrival of casualties at COP This 9-line request was transmitted by on to who physically relayed it to the along with a phone call from to the battle staff. Concurrent to evacuation arrangements, the HQ staff authorized the dispatch of from COP to COP Once the helicopter evacuation had been arranged, the SOTF HQ continued to track movements in the battlespace, while the and SOTF moved to the to meet their personnel. The SOTF HQ coordinated arrangements for evacuation with CANSOFCOM HQ in Canada and began post-incident reporting in accordance with the SOTF Standing Orders.

24. Medical Evacuation and Treatment. Medical evacuation assets were first alerted to the incident by the battle staff, who received phone call and overheard radio transmissions on the Initial reporting indicated the point of injury as being the Peshmerga position As this position is considered to helicopters, the activated two evacuation assets: First, they activated the second, they activated the

request from confirmed the pickup location as COP two medical evacuation helicopters were authorized to depart at 2343 hours. Upon arriving at COP at 2358 hours, the first helicopter was loaded with as casualties, along with The helicopter left COP at 0003 hours and arrived at the at 0017 hours. were treated on site by the surgical teams, and was subsequently identified as a casualty while in the and treated. The were on site with Sgt Doiron at the and were present when he was pronounced dead

25. arrived at the via ground evacuation at 0241 hours for treatment.

26.

Most of the soldiers had been awake throughout the previous night, and were not on duty during the day when first visited the position and indicated their intention to return.

10/22

27. Key Timeline

Time (local time, time zone designator 'C')	Event
2300 (approx.)	Arrives at _____ and dismounts from vehicles
2305 (approx.)	Initial Shots fired
No Later Than (NLT) 2311	SOTF reports friendly fire incident on radio to _____ logs into _____
2312	_____ transmissions received at _____
NLT 2335	Enough info received to complete 9-line evacuation request
2335	passes 9-line request via radio to SOTF
2337	9-line request sent from SOTF to _____ via phone
2343	MEDEVAC helicopters depart _____
2358	MEDEVAC helicopters arrive at COP _____
0003	MEDEVAC helicopters depart COP _____
0017	Patients transferred to _____
	Sgt Doiron time of death _____

11/22

GENERAL FINDINGS

Finding 1

28. The IO found that the cause of the friendly fire incident was mis-identification.

- a. Peshmerga soldier believed that and the rest of were enemy fighters attacking their position. Position had been attacked the night before and the resulting in believed that the enemy was attacking once again, and fired at and the others out of self-defence.
- b. The MG position, hearing open fire, immediately assessed that the enemy was attacking again, and quickly brought their gun into action in support. Although the Peshmerga in the position initially were approach, yelling and firing made them believe that their initial assessment was wrong, and they fired in self-defence at what they believed to be the enemy. Peshmerga soldier fired the MG at the group of dismounts, and a second time at when he attempted to move to

Finding 2

29. Additionally, the IO found numerous contributing factors present at the time of the incident:

- a. actions on the FLOT were wholly consistent with SOTF Advise and Assist mandate and were specifically requested by Peshmerga (daytime commander of position for that evening. Although assistance was requested, the Peshmerga failed to communicate to the level of and his soldiers would have later that evening.
- b. Although coordination at the Sector HQ level had been completed, it was conducted on 3 Mar 2015 and not followed up to ensure task completion. SOTF personnel expected that would follow-through on coordination with local commanders. This was the practice over an extended period of time working with and SOTF personnel had every reason to believe that this trend would continue.
- c. Despite indicating to Peshmerga on the afternoon of the 6th that they would be returning that night, this message did not reach his replacement, who was on duty at the time of approach. In fact, none of the Peshmerga had collectively passed the message that the Canadian patrol would be arriving, and their approach was unanticipated. None of the Peshmerga soldiers involved in the incident were present during daytime mission to the position. This fact runs contrary to expectations, which believed that their earlier presence on the position was one of to coordinate their arrival at night. That said, battlefield deconfliction protocols worked well from and initially at as well.

