



UN Deployment: **PRIORITIZING COMMITMENTS AT HOME AND ABROAD**

Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

The Honourable Daniel Lang, Chair

The Honourable Mobina S.B. Jaffer, Deputy Chair

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS.....	iv
MEMBERS OF THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE.....	vi
ORDER OF REFERENCE	vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
RECOMMENDATIONS	4
INTRODUCTION.....	5
PART A: CANADA’S NATIONAL INTEREST AND UN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS	8
Building a National Consensus Pre-Deployment.....	10
Making the case for UN Peace Support Deployment.....	12
Peacekeeping’s transition to Peace Support Operations Missions.....	14
Risks.....	17
HOW AND WHERE CAN CANADA CONTRIBUTE.....	17
Personnel.....	21
– <i>Women and UN Security Council Resolution 1325</i>	21
– <i>Francophones</i>	23
Equipment	24
Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System	24
Non-Military Contributions to UN Peace Support Operations.....	25
Conflict Prevention and Capacity Building	25
Training.....	29
A UNITED NATIONS IN NEED OF REFORM	30
Combatting Corruption.....	33
Sexual Abuse and Misconduct.....	33
PART B: CANADA AND UN PEACEKEEPING - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND MISSIONS	35
COLD-WAR ERA PEACEKEEPING.....	35

A. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in Egypt.....	37
1. Authorization General Assembly Emergency Session Resolutions 998-1000 (1956–1967).....	37
2. Context	37
3. Mandate	37
4. Canadian Contribution.....	37
B. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	38
1. Authorization Security Council Resolution 186 (1964–present).	38
2. Context	38
3. Mandate	38
4. Canadian Contribution.....	38
C. Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).....	39
1. Authorization Protocol to the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace (1981–present).	39
2. Context	39
3. Mandate	40
4. Canadian Contribution.....	40
POST-COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING.....	40
A. UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and NATO-Led Implementation Force (IFOR).....	42
1. Authorization 1992–1995 (UN Security Council Resolution 743).....	42
2. Context	42
3. Mandate	42
4. Canadian Contribution.....	43
B. UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I – 1992) (UNOSOM II – 1993).....	43
1. Authorization Security Council Resolution 751 (1992).....	43
2. Context	43
3. Mandate	44
4. Canadian Contributions	45
C. UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).....	45
1. Authorization Security Council Resolution 872 (1993–1996).....	45
2. Context	45
3. Mandate	46
4. Canadian Contribution.....	47
MODERN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS.....	48
A. United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO).....	48
1. Authorization Resolution 1925 (2010–present).	48
2. Context	48
3. Mandate	49
4. Canadian Contribution.....	50
B. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).....	51
1. Authorization Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013-present).....	51

2.	Context	51
3.	Mandate	52
4.	Canadian Contribution.....	53
C. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).....		
1.	Authorization UN Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014-present).....	53
2.	Context	53
3.	Mandate	54
4.	Canadian Contribution.....	55
APPENDIX A – DUTCH LETTER TO PARLIAMENT		
		56
APPENDIX B - TOP CONTRIBUTORS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS		
		70
APPENDIX C – CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS		
		71
APPENDIX D – FATALITIES IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS		
		76
APPENDIX E – WITNESSES.....		
		79

LIST OF ACRONYMS¹

ACCORD	AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
AU	AFRICAN UNION
C-34	UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
CAF	CANADIAN ARMED FORCES
CAR	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
DPR	DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW
DRC	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
ECOWAS	ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
EUAM UKRAINE	EUROPEAN UNION ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR CIVILIAN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM UKRAINE
EUPOL COPPS	EUROPEAN UNION POLICE CO-ORDINATING OFFICE FOR PALESTINIAN POLICE SUPPORT
FIB	FORCE INTERVENTION BRIGADE
GAC	GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA
HIPPO	HIGH-LEVEL INDEPENDENT PANEL ON UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS
ISIL	ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT. ALSO KNOWN AS THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS), THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND AL-SHAM, THE ISLAMIC STATE (IS), AND DAESH (IN ARABIC)
KFOR	KOSOVO FORCE
MFO	MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS
MINUSCA	UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
MINUSMA	UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED STABILIZATION MISSION IN MALI
MINUSTAH	UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI
MONUSCO	UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
NORAD	NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
NATO	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
PSOPS	PEACE AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS PROGRAM
PSTC	PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTRE
RCMP	ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

¹ This list of acronyms includes terms not defined in tables that appear within the Report as well as recurring references. It is not an exhaustive list of every acronym that appears in the Report.

SRS	SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
UN DPKO	UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
UNEF I	FIRST UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE
UNPROFOR	UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNAMIR	UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNFICYP	UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS
UNMISS	UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
UNOSOM I	UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I
UNTSO	UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION
USCC	OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES SECURITY COORDINATOR IN JERUSALEM

MEMBERS OF THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Honourable Daniel Lang, Chair
The Honourable Mobina S.B. Jaffer, Deputy Chair

And

The Honourable Senators:

Lynn Beyak
Claude Carignan, P.C.
Jean-Guy Dagenais
Colin Kenny
Elaine McCoy
Don Meredith
Vernon White

Ex-officio members of the Committee:

The Honourable Senators Claude Carignan, P.C. (or Yonah Martin) and Peter Harder, P.C. (or Diane Bellemare).

Other Senators who participated from time to time in the work of the Committee:

The Honourable Senators Larry W. Campbell, James S. Cowan, Joseph A. Day, Frances Lankin, P.C., Wilfred P. Moore, Victor Oh, Nancy Greene Raine and Pierrette Ringuette.

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ORDER OF REFERENCE

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate*, Thursday, April 21, 2016:

With leave of the Senate,

The Honourable Senator Lang moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Tannas:

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on issues related to the Defence Policy Review presently being undertaken by the government;

That, pursuant to rule 12-18(2)(b)(i), the committee be authorized to meet from June to September 2016, even though the Senate may then be adjourned for a period exceeding one week;

That the committee be permitted, notwithstanding usual practices, to deposit with the Clerk of the Senate its report if the Senate is not then sitting, and that the report be deemed to have been tabled in the Chamber; and

That the committee table its report no later than December 16, 2016, and that the committee retain all powers necessary to publicize its findings for 180 days after the tabling of the final report.

After debate,

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Charles Robert

Clerk of the Senate

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has undertaken an investigation into the federal government's plan to increase Canada's participation in United Nations peace support operations. It comes as part of a broader study of the federal government's Defence Policy Review. To provide a strong evidentiary foundation for this report, Senators interviewed expert witnesses and undertook a fact-finding mission to UN Headquarters to learn how Canada could further contribute to UN missions.

The Committee's report, *UN Deployment: Prioritizing commitments at home and abroad*, identifies several possible areas for Canada to play a significant role in peace support operations, including non-military contributions that can strengthen governance, rule of law, and assist in conflict prevention abroad.

In theory, this is laudable. We have a proud tradition in which 120,000 Canadians have served on peacekeeping missions, though these missions have cost 122 Canadian lives. Canada is also an active contributor to the United Nations, and other international campaigns. On average, the Government of Canada contributes approximately \$1.5 billion annually to the United Nations and its various agencies, including \$324 million in 2015-2016 for peace support operations. In addition, Canada has been and remains a major contributor to coalition- and NATO-led missions in, for example, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Latvia and Haiti.

That said, UN peacekeeping missions have changed dramatically over time. ***Today's missions are undertaken when there is often no peace to keep.*** They are more about peace support and the protection of civilians than they are about traditional peacekeeping, where parties agree to end hostilities and international observers monitor the "peace."

Modern peace support operations involve complex and hostile environments in which enemies are often not identified, arms are being smuggled and civilians are targeted. There are also significant operational as well as command and control challenges for the UN and for those nations deploying civilian and military personnel, and equipment.

In August 2016, the government pledged 600 troops, 150 police officers and \$450 million over three years to UN peace support operations. While the specific mission has not been identified, Canada is under pressure to join the UN peace support mission in Mali, one of the largest and most dangerous of all UN peace support operations.

Over the course of our study, witnesses recommended that Canada should become more involved in training — especially for police and military from developing countries — as well as in providing intelligence and equipment, **rather than putting boots on the ground.** If Canada were to become more involved in training, it would contribute to long-term capacity building for regional organizations and those developing countries that are deploying troops so they meet a basic performance standard.

The Committee agrees and notes that Canada should employ a strategic approach which includes conflict prevention, capacity building, training and implementation of UN reforms, including UN resolution 1325, which urges an increase in the participation of women in all UN peace and security efforts.

Before the government proceeds with a deployment of Canadian troops to support a UN mission in Africa, the committee makes eight recommendations.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Canadian Armed Forces has many ongoing commitments, including to our national defence and our contributions to NORAD and NATO. As a result, Canada has needs that must be addressed, including recruitment, training and updating various military and strategic capabilities. Before Canada further extends its commitments to UN peace support operations, **the Committee highlights the following:**

Statement of National Interest:

Prior to increasing the commitments for UN peace support operations, the government must ensure adequate funding is available to meet the current national and international operational priorities for the Canadian Armed Forces.

No deployment without Parliament's consent

To ensure that parliamentarians and the Canadian people are fully informed about the rationale behind Canada's participation in peace support operations, **the Committee recommends the government table a 'Statement of Justification' in both Houses of Parliament that outlines the specifics of any UN deployment every time Canadian troops are involved.** This statement should include the size of the mission, the goals, risks involved, rules of engagement, the costs, and details for a fixed-term withdrawal plan.²

Support regional bodies to build capacity

As UN peace support operations deal with increasingly complex and dangerous situations, Canada must focus its finite resources in Africa and the Americas by working with key regional partners to enhance capabilities in conflict prevention and governance. **The Committee recommends that Canada develop and implement a plan focussed on conflict prevention and capacity building with the African Union and the Organization of American States.**

Sharing Canadian expertise

Canada can play a large role in ensuring that our international partners will be prepared and disciplined when engaging in UN peace support operations. **The Committee recommends that government establish a Peace Support Operations Training Centre to assist in training military, police and civilians from troop-contributing countries pre and post deployment. Training should be available inside Canada and outside.**

² The UN is committed to finding a replacement for Canada once its term is complete.

Resolution 1325: Women and peace support operations

The UN has recognized through Resolution 1325 that women have unique contributions to make in peace processes — yet only about 4% of uniformed personnel are women. **The Committee recommends that Canada expedite implementation of Resolution 1325 and ensure women are included in all aspects of peace support operations.**

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Government table a “Statement of Justification” in both houses of Parliament outlining the specifics of any UN deployment including the size of the mission, its goals, the risks involved, the costs, rules of engagement and a fixed-term deployment plan so as to ensure bi-partisan and multi-partisan support through open parliamentary debate prior to confirmation and deployment of members of the Canadian Armed Forces.
2. The committee recommends that the government clearly articulate the rules of engagement for internationally deployed Canadian personnel so as to allow Canadian military or police to take appropriate action to defend themselves and/or civilians from harm or abuse.
3. Canada expedite implementation of Resolution 1325; that it encourage the inclusion of more women in all aspects of peace support operations; and that it ensure that Canadian and United Nations personnel deployed receive extensive training related to the women, peace, and security agenda.
4. In recognition of the burden that a deployment to a francophone nation will have on Franco-Canadians, the government develop a strategy to better support those units and their families.
5. The government to ensure sufficient financial and support resources will be available for women and men who return from dangerous peace support operations, especially those who develop post-traumatic stress disorders.
6. Develop and implement a plan focused on Conflict Prevention and Capacity Building with two regional organizations - specifically the African Union and Organization of American States – and establish specific benchmarks for success.
7. Establish a Peace Operations Training Centre to assist in training military, police and civilian personnel from troop contributing countries pre and post deployment. Training should be available inside Canada and outside.
8. Work with the UN Secretary General to define and implement a framework to prosecute sexual exploitation and assault, human trafficking, abuse of minors and prostitution which have occurred during UN peace support operations.

INTRODUCTION

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence's study of Canada's engagement in United Nations peace support operations responds to an order of reference obtained from the Senate on the 21st of April, 2016 "to examine and report on issues related to the Defence Policy Review presently being undertaken by the government." As part of the study, the Honourable Harjit Singh Sajjan, Minister of National Defence specifically requested that the committee examine Canada's re-engagement with United Nations (UN) peace support operations, which was in line with his Defence Policy Review and his mandate letter from the Prime Minister.

The Senate Committee took a broad, but cautious approach to the subject especially in light of the changing nature of UN peace support operations, and the risks involved.

During the course of its study, the Committee held 6 days of hearings and heard from over 45 witnesses between 30 May and 21 September and participated in a fact-finding mission to UN headquarters in New York City on 24 October 2016. While some witnesses focused their presentations on the issue of peace support operations³, others addressed issues related to the broader defence policy review, which the committee will report on in the coming months.

This interim report focuses on Canada's re-engagement with UN peace support operations. The report provides a constructive view of Canada's involvement with UN peacekeeping, the challenges involved and it examines some of the options which are before the government and Parliament.

Canada's Commitments to the UN, NATO and International Missions

Between, its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and the UN, Canada has been making ongoing, substantial contributions to meet our continental and international obligations. When it comes to supporting the UN, Canada has been there both financially and in terms of providing personnel. In the last fiscal year, Canada provided approximately \$1.5 billion to various UN programs and agencies. Of that contribution \$324 million went to support UN peacekeeping operations.

Financial Contributions to the UN 2015-2016	Total (Canadian Dollars)
UN Regular Budget	\$105.2 million
UN Peacekeeping budget (9 th largest)	\$324 million
Specialized UN Agencies	\$73 million
Voluntary Contributions through Global Affairs Canada (2014-2015)	\$1 billion (\$356 million to the World Food Programme; \$200 million to UNICEF; \$113 million to the UN Development Programme (UNDP); \$83 million to UN High Commission for Refugees; and, \$80 million to the World Health Organization)
Total	\$1 502 200 000 m

Source: Unclassified briefing note prepared by Global Affairs Canada

³ Throughout the testimony, witnesses used the terms "peacekeeping", "peace support operations", and "peace operations" interchangeably, to describe the range of activities designed to support conflict prevention, conflict monitoring, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding.

Since 2001, Canada deployed most of its military resources to Afghanistan. Following the Afghanistan commitment, Canada participated in significant coalition missions. Currently 112 Canadians are deployed on UN Peace Operations and other missions as indicated in the following tables.

CANADIAN ARMED FORCES (CAF) PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS

CAF Mission name	Country	International context	Timeframe	Number of CAF Personnel Deployed
Various ⁴	Afghanistan	US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO's International Security Assistance Force	2001-2014	More than 40,000
Operation MOBILE	Libya	Operation Unified Protector	March 2011-October 2011	655 (at peak)
Operation IMPACT	Iraq/Syria	Contribution to the Middle East Stabilization Force (MESF)	August 2014 – Ongoing	Approx. 830
Operation UNIFIER	Ukraine	Operates under the <i>Multinational Joint Commission</i> ⁵	April 2015 –Ongoing	Approx. 200
Operation REASSURANCE ⁶	Latvia	Part of NATO assurance and deterrence measures in Central and Eastern Europe	2017	Up to 455 ⁷

Source: National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces and NATO

⁴ A total of eight distinct missions were deployed over the course of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan. See: National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces : [The Canadian Armed Forces Legacy in Afghanistan](#).

⁵ Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Reforms Project Office: [International Partnerships](#).

⁶ Operation REASSURANCE consists of various CAF air, land and maritime deployments in Central and Eastern Europe, to which a Latvian component will be added in the spring of 2017. See: Government of Canada, [Defence Minister concludes meetings at NATO and in Latvia](#), News Release, 28 October 2016.

⁷ *Ibid.*

Canadian Personnel Deployed to United Nations Peace Operations (as of 31 August 2016)

United Nations Mission	Canadian Personnel
MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti)	88 (4 military; 84 police)
MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)	9 (all military)
UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)	1 (military)
UNMISS (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan)	10 (5 experts; 5 military)
UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization – Golan Heights, Lebanon and Sinai Peninsula)	4 (experts)

Source: United Nations, UN Mission's Summary Detailed by Country, 31 August 2016.

Canadian Personnel Deployed to Non-United Nations Peace Operations (as of May 2016)*

	Military	Police	Total*
Non-UN Missions:			
Sinai, Egypt (MFO)	71	0	71
Jerusalem, Israel (USSC)	21	1	22
Palestinian Territories, West Bank (EU Pol COPPS)	0	1	1
Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)	0	2	2
Kosovo (KFOR)	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>
<u>TOTAL NON-UN</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>101</u>

*Figures represent Canadian deployments as of May 2016. Numbers may fluctuate on a monthly basis due to incoming and outgoing rotations and deployment cycles.

Source: Table prepared by Global Affairs Canada and submitted to the Committee

PART A: CANADA'S NATIONAL INTEREST AND UN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

During his appearance before the Committee on 30 May 2016, the Minister of National Defence provided some confirmation concerning the government's future plans for peacekeeping. He reminded the Committee that "the Prime Minister has been explicit in his commitment to revitalizing Canada's engagement in peacekeeping missions."⁸

When it comes to how Canada will engage the UN on peace support operations, the Committee is of the view that any decision or measures to engage must take into consideration all present national and international commitments. These commitments can be defined as defence of Canada; our continental defence as part of NORAD and our strategic defence within the NATO Alliance. Additionally, it is vital to address shortcomings within the Canadian Armed Forces which include recruitment, training, and retention of full-time and reserve members of the Canadian Armed Forces; capability gaps which have been identified today and equipment needs in the near, medium and long term.