12/22

- d. It is believed that the commander located at position on the evening of 6 March 2015 did not successfully warn off that was approaching. Although the patrol requested that he call forward to deconflict their approach as an additional risk mitigation, the call was never confirmed. When asked about a call prior to 2300 hours to forewarn about an approaching friendly patrol, the commander
- e. Other positions on the did not pass down the line about approaching friendly vehicles. communications were the only method, and despite passing by the commander at seemed surprised to see the Canadians. Likewise, position also failed to pass the message, although they are somewhat off-set from the defensive track plan and may not have had visibility on movement. Even amongst the position itself, the first Peshmerga soldier on the checkpoint failed to pass on to anyone that was approaching on foot.
- f. The common TTP that the Peshmerga were used to seeing SOTF use at position was a caught the Peshmerga off guard, as they had not been at night at this particular position. SOTF personnel had every reason to believe that this including at position three hours prior.
- g. None of the Peshmerga soldiers implicated in the shooting were able to positively identify the approaching dismounts by visual means. on the position in order to mask it from the enemy. None of the Peshmerga and although they were generally aware of dismounted movement approaching, they could not determine if they were friend or foe.
- h. Despite shouting in English to identify his patrol, it is reasonable to conclude the Peshmerga soldier who engaged

Finding 3

30. The IO found that the sufficiency of the TTPs present at the time of the incident were as follows:

- a. Battlefield Deconfliction: Sufficient. SOTF members conducted time-proven and logical deconfliction protocols while approaching the Peshmerga position. The expectation that the mutually supporting deconfliction methods had been carried out all failed leading up to this mission. The errors of the Peshmerga were as follows:
 - i. SOTF members expected to conduct deconfliction on their behalf, as had been customarily established as pre-missions protocols over an extended period of time and was anticipated in this instance. Specifically, personnel at COP expected him to conduct coordination with Peshmerga units on their behalf. contributed to members of the patrol arriving at Peshmerga positions throughout 6 March 2015 without warning.

- ii. Patrol members projected a high level of confidence in the level of coordination amongst Peshmerga soldiers on positions. On 6 March 2015, despite indicating to each position that they would be returning later on that evening, each individual Peshmerga soldier on position was not made aware. As a result, were all unaware of the intended return of the SOTF patrol.
- iii. The Peshmerga while approaching Peshmerga positions at night. The TTPs in place at the time of the incident were those that had been established by custom and had functioned well on previous occasions, including over extended periods of combined operations between SOTF and the Peshmerga. These TTPs were a blend of western military precision adapted to a Peshmerga force. When asked if a more formal system should be established, Peshmerga commander in the It is worth noting that the TTPs for
- iv. It is important to note that the current SOTF TTP during deconfliction is deemed to be sufficient. SOTF members initiate all interaction with the Peshmerga by or and only after establishing initial rapport. It is important to note that and is commonly used across the coalition while interacting with Peshmerga. Although using a linguist or translator would alleviate the need for in most cases, the current TTPs are deemed sufficient as they were not a contributing factor to this incident. It is particularly important to highlight that Arabic was a non-factor in this incident, since Arabic was only spoken after the shooting had occurred.
- b. Medical Evacuation: Sufficient.
 - i. Patrol personnel provided first aid care under fire and organized ad-hoc ground evacuation back to COP as swiftly as possible under the tactical circumstances. Although evacuating casualties by helicopter from proximate to the point of injury would have removed the 10 minute travel time by ground in this instance, the added risk and complexity of establishing a hasty PZ proximate to the FLOT is problematic and likely would have added additional time to the overall evacuation.
 - ii. SOTF procedures for receiving and coordinating 9-line evacuation requests is understood well and functioned as expected. The early warning provided by and forwarded on by allowed the evacuation helicopters to lift off six minutes after the received the completed request.
 - iii. Reception of the helicopter at the pre-established PZ functioned well, with the pilots reporting good markings on approach.

- c. Sufficient. based on a number of relevant factors. In this instance, the requirement for reinforcements was identified early by key personnel, and elements moved to reinforce The current TFSO for activation sufficiently covers TTPs.

SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Finding 4

31. The IO found that the cause of death of Sgt Doiron was from a wound.
- a. (U) Memorandum of Record, Andrew Doiron (Annex D, Appendix 12)
 - b. (PROTECTED B) Certificate of Death (Annex D, Appendix 10)
 - c. (U) Re: Incident 6 March 2015 (Annex D, Appendix 11)

Analysis

32. Upon arrival at the , Sgt Doiron

Finding 5

33. The IO found that the factor which contributed to the death of Sgt Doiron, in addition to Findings 1 and 2 above, was the
- a. (U) Memorandum of Record, Andrew Doiron (Annex D, Appendix 12)
 - b. (U) Interview, Annex C Appendix 23)
 - c. (U) Re: Incident 6 March 2015 (Annex D, Appendix 11)

Analysis

34. provided tactical first aid to Sgt Doiron while facilitating the first leg of evacuation to surgical care. The chain of care continued at COP with Upon arrival at the and medical examination, it was determined that Sgt Doiron's injuries indicated that Sgt Doiron's

Finding 6

35. The IO found that Sgt Doiron was on duty at the time of his death.

- a. (S CEO LIMDIS) Operation IMPACT TF- Mounting Order (Annex D, Appendix 16)

Analysis

36. Sgt Doiron was deployed as a member of SOTF Op IMPACT as indicated in the Mounting Order. He arrived in Iraq on with the Main Body of the task force and is indicated on the TO&E as a member as such (Annex A to the Mounting Order).

Finding 7 (a)

37. The IO found that Sgt Doiron's death was attributable to military service.

- a. (S) Testimony - Annex C, Appendix 1)
- b. (S) Testimony - (Annex C, Appendix 2)
- c. (S) Testimony - (annex C, Appendix 4)
- d. (S) Testimony - (Annex C, Appendix 15)
- e. (S) Testimony - (Annex C, Appendix 17)

Analysis

38. Sgt Doiron's chain of command confirms that he was going about duties directly related to military service at the time of his death.

Finding 7 (b)

39. The IO found that the cause of injury to

- a. (U) Memorandum for Record, (Annex D, Appendix 15)
- b. (S) Testimony - Annex C, Appendix 29)
- c. (S) Witness Statement - (Annex C, Appendix 6)
- d. (S) Testimony - Annex C, Appendix 7)
- e. (S) Witness Statement - (Annex C, Appendix 8)
- f. (S) Testimony - (Annex C, Appendix 9)
- g. (U) Testimony - Peshmerga soldier (Annex C, Appendix 23)
- h. (U) Testimony - Peshmerga soldier (Annex C, Appendix 24)
- i. (U) Testimony - (Annex C, Appendix 22)

Analysis

40. [redacted] was patrolling behind [redacted] at the time of the friendly fire incident and was in the line of fire from both Peshmerga shooting positions [redacted] observed shots fired from both Peshmerga positions, and was aware of Sgt Doiron [redacted] Once the initial firing subsided, both [redacted] communicated with [redacted] who indicated that he had been [redacted]

[redacted] Both Peshmerga soldiers [redacted] admit to firing at the group of Canadians, but [redacted]

Finding 8

41. The IO found that the contributing factors to the injury to [redacted] are contained in Findings 1 and 2.

Finding 9

42. The IO found that [redacted] was on duty at the time of his injury.

- a. (S CEO LIMDIS) Operation IMPACT TF- [redacted] Mounting Order (Annex D, Appendix 16)

Analysis

43. [redacted] was deployed as a member of SOTF Op IMPACT [redacted] as indicated in the Mounting Order. He arrived in Iraq on [redacted] with the Main Body of the task force and is indicated on the TO&E as a member as such (Annex A to the Mounting Order).