Numerous witnesses told the Committee that Canada's new defence policy should continue to be centred primarily on the defence of Canada, followed by the defence of North America in cooperation with the United States (U.S.) through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), and thirdly that it identify the essential elements and requirements for Canada to contribute to multilateral international operations.⁹

Colonel (Ret'd) Charles Davies testified to the Committee that, "peace support is not and never will be a no-fail mission for Canada."¹⁰

David Bercuson, Director of the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, told the Committee that, "Our military resources should be preserved to be used in alliance with NATO and the United States in the defence of North America or to make a difference where it can really count in the national interests of this country, such as in the Caribbean Basin."¹¹

Former Defence Minister Peter MacKay testified that:

[A]ny realignment of defence policy must take into consideration the geopolitical ramifications of both combat and non-combat interventions. While this government has committed to refocusing on the United Nations, it must not be at the expense of our current partnerships...I would suggest that the priority still has to remain our NORAD commitments, our NATO commitments. For the type of missions that are classified as classic peacekeeping missions, we can provide other supports rather than large-scale troop movements or commitments.

⁸ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Sajjan.

⁹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Battista, Davies, Colin Robertson, Gosselin; [Evidence](#), 13 June 2016, MacKay.

¹⁰ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Davies.

¹¹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, David Bercuson.

...as a privileged nation, where we're able to do both [UN and NATO missions]....in order to get there and maintain...capacity, we have to make investments... we cannot be neglectful of our NATO commitments, which are solemn obligations that go back to the end of the Second World War.¹²

When asked if Canada should be prioritizing its commitments to NATO or the UN, most witnesses told the Committee that it is not a question of “either/or” but rather of “using the right tool for the right job.”¹³ Almost all witnesses indicated that these organizations have different strengths and serve different functions.

The Committee heard that while the UN offers expertise in terms of capacity building and nation-building, NATO is known for its effective military command and control structure as well as specialized equipment such as “enablers” that better-place the NATO alliance to carry out certain activities that stretch beyond the capacity of the UN.

Colonel (Ret’d) Michael P. Cessford noted:

[W]e have almost inevitably a shared objective and shared strategic outcomes that are desired by both the United Nations and NATO. The question is how to go about attaining this shared objective. ... Certainly, it may well be that for a period of time the capabilities resident in NATO are more appropriate perhaps to the entry level, but we should be looking at transition soon to a UN operation, particularly when you move from combat operations to what truly are peace and stability operations, engaging ideally other regional partners such as the African Union.¹⁴

Mr. Cessford also explained that there may be opportunities for these two organizations to work together, as “[t]he military has one imperative, and that is to establish the security conditions such that other elements engaged to achieve the peace, to win the peace.”¹⁵

Further to this point, Major-General (Ret’d) James R. Ferron added: “Our centre of gravity is the credibility in working within alliances to achieve collective defence. Consequently, a level of interoperability in thought, purpose, and equipment is required within our NORAD, our NATO, our UN and any coalition of forces agreed to by the government.”¹⁶

While Professor Walter Dorn suggested to the committee that “NATO and the UN want to work more closely together, and I think we should be looking at bridging those two institutions so they have a means to work together,”¹⁷ there remains operational and political challenges for them doing so.

¹² SECD, [Evidence](#), 13 June 2016, MacKay.

¹³ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Davies, Cessford, Robertson, Davidson; SECD, [Evidence](#), 13 June 2016, MacKay; [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Sajjan.

¹⁴ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Cessford.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Ferron.

¹⁷ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Walter Dorn.

For her part, Elinor Sloan, Professor of International Relations at Carleton University, recommended that the government “support efforts to boost military forces in the Baltic region versus Russian aggression” but also suggested to the Committee that “NATO and other regional organizations are part of the UN system; they’re part of the UN Charter. So to go with a NATO operation, you’re not entirely going out of the UN; it’s just been delegated to a regional organization.”¹⁸

The Committee views the defence of Canada to be the first priority for the Canadian Armed Forces followed by our commitment to continental defence as part of NORAD, and then our commitment to NATO and international contributions to peace and security. This includes ensuring appropriate financial investments are made to address priorities and fill capability gaps. At the same time, there is a need for Canada to be an active contributor to efforts when international disasters or humanitarian crisis occur. Supporting international efforts to promote peace and protect civilians through the UN or NATO are important objectives; however, such engagement must come after serious consideration of all the factors involved and after Parliament has fully considered a proposed mission.

Building a National Consensus Pre-Deployment

The government announced in August 2016 that it has pledged “up to 600 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel to be available for possible deployment to UN Peace operations”¹⁹ as well as \$450 million over three years towards the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs), managed by Global Affairs Canada. “The International Police Peacekeeping Program was renewed for a five-year period, with renewed funding of \$46.9 million per year provided through Budget 2016 for the first three years to allow for the deployment “of up to 150 police officers.”²⁰ In addition, \$30 million was announced over three years for Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building in the Sahel region of Africa. These measures will account for a significant deployment of Canadians as part of UN Missions.

Parliamentary precedents have been established for bringing issues of deployment of Canadian Armed Forces personnel before the House of Commons for a vote. The committee agreed that any deployment on a UN peace support mission with such substantial numbers as announced by the government, should be debated and voted on by parliamentarians in both chambers.

Major-General (Ret’d) Lewis MacKenzie advised that public debates help to better inform parliamentarians on operational decisions being made by the government. In noting that “Canadians deserve a more open, transparent debate on how their military gets used in this world,” Lieutenant General (Ret’d) Michael Day recommended that transparent debate in Parliament is one avenue the government could undertake to publicly detail its commitments.²¹

This inclusion of a parliamentary debate on missions demonstrates that the deployment of Canadians has the support of Canadians, as represented by parliament. It also affirms in the words of House of Commons

¹⁸ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Sloan.

¹⁹ Government of Canada, “[Canada to support peace operations](#),” News release, 26 August 2016.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Michael Day.

Speaker John Fraser, that Canada is a parliamentary democracy, not “a so-called executive democracy nor a so-called administrative democracy.”²²

Governments cannot and must not deploy Canadians without clearly advising Parliament of the mission. Taking into consideration the mandate of the government to promote and encourage open and transparent government, the Committee believes it is time that the government moved to ending partisanship for military deployment by striving for consensus prior to deploying Canadians to dangerous missions.

The Committee reviewed correspondence between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and their Parliament when it came to their 2013 decision to deploy Dutch troops and equipment to Mali in support of the UN Mission (see Appendix A). The letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Minister of Security and Justice and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation addressed to Parliament was revealing for its clarity and transparency.

It outlined the grounds for participation; defined the mission; explained the political situation on the ground; spoke to issues of security; human rights; the humanitarian situation; specified development cooperation; the complexity of the situation in Mali; regional challenges; the operational concept and organization for the mission (including challenges and coordination); operational aspects including (contribution of members to join the UN police; the size of the mission; command structure; medical services; operational risks (such as security; health; Improvised Explosive Device threat; force protection); the participation of other countries; responsible withdrawal, monitoring and evaluation and funding.

These various issues were part of a “whole of government” approach to the mission and the clarity of the letter and the willingness to define the challenges, including the end date for the mission, contributed to the government earning the trust of all parties in support of the deployment on the most dangerous of all UN missions to Mali.

While it is never easy to obtain parliamentary consensus, the Committee believes strongly that when the lives of Canadians are put at risk, parliamentarians and the executive branch of government should put aside partisan interests and work together for the best interest of Canada and Canadians.

Prior to increasing the commitments for UN peace support operations, the government must ensure adequate funding is available to meet the operational priorities for the Canadian Armed Forces.

The Canadian Armed Forces has many ongoing commitments, including our national defence and our contributions to NORAD and NATO. As a result, Canada has needs that must be addressed, including recruitment, training and updating various military and strategic capabilities. Before Canada further extends its commitments to UN peace support operations the Committee highlights the following:

²² House of Commons, *Debates*, October 10, 1989, p. 4461.

Statement of National Interest:

Prior to increasing the commitments for UN peace support operations, the government must ensure adequate funding is available to meet the current national and international operational priorities for the Canadian Armed Forces.”

To that end, the committee recommends that:

RECOMMENDATION 1

The Government table a “Statement of Justification” in both houses of Parliament outlining the specifics of any UN deployment including the size of the mission, its goals, the risks involved, the costs, rules of engagement and a fixed-term deployment plan so as to ensure bi-partisan and multi-partisan support through open parliamentary debate prior to confirmation and deployment of members of the Canadian Armed Forces.

RECOMMENDATION 2

The committee recommends that the government clearly articulate the rules of engagement for internationally deployed Canadian personnel so as to allow Canadian military or police to take appropriate action to defend themselves and/or civilians from harm or abuse.

Making the case for UN Peace Support Deployment

In order to set Canadian Armed Forces personnel up for successful participation within UN peace operations, witnesses recommended that primary consideration be given to deployments aligned with Canada’s national interests.

With a view to improving operational viability, Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Michael Day recommended that approaching military deployments as part of a larger national picture, rather than simply an end state in and of themselves, allows for greater strategic direction.²³

Some witnesses underscored that while there are countless places across the world that might benefit from a Canadian presence, a coherent, long-term peace operations strategy should be centred on those places which are strategically important to Canada and its interests, and focus on places where it can make a difference. The need for clear and achievable objectives when it comes to deployments as part of peace operations was also underscored throughout the testimony. A number of witnesses explained that, as peace support missions encompass a broad range of activities along the spectrum of conflict, from mediation, to peacebuilding, to robust use of force to bring about the cessation of hostilities, discernible goals should be set in order to adequately monitor progress in situations subject to fluidity. The

²³ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Michael Day.

Committee heard that objectives should be realistic, measurable, and include milestones available for public review so that the Canadians can measure success along with a clear exit strategy.

In explaining the importance of results-oriented deployments, Mrs. Petra Andersson-Charest, Director of Programs at the Parliamentary Centre, argued that they “[need] to be based on a common understanding of what is a successful peace operation and have well-defined criteria to determine progress and measure results.”²⁴

Some witnesses offered their views as to why renewed engagement with UN peace operations is in Canada’s national interest. According to Vice-Admiral (Ret’d) Drew Robertson, governments order such deployments generally “because supporting the international rules-based order, anchored by the UN Charter, treaties and conventions, has produced the peace and security on which our trade and prosperity depend. Governments do so fundamentally since acting as a force for good is in Canada’s abiding national interest.”²⁵

In today’s global environment, national security is inherently tied to international security. Within this context, the Committee heard that mitigating instability and preventing or containing armed conflict is advantageous to Canada.²⁶ Protracted conflicts play a destabilizing role regionally and even internationally by creating the conditions for insurgencies, weakening government institutions and allowing crime to take hold – all of which incur devastating impacts on civilian populations.

Professor Dorn elaborated:

It’s in our interest as a Western nation to find ways to ease the suffering in faraway lands. These conflicts are open wounds on the world body that hemorrhage problems to the rest of the globe. They yield massive refugee flows and spread of diseases, piracy and terrorism, and they can cost literally trillions of dollars, as witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq. If peaceful solutions are not found, then we are going to see more disaster.²⁷

Within this context, Professor Boulden testified that by contributing to the resolution of a particular conflict, thereby helping to ensure the security of others, “we are contributing to our own national security.”²⁸ Her Excellency Ambassador Anne Kari Hansen Ovind, Ambassador of Norway, explained that, from her country’s perspective, there are strong links between UN peace operations and the security of Norway.

Using Norway’s involvement in the Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) as an example, Her Excellency explained that Mali, geographically located as a gateway to the Euro-Atlantic area, “is a hub for international terrorism, gun smuggling and human trafficking. It is a transit country for migration.

²⁴ SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, Petra Andersson-Charest, Director of Programs at the Parliamentary Centre.

²⁵ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Vice-Admiral (Ret’d) Drew Robertson.

²⁶ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Gwozdecky, Sajjan; [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Dorn.

²⁷ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Dorn.

²⁸ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Boulden.

Locally, the UN plays a vital role in contributing to stability and sustainable peace. At the same time, the mission is an important part of the fight against violent extremism internationally.”²⁹

Peacekeeping’s transition to Peace Support Operations Missions

UN peacekeeping missions have changed dramatically over time. Today’s missions are undertaken when there is often *no peace to keep*. The missions today are more about peace support and protection of civilians, than they are about peacekeeping where the parties agree to end hostilities and international observers monitor the “peace”.

Most peacekeeping operations between the mid-1950s through to the early 1990s were created to manage situations of interstate conflict, in support of ceasefire agreements and related political processes. During those years, peacekeeping became a cornerstone of Canada’s international engagement, and Canada participated in all of these missions with varying scope, duration and degree of success. The Committee was informed that during the cold war era, peacekeeping missions were typically premised on three main principles: consent of the parties, impartiality and use of force in self-defence.³⁰

At the end of the cold war, the nature of peacekeeping operations shifted away from the interposition between states of a neutral third party towards addressing intra-state conflicts often requiring significant intervention and humanitarian assistance.

New dimensions were added to the mandates of UN peace support operations, such as election monitoring, the supervision of returning refugees, securing reconciliation arrangements, and protecting civilian populations caught in the turmoil of civil wars. One witness highlighted that during this period, the number of UN missions grew exponentially – from 18 missions during the first 40 years in which peace operations were conducted to 23 missions in the early 1990s, which coincide with the end of the cold war.³¹

As UN missions became increasingly involved in addressing the internal instabilities of a country, “peace support operations” became the generic term used to describe the spectrum of operations that might be undertaken to sustain or restore peace and security under the terms of the UN Charter. The Committee heard that the mandates established by the Security Council have varied by mission and can involve a range of activities designed to support the following, among others:

- **Conflict Prevention:** Diplomatic measures to keep interstate or intrastate tensions from erupting into full conflict. This process involves the creation of early warning systems and information gathering.
- **Peacemaking:** Measures used to stop ongoing conflict, usually involving diplomatic action to bring parties to a negotiated agreement.
- **Peace enforcement:** Application of coercive measures to ensure the continuation of peace. This can include the use of military force. This method requires Security Council approval.

²⁹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Her Excellency Anne Kari Hansen Ovind, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Norway, Royal Norwegian Embassy in Ottawa.

³⁰ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Sloan.

³¹ *Ibid.*

- **Conflict Management:** Using national capacities to address core issues within a country for the purpose of preventing or ending conflict. This process is usually done together with a peacebuilding process.
- **Peacebuilding:** Actions that aim to reduce the risk of relapse into conflict by strengthening national capacity for conflict management at all levels. The end goal is to set the grounds for sustainable peace and development.

Witnesses pointed to less successful missions like those in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia, to highlight the limitations of peacekeeping. The Committee heard testimony that in both the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), peacekeepers, with limited mandates and resources, were overwhelmed by conflicts that escalated with tragic results. These missions exposed the increased risk peacekeepers faced in the new security environment and the need for reform in order to adapt to changing circumstances.³²

With regard to what became known as “2nd generation peacekeeping”, Major (Ret’d) Wayne Mac Culloch, National President of the Canadian Association of Veterans in United Nations Peacekeeping, noted that some operations, like the one in Namibia which lasted from 1989 to 1990 had great success in maintaining peace and stability while helping create the conditions necessary for the establishment of democratic governance.³³

Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Roméo Dallaire reminded the Committee in testimony that “We stumbled in the 1990s because we were an experientially-based military... our leadership structure failed us, and Somalia was simply the high-watermark of that.”³⁴

These views were endorsed by Major-General (Ret’d) Lewis MacKenzie when he acknowledged the changing nature of UN peacekeeping missions: "I'm delighted that the word "peacekeeping" has been removed from the vocabulary and it is now peace operations. They are not. They are protection missions. [Canadians] are going there and should go there to help in the protection of the innocent, and they can't protect all that many, but at least that will be their role. They will be a protection force."³⁵

The transition from traditional peacekeeping where peace is agreed to and required to be maintained, versus the new, more complex and hostile environment where hostile enemies are often not identified, arms are being smuggled and civilians targets - represents significant operational, as well as command and control challenges for the UN and those nations deploying civilian, military personnel, and equipment.

The security environment where the UN missions now deploy has grown increasingly complex and dangerous as armed conflicts and tribal tensions become more fragmented and multi-dimensional. It can involve a multitude of armed actors, including non-state militias and terrorists, and many dimensions, whether sectarian, ethnic, regional or local. The violence associated with such conflicts is rarely limited to

³² In June 1992, Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali released a document entitled [An Agenda for Peace](#), providing recommendations on ways to strengthen and improve the UN’s capacity to maintain peace. It was commissioned by the UN Security Council on 31 January 1992 at its first ever meeting at the level of heads of state. A [supplement](#) was published in 1995.

³³ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Mac Culloch.

³⁴ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Dallaire.

³⁵ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, MacKenzie.

a recognized battlefield. In many of them, civilians are being subjected to brutal violence and severe rights violations.

Global Affairs Canada officials outlined to the committee the reality of modern peace operations as follows:

There is often no clear peace accord to be monitored. Violence frequently occurs in intra-state conflicts, many of which spill over to neighbouring countries, creating deep regional strains. Armed parties are frequently non-state actors that act without regard for international law and are seldom held accountable for their actions. Combatants rarely represent formal armies of recognized states and operate without regard for international norms. Actors and alliances frequently shift. Civilians are routinely targeted. Children and rape are often used as weapons of war. It is common for some parties to refuse to accept political processes and/or ceasefires and, in other cases, for state actors to refuse to accord recognition to their non-state opponents.