Finding 10

44. The IO found that [redacted] injuries are directly attributable to military service.

- a. (S) Testimony – [redacted] (Annex C, Appendix 1)
- b. (S) Testimony – [redacted] (Annex C, Appendix 2)
- c. (S) Testimony – [redacted] (annex C, Appendix 4)
- d. (S) Testimony – [redacted] (Annex C, Appendix 15)
- e. (S) Testimony – [redacted] (Annex C, Appendix 17)

Analysis

45. [redacted] chain of command confirms that he was going about duties directly related to military service at the time of his injury.

Finding 11

46. The IO found that the cause of injury to [redacted] from either Peshmerga soldier [redacted]

- a. (U) Memorandum for Record, CAF Member (Annex D, Appendix 13).
- b. (S) Witness Statement – (Annex C, Appendix 6)
- c. (S) Testimony – (Annex C, Appendix 7)
- d. (U) Testimony – Peshmerga soldier (Annex C, Appendix 23)
- e. (U) Testimony – Peshmerga soldier (Annex C, Appendix 24)
- f. (U) Testimony - (Annex C, Appendix 22)

Analysis

47. first became aware of his injury after his first attempt to move from a position of cover towards While doing so, he received a burst of incoming fire and dove back to cover. At the time of the injury, believed the injury was on 7 March 2015. Both Peshmerga soldiers admit to firing at the group of Canadians, but

Finding 12

48. The IO found that contributing factors to the injury of are contained in Findings one and two.

Finding 13

49. The IO found that was on duty at the time of his injury.

- a. (S CEO LIMDIS) Operation IMPACT TF Mounting Order (Annex D, Appendix 16)

Analysis

50. was deployed as a member of SOTF Op IMPACT as indicated in the Mounting Order. He arrived in Iraq on with the Main Body of the task force and is indicated on the TO&E as a member as such (Annex A to the Mounting Order).

Finding 14

51. The IO found that injuries are directly attributable to military service.

- a. (S) Testimony – (Annex C, Appendix 1)
- b. (S) Testimony – (Annex C, Appendix 2)
- c. (S) Testimony – (Annex C, Appendix 4)
- d. (S) Testimony – (Annex C, Appendix 15)
- e. (S) Testimony - (Annex C, Appendix 17)

Analysis

52. chain of command confirms that he was going about duties directly related to military service at the time of his injury.

Finding 15

53. The IO found that the cause of injuries to from either Peshmerga soldier

- a. (U) Memorandum for Record, CAF Member (Annex D, Appendix 14)
- b. (S) Witness Statement – Annex C, Appendix 8)
- c. (S) Testimony – Annex C, Appendix 9)
- d. (U) Testimony – Peshmerga soldier (Annex C, Appendix 23)
- e. (U) Testimony – Peshmerga soldier Annex C, Appendix 24)
- f. (U) Testimony – (Annex C, Appendix 22)

Analysis

54. was patrolling in front of towards the Peshmerga MG position at the time of the incident. He observed the Peshmerga soldier ready his weapon, and subsequently begin firing at the entire patrol. also observed the Peshmerga soldier in the MG position turn their weapon towards them and fire a burst. He

Peshmerga soldiers admit to firing at the group of Canadians, but on 7 March 2015. Both

Finding 16

55. The IO found that contributing factors to the injury of are contained in findings 1 and 2.

Finding 17

56. The IO found that was on duty at the time of his injuries.

- a. (S CEO LIMDIS) Operation IMPACT TF- Mounting Order (Annex D, Appendix 16)

Analysis

57. was deployed as a member of SOTF Op IMPACT as indicated in the Mounting Order. He arrived in Iraq on with the Main Body of the task force and is indicated on the TO&E as a member as such (Annex A to the Mounting Order).

Finding 18

58. The IO found that injuries are directly attributable to military service.
- a. (S) Testimony – (Annex C, Appendix 1)
 - b. (S) Testimony – Annex C, Appendix 2)
 - c. (S) Testimony – annex C, Appendix 4)
 - d. (S) Testimony – (Annex C, Appendix 15)
 - e. (S) Testimony – Annex C, Appendix 17)

Analysis

59. chain of command confirms that he was going about duties directly related to military service at the time of his injury.