Missions often operate in regions threatened by transnational violent extremist groups, where troops must be trained and equipped for asymmetrical warfare. Peacekeeping missions also have a role in protecting civilians from sexual and gender-based violence and other atrocities. As civilians and UN personnel are regularly targeted, the use of force beyond self-defence is increasingly authorized by the UN Security Council.³⁶

As the Ambassador of Norway to Canada informed the Committee: “UN personnel are directly targeted in the field, and often find themselves, with limited training and equipment, trying to keep peace when there is no peace to keep.”³⁷

Former Minister Peter MacKay reminded the Committee that “These peacekeeping missions remain dangerous and demanding...the pure reality is that we live in a very different world and different time, as the minister himself acknowledged when he was before you. Asymmetric warfare has forced us to rise to this new challenge. We can no longer depend on conventional tactics to guarantee conflict success. In fact, where once we measured success in terms of kilometres, we are now content to measure centimetres.”³⁸ By asymmetric attacks, the Committee understands the former minister is referring to tactics in which belligerents employ hit and run style terrorist attacks.

To meet these challenges, the Committee took careful note of the advice from Major-General (Ret’d) MacKenzie when he stated:

... no matter what the UN asks for now, today, particularly in Africa, we do not let them tell us what we need to send. We cannot count on our small penny packet groups, which I hear being discussed, whether it is helicopters or intelligence or command and control or a medical unit. Their security should not be put in the hands of a foreign military force

³⁶ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Gwozdecky.

³⁷ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Ovind.

³⁸ SECD, [Evidence](#), 13 June 2016, MacKay.

participating in the mission. We have to send our folks on the mission capable of protecting ourselves.³⁹

The Committee was assured by the Chief of Defence Staff, General Jonathan Vance that at all times Canadians who are deployed under the UN missions will be protected by the Canadian Armed Forces and will remain under Canadian command.⁴⁰

Risks

UN peace operations increasingly face asymmetric threats on the ground. This trend has led to rising death tolls in UN missions taking place in Africa, particularly Mali, where, as the committee learned, 106 peacekeepers have been killed in the context of that operation.” Despite these concerns, Lt.-Gen (Ret’d) Cuppens recounted that, sometimes, as a country becomes engaged abroad in an array of areas, “not enough attention is paid to the security elements and risks involved.”⁴¹

Maj.-Gen. Lanthier detailed the process by which the Canadian Armed Forces identify mission parameters and requirements, and explained that “[w]hat is the art of the possible, we do; and the rest, we identify where those gaps exist and we identify what the mitigation strategies are... We will never put away all risks, but we will always deploy with an understanding of the parameters and capabilities we have so that there is a match with the two.”⁴² In discussing the risks of potential CAF deployments as part of UN peace operations, General Vance stated:

Anywhere you need to use the military as opposed to any other instrument of government, it is, by definition, risky. It is, by definition, an environment that demands more than what you could do with any other group of people. So the fact that risk exists ought not to be the main reason why you wouldn't deploy....

But a risky mission that has great potential for success may be a mission that you want to invest in, and in the military, we do risk. We're good at that, if we can mitigate it. If the risk is not mitigatable and is out of all proportion and at the same time there's no hope of moving forward, then it's probably the wrong mandate and it would very likely be a mandate on which I would advise the government that it would need to do some more work with the UN before you would commit troops.⁴³

HOW AND WHERE CAN CANADA CONTRIBUTE

To understand where Canada should be in terms of peace operations today, several witnesses spoke of Canada’s long history of participation in international peacekeeping. It was noted that this legacy began with the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) – what is widely referred to as the first official UN peacekeeping mission – that was established as a result of the combined efforts of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, then Canada’s Minister for External Affairs, in championing the proposal to send

³⁹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, MacKenzie.

⁴⁰ SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, Vance.

⁴¹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Cuppens.

⁴² SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, Lanthier.

⁴³ SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, Vance.

peacekeepers to defuse the Suez Crisis, and the leadership of Canadian E. L. M. “Tommy” Burns, the UN Force Commander of UNEF I.

In more recent years, Canada has not been as involved in UN peace operations as it had been historically. According to Professor Elinor Sloan this departure follows: “[s]tarting in 1996, NATO reluctantly entered the peace support operations business, because UNPROFOR [the United Nations Protection Force], the UN mission, was unable to address the difficult circumstances on the ground. Starting then, at the beginning of 1996, Canada’s commitment to peace support operations shifted from the UN to NATO.” It was also noted that NATO-led peace operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan focused on security sector reform – “a process of building or rebuilding a state’s security sector, including military and police forces.” Some witnesses warned that it was a mistake to view Canada’s shift towards NATO-led interventions as a step away from peace operations, noting rather that “Canada has been consistently involved in peace support missions right up to this very day, currently training troops in the Ukraine and, as we know, in northern Iraq, Kurdistan.”⁴⁴

The Honourable David Pratt suggested that Canada has to “pick and choose its missions very carefully, depending on the mandate and a lot of circumstances. Each individual situation that requires UN intervention has its own peculiarities, and we have to look at those very carefully.”⁴⁵

Hervé Ladsous, Head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) reiterated that, “there is an opportunity now – and the needs are certainly there – for Canada to once again become an important contributor of troops and police forces, as it historically was for many years.”⁴⁶ He also noted that Canada has, for many years, chaired the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (known as the C-34), which is responsible for overseeing the DPKO. The Committee’s fact-finding mission to UN Headquarters in New York confirmed strong interest in having Canada increase its participation on UN missions beyond providing financing support.

These views were also reinforced by the Minister of National Defence who, in mid-August 2016, conducted a week long fact-finding trip to five countries in Africa “to inform Canada’s re-engagement in peace operations.”⁴⁷ During this trip, the Minister learned about the security context of Africa from parties closely involved in peace operations, and to “inform future partnerships as Canada looks to re-engage in a full spectrum of multilateral peace operations.”⁴⁸

Shortly after, Canada’s Ambassador to the United Nations confirmed to the media that the 600 troops and the \$450 million will be allocated towards a mission that will take place in Africa.⁴⁹ Additional media reports and information obtained during the committee’s fact-finding trip to the UN confirmed that the Government of Canada is seriously considering a deployment to Africa. Members of Canadian Joint Operations Command have recently returned from Mali and numerous engagements in this area have led the committee to focus on a possible deployment to Africa.

⁴⁴ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Sloan.

⁴⁵ SECD, [Evidence](#), 13 June 2016, Pratt.

⁴⁶ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Ladsous.

⁴⁷ Government of Canada, “[Minister Sajjan Concludes Fact-Finding Week in Africa](#),” News release, 16 August 2016.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/un-ambassador-peacekeeping-africa-1.3736907>

Today, more than two-thirds of all UN personnel deployed on peace support operations are now operating in African countries where persistent violence and unresolved political, religious and tribal tensions have led to the development of asymmetric threats in which power between belligerent factions differs greatly. These conflicts can be found in several UN missions, including the missions in Darfur, South Sudan, Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A number of witnesses pointed to the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) as one mission where UN troops are facing asymmetric threats, and where 106 UN personnel, including 97 from the military, have been killed since operations began in 2013.

Current UN Deployments in Africa (Source: "[Peacekeeping Fact Sheet](#)", United Nations)

Authorization date	UN Mission	Strength ⁵⁰	Details	2016 Annual Budget ⁵¹
1991	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	461	Uniformed personnel: 217 Civilian personnel : 241 UN Volunteers: 4 <i>Fatalities : 15</i>	\$56,582,500
2003	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	3,100	Uniformed personnel: 1,813 Civilian personnel : 1,159 UN Volunteers: 138 <i>Fatalities : 197</i>	\$187,192,400
2004	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	4,556	Uniformed personnel: 2,807 Civilian personnel : 961 UN Volunteers : 93 <i>Fatalities : 143</i>	\$153,046,000
2007	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	20,616	Uniformed personnel: 17,023 Civilian personnel : 3,412 UN Volunteers: 141 <i>Fatalities : 235</i>	\$1,039,573,200
2010	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)	22,498	Uniformed personnel: 18,620 Civilian personnel : 3,470 UN Volunteers: 364 <i>Fatalities : 102</i>	\$488,691,600
2011	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	4,778	Uniformed personnel: 4,534 Civilian personnel : 202 UN Volunteers: 30 <i>Fatalities : 21</i>	\$268,264,600

⁵⁰ As of 31 August 2016

⁵¹ In US dollars. Figures indicate approved financial resources for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017

2011	United Nation Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	16,147	Uniformed personnel: 13,723 Civilian personnel : 1,973 UN Volunteers: 404 <i>Fatalities : 46</i>	\$1,081,788,400
2013	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	13,083	Uniformed personnel: 11,883 Civilian personnel : 1,246 UN Volunteers: 145 <i>Fatalities : 106</i>	\$933,411,000
2014	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	13,327	Uniformed personnel: 12,152 Civilian personnel : 760 UN Volunteers: 154 <i>Fatalities : 25</i>	\$920,727,900
TOTAL		98,566	Fatalities - 890	\$5,129,277,600

Witnesses were divided in their opinions of whether Canada should enhance its participation in UN missions taking place in Africa. David Bercuson testified that he does:

not support a mission to Africa because any mission to just about any of Africa's trouble spots Mali, the Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan, to name a few is a mission to join one of a number of incredibly complex wars, wars way more complex than the one we fought in Afghanistan and none of which show any chance of a peaceful resolution any time soon.⁵²

Colonel (Ret'd) Michael Cessford told the Committee:

Let me conclude by stating that NATO or the UN or other regional entities, such as the African Union, have the potential to initiate and oversee peace and stability operations; but the capabilities and operational constraints that each organization can bring to these types of operations will vary dramatically.

In my opinion, the UN is not yet capable of resolving the types of complex and difficult peace and stability operations that we might see, for example, in the near future in Yemen or Syria, a point accepted by many senior officials within the United Nations. For example, the UN report of the high-level independent panel on peace operations published in June 2015 recognizes that the UN could not effectively conduct what were deemed to be counter-terrorist operations or operations against enemies such as ISIL/Daesh and what you would find in Yemen as well.

Given this care must be taken by the Government of Canada in advance of any commitment of forces to UN operations to assess the potential for mission success and to ensure that the planned operations carry an acceptable level of risk. Shortfalls in UN capabilities and imposed constraints in mission mandates must be critically reviewed to ensure that Canada does not run the risk of mission failure or of seeing the diversion of

⁵² SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Bercuson.

scarce resources for the achievement of only local, tactical and other transient successes. This is not to say Canada should not commit forces to UN operations but rather that we should support those missions that best make sense.⁵³

In acknowledging the demanding operating environments in many African peace missions, where “the UN is under considerable strain to deliver on increasingly demanding mandates,” Ambassador Ovind, told the Committee that her country “believes that it is of paramount importance to increase western participation [in Africa.]”⁵⁴

The Committee explored how and where Canada could contribute to UN missions in Africa.

Personnel

– Women and UN Security Council Resolution 1325

Based on witnesses’ comments, the committee found that Canada has the resources to help the United Nations fulfill its commitments from UN Resolution 1325 by introducing women into leadership roles across the organization, including sections associated with peace support operations.

Professor Dorn shared that only around 4% of uniformed personnel in peacekeeping currently are women; whereas women makeup around 15% of Canada’s Regular Force.⁵⁵ Mr. Ladsous noted that “we always need more women, and we know that Canada has one of the strongest policies in that regard.”⁵⁶ He also outlined recent UN efforts to place more women in leadership roles, noting that at present, the UN has seven heads of missions; Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, who are women; and that the first female Force Commander was recently appointed to the mission in Cyprus. He further explained that in Haiti, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), all-female police units are being deployed in recognition of the particular vulnerabilities facing women and children in situations of conflict.⁵⁷

Several witnesses spoke at length about the advantages of including more women in Canada’s military contributions to peace support operations. Kwezi Mngqibisa of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) added that the role of female leaders is “not simply to advance the mainstreaming of gender and what it does, but it is also to ensure that these individuals agitate for ensuring that the broader realm of protection of civilians, the manifestation of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and beyond the mission are given the necessary due attention.”⁵⁸

The Committee was also told that these opportunities to contribute women to the UN applied to Canada’s civilian contributions. Paul LaRose-Edwards of CANADEM describes this contribution as necessary in order to change the culture of the UN, stating that “[l]ooking at women's issues, children's issues out there, women have more of an inherent understanding of the challenges facing refugees, IDPs, people in crisis,

⁵³ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Cessford.

⁵⁴ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Ovind.

⁵⁵ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Dorn.

⁵⁶ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Ladsous.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Mngqibisa.

so the more women you have in the UN, the better.”⁵⁹ Several witnesses agreed that “Canada can offer skilled female military personnel for both UN headquarters and field operations, including in leadership positions.”⁶⁰

Mr. LaRose-Edwards also adds that Canada has the means to “inject women into UN hiring processes” despite slow progress on the implementation of UN Resolution 1325.⁶¹

It was suggested that UN member states prioritize increasing the number of female uniformed personnel deployed as part of UN peace operations. It was noted that a “gender-balance premium” to troop contributing countries was one option being explored as a means of increasing the participation of women. Reimbursement rates for peacekeepers should include “risk”, “readiness”, and “key enabling capacities” premiums. This would create incentives for troop- and police-contributing countries to develop gender-sensitive strategies to address the recruitment, retention, and advancement of female uniformed personnel.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts must also take a gender-sensitive approach towards the effective engagement of women in civilian life following conflict.

During its fact-finding mission to UN headquarters in New York, UN Women told members of the Committee that gender-balance needs to be better integrated within and across peace operations at the early stages of mission design, rather than being treated as an after-thought.

Training is one area where some progress has been made in this regard, and the Committee learned that gender-training for troops is one area where progress has been achieved. In particular, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana is one example of a facility that has moved to incorporate gender into its training doctrine.

Other innovative and gender-sensitive approaches have recently been developed with the aim of strengthening the role of women in peace operations. For example, a pilot project launched by the UN in Liberia saw the deployment of all-female UN engagement teams, which, in turn, had a positive influence on the recruitment of women to Liberia’s police and military forces. The committee takes note of this, as well as strong testimony during its fact finding mission from NGOs and leaders of UN Women and recommends that:

RECOMMENDATION 3

Canada expedite implementation of Resolution 1325; that it encourage the inclusion of more women in all aspects of peace support operations; and that it ensure that Canadian and United Nations personnel deployed receive extensive training related to the women, peace, and security agenda.

⁵⁹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, LaRose-Edwards.

⁶⁰ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Dorn.

⁶¹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, LaRose-Edwards.

– Francophones

While the UN is rarely short on infantry personnel, about half of UN troops currently deployed on peace operations are working in francophone countries.

As such Mr. Ladsous, said that the UN is looking for well-trained uniformed personnel who speak French.⁶² Professor Dorn cautioned that “going to the African francophone countries would put an extra burden on the francophone units in Canada, the 22nd and the 5th brigade.”⁶³

The committee agrees and recommends that:

RECOMMENDATION 4

In recognition of the burden that a deployment to a francophone nation will have on Franco-Canadians, the government develop a strategy to better support those units and their families.

The Committee believes that further consideration must also be given to how Canada supports its personnel upon return from deployments on peace operations. Testimony presented to the Committee confirmed that Canadian troops who participated in peace operations during the 1990s “came back to Canada badly scarred, physically and psychologically, from the experience.”⁶⁴ Lt.-Gen Cuppens testified that “more soldiers have died of suicide since Afghanistan than the numbers that have died while they were in theatre.”⁶⁵

The families of Canadian personnel deployed on missions also require significant support. As members of the RCMP and police forces regularly deploy as part of modern peace operations, Major (Ret'd) Wayne Mac Culloch, argued that provincial and municipal police forces and members of the RCMP who deploy on such missions “should receive the same levels of support and coverage as the Canadian Armed Forces members.”⁶⁶

Noting that post-deployment costs are significant, sometimes equal or greater to the cost of deployment itself, the committee notes with concern the lack of funding in this area and urges:

RECOMMENDATION 5

The government to ensure sufficient financial and support resources will be available for women and men who return from dangerous peace support operations, especially those who develop post-traumatic stress disorders.

⁶² SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Ladsous.

⁶³ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Dorn.

⁶⁴ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Bercuson.

⁶⁵ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Cuppens.

⁶⁶ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Mac Culloch.

Equipment

There is also a need for “enablers” – specialized capabilities including personnel responsible for such things as field hospitals, helicopters and heavy air lift, explosive ordnance disposal, counter-improvised explosive device capabilities, route clearance packages, unmanned aerial systems and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance capabilities.

The Committee learned that enablers can drastically impact the effectiveness of a mission. In this regard, Professor Sloan declared that “Canada can make its greatest contribution to peace operations in the provision of critical enablers like signals, logistics intelligence, engineering and air transport.”⁶⁷

Professor Sloan mentioned that a valuable Canadian contribution “could be to make one of our C-17s [Globemaster military transport aircraft] available for UN-led peacekeeping missions.”⁶⁸

The Government could utilize these highly technical capabilities to assist UN troops deployed on peace support operations; however it is important that consideration be given to the impact on the lifecycle of such equipment in hostile weather. It is worth pointing out the experience of the Dutch who found their helicopters had suffered significant damage after a three year deployment in Mali.

Should Canada utilize its helicopters on such UN Missions, it would be important for military planners to clearly forecast the investments that will be required to operate as well as the cost of replacement, should damage become severe. These costs should be budgeted into any deployment planning.

Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System

Support for enhancing the UN’s rapid deployment capabilities was listed as a critical area where Canada could focus its contributions. Professor Boulden explained the importance of rapid reaction, noting “all the lessons learned by our previous operations support the idea that what we do in the first six days, six weeks and six months in a conflict response is crucial to success over the longer term....That idea has returned recently. At the London conference; for example, the idea of having a 30-, 60- and 90-day response capacity was affirmed. So this is an area in which Canada could, again, work to take the lead, and it has the capacity to do that.”⁶⁹

In this context, Mr. Ladsous felt that “Canada must take part in the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System so we can make progress.”⁷⁰ This notion was supported in a written submission provided by the Canadian Peacekeeping Veteran’s Association, who recommended that “if it has not already done so, Canada should become a signatory to the UN’s new Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System.”⁷¹

⁶⁷ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Sloan.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Boulden.

⁷⁰ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Ladsous.

⁷¹ SECD, [Submission](#), “Peace Support Operations: Canadian Deployment and the United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System,” Canadian Peacekeeping Veteran’s Association, Brigadier-General (Retired) Gregory Blair Mitchell, 22 August 2016.

Non-Military Contributions to UN Peace Support Operations

Based on witnesses' comments, the Committee found that while military operations are crucial tools that can be employed to bring about stability and security in a country, a purely military approach to modern conflict is unlikely to produce meaningful and lasting effects. As General Vance elaborated, "in most instances, the nature of the conflict and the things that you can do about it, maybe 20 per cent of it can be managed by the military. The other 80 per cent speak to root causes, speak to challenges of the nations they are dealing with, and no matter how much military force you put at it, it's unlikely to solve the root causes."⁷²

In Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Dallaire's assessment, "[w]e can also significantly influence countries to not fall into conflict and also prevent them from engaging in conflicts by other means than those that are purely military."⁷³ For Dallaire, whole of government planning for UN peace support missions provide "this country and the world with much safer prevention tools to conflict and ultimately resolution of conflict that will last through reconciliation."⁷⁴

Major General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie echoed these sentiments, indicating that holistic approaches to conflict are comprised of concurrent input from military, development, foreign affairs, and diplomatic spheres.⁷⁵ As Ambassador Sjögren succinctly put it "[t]he conflicts are multi-faceted, and the response has to be multi-faceted."⁷⁶

Conflict Prevention and Capacity Building

The Committee was told that conflict prevention and mediation play crucial roles in relation to peace support efforts, and that as the UN moves towards broader mandates to govern these missions, Government of Canada commitments could be extended beyond the Canadian Armed Forces to encompass other areas such as justice, police support, development, and political and government support in conflict situations.

A representative from Global Affairs Canada reasoned that "[w]e want to develop our civilian capacity to deploy people in these peace missions so that they can hopefully prevent conflict before it happens because obviously it's vastly cheaper and vastly less costly in humanitarian terms to prevent a conflict before it has taken place."⁷⁷

General Vance underscored that a focus on conflict prevention efforts is simply the sensible thing to do:

I can think of no Chief of Defence that I know or work with around the world that wouldn't first try to find ways to prevent the conflict, to mitigate it. The use of force should never be done just for the sake of using force...We set conditions for better things to happen...That's the ultimate objective. So I believe that the UN is a valuable institution

⁷² SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, Vance.

⁷³ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Dallaire.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, MacKenzie.

⁷⁶ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, His Excellency Per Sjögren, Ambassador of Sweden to Canada.

⁷⁷ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Gwozdecky.

through which, given a correct analysis and a correct application of military forces, those forces can help to lead to the other things that need to occur in the political, social and economic space to provide real and long-term change.⁷⁸

The Committee was presented with a great deal of evidence to suggest Canada could make a meaningful contribution to UN peace support operations by supporting and advocating for stronger capacity building initiatives at a variety of levels and by working with regional organizations to develop capacity for conflict prevention and good governance.

The importance of addressing the entire spectrum of conflict was outlined by Maj.-Gen. Lanthier as follows:

If you don't develop the governance level, if you don't do security sector reform at the highest level, if we don't make sure of that, from an economic perspective, a justice perspective, a legal perspective, a constitutional perspective, if you don't attack all of this simultaneously and follow through all the way to the tactical level, then sustainability of mission success is compromised.⁷⁹

While a comprehensive approach to peace support operations was advocated by many witnesses, General Vance drew attention to the fact that these approaches take time:

Most of the conflicts that we're dealing with today... are long and intractable and take and use the UN presence as a matter of a stabilizing influence that helps mitigate the conflict, prevent it from getting worse, reduction to the harm that comes, while the important social, political and economic work happens to address what's really behind all of it, the nature of the conflict itself.⁸⁰

Mr. Kwezi Mngqibisa, a Coordinator with the [African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes](#) (ACCORD), drew attention to security challenges posed by Boko Haram and al-Shabaab in certain African regions, reinforcing that the current peace and security architecture has failed to address these pressing concerns.⁸¹ The UN's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report itself recognized the limitations of the UN to address insurgency, finding that it "could not effectively conduct what were deemed to be counter-terrorist operations or operations against enemies such as ISIL/Daesh."⁸²

The Committee heard that Canada could help fight radicalization and violent extremism in Africa by better equipping and supporting regional organizations, such as the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to address these challenges. Mr. Mngqibisa said that even though ACCORD is working to provide joint learning among troops from regional economic communities in Africa and the AU under regional peace operations deployments, "some of these defence forces do not have proper military management structures. They do not enjoy proper structures of civil military relations.

⁷⁸ SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, Vance.

⁷⁹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, Lanthier

⁸⁰ SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, Vance.

⁸¹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Mngqibisa.

⁸² SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Cessford.

They do not have properly articulated processes of capacity building and debriefing, all of the things we would expect a properly functioning military to do.”⁸³

Professor Boulden underlined that, in the African context,

[R]egional organizations are key players. They have become the first responders. They are the heavy lifters. They take on the burden of the conflict response on the ground, and they are the ones that take on the highest risks. They do that even while they themselves are struggling with significant capacity challenges, both as individual states and in terms of regional actors. There's a lot Canada could do here that would contribute to better peace support responses over time.⁸⁴

When called upon to respond to crises, the African Union (AU) negotiates with sub-regions and nations in order to assemble its troops.

The troops are there, argued Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Dallaire, but “[w]hat is holding them back is training centres to build command and control capabilities and deployment capabilities and sustainment capabilities to do those jobs...”⁸⁵

Some witnesses maintained that the government could work through the regional and secondary hubs in Africa towards “developing their infrastructure, their intellectual infrastructure by exchanges of professors and curriculum” with a view to building regional capacity.⁸⁶ Ms. Andersson-Charest identified good governance as a critical component of whole of government approaches to reinforcing security and building sustainable peace. She reasoned that:

Good governance can be seen as the immune system to help provide the stability and the reliability and predictability needed to ensure rule of law, citizen security and a business climate that is favourable to investment and a national prosperity. This helps mitigate state fragility and conflict. Good governance provides the best possible process for decision-making that is inclusive, transparent and accountable, as well as equitable and meaningful at all levels. It is also the most effective way to empower nations to take ownership of their own efforts...⁸⁷

The rationale for whole of government engagement in peace operations extends to the training realm as well. Professor Dorn stressed that “Canada needs a centre where police, military and civilians train together [as] [t]his capacity was lost with the demise of the Pearson peacekeeping centre in 2013.”⁸⁸ The Committee was informed that the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre’s legacy includes having trained more

⁸³ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Mngqibisa.

⁸⁴ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Boulden.

⁸⁵ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Dallaire.

⁸⁶ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Lt.-Col. IRet'd) Last.

⁸⁷ SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, Petra Andersson Charest, Director of Programs, Parliamentary Centre

⁸⁸ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Dorn.

than 180,000 people from across military, police, and civilian communities from more than 150 countries, and founding the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres in 1995.⁸⁹

There is a growing recognition of the role Canadian police officers can play in terms of training and helping build the capacity of local police forces. As Mr. Gwozdecky elaborated, “It's not enough just to expel the bad guys. You need to have police to stabilize a community to make it a safe place for people to operate, and police are best placed to offer that kind of support as opposed to militaries.”⁹⁰

In terms of potential Canadian contributions to peace operations efforts, Minister Sajjan stated that “Police capacity building, in my opinion, is probably one of the most important steps that’s needed.”⁹¹

To that end, Canada has an opportunity to become a significant partner in developing the capacity of regional bodies by focusing effort and resources. Noting that Canada cannot be everywhere all the time, the committee urges focus and strategic planning to achieve specific objectives. Given that there is significant need for Canada’s engagement in Africa given the various conflicts, as well as in the Americas, where Columbia is just emerging from a prolonged period of conflict, the committee urges the government to:

RECOMMENDATION 6

Develop and implement a plan focused on Conflict Prevention and Capacity Building with two regional organizations - specifically the African Union and Organization of American States – and establish specific benchmarks for success.

While the goal of civilian peacekeepers is generally the strengthening of states and their institutions after conflict, it is important to remember that the means of reaching that end can vary depending on the context. For example, civilians played a great role in stabilizing El Salvador through political observation and negotiation. However, in Mozambique, civilians mainly assisted through the provision of technical assistance and advisory services as the country attempted to establish a fair and democratic electoral process.

UN peace operations are inherently structured to recognize the essential role of civilian personnel. It was noted that Canada could play a particular role in placing a greater number of civilians in UN peace operations. As Paul LaRose-Edwards highlighted, in UN peace operations, “[t]he military force commander reports to the civilian head of mission, invariably the SRSG, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. In peace operations there is never a military solution. The enduring solutions lie in politics, rule of law and civil society.”⁹²

In order to more fully engage in conflict prevention and capacity building, Canada should consider a greater focus on democratic governance, electoral and party development, media, and rule of law to promote our values and interests abroad.

⁸⁹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Colin Robertson, Davidson; [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Dorn.

⁹⁰ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Gwozdecky.

⁹¹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May, 2016, Sajjan.

⁹² SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, LaRose-Edwards.

Training

Numerous witnesses recommended that Canada establish a Canadian international peace operations training centre to bring together civilians and uniformed personnel, in an effort to better prepare these groups for actual deployments.

Major-General (Ret'd) James Ferron suggested that the government's approach to peace support operations "should be viewed in light of the entire spectrum of conflict, from traditional peacekeeping through to war fighting operations, with an understanding of the capabilities and capacity required before, during and after the conflict."⁹³ Michael Cessford added his voice to those calling for a strong understanding of the capabilities and capacity required before, during and after the conflict.⁹⁴

David Bercusson recounted the lessons learned from Canada's efforts in the former Yugoslavia to suggest that the Government of Canada ensure that CAF personnel benefit from a comprehensive understanding of the regional dynamics at play and the context of each conflict before deploying troops abroad. As he told the Committee, "Canada went into the Balkans eventually with two full battle groups, something we could not do today, with the best of intentions, but without clearly understanding the human geography in the region. ... We did not seem to understand the deep hatred that separated not all but many of the three chief players in what soon became a three-way civil war between Croats, Bosnians and Serbs."⁹⁵

During his appearance, the Minister of National Defence acknowledged the importance of understanding cultural contexts prior to deploying to a country. Similarly, Professor Boulden was encouraged by the Minister's recent fact-finding mission to Africa, asserting that "if we're going to focus on peacekeeping in Africa, and it seems we are for the moment, we should be getting more knowledgeable not just about the specific conflicts that we hope to influence but also about the broader situation of conflict in Africa."⁹⁶

While noting that peace support operations need the military, Paul LaRose-Edwards also claimed that "We desperately need the military to be better aware of the politics they are getting into."⁹⁷ As Professor Boulden summarized, "the more knowledgeable we are about the specifics and the broader conflict trends and what signals tell us about where a conflict is heading, the more we can minimize our risks."⁹⁸

Officials from the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre outlined their role in preparing military personnel for deployment as part of multi-dimensional peace operations as follows:

Canada's Peace Support Training Centre, or PSTC, is a Joint-Inter-Agency and multinational training establishment, nested in the Canadian Army, which provides specific, individual training to prepare selected members of the Canadian Armed Forces, Other Government Departments and foreign military personnel for full spectrum operations. Located at

⁹³ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Ferron.

⁹⁴ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Cessford.

⁹⁵ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Bercusson.

⁹⁶ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Boulden.

⁹⁷ SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, LaRose-Edwards.

⁹⁸ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Boulden.

Canadian Forces Base Kingston, PSTC's staff of 58 personnel consists of all three environments, Army, Navy, and Air Force, from both the Regular and Reserve Force.⁹⁹

The Committee was told that the Peace Support Training Centre is the primary vehicle used by the military to train its forces for participation in UN peace operations currently and that its doctrine has evolved to incorporate UN-mandated "training requirements related to Gender, Peace and Security, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Children in Armed Conflict, Conflict-related Sexual Violence, and other relevant human rights issues."¹⁰⁰ While the Centre engages with Global Affairs Canada, the Toronto Police Force, and the RCMP, witnesses clarified that these arrangements are mainly ad hoc.

Maj.-Gen. Lanthier identified this issue as a policy gap requiring examination, and underscored that "there is not a recognized, formally funded centre with clear priorities...[w]e need to be able to create that space to train so that it's not a pickup team that shows up, so that it's a team that is thinking the same way about stabilization operations or peace support operations."¹⁰¹

Commodore Santarpia added that CAF personnel are well-placed to provide on the ground training to international staff, since Canada's active participation in coalitions or alliances has meant that "staff officers are experienced in managing the added layers of complexity introduced in multinational headquarters."¹⁰² And former Defence Minister Peter MacKay told the Committee:

The fact is the United Nations has many partner nations that can support them, yet Canada has a unique role to play. Canada has a traditional role to play but also can provide staff officers, trainers, intelligence support and logistics. Canada has to lead, again as Mr. Pratt has emphasized. Our strength is in a smaller, more focused but integral role, such as command and control, intelligence training and this logistical support.¹⁰³

There is a need to focus Canada's contributions to peace support operations on training. This will allow Canada to develop niche expertise and significantly contribute to UN missions' potential positive impact.

To that end, the committee recommends that the government:

RECOMMENDATION 7

Establish a Peace Operations Training Centre to assist in training military, police and civilian personnel from troop contributing countries pre and post deployment. Training should be available inside Canada and outside.

A UNITED NATIONS IN NEED OF REFORM

As Canada considers its options for increased partnership with the United Nations, it is vital that Canadians are assured monies and personnel deployed to the UN are effectively utilized. According to Lieutenant-

⁹⁹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, Lanthier.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² SECD, [Evidence](#), 21 September 2016, Santarpia.

¹⁰³ SECD, [Evidence](#), 13 June 2016, Mackay.

General (Ret'd) Dallaire the UN has earned a negative reputation within the Canadian Armed Forces based on experiences related to insufficient strategic planning within the international institution.¹⁰⁴

The Committee heard that recent reviews of UN peace operations, including the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report have identified a need to strengthen the UN Secretariat to become more agile and flexible in supporting field missions, and address these major concerns.

From 2014 through 2015, the HIPPO panel reviewed the state of peace operations and released a report in 2015 with recommendations related to four key areas for improvement, including:

- **Primacy of politics:** Lasting peace is achieved through political solutions and not through military and technical engagements alone. Political solutions must guide all UN peace operations.
- **Responsive operations:** UN missions should be tailored to context. The UN should embrace the term 'peace operations' to denote the full spectrum of responses.
- **Stronger partnerships:** A more resilient global and regional architecture for international peace and security is needed for the future. The UN must lay out a vision and help enable others.
- **Field-focused and people-centered:** UN Headquarters should focus more on enabling field missions and UN personnel must renew their resolve to serve and protect the people.¹⁰⁵

Mark Gwozdecky from Global Affairs Canada stated that the report stresses "the imperative of creating a UN Secretariat that is centred on the people they serve."¹⁰⁶

Her Excellency Ambassador Anne Kari Hansen Ovind of Norway told the committee that "UN peacekeeping efforts cannot be based on which capacities we can offer, but what the conflict requires and the UN's ability to deliver just that. To do so, more resources must be accompanied by significant reforms."¹⁰⁷

Writing in the New York Times on 18 March 2016, former UN Assistant Secretary General for Field Support, Anthony Banbury observed:

The world faces a range of terrifying crises, from the threat of climate change to terrorist breeding grounds in places like Syria, Iraq and Somalia. The United Nations is uniquely placed to meet these challenges, and it is doing invaluable work, like protecting civilians and delivering humanitarian aid in South Sudan and elsewhere. But in terms of its overall mission, thanks to colossal mismanagement, the United Nations is failing.

¹⁰⁴ SECD, [Evidence](#), 19 September 2016, Dallaire.

¹⁰⁵ <http://futurepeaceops.org/hippo/>

¹⁰⁶ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Gwozdecky.

¹⁰⁷ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Ovind.

He states that “The heads of billion-dollar peace operations, with enormous responsibilities for ending wars, are not able to hire their immediate staff, or to reassign non-performers away from critical roles. It is a sign of how perversely twisted the bureaucracy is that personnel decisions are considered more dangerous than the responsibility to lead a mission on which the fate of a country depends.”

Banbury describes further incompetence when he speaks about allocation of resources to missions such as in Haiti, or peacekeeping in Africa. He notes:

When we took over peacekeeping responsibilities from the African Union there in 2014, we had the choice of which troops to accept. Without appropriate debate, and for cynical political reasons, a decision was made to include soldiers from the Democratic Republic of Congo and from the Republic of Congo, despite reports of serious human rights violations by these soldiers. Since then, troops from these countries have engaged in a persistent pattern of rape and abuse of the people — often young girls — the United Nations was sent there to protect.

When it comes to the UN Mission in Mali, Banbury observes:

Our most grievous blunder is in Mali. In early 2013, the United Nations decided to send 10,000 soldiers and police officers to Mali in response to a terrorist takeover of parts of the north. Inexplicably, we sent a force that was unprepared for counterterrorism and explicitly told not to engage in it. More than 80 percent of the force’s resources are spent on logistics and self-protection...The United Nations in Mali is day by day marching deeper into its first quagmire.