RECOMMENDATIONS

60. The IO recommends that this Summary Investigation be considered sufficient for the purposes of investigations by the chain of command, and that no Board Of Inquiry be convened. The IO considers that further administrative investigation would bear no further clarity on the situation, nor is any required.

61. In order to reduce the risk of similar incidents in the future, the IO recommends the following:

- a. Recommendation 1: Continue to exercise very high levels of due diligence while conducting tactical movement about the battlespace.
- b. Recommendation 2: When possible, Although this is not always tactically feasible given the mandate, it should be avoided, as Peshmerga the threat of enemy attack from the rear.
- c. Recommendation 3: Do not approach a Peshmerga position without having established direct and continuous communications with the position's commander.
- d. Recommendation 4: After establishing communications with the position's commander,

62. Further, the IO recommends that these deconfliction protocols be declassified to a releasable level for other members of the Operation Inherent Resolve coalition. Although Peshmerga units in other Sectors along the FLOT may these recommendations may be found helpful nonetheless. In order to ensure widest dissemination, the classification of "SECRET MESF" is recommended, as this ensures dissemination across the Middle East Stabilization Force.

63. These recommendations are identified based on

The TTPs in place at the time of the incident were sufficient based on the known facts at the time, and the IO assesses that other people, knowing the same information as members of SOTF would have acted in a similar manner and made similar decisions. Had this incident not occurred, the methods of coordinating night movement would have been deemed satisfactory. As a result of the incident, however,

As a consequence, SOTF should initiate more robust deconfliction protocols

LIST OF ANNEXES:

Annex A	Terms of Reference dated 8 March 2015
Annex B	Correspondence to and from the IO
Appendix 1	(C Email exchange, IO to DComd CANSOFCOM
Annex C	Witness Testimony
Appendix 1	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 2	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 3	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 4	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 5	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 6	(S) Witness Statement -
Appendix 7	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 8	(S) Witness Statement -
Appendix 9	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 10	(S) Interview - (not recorded)
Appendix 11	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 12	(S) Witness Statement -
Appendix 13	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 14	(S) Witness Statement -
Appendix 15	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 16	(U) Interview - (not recorded)
Appendix 17	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 18	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 19	(S) Testimony -
Appendix 20	(S) Testimony - (second iteration)
Appendix 21	(U) Testimony -
Appendix 22	(U) Testimony -
Appendix 23	(U) Witness Statement -
Appendix 24	(U) Testimony - Peshmerga soldier
Appendix 25	(U) Witness Statement - Peshmerga soldier
Appendix 26	(U) Testimony - Peshmerga soldier
Appendix 27	(U) Witness Statement - Peshmerga soldier
Appendix 28	(U) Interview - (not recorded)
Appendix 29	(S) Testimony -

SECRET CEO LIMDIS (SECRET less Annexes)

Annex D	Other Evidence
Appendix 1	(S SOTF Storyboard
Appendix 2	(U) SOTF Storyboard
Appendix 3	(S I Storyboard
Appendix 4	(S) Overview, positions
Appendix 5	(S Fusion Graphic, Incident Site
Appendix 6	(S) Key Node / Battlespace Geometry
Appendix 7	(S) Radio Log, SOTF TOC
Appendix 8	(S) Radio Log, COP TOC
Appendix 9	(S) Log, SOTF TOC
Appendix 10	(PROTECTED B) Certificate of Death, Sgt A.J. Doiron
Appendix 11	(U) Re: Incident 6 March 2015 (CANSOFCOM Surgeon)
Appendix 12	(U) Memorandum for Record, Andrew Doiron
Appendix 13	(U) Memorandum for Record, CAF Member
Appendix 14	(U) Memorandum for Record, CAF Member
Appendix 15	(U) Memorandum for Record, Subject
Appendix 16	(S CEO LIMDIS) Operation IMPACT TF Mounting Order
Annex E	List of Acronyms