It is important to not gloss over the key challenges faced by the UN, especially at a time when the government is attempting to increase support. According to former Defence Minister David Pratt:

When people think about the UN, they think about peace operations, peacekeeping; and when they think about peacekeeping, they think about the UN. The UN's brand is peacekeeping, peace operations, and the brand has suffered in recent years because of some of the issues we have seen in terms of peacekeepers sexually abusing the populations that they are supposed to protect, those sorts of issues. That stuff has to be dealt with. It has to be dealt with in a very resolute way, by the Security Council and by the General Assembly, and I think Canada has an opportunity.¹⁰⁸

Minister MacKay who served as Defence Minister from August 2007 to July 2013 testified to the committee that “part of the problem is, of course, the Security Council itself and its membership not wanting to or agreeing to certain reforms or parameters placed around missions. The second is just the malaise and the bureaucratic inertia that exist within the UN itself. It's endemic.”¹⁰⁹

He noted that:

It’s a Herculean task to try to get the UN to change in the way it conducts itself, especially around these types of mission sets. So that's not to suggest disengagement. Continue to

¹⁰⁸ SECD, [Evidence](#), 13 June 2016, Pratt.

¹⁰⁹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 13 June 2016, MacKay.

roll that rock up the hill, but in the meantime, the minister, the government, all the departments have to be cold-eyed realists about what Canada can and cannot do and put the emphasis where it's needed: build capacity for NATO and NORAD.¹¹⁰

While the task may be difficult, Canada must do more to reform the UN.

Combatting Corruption

The Committee learned that the top troop contributing countries to UN peace operations come from developing countries that may lack not only adequate training for their military but may also be democratically and institutionally underdeveloped. Witnesses expressed concern with potential levels of corruption among UN troops. For example, Mr. Colin Robertson referenced a study conducted by Transparency International and Human Rights Watch which found that “the militaries of the 30 countries, almost all developing nations, which provide the most soldiers and police officers to UN peacekeeping operations...are among those most susceptible to corruption and guilty of abuse and crimes against those they are sent to protect.”¹¹¹

Sexual Abuse and Misconduct

The Committee was informed of the mounting concerns about sexual abuse by peacekeepers and the fact that this is now a serious issue that the UN is trying to address. Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie elaborated on some of the particular forms of abuse, including “human trafficking, prostitution rings [and] black marketing.”¹¹² Kwezi Mngqibisa added that this kind of misconduct often goes without punishment, as “member countries appear, somewhat, to have a stranglehold on the ability of the deploying authority -- the EU or the UN -- to say that we shall take no more of your troops until the instances of sexual exploitation and abuses carry the necessary punishment.”¹¹³

Hervé Ladsous told the Committee that allegations of sexual misconduct have been made against peacekeepers stationed in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Congo. According to his testimony, “we are adopting a zero tolerance policy, and the target we are working towards is ‘zero instances.’ Unfortunately, we are the United Nations, and member states have not provided us with the means to launch investigations and legal proceedings. All of this remains in the hands of member states who, with the UN’s help, work to ensure that such questionable, regrettable and disheartening situations do not happen again.”¹¹⁴

With that said, ensuring that international personnel guilty of such crimes are held accountable is an area that demands further attention. Mr. Ladsous outlined the disciplinary process: “many of our people will come from different home organizations, so if there is a question of sexual exploitation or abuse, the disciplinary undertaking falls to that home organization.”¹¹⁵ In the Canadian context, a government official held that “[b]y and large I think it’s safe to say that Canadian law enforcement institutions have

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 June 2016, Colin Robertson.

¹¹² SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, MacKenzie.

¹¹³ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016, Mngqibisa.

¹¹⁴ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Ladsous.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

very robust systems in place to deal with sexual misconduct, and we rely on those protocols to ensure that the right thing is done, that we address every situation.”¹¹⁶

Major-General (Ret’d) MacKenzie told the committee that Canada can take a leadership role in addressing this issue, as Canada has “the expertise and a national record and reputation for dealing with it. Quite frankly, it would fall within the same category as what the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre was doing by way of training female police officers in Africa.”¹¹⁷

The Committee therefore recommends that the Government:

RECOMMENDATION 8

Work with the UN Secretary General to define and implement a framework to prosecute sexual exploitation and assault, human trafficking, abuse of minors and prostitution which have occurred during UN peace support operations.

¹¹⁶ SECD, [Evidence](#), 30 May 2016, Gwozdecky.

¹¹⁷ SECD, [Evidence](#), 20 September 2016. MacKenzie.

PART B: CANADA AND UN PEACEKEEPING - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND MISSIONS

As the Government of Canada moves towards “renewing” its engagement in peace support operations, it is worth highlighting what Canada’s contributions resembled in years past. Peacekeeping became a prominent feature of Canada’s international presence from its earliest days of the UN and remained so until the mid-1990s.

In the decades following the first use of peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), Canada maintained an unequalled record of participation and was often the single largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions between 1956 and 1992. By 1988, the year in which UN peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, “Canada had sent about 80,000 soldiers to UN operations”¹¹⁸ – about 10% of the total international troops deployed at that time. It had also participated in many non-UN peace operations as well. At the height of Canada’s contributions, in the early 1990s, more than 3,000 Canadian military personnel were deployed on UN operations.¹¹⁹ Canadian personnel participated in every UN peacekeeping mission until 1995¹²⁰ when the government decided to withdraw from the missions as a result of significant failures in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. To date, over 120,000 Canadians have served in UN peace operations. Today, the number of Canadian personnel deployed as part of UN peace operations totals 106, with a further 101 deployed as part of non-UN missions.¹²¹

COLD-WAR ERA PEACEKEEPING¹²²

The UN Charter does not define the character or nature of peacekeeping forces. In fact, the term “peacekeeping” does not appear in the Charter. Peacekeeping operations are instead sometimes referred to as Chapter 6.5 missions – “going beyond the peaceful resolution of disputes outlined in Chapter 6 of the Charter, but falling short of the enforcement mechanisms of Chapter 7.”¹²³ The concept evolved from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which was established in the Middle East in 1948 when war broke out between Israel and its neighbouring countries. [UN Security Council Resolution 50](#) mandated a “group of military observers” to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire

¹¹⁸ Murray Brewster, “[Does Canada still contribute to peacekeeping in the world?](#)” *The Toronto Star*, 29 September 2015.

¹¹⁹ Walter Dorn, “[The UN at 70: A return of Canada, the Peacekeeper](#),” *OpenCanada*, 23 October 2015.

¹²⁰ World Federalist Movement – Canada (WFM), “[Canada and UN Peacekeeping](#),” July 2015.

¹²¹ Hand-out distributed to SECD by Global Affairs Canada officials during a [hearing](#) held on 30 May 2016 entitled *Current Peace Operations: Canadian Deployments*.

¹²² Descriptions of the selected missions within this section are only intended to provide an overview of some of the UN peacekeeping missions witnesses made reference to in order to highlight peacekeeping trends during that period. Peace operations usually take place in countries with complex histories and backgrounds. In some cases, peacekeeping missions can last for decades. As such, the descriptions of those missions within this paper should not be construed as a fulsome characterization of every aspect of those missions, but rather a snapshot of key issues.

¹²³ Michael K. Carroll, “[Peacekeeping: Canada’s past, but not its present and future?](#)” *International Journal*, Vol. 7(1), 2016, p. 172.

agreement. Canadian involvement in UNTSO began in 1954 and remains ongoing.¹²⁴ UNTSO was soon followed in 1949 by the [United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan](#) (UNMOGIP). These early monitoring missions set a pattern for what is now referred to as “traditional peacekeeping” whereby UN peacekeepers monitor ceasefire agreements between the armed forces of two neighbouring countries. Both of these examples also demonstrate a classic problem related to traditional peacekeeping in that many operations last for years, if not decades, as monitoring missions are not intended to address the roots of the conflicts in question.¹²⁵

At the time, Canada’s interest in peacekeeping was aligned with its strong support for the UN and efforts to maintain international peace and security. As cold war tensions between permanent member countries of the Security Council made it difficult for the UN to undertake other military interventions under Chapter VII provisions, the UN turned increasingly to peace operations that could be carried out under Chapter VI of the Charter.¹²⁶ During those years, peacekeeping became a cornerstone of Canada’s international engagement.

Canada is often credited with “inventing” peacekeeping in 1956 largely because of the role played by then-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, backed by the United States, in defusing the Suez Crisis. Pearson championed a proposal to establish a large-scale UN peacekeeping operation to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities between Egypt on one side and France, Israel, and the United Kingdom on the other.

Between 1947–1985, the UN undertook 13 peacekeeping operations of varying scope, duration, and degree of success, and Canada remained at the very forefront of the countries contributing to these missions. Two key characteristics central to classical conceptions of peacekeeping arose during this era: consent of the belligerents to a truce and the presence of outside peacekeepers to monitor the truce, and the impartiality of peacekeepers. The use of force was limited, though peacekeepers were armed for self-defence as of 1956. The following missions are outlined below: UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I), UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai Peninsula.

¹²⁴ Operation [JADE](#) is Canada’s ongoing contribution to UNTSO and its longest-running overseas engagement. Task Force Middle East, the Canadian contingent in UNTSO, “comprises four officers who work as United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) and, when requested by the UN, a senior officer who services in one of several leadership positions in the region.” See the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND), “[Operation JADE](#).” As of 31 June 2015, 142 military observers from 25 countries were supporting UNTSO. See UN, “[United Nations Truce Supervision Organization \(UNTSO\)](#),” *Background*.

¹²⁵ The [United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan](#) (UNMOGIP) remains active to this day. Canadian contributions to UNMOGIP began in 1950 and came to a close 36 years later in 1995. See the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND), “[Details/Information for Canadian Forces \(CF\) Operation United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan](#),” 28 November 2008.

¹²⁶ Chapter VI deals with the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes.”

A. [United Nations Emergency Force \(UNEF I\) in Egypt](#)

1. **Authorization** General Assembly Emergency Session Resolutions 998-1000 (1956–1967).¹²⁷

2. **Context**

Following the withdrawal of British and American funding for the Aswan Dam project on the Nile River, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and imposed transit fees to finance the Aswan project. Britain and France viewed Egypt's actions as a threat to their national security interests and condemned its actions. Israel, concerned about growing incursions into Israel from Gaza, was brought into British and French plans to retaliate against Egypt. Israeli forces attacked Egypt on 29 October 1956, followed by British and French interventions on 31 October 1956. While the United States (U.S.) and Soviet Union attempted to arrange a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal, no consensus could be reached in the Security Council due to the vetoes of France and the UK. The matter was referred to the General Assembly and a resolution entitled "Uniting for Peace" called for a ceasefire. Lester B. Pearson, concerned that the ceasefire would not last, "promoted the idea of a UN force to separate the two combatants and to allow and encourage the British and French forces to withdraw."¹²⁸ Pearson's call for "a truly international peace and police force ... large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is worked out"¹²⁹ was added to the emergency session resolution draft and adopted as Resolution 1000. While UNEF was relatively successful in its mission for ten years, regional tensions heightened in 1967 and the Egyptian president ordered UNEF troops to withdraw from its territory. Weeks later, the Six-Day War began. While Canadian troops had left Egypt in time before the violence erupted, 15 peacekeepers (Indian and Brazilian) were killed after the fighting broke out. "When the war was over, Israel was left in possession of the entire Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, and UNTSO returned to the new Egyptian-Israeli frontier to resume its monitoring mission."¹³⁰ Peacekeepers returned to the Sinai six years later, after the October 1973 War and remained in place as UNEF II until Egypt and Israel signed a historic peace treaty in 1979.

3. **Mandate**

"UNEF I was established to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces."¹³¹

4. **Canadian Contribution**

In addition to Pearson's ingenuity and involvement in drafting Resolutions 998-1000 establishing UNEF, Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns was appointed UNEF's Force Commander, having

¹²⁷ "During the first emergency special session, the General Assembly had adopted a total of seven resolutions. With these resolutions, the Assembly gave the Secretary-General the authority and support he required to bring about the cessation of hostilities in Egypt and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian territory with the assistance of a new type of peacekeeping machinery, the United Nations peacekeeping force." UN, "[UNEF I: Background.](#)"

¹²⁸ The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND), "[Details/Information for Canadian Forces Operation United Nations Emergency Force I.](#)" 28 November 2008.

¹²⁹ United Nations Association in Canada, "[UN Peacekeeping: More than 50 Years of Canadian Participation.](#)" p. 3.

¹³⁰ DND, "[Details/Information for Canadian Forces Operation United Nations Emergency Force I.](#)" 28 November 2008.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

previously served as Chief of Staff with UNTSO. Canadian support to UNEF was named Operation Rapid Step (I¹³², II). From 1956–1967 Canada provided air transport support, logistics personnel, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, an infantry platoon, engineers (mine-clearance), maintenance, and HMCS Magnificent.¹³³ Number of Canadian Fatalities: 53.

B. [United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus \(UNFICYP\)](#)

1. Authorization [Security Council Resolution 186](#) (1964–present).

2. Context

The small Mediterranean island of Cyprus became an independent state in 1960. With a largely Greek population, many Greek Cypriots have long favoured joining Greece. However, Cyprus is also home to a sizeable Turkish minority, and given its geographical proximity to the island, Turkey has maintained interest and influence in Cyprus' politics. A series of constitutional crises emerged following independence, largely owing to ethnic tensions, and culminated in the spread of violence in December 1963. Cyprus lodged a complaint with the Security Council, charging that Turkey was acting aggressively and intervening in its internal affairs. Turkey maintained that the Greek Cypriot leaders were amending the Constitution to deny rights to the Turkish minority. Following failed peace attempts, the Security Council adopted Resolution 186 establishing UNFICYP to restore stability and prevent further hostilities. The fragile peace was upset in 1974 when the Greek Cypriot population, favouring a union with Greece, launched a coup d'état and took control of certain regions of Cyprus. Turkey invaded in response. The international peacekeepers, already stationed on the island with UNFICYP, found themselves in the midst of active hostilities. A ceasefire was eventually arrived at following several weeks of fighting, and a buffer zone stretching across Cyprus – known as “the Green line” was established, partitioning the island between those areas controlled by the Greeks and the Turks.

3. Mandate

UNFICYP was originally mandated in 1964 to “preserv[e] international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.”¹³⁴ After the 1974 coup, the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions expanding and extending its mandate, including by adding a police contingent and humanitarian elements, though it is mainly involved in maintaining the terms of the ceasefire.

4. Canadian Contribution

According to the Canadian Association of Veterans in UN Peacekeeping, in 1963, “Paul Martin, Canada’s Secretary of State, forged the necessary world support to create the UN Force ... HMCS Bonaventure carried troops and equipment and the RCAF [Royal Canadian Air Force] flew in C130 Hercules loaded with

¹³² It is worth noting that Egyptian President Nasser objected to the deployment of Canada’s 1st infantry battalion The Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada (QOR) – because they closely resembled British uniforms and contained the word “royal.” Therefore, QOR first battalion would not deploy and Rapid Step 1 was replaced by Rapid Step 2. Canadian markings were muted or removed as a result, and replaced with the words United Nations.

¹³³ Colonel John Gardam, “Chapter 5: First United Nations Emergency Force – UNEF 1 – 1956–1967,” *The Canadian Peacekeeper*, Canadian Association of Veterans in United Nations Peacekeeping, (Burnstown, Ontario): p. 18.

¹³⁴ UN, “[United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus \(UNFICYP\): Background.](#)”

equipment and several Yukons loaded with personnel.”¹³⁵ Three Canadians died in the violence that followed the 1974 coup. Seventeen more were injured. In 1989, Canada’s Major-General C. Milner served as Force Commander. Canada maintained a large contingent in Cyprus until 1993. At its height, more than 1,100 Canadian military personnel were deployed as part of the mission. Over 25,000 CAF members have served in Cyprus since 1963. As of May 2016, only 1 member was deployed. Canada’s participation in UNFICYP demonstrated that during the cold war, Canada was able to participate in some operations where our traditional allies would have been un-welcome. It also helped to reduce the risks of a damaging rift within NATO, as both Greece and Turkey are members of the Alliance. Number of Canadian fatalities: 29.

C. Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)

1. Authorization Protocol to the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace (1981–present).

2. Context

The Department of National Defence (DND) explains the origins of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) as follows:

The MFO has its roots in the September 1978 meetings at Camp David, near Washington D.C., where President Anwar El Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel conducted peace talks with the assistance of U.S. President Jimmy Carter. The meetings at Camp David produced two framework documents, known as the Camp David Accords, that led directly to the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace signed in Washington on 26 March 1979.

The Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace has the following primary terms:

- formal recognition of each nation by the other;
- the cessation of the state of war that had existed since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War;
- the complete withdrawal by Israel of its armed forces and civilians from the areas of the Sinai Peninsula that Israel had captured during the Six-Day War of 1967;
- free passage for Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal; and
- recognition of the Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Taba-Rafah Straits as international waterways.

On 24 July 1979, the Secretary-General of the United Nations formally acknowledged the refusal of the U.N. Security Council to extend the mandate of the second United Nations Emergency Force or to authorize a new peacekeeping force for the Sinai Peninsula. Consequently, Egypt and Israel began a co-operative effort – again assisted by the United States – to develop an alternative peacekeeping solution for the region defined under Annex I of the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace, the “Protocol Concerning Israel Withdrawal and Security Arrangements.” After prolonged negotiations to establish terms of reference

¹³⁵ Colonel John Gardam, p. 19.

that protect the sovereignty of both parties to the treaty, the MFO stood up at El Gorah and Sharm-el-Sheikh on 3 August 1981.¹³⁶

3. Mandate

The Protocol to the Treaty of Peace defines the mission of the MFO: “The mission of the MFO is to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace and employ best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.”¹³⁷ DND notes that “MFO employs a large contingent of civilian observers working throughout the Sinai Peninsula, and about 1,650 troops from 12 nations who patrol the zone closest to the Egyptian-Israeli border.”¹³⁸

4. Canadian Contribution

Canada’s participation in MFO began in 1985. Since then, it has provided helicopter support and staff expertise. In March 2015, Canada assumed responsibility for policing services for MFO personnel for a period of 4 years.¹³⁹ Military police duties within MFO include traffic control, patrols, investigations, inspections, searches, and crime prevention programs. Canada’s Major-General Denis Thompson has served as Commander of the MFO since March 2014.¹⁴⁰ There are currently 71 CAF personnel deployed under the MFO.¹⁴¹ Number of Canadian fatalities: 1.

POST-COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING¹⁴²

At the end of the cold-war in 1991, international conflict management approaches shifted towards multi-polarity to address the needs of the new peace and security environment. Struggles for national identity and self-determination within states “disintegrated into ethnic, religious, and political fragmentation.”¹⁴³ While the risk of large-scale war between states was diminished, intra-state conflicts grew exponentially, and so too did the number of peacekeeping missions around the world. This era is sometimes referred to as “2nd generation peacekeeping” – when the UN moved beyond simple interposition of a neutral third party between warring sovereign states and towards humanitarian intervention. Testifying in 1992 before the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,

¹³⁶ DND, “[Operation CALUMET](#),” 15 July 2016.

¹³⁷ MFO, “[Mission](#).”

¹³⁸ DND, “[Operation CALUMET](#).”

¹³⁹ See MFO, “[Canada Assumes Force Military Police Role From Hungary](#),” 1 April 2015.

¹⁴⁰ Government of Canada, “[Canada’s Major-General Denis Thompson to lead Multinational Force and Observers another year](#),” 19 November 2015.

¹⁴¹ Hand-out distributed to SECD by Global Affairs Canada officials during a [hearing](#) held on 30 May 2016 entitled *Current Peace Operations: Canadian Deployments*.

¹⁴² Descriptions of the selected missions within this section are only intended to provide an overview of some of the UN peacekeeping missions witnesses made reference to in order to highlight peacekeeping trends during that period. Peace operations usually take place in countries with complex histories and backgrounds. In some cases, peacekeeping missions can last for decades. As such, the descriptions of those missions within this paper should not be construed as a fulsome characterization of every aspect of those missions, but rather a snapshot of key issues.

¹⁴³ Thomas G. Weiss, “On the Brink of a New Era? Humanitarian Interventions 1991–1994,” in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (Eds.), p. 3.

UN Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping, Marrack Goulding, outlined the changing nature of peacekeeping operations during this period as follows:

- New operations usually have a large civilian component;
- They often involve elections-their organization and conduct;
- They usually involve an important information component especially concerning democratic institutions;
- They often involve a police component;
- They often involve a human rights dimension, going beyond the supervision of police by intruding deeply into the judicial and penal systems;
- They are time-limited – most new operations have a timetable for implementation, which has been good for troop-contributing countries; and
- More often than not, the new operations are dealing with internal conflicts.¹⁴⁴

The qualitative shift in the nature of missions mounted were distinct from earlier missions such as [Namibia](#) (1989) and [Central America](#) (1989) introduced new dimensions such as election monitoring and the supervision of returning refugees, securing implementation of national reconciliation arrangements between an established government and guerrilla movements ([Angola](#), [Cambodia](#), [El Salvador](#), [Mozambique](#)), and also of protecting – including by means of military force – humanitarian assistance provided to civilian populations caught in the turmoil of civil wars (Somalia, Yugoslavia).

As UN missions became increasingly involved in addressing the internal instabilities of a country, “peace operations” became the generic term used to describe the spectrum of operations that might be undertaken to sustain or restore peace and security under the terms of the UN Charter.¹⁴⁵

The complexity of undertaking peacekeeping operations in the context of conflicts within a country became more evident at the same time as another phenomenon: the explosion in the number of UN peacekeeping operations. Between 1988–1993 the UN Security Council established no fewer than 14 peacekeeping operations, as many as had been created in the previous 40 years. Throughout the 1980s, the number of Canadian military personnel on peacekeeping assignments averaged 1,643. As Walter Dorn points out, “Canadian generals commanded four UN missions in the 1990s but none since.”

While some peacekeeping operations, like the one in Namibia, had great success in maintaining peace and stability in a country and helping create the conditions necessary for the establishment of democratic governments, others highlighted the limitations of peacekeeping.¹⁴⁶ In both the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), peacekeepers, with limited mandates and resources, were overwhelmed by conflicts that escalated with tragic results.¹⁴⁷ Along with Somalia, these

¹⁴⁴ Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping*, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington: 1994), p. 3.

¹⁴⁵ The mandates established by the Security Council vary by mission and can involve a range of activities designed to support: conflict prevention, conflict monitoring, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding.

¹⁴⁶ For other examples of missions deemed “successes” see UN, “[Success in peacekeeping](#).”

¹⁴⁷ For example, see David Pugliese, “[Profile: Romeo Dallaire’s peacekeeping nightmare](#),” *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 May 2014 (originally published in 2002).

missions exposed the increased risk peacekeepers faced in the new security environment and the need for meaningful UN reform to adapt to dangerous circumstances.¹⁴⁸

A. [UN Protection Force \(UNPROFOR\)](#) and NATO-Led Implementation Force (IFOR)

1. Authorization 1992–1995 ([UN Security Council Resolution 743](#)).

2. Context

Violence erupted in the Balkans in 1991 when Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally declared independence from the former Yugoslavia. Long-standing ethnic, religious, and political tensions sparked intense fighting between mainly Bosnian Serbs on one side and Bosnians and Croats on the other. In 1992, the Bosnian Serb army began a campaign to “ethnically cleanse” the non-Serbian population of Bosnia. Atrocities were committed throughout the war, on all sides culminating in 1995 when UNPROFOR forces inability to secure peace and stop the violence against civilians. UN troops were also taken hostage.

3. Mandate

UNPROFOR was initially established for a 12 month period “as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.”¹⁴⁹ However, as author David Anderson explains,

Whereas the role of UNPROFOR in Croatia was along the lines of traditional peacekeeping, with a ceasefire to be monitored, in Bosnia there was never a ceasefire of any permanence to be monitored, and the UN peacekeepers were loaded with a variety of non-peacekeeping tasks. Unlike the UN’s task in Croatia, the mandate for Bosnia was never clear. ... Peacekeepers were required to moderate the ongoing conflict by limiting the parties’ recourse to certain military means (e.g. the use of combat aircraft) or protecting cities or areas from attack. Although the Security Council resolutions for Bosnia were passed under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the UN’s Charter, the constant concern was that the use of force would compromise the peacekeeping operation, contradict the impartiality which is the hallmark of UN peacekeeping, and endanger the relief agencies. Consequently UNPROFOR was never given the resources to carry out many of its tasks.¹⁵⁰

As fighting continued to escalate, “[s]oldiers from Canada and other nations in the mission felt ineffective, if not useless, as ceasefires were constantly violated ... ethnic cleansing expanded mass slaughter of innocents was committed. All the while, the Security Council in New York produced resolutions, over 70

¹⁴⁸ In June 1992, Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali released a document entitled [An Agenda for Peace](#), providing recommendations on ways to strengthen and improve the UN’s capacity to maintain peace. It was commissioned by the UN Security Council on 31 January 1992 at its first ever meeting at the level of heads of state. A [supplement](#) was published in 1995.

¹⁴⁹ UN, “[United Nations Protection Force](#),” *Profile*. For further detail regarding the conflict in the former Yugoslavia see David Anderson, “[The Collapse of Yugoslavia: Background and Summary](#),” *Australian Parliamentary Research Service*, Research Paper No. 14 1995-96, 22 November 1995, BBN News, “[Balkans war: a brief guide](#),” 18 March 2016, and the United States Department of State, “[The War in Bosnia, 1992–1995](#),” *Office of the Historian*.

¹⁵⁰ Anderson, p. 5.

in all, which UNPROFOR could not possibly implement.”¹⁵¹ Troops were mandated to ensure that the three “United Nations Protected Areas” (UNPAs) in Croatia were demilitarized, to observe the withdrawal of the [Serbian forces] from these areas, to supervise that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of an armed attack, and to support the work of UN humanitarian agencies to facilitate the return of displaced persons in the UNPAs.¹⁵² Despite UNPROFOR’s efforts, the mission was not able to create the conditions for a lasting peace.

In 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords were signed and the UN Security Council adopted [Resolution 1031](#) authorizing a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) to deploy in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a one-year mandate. Operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, this authorization also gave NATO forces “a mandate not just to maintain peace, but also, where necessary, enforce it.”¹⁵³ In implementing the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO’s first major crisis-response operation helped end the war in 1995. IFOR was replaced by the **the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR)**, which derived its authority from [UN Security Council Resolution 1088](#) (1996) and continued to operate under Chapter VII to “contribute to a safe and secure environment conducive to civil and political reconstruction.”¹⁵⁴ SFOR’s mission ended in December 2004. At its height, NATO troop strength reached about 60,000.¹⁵⁵

4. Canadian Contribution

Some 40,000 Canadian military personnel served in the Balkans, with the majority supporting UN peace operations. Between 1992–1995, approximately 1600 Canadian military personnel were serving as part of UN missions at any given time. At its height, this number reached 2500.¹⁵⁶ About 1500 Canadians participated in the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR missions.¹⁵⁷ Canadian Brigadier General Lewis MacKenzie served as UNPROFOR Chief of Staff from February–April 1992 and as Commander of the Sarajevo Sector from May–August 1992.¹⁵⁸ 23 Canadian soldiers were killed supporting missions in the former Yugoslavia

B. [UN Operation in Somalia I \(UNOSOM I – 1992\) \(UNOSOM II – 1993\)](#)

1. Authorization [Security Council Resolution 751](#) (1992).

2. Context

Civil war broke out in Somalia in 1991 when President Siad Barre was overthrown. The violent power struggle that erupted among feuding clans, their militias, and political factions resulted in widespread forced displacement and malnutrition for the civilian population. A ceasefire was urgently pursued by United Nations officials in efforts to bring greater humanitarian aid to the “almost 4.5 million

¹⁵¹ Dorn, 14.

¹⁵² UN, “[United Nations Protection Force](#),” *Background*.

¹⁵³ NATO, “[Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina](#),” 7 September 2015.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁵⁵ Veterans Affairs Canada, “[The Canadian Armed Forces in the Balkans](#),” 8 December 2014.

¹⁵⁶ Dorn, 14.

¹⁵⁷ Veterans Affairs Canada, “[The Canadian Armed Forces in the Balkans](#).”

¹⁵⁸ [Canadiansoldiers.com](#), “[United Nations Protection Force](#).” Major-General (Ret’d) MacKenzie was highly critical of the UN’s response to the conflicts in the Balkans and wrote about his experience in peace operations in his book *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo*.

people in Somalia (over half the estimated population) threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition-related disease.”¹⁵⁹

3. Mandate

A ceasefire was reached among the two main political factions in March 1992 and the Security Council adopted [Resolution 751](#) on 24 April 1992. Initially, Resolution 751 authorized 50 unarmed military observers to be sent to Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire. In August 1992, the Security Council, “disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering cause by the conflict and concerned that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,” adopted [Resolution 775](#) authorizing the enlargement of UNOSOM’s troop strength with the principal aim of averting a famine. In September, a security force of 500 was approved in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and safety of UN personnel. Three logistical units totalling 719 personnel were also deployed.¹⁶⁰ The humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate, however, and in December 1992, the Security Council adopted [Resolution 794](#) (1992), invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter to authorize the use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”¹⁶¹ It also called on the Secretary-General and the participating Member States to make arrangements for “the unified command and control” of the military forces that would be involved in carrying out this authorization. By authorizing the use of force to support humanitarian operations, “the [Security] Council was departing from its usual practice of seeking the consent of the de facto Somali authorities for its activities.”¹⁶²

Operating under the Chapter VII authorization granted by the Security Council, the United Task Force (UNITAF) – a multinational force was formed led by the U.S. – was deployed in December 1992. UNITAF, with a strength of almost 40,000 troops from over 20 participating countries, “successfully subdued the warlords and armed factions and enabled NGOs to safely provide humanitarian relief to Somalis”¹⁶³ before transitioning the operation back to the United Nations (known as [UNOSOM II](#)). While the security situation had improved with the deployment of UNITAF, there remained no central government, and violence continued. As such, UNOSOM II was mandated “to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country’s institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali state based on democratic governance.”¹⁶⁴ However, President Clinton ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia following an attack on UNOSOM II coalition forces and forces under U.S. command and control that resulted in the death of 18 U.S. soldiers.¹⁶⁵ Other coalition countries followed suit, and UNOSOM II’s troop strength was reduced to 15,000 in 1994. On 4 November 1994, the Security Council passed [Resolution 954](#), which would mark

¹⁵⁹ United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), “[Background](#).”

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ Council on Foreign Relations, “[UN Security Council Resolution 794, Somalia](#),” *Primary Sources*, 3 December 1992.

¹⁶² United Nations Security Council, “[Note by the Secretary-General](#),” S/1994/653, 1 June 1994.

¹⁶³ Ted Dagne, “[Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace](#),” *Congressional Research Service*, 31 August 2011.

¹⁶⁴ United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), “[Background](#).” The U.S. Rangers were not under United Nations command and control, but had been deployed as part of a U.S. quick reaction force. An American pilot was also captured during the “Battle of Mogadishu” and later released. The bodies of the U.S. soldiers who died were publicly desecrated and the footage was broadcast on television.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

the final mandate extension of UNOSOM II to 31 March 1995. By that time, all civil institutions had collapsed and there was no central authority. Some UN agencies continued humanitarian operations.

4. Canadian Contributions

Canadian Armed Forces personnel deployed as part of both UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, and UNITAF. While Canada provided 1,400 personnel to assist in the multinational U.S.-led UNITAF mission, its contributions were “clouded by controversial incidents involving the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the death of a young Somali intruder in the Canadian camp near the town of Belet Uen. A high-profile Canadian military inquiry would follow and the Airborne Division would eventually be disbanded.”¹⁶⁶ A 1994 *New York Times* article described the controversy at the time, explaining that “exhibits in court-martial proceedings show Canadian soldiers at a desert outpost in Somalia posing with a blindfolded, bruised and blooded Somali teenager, who was tortured until he died a few hours later.”¹⁶⁷ Eventually, one company commander was tried by court martial and convicted for encouraging violent behaviour. Two soldiers implicated in the incident were charged. David Bercuson explains that “one – Master Corporal Clayton Matchee tried to hang himself, but only succeeded in doing himself irreparable brain damage. The other was imprisoned for five years.”¹⁶⁸ A government-appointed inquiry, the “Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia,” often referred to as the “Somalia Commission” released its [findings](#) in 1997. As the Commission noted in its report, the “Somalia Affair,” as it came to be known, “impugned the reputations of individuals, Canada’s military and, indeed, the nation itself.”¹⁶⁹ Despite the stain of the “Somalia Affair,” Canadian military personnel contributed to UN humanitarian efforts. As DND outlines, “Canadians restored security for an area over 30,000 square kilometres, escorted famine relief convoys, carried out extensive de-mining operations and collected, safeguarded or destroyed thousands of confiscated weapons. CC-130 Hercules aircraft also transported over 730 tons of food aid and humanitarian supplies into Somalia from Nairobi, Kenya. Additionally, Canadian Forces personnel built four schools, built or repaired two bridges, rebuilt roads and helped re-establish a local constabulary.”¹⁷⁰

C. [UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda \(UNAMIR\)](#)

1. Authorization [Security Council Resolution 872 \(1993–1996\)](#).

2. Context

In the early 1990s, longstanding tensions flared between Rwanda’s two main ethnic groups: the Hutus and the Tutsis. Widespread violence moved the country toward civil war and eventually, genocide. Following the outbreak of fighting in 1990, a number of ceasefire agreements were negotiated and

¹⁶⁶ Veterans Affairs Canada, “[The Canadian Armed Forces in Somalia](#),” 8 December 2014. See also Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, [Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia](#), Ottawa, 1997.

¹⁶⁷ Clyde H. Farnsworth, “[Torture by Army Peacekeepers in Somalia Shocks Canada](#),” 27 November 1994.

¹⁶⁸ David J. Bercuson, “[Up from the Ashes: the Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces After the Somalia Affair](#),” *Canadian Military Journal*, 1 March 2009.

¹⁶⁹ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, “Executive Summary,” *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, 2 July 1997.

¹⁷⁰ DND, “[Canada and Multilateral Operations in Support of Peace and Stability](#),” 27 February 1998.

broken. [Security Council Resolution 846](#) (1993) established a UN observer mission “to monitor the border between Uganda and Rwanda and verify that no military assistance was being provided across it” and Canadian Brigadier-General Roméo A. Dallaire was appointed Chief Military Observer of the mission.¹⁷¹ Peace talks continued and the Arusha Accords were finalized on 4 August 1993, calling “for a democratically elected government and provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government until the elections, in addition to repatriation of refugees and integration of the armed forces of the two sides. Both sides asked the United Nations to assist in the implementation of the agreement [and] requested that the international force oversee the demobilization of existing armed forces.”¹⁷² UNAMIR was established in October 1993 and the first UNAMIR contingent deployed in November. UNAMIR’s mandate was extended in early 2014 as the establishment of transitional institutions was delayed, and security deteriorated.

In the 100 days between 6 April and 16 July 1994, an estimated 800,000 to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in the Rwandan genocide. As Human Rights Watch has stated, “the Rwandan genocide was exceptional in its brutality, its speed, and in the meticulous organization with which Hutu extremists set out to destroy the Tutsi minority.”¹⁷³ In addition to ethnic tensions, other factors also contributed to the outbreak of genocide, including the rise of extremist factions within the government of President Juvenal Habyarimana and an on-going conflict with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In 1994, the RPF was a political and military movement of Rwandan Tutsi refugees, based in Uganda. Its stated aims included securing the repatriation of Rwandans living in exile and reforming the Rwandan government. The killings ended when the RPF captured the Rwandan capital of Kigali, declared a ceasefire and installed a multi-ethnic government with a Hutu, Pasteur Bizimungu, as president, and Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, as his deputy. Following the victory of the RPF, an estimated one to two million Rwandese Hutus – including Hutu civilians as well as officials of the previous Hutu government, regime soldiers and members of the genocidal *Interhamwe* militia – fled westward to what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The RPF has remained in power since the end of the genocide. Mr. Kagame has been the President of Rwanda since March 2000.

3. Mandate

On 5 October 1993, the Security Council passed [Resolution 872](#), establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist with implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement. UNAMIR was mandated to:

assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government’s mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ UN, “[Rwanda – UNAMIR, Background.](#)”

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ Human Rights Watch, [Rwanda: Justice After Genocide – 20 Years On](#), 28 March 2014, p. 1.

¹⁷⁴ UN, “[Rwanda – UNAMIR, Mandate.](#)”

On 21 April 1994, the Security Council passed [Resolution 912](#), reducing UNAMIR's numbers to a small group to remain in Kigali "to act as an intermediary between the two parties, in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire; assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and monitor developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR."¹⁷⁵ UNAMIR's mandate would undergo several adjustments. Yet, General Dallaire's "pleading for more troops and the authorization to use force [was] denied by the UN Secretariat and the Security Council."¹⁷⁶ Eventually, UNAMIR's force structure and deployment was adjusted in response to armed attacks by groups infiltrating Rwanda across the border with Zaire [before it was renamed the DRC] and its mandate was expanded again to allow for, among other things, protection of internally displaced persons camps. Security Council Resolution 1029 extended UNAMIR's mandate for a final period to 8 March 1996. However, in January 1996, "the Permanent Representative of Canada formally notified the Secretary-General that his Government had decided to withdraw its participation in UNAMIR. The Government considered that the UNAMIR mandate, as adjusted in December 1995, was not viable in the light of the reduction of the force level."¹⁷⁷

4. Canadian Contribution

Two Canadians served as Commander of UNAMIR: Major-General Roméo Dallaire and Major-General Guy Tousignant. Additionally, between 1993–1996, Canada participated in three missions in Rwanda:

In 1993–1994, Canada contributed to the [United Nation Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda \(UNOMUR\)](#) for the purpose of monitoring and verifying that no weapons or ammunition were transferred between Uganda and Rwanda. [4 Canadian officers]

Canada provided medical assistance and water purification facilities to refugees as part of a non-UN mission during 1994. This mission was known as OP PASSAGE. The medical unit screened over 22,000 patients during their four-month deployment.

Finally, in the full period of 1993–1996, Canada deployed forces as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), referred to as OP LANCE. The mandate of UNAMIR was to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians in Rwanda; and to provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief. A Canadian CC-130 Hercules was the only aircraft in the world flying into Kigali during the worst of the conflict in Rwanda.¹⁷⁸

Number of Canadian fatalities: 1.

¹⁷⁵ UN, "[Rwanda – UNAMIR, Background.](#)"

¹⁷⁶ Trevor Findlay, "Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations," p. 282. According to Human Rights Watch, "[t]he UNAMIR mandate permitted the peacekeepers to use force in self-defence ... however, headquarters in New York had insisted repeatedly on a narrow definition of what was permitted under the mandate and the Rules of Engagement. Consequently, General Dallaire ordered troops over and over to negotiate and to avoid the use of armed force."

¹⁷⁷ UN, "[Rwanda – UNAMIR, Background.](#)"

¹⁷⁸ DND, "[Canada and Multilateral Operations in Support of Peace and Stability,](#)" 27 February 1998.

MODERN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Since the early 1990s and the several missions that took place during that period, there has been a significant evolution in the nature of UN peace support operations. The professional and well-trained armies of troop contributing countries from years prior were replaced by troops from developing countries as western nations grew disenchanted with the UN or preoccupied with engagements in other international conflicts. Canada's participation in peace operations dropped significantly.¹⁷⁹ While the number of armed conflicts has declined over the last two decades, those conflicts of the "the third generation" of peacekeeping have proven intractable and take place in some of the most complex and high-risk operating theatres in the world.

As United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Hervé Ladsous, explained:

Some [conflicts] like the Democratic Republic of Congo and even South Sudan today are confronting a second or third wave of conflict. And many of these formerly intrastate conflicts are becoming increasingly regionalized or even internationalized, and on average more prolonged and deadly as a result. Today 87% of UN uniformed peacekeeping personnel are in Africa where we can see an arc of crisis extending from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. These conflicts are driven by a complex mix of factors including failing or incapable states, flare-ups of ethnic strife, transnational criminal and terrorist threats, and serious humanitarian and public health crises.¹⁸⁰

In striving to provide a dynamic response to these multi-faceted conflicts, innovative approaches have taken shape. Regional organizations have featured more prominently in modern peace operations, both UN and non-UN. Mediation and preventive efforts have proliferated, and as the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC demonstrates, the Security Council has begun to issue more robust mandates. The missions outlined below have been raised in SECD testimony as depictions of modern day peace operations and their underpinning challenges. While Canada has provided military support to the mission in the DRC, it has not deployed troops to the CAR or Mali to date.

A. United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)

- 1. Authorization Resolution 1925 (2010–present).**
- 2. Context**

In the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, "some 1.2 million Rwandanese Hutus – including elements who had taken part in the genocide – fled to the neighbouring Kivu regions of eastern DRC, formerly Zaïre, an area inhabited by ethnic Tutsis and others."¹⁸¹ In 1996, a rebellion started and a devastating regional war – centred in the DRC but which drew several neighbouring armies into the Congo – ensued. In 1997, forces

¹⁷⁹ In 1995, Canada ranked 6th out of 84 countries in the world in terms of contributions to peace operations with 2,204 military personnel deployed. According to a hand-out distributed to SECD by Global Affairs Canada on 30 May 2016, Canadian deployments on peace in UN missions number 106. A further 101 Canadian personnel are deployed on non-UN missions.

¹⁸⁰ UN Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous, "[New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping](#)," *The Brookings Institution*, 17 June 2014.

¹⁸¹ UN, "[UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo \(MONUSCO\): Background](#)."

led by Laurent Désiré Kabila took the capital Kinshasa with the aid of Rwanda and Uganda, and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A rebellion was quickly launched against the Kabila government in 1998 and rebels seized several regions of the country. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed in 1999. While a good portion of the DRC is now engaged in post-conflict peacebuilding, the provinces in the eastern part of the country remain unstable. Various rebel and militia groups continue to operate in the east. These groups and their respective off-shoots fight against the national army (the FARDC) and against each other for territorial and population control in eastern DRC, and for access to the country's valuable natural resources. Nearly two decades of chronic conflict has created a "culture of displacement" in the DRC and the all-time largest number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) recorded in the Congo was 3.4 million at the end of 2013.¹⁸² Now, as a fragile peace has taken hold following the defeat of the March 23 Movement (M23 – an armed rebel group) by MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), many IDPs have returned, and the UN is turning its attention to how best assist people returning from protracted violence and displacement.

3. Mandate

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the mission that preceded MONUSCO, was established by Security Council [Resolution 1279](#) (1999) to observe the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement between DRC and five regional states was the first concerted effort to end the Second Congo War. It was also mandated to facilitate the formation of a transitional DRC government. MONUC monitored the 2006 election that would see President Joseph Kabila win the Presidency. Following the election, MONUC was mandated by various UN Security Council resolutions to implement multiple political, military, rule of law, and capacity-building tasks, as well as conflict resolution efforts in a number of provinces.¹⁸³

In 2010, Security Council [Resolution 1925](#) renamed MONUC as the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) and gave it a two-pronged mandate: "the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel, and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and peace consolidation efforts with the Government of the DRC."¹⁸⁴ While some regions stabilized, the eastern DRC "continued to be plagued by recurrent eaves of conflict, chronic humanitarian crises and serious human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence."¹⁸⁵ Complicating factors included the "continued presence of Congolese and foreign armed groups taking advantage of power and security vacuums in the eastern part of the country; the illegal exploitation of resources; interference by neighbouring countries; pervasive impunity; intercommunal feuds; and the weak capacity of the national army and police to effectively protect civilians and the national territory and ensure law and order."¹⁸⁶

In 2013, the Security Council unanimously adopted [Resolution 2098](#), which created a specialized "Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)" within its stabilization mission in the eastern DRC consisting of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special force and Reconnaissance company.¹⁸⁷ While

¹⁸² Stacey White, "[Now What? The International Response to Internal Displacement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.](#)" *The Brookings Institution*, December 2014, p. 4.

¹⁸³ UN, "[UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo \(MONUSCO\): Background.](#)"

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ UN, "[UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo \(MONUSCO\): Background.](#)"

¹⁸⁷ UN, "[MONUSCO: Facts and Figures.](#)"

emphasizing that this action was being taken on an exceptional basis and did not create a precedent, the intervention brigade was authorized as a Chapter VII mission to engage in targeted offensive operations with the objective of preventing the expansion of all armed groups, neutralizing those same groups, and disarming them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities. The creation of the FIB marked the first time the Security Council has approved an “offensive combat” force within a UN-led mission. While some contend that the brigade has had an overall positive effect and contributed to relative stability in the eastern DRC,¹⁸⁸ some caution that the “FIB’s collaboration with FARDC makes humanitarians all the more uneasy given FARDC’s poor human rights record and documented sexual assault violations.”¹⁸⁹

MONUSCO and FIB mandates have been continuously extended, most recently through [Resolution 2277](#) in March 2016. The resolution reaffirmed the Security Council’s intention to downsize troop strength and outlined that MONUSCO’s strategic priorities would “contribute to the protection of civilians from violence – including gender-based violence and violence against children – and stabilization, including by supporting the creation of an environment conducive to peaceful, credible and timely elections.”¹⁹⁰ MONUSCO has long been the UN’s largest peace operations and is currently supported by 18,664 uniformed personnel and 3,470 civilian personnel.¹⁹¹

4. Canadian Contribution

In 1996 the Security Council authorized [Resolution 1080](#) establishing a Canadian-led multinational humanitarian operation in the DRC. The force was coordinated at the direction of Prime Minister Chretien, who secured a commitment for over 12,000 troops from other countries. Canada was to provide Lt. Gen. Maurice Baril as Force Commander and 1500 additional troops. However, the mission was abandoned before the force could deploy because of the insurgency led by Laurent Kabila which resulted in several hundred thousand Rwandan refugees returning home.¹⁹² [Operation Crocodile](#) is Canada’s current military contribution to MONUSCO. Task Force DRC is the Canadian contingent comprised of nine Canadian Armed Forces personnel supporting MONUSCO in Kinshasa and Goma with “expertise fields such as operations, liaison, and training.”¹⁹³ As of May 2016, there were 9 CAF personnel deployed under MONUSCO. Number of Canadian Casualties: 1 (under MONUC, MONUSCO’s predecessor).

¹⁸⁸ See Martha Mutisi, “[Redefining Peacekeeping: The Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo](#),” *Kujenga Amani*, 26 July 2015.

¹⁸⁹ Stacey White, “[Now What? The International Response to Internal Displacement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo](#),” *The Brookings Institution*, December 2014.

¹⁹⁰ UN, “Security Council Authorized Mandate Renewal for United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo.”

¹⁹¹ United Nations, “[Peacekeeping Fact Sheet](#),” 31 August 2016.

¹⁹² Duane Bratt, “Canada’s peacekeeping mission to eastern Zaire, a failed attempt at rehabilitating the military,” *Peace Research*, Vol. 30 (4), November 1998, p. 25.

¹⁹³ DND, “[Operation CROCODILE](#),” 10 July 2015.

B. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

1. Authorization Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013-present)

2. Context

The current crisis in Mali can be linked to long-standing grievances in the country's northern territory towards the central government, elite corruption and deficiencies in the country's security sector. More immediately, the crisis was triggered by a military coup in March 2012. A group of Malian soldiers, frustrated with the poor handling of the elected government's campaign to counteract rebel ethnic Tuareg militias, who had been actively challenging state authority and the Malian military in the north of the country, overthrew President Touré. The chaos initiated by the military coup in the south accelerated the collapse of state authority in northern Mali, a vast and arid territory which was already characterized by weak government control and limited government services. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a group of Tuareg separatists, some of whom had returned with training and weapons from Libya, were able to seize control of key towns and strategic points in northern Mali, driving out the national army and proclaiming the establishment of an independent state, which they called "Azawad."¹⁹⁴

However, this group, which is reportedly motivated primarily by ethnic nationalism, was eventually pushed aside by a number of well-armed insurgent groups that are affiliated with criminal and terrorist networks and associated with the desire to impose a more extreme version of Islam in Mali – a country that has an overwhelmingly Muslim-majority population together with a history of secular governance. The main groups that have been identified among these include: Ansar Dine, a Malian group which "insists its goal is to control the whole country and turn it into an Islamic state"¹⁹⁵; The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujwa), which has been described as "an offshoot of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)"¹⁹⁶; and the AQIM, which "is a Salafi-jihadist militant group and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization operating in North Africa's Sahara and Sahel."¹⁹⁷

Following the coup, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led intensive mediation efforts to return power to a civilian administration, and signed a framework agreement with the military junta to establish a transitional Government. Interim authorities then requested UN capacity building assistance in the areas of "political negotiation, elections, governance, security sector reform and humanitarian assistance."¹⁹⁸

By the end of 2012, these various and at times splintering and overlapping groups were in control of the northern half of Mali. Reports emerged indicating that violations of international human rights and humanitarian law had taken place and that the insurgents were imposing a harsh form of Sharia (Islamic)

¹⁹⁴ The Tuaregs, who have in previous decades rebelled against the central government in Mali in response to perceived grievances and marginalization, are a semi-nomadic people who live primarily in northern Mali and Niger, but also inhabit parts of southern Algeria and Libya, and northern Burkina Faso. They comprise approximately 10% of Mali's total population.

¹⁹⁵ Simon Allison, "[Mali: five key facts about the conflict](#)," *Guardian Africa network*, 22 January 2013.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ UN, "[MINUSMA: Background](#)."

law in a number of communities in the territory under their control.¹⁹⁹ The international response to the crisis in Mali was marked by significant concern over the deteriorating political and security situation in the country, but also caution over how best to proceed to assist with the restitution of constitutional order and government authority in the north. This stemmed from the complexity of the security situation on the ground and the ongoing political challenges in the country. Practical considerations also affected assessments of the response to the crisis, including factors such as the logistical challenges associated with the size and harsh nature of the remote and largely-desert territory under insurgent control, as well as the capacity, command and control, equipment, and training limitations of the relatively-small sized Malian armed forces.

Despite these factors, international concern persisted over the loss of Mali's territorial integrity, the humanitarian crisis and regional destabilization that followed in the wake of the insurgents' ascendancy, and the possibility that Mali's northern territory could become an entrenched safe haven for terrorist groups and criminal networks. AQIM affiliates have been involved in several high-profile hostage-taking incidents in the region, and have been targeting UN peacekeeping forces since their deployment in 2013 with deadly results.

3. Mandate

December 2012, the UN Security Council passed [Resolution 2085](#) authorizing an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) with a Chapter VII mandate. The resolution authorized AFISMA to carry out the following tasks:

- Build the capacity of Mali's armed forces in coordination with international partners;
- Support "the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups ...";
- Support the creation of "a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of human assistance ..." ²⁰⁰

Events in Mali escalated quickly. Before AFISMA could deploy, insurgents pushed south towards Bamako and Malian authorities requested immediate assistance from France, which initiated air strikes against the insurgents in January 2013.²⁰¹ The European Union (EU) launched a training mission for Malian armed forces, known as the [EU Training Mission in Mali \(EUTM\)](#) in February 2013.

On 25 April 2013, the Security Council adopted [Resolution 2100](#), establishing MINUSMA, which would assume AFISMA responsibilities. In June 2014, the Security Council adopted [Resolution 2164](#), expanding MINUSMA's mandate to include, among other things, the protection of civilians, supporting

¹⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), "[Addressing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the North](#)," *Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs*, Testimony of Corinne Dufka, Senior Researcher, Africa Division, HRW, 5 December 2012.

²⁰⁰ UN Security Council, [Resolution 2085](#) (2012)

²⁰¹ Initially dubbed Operation Serval, the French-led military engagement was successful in retaking Malian territory that was held by militants. Operation Serval was replaced by under Operation Barkhane in August 2014. France has about 3500 troops stationed in the Sahel under Operation Barkhane, mainly training the Malian Armed Forces in counter-insurgency tactics. See France, Department of Defence, "[Barkhane : aux côtés des forces armées maliennes](#)," 22 August 2016 [AVAILABLE IN FRENCH ONLY].

political reconciliation, and rebuilding the security sector. MINUSMA's mandate was further amended by [Resolution 2227](#) of June 2015 to include a ceasefire monitoring mandate, following the signing of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali between the Government of Mali and a coalition of armed groups. The Agreement, viewed as an achievement towards establishing lasting peace and reconciliation in the country, calls for parties to implement a ceasefire as well as political and institutional reforms. Implementation of the Agreement has been slow, and numerous ceasefire violations have been reported.²⁰²

Despite the restoration of State control in many northern areas, the security situation remains volatile and asymmetrical challenges continue to undermine governance and development efforts. With 105 fatalities, Mali is the deadliest active UN mission for peacekeepers.²⁰³

4. Canadian Contribution

Between 15 January–31 March 2013, members of the CAF supported France's Operation Serval. Under [Air Task Force Mali](#), Canadian contributions included "one CC-177 Globemaster heavy lift transport aircraft and about 40 Royal Canadian Air Force personnel: flight and maintenance crews from 429 Transport Squadron and traffic technicians from 2 Air Movements Squadron, both units of 8 Wing Trenton in southern Ontario."²⁰⁴ Air Task Force Mali's mandate excluded combat. According to Global Affairs Canada, in 2014–2015, Canada provided financial support to MINUSMA in the amount of US\$24.8 million. In 2013, Canada committed as \$5 million to support the African Union mission in Mali and a further \$1 million to support the EUTM in Mali.²⁰⁵ Though it has not provided any troops as part of the UN mission, it has been [reported](#) that members of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) have taken part in Exercise Flintlock – an annual regional military exercise in Africa – to help conduct counter-terrorism training for troops from African countries, including Mali.

C. [United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic \(MINUSCA\)](#)

1. Authorization [UN Security Council Resolution 2149 \(2014-present\)](#).

2. Context

Long plagued by instability and an ineffective central government, the Central African Republic (CAR) has endured recurrent insurgencies and protracted violence since the 1990s. In March 2013, a rebel movement known as the Seleka seized control of the capital, Bangui and overthrew President François Bozizé (who came to power in an armed rebellion 10 years earlier). As the International Crisis Group explains,

By virtue of its geography and history, CAR is located at the crossroads between two regions and two peoples: in the north, the Sahel with its pastoralist communities and majority Muslim merchants, and in the south, Central Africa with its communities of the savanna, initially animist but now predominantly Christian. The Seleka power grab in March 2013 marked a fundamental reversal of CAR's traditional political landscape. For

²⁰² See Security Council Report, "September 2015 Monthly Forecast: Mali," 31 August 2015.

²⁰³ UN Peacekeeping, "[Fatalities by Mission and Incident Type](#)," 31 July 2016.

²⁰⁴ DND, "[Support to French operations in Mali](#)," 25 November 2014.

²⁰⁵ Global Affairs Canada, "[Embassy of Canada to Mali](#)," June 2016.

the first time since independence, a force stemming from the Muslim population of the north and east of the country held the reins of power.²⁰⁶

A transitional government was established in 2013 and the Seleka leaders, once in power, “oversaw attacks on Christian communities, prompting the formation of largely Christian- and animist-led ‘anti-balaka’ militias (often translated as anti-bullets or anti-machetes) that have targeted Muslims and northerners.”²⁰⁷ Inter-communal clashes erupted around the capital. Sectarian violence has since paralyzed the country and destroyed government institutions. In December 2014, a UN commission found that all parties to the conflict were responsible for “‘war crimes and crimes against humanity’ and that abuses by anti-balaka groups amounted to ‘ethnic cleansing’ of CAR’s Muslim community.”²⁰⁸ The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) reports that there are over 420,000 IDPs in CAR.²⁰⁹ The international response has featured national, regional, and UN efforts to stabilize the situation. In December 2013, the French government launched Operation Sangaris to disarm the militias and secure Bangui with support from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU). A UN arms embargo and sanctions regime was also put in place.

MINUSCA was established in 2014. Since then, serious allegations of sexual exploitation, rape, and other abuses by UN peacekeepers, as well as Operation Sangaris troops have been documented.²¹⁰ In June 2015, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon established an “Independent Review Panel on UN Response to Allegations of Sexual Abuse by Foreign Military Forces in Central African Republic.” The Panel, chaired by Canadian former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps, issued its [report](#) in December 2015, and ultimately found that “[s]tructures currently in place for the criminal prosecution of peacekeepers who commit crimes of sexual violence are ineffective and inadequate.”²¹¹

3. Mandate

Security Council [Resolution 2127](#) was adopted on 5 December 2013 and authorized an AU-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA). In April 2014, Security Council [Resolution 2149](#) established MINUSCA (which absorbed MISCA) and granted Chapter VII authorization to, among other things: protect civilians, to assist with the political transition and reconciliation process, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, carry out disarmament and demobilization strategies, and in some circumstances implement “urgent temporary measures ... to arrest and detain in order to maintain

²⁰⁶ International Crisis Group, “[Central African Republic: The Roots of Violence](#).” Prior to the conflict, CAR’s estimated population of 4–5 million was made up of 15% Muslim and 85% Christians or followers of indigenous beliefs. A Congressional Research Service document explains that “[t]he Seleka was founded in northeastern CAR and drew on grievances among members of the minority Muslim community – many of whom hail from the northeast – stemming from perceived exclusion and persecution by successive governments led by Christians from the south or northwest.” See Alexis Arieff and Tomas F. Husted, “[Crisis in the Central African Republic](#),” *Congressional Research Service*, 17 August 2015.

²⁰⁷ Arieff and Husted, p. 1.

²⁰⁸ [Final Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic](#), S/2014/928, 22 December 2014.

²⁰⁹ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “[Central African Republic Situation, UNHCR Regional Update 67](#),” 30 April 2016.

²¹⁰ See Sandra Laville, “[UN aid worker suspended for leaking report on child abuse by French troops](#),” *The Guardian*, 29 April 2015, and Annerieke Smaak, “[Holding Abusive UN Peacekeepers to Account](#),” 8 June 2016.

²¹¹ Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in Central African Republic, [Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers](#).

basic law and order and fight impunity.”²¹² On 26 July 2016 [Security Council Resolution 2301](#) extended MINUSCA’s mandate through 2017. The mission’s current strength is 13,327 uniformed and civilian personnel.²¹³

4. Canadian Contribution

According to Global Affairs Canada (GAC), “Canada is contributing approximately \$31 million through its assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget for MINUSCA in 2015–2016.”²¹⁴ No Canadian armed forces personnel are currently deployed as part of MINUSCA or other regional or national-led responses.

²¹² See UN, “[United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic \(MINUSCA\): Mandate.](#)”

²¹³ UN, “[Peacekeeping Fact Sheet](#),” 31 July 2016.

²¹⁴ GAC, “[Canada-Central African Republic Relations](#),” June 2016.

APPENDIX A – DUTCH LETTER TO PARLIAMENT

Letter dated November 2013 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Security and Justice and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation to the House of Representatives concerning the government's decision to contribute to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

We are writing to inform you, in accordance with article 100 of the Constitution, of the government's decision to make a contribution to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Essential facts

The government has decided, in response to a request from the United Nations, to make the following contribution to MINUSMA:

- 220 military personnel for the intelligence arm of the military component of the UN mission. The contingent will comprise:
 - 70 analysts and intelligence personnel for the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU), operating from the headquarters in Bamako and Gao;
 - a 90-strong special forces long range reconnaissance unit operating from Gao;
 - a 60-strong detachment equipped with four Apache combat helicopters and stationed at the airfield in Gao.
- 128 military support personnel, including a national support detachment, to work with these units.
- As usual at the start and finish of military missions, extra military personnel are needed to provide support.
- 30 police officials for the police component of the mission (maximum of 20 Netherlands Marechaussee personnel and 10 police officers), preferably based at the same locations as the Dutch military personnel.
- A contribution of civilian experts, in fields such as civilian protection, rule-of-law development, security sector reform, gender equality and the protection of cultural heritage. These experts too should preferably be based in Gao and Bamako.

The UN assists Mali in strengthening state structures that deliver security and other services to the population throughout the country. The Netherlands contribution of 368 military personnel is intended to support the UN in the first phase of its mission, specifically by helping to get the mission up and running. By focusing on providing a niche military capability, namely intelligence and reconnaissance, the Netherlands can address a critical need of the UN. The Dutch contingent will significantly enhance the mission's effectiveness, and hence its likelihood of success. For a country like ours, which benefits greatly from international cooperation, it is important to bear a share of the responsibility in international affairs.

The nature of the military contribution is determined by the desire to play a substantial role in ensuring the mission's success. Its size is determined in part by the desire to make a coherent and self-reliant contribution, which ultimately minimises the extent to which the Dutch military personnel are dependent on others for the performance of their tasks and for their own protection. Unlike past missions, for example in Uruzgan and Srebrenica, the Dutch military personnel will not be responsible for a particular geographic area.

The Dutch contingent will, in principle, stay until the end of 2015, assuming that the UN Security Council extends MINUSMA's mandate after 25 April 2014. The government will carry out an interim evaluation in mid-2015. The findings of this evaluation will provide the basis for the decision whether to extend or terminate all or part of the Dutch contribution to this UN mission from the end of 2015.

The complexity of the problems in Mali requires a comprehensive approach that incorporates defence, diplomacy and development (the 3Ds). Interventions in the fields of security, the rule of

law, strengthening state structures, socioeconomic development and promotion of the political process must be properly coordinated. The integrated character of Dutch efforts in Mali will be further strengthened by coordinating our contribution to MINUSMA with the Dutch bilateral development programme.

In keeping with the terms of reference for decisions on the deployment of military units abroad, we will address below the grounds for participation, the situation in Mali, the organisation of MINUSMA and the operational and financial aspects of the Dutch contribution.

Grounds for participation

Participation in this UN mission serves various Dutch interests. The Netherlands has an interest in international security, stability and a well-functioning international legal order. In its recently published International Security Strategy the government announced that in achieving its strategic objectives it would focus mainly on unstable regions in the vicinity of Europe. The Sahel in Africa is one such region. At present the international balance of power is shifting as the United States focuses more on Asia than in the past. Europe, and hence the Netherlands too, will increasingly have to look after its own interests independently, certainly in areas in Europe's immediate vicinity. Europe itself will have to prevent unmanageable situations from arising close to home. It is important in this connection for the problems to be tackled in their countries of origin rather than waiting until they have spread to Europe and possibly the Netherlands.

The problems in Mali have a strong regional dimension. International terrorism and criminal networks extend far beyond national borders. The combination of cross-border crime and terrorism and a lack of effective and legitimate state authority is threatening to further destabilise not only Mali, but also the already fragile region along Europe's southern border.

Northern Mali has become a breeding ground for extremism and a sanctuary for terrorist training camps and the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. This is illustrated by the attacks on an Algerian gas plant (January 2013) and a uranium mine in Niger (May 2013). These were carried out by a splinter group of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which was operating from Mali.

Mali has long been located at the intersection of smuggling routes running from South America to Europe, where they link up with European criminal networks, or to eastern or southern Africa. Along these routes, drugs and arms are traded and smuggled. Mali has also become an important staging post in Africa on the south-north route for human trafficking and illegal migration. Through the vast, unpoliced area in northern Mali, people and goods find their way through countries such as Niger to Libya and the Mediterranean coast. The money generated by these activities and the ransoms paid for the release of hostages are an important source of funding for terrorist activities. Further destabilisation of this vulnerable region will increase the flow of migrants trying to reach Europe from and through the Sahel.

Solidarity with the civilian population of Mali is another important consideration underlying the government's decision. The Malian people have been hard hit by the poverty, instability, insecurity and human rights violations caused by the crisis in the country. As a result of the crisis, the country now has 350,000 displaced persons and 170,000 refugees. Article 90 of the Dutch constitution provides that the government has a duty to promote the development of the international legal order, which most certainly includes safeguarding human rights. Participation in MINUSMA also reflects the active role played by the Netherlands in the international debate on the great importance of human security. A contribution to MINUSMA is in keeping with our long partnership with Mali in the development field, and it will enable us, in conjunction with the bilateral development cooperation programme, to enhance the effectiveness of the Netherlands' efforts.

It is also important from an economic perspective to ensure that the natural resources and energy sources in the region remain accessible to and available for industry and trade. This has a bearing,

for example, on the position of the Dutch ports. North Africa is an important commodities partner for the Netherlands. And the Netherlands is on average the fifth-largest trading partner in West Africa.

MINUSMA

UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (April 2013) forms the basis for MINUSMA. The mission has obtained a broad and integrated mandate for an initial period of 12 months (until 30 June 2014). It is probable that the UN Security Council will maintain the mission for a number of years. The main objectives of the mission are to stabilise key population centres, provide support for the re-establishment of state authority throughout the country, assist in the process of political dialogue and reconciliation, support the organisation of elections, protect civilians and provide support for humanitarian assistance. Other important objectives are helping to punish war crimes and protecting cultural heritage. To achieve these objectives (with the exception of assistance with dialogue, reconciliation and elections), the mission may use all necessary means under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A unique aspect of the mandate is the designation of France as a parallel force. Under Resolution 2100 French troops are authorised 'to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat'. The precise terms of this arrangement are recorded in a technical agreement between France and the UN. This provides, among other things, that the Force Commander of MINUSMA, acting in the name of the UN Secretary-General, may directly call in the assistance of the French troops. The scaling back of France's Operation Serval has no bearing on this agreement.

Lessons learned in the past, such as the need to operate under robust rules of engagement and to have a good information position and effective intelligence-gathering capacity, are reflected in the MINUSMA mandate. The UN is assisting Mali in developing a functioning government that delivers security and other services to the population throughout the country. The aim of the Dutch contribution is to support the UN in the first phase of its mission. The Netherlands is making a military contribution specifically designed to help get the mission up and running through a coherent contribution to its intelligence capability. This will be easily transferable to other countries when the Netherlands decides to terminate its participation in the mission.

Political situation

In January 2012, following previous uprisings in the 1960s, the 1990s and 2007, a Tuareg rebellion broke out in northern Mali. On 22 March 2012 President Touré was deposed by a group of disaffected soldiers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, who acted out of dissatisfaction with the fact that the army was in a weak position and not equipped to quell the rebellion. Partly as a result of the government's inability to restore state authority, the north of the country was transformed in the course of 2012 into a sanctuary for armed and terrorist groups, which regularly worked together in shifting coalitions. Over time, jihadist groups succeeded in marginalising the (secular) Tuareg rebels and assuming control in northern Mali. In April 2012, under international pressure, the leaders of the military coup made way for a transitional government. By December 2012 the process of political transition had become completely bogged down and interim prime minister Diarra was compelled to resign by the coup leaders. In early January 2013 jihadist groups started advancing southwards and managed to break through to the de facto border between northern and southern Mali. On 11 January France, acting at the request of the Malian authorities and with the support of the UN Security Council, mounted a military intervention (Operation Serval) intended to restore Mali's territorial integrity. The arrival of the French troops was welcomed by the Malinese population. The French, supported by the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and the Malian army, succeeded in recapturing northern Mali from the rebels. At the end of January the interim government adopted a roadmap for transition in order to restore territorial integrity and constitutional order in Mali.

Protracted negotiations in Ouagadougou, in which the president of Burkina Faso acted as mediator, resulted on 18 June 2013 in a provisional agreement between the interim government and various armed groups from northern Mali, which was conditional upon the resumption of

peace negotiations within 60 days of the date on which an elected government would take office. Besides regulating a ceasefire, the agreement arranged for the return of civilian administration and the army to Kidal. This made it possible to hold presidential elections throughout Mali, which was one of the conditions of the roadmap. A first step in the disarmament of the armed groups was their 'cantonnement' (confinement in special camps) pending a final agreement. The agreement also provided for the establishment of an international commission to investigate serious crimes and human rights violations.

The presidential elections took place in July and August 2013 and passed off well considering the circumstances. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected by a clear majority. Both the local population and the international community have high expectations for his presidency. With the appointment of the team of ministers on 8 September the government can begin formulating its policy. Whether Keita is indeed able to deliver the necessary reforms will now become apparent. Several of his ministerial appointments have come in for criticism. However, he has taken resolute action against the former coup leaders, thereby greatly reducing Sanogo's influence. Sanogo's earlier promotion to the rank of four-star general is seen as a conciliatory gesture designed to encourage him to leave office voluntarily; he no longer has a formal role within the Malian army. In this respect, Keita's statement that 'there's no room for two captains on this ship' is telling. The majority of Sanogo's accomplices have also disappeared from the scene.

President Keita wishes to focus on reconciliation, solving the problems in the north of the country, tackling corruption, reforming the state (for example through decentralisation), development (with specific attention to the position of the North), agriculture, employment, education and healthcare. Through regional and national consultations the government wishes to give the population a say in the country's future course. The first negotiations with representatives from northern Mali were started in September. The government will also modify the mandate and composition of the reconciliation committee, which was set up by the interim government but has proved ineffective. Many Malians consider that the reconciliation process, a basic condition of which is tackling impunity, must grow from the bottom up, rather than being imposed from the top down.

Security

The UN Security Council authorised the deployment of AFISMA in December 2012, and the EU established a training mission to strengthen the Malian army (EUTM Mali) in February 2013. MINUSMA – AFISMA's successor – was established by the UN Security Council on 25 April 2013.

The situation in northern Mali is now relatively calm, thanks in part to Operation Serval and MINUSMA. However, to what extent the situation is truly stable is uncertain. There is still a group which advocates an independent state in northern Mali ('Azawad'), and the jihadists have not yet completely disappeared either. The threat posed by the jihadists is also apparent from the attacks in the northern cities of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal in late September and early October. Nonetheless, Operation Serval and MINUSMA have succeeded in eliminating various terrorists and seizing caches of explosives, most recently in Operation Hydra at the end of October. On 23 October two MINUSMA soldiers from Chad were killed during an attack in Tessalit. There are also ethnic conflicts between and within the Arab, Tuareg and Peuhl communities. Banditry and drug trafficking remain a security problem, and the return of displaced persons (estimated at 140,000) is causing tensions. In some cases they have been accused by those who remained behind of collaborating with jihadists. The return of displaced persons is also leading to disputes about land. Food shortages, partly due to the protracted drought and other ecological conditions, are another source of potential conflict.

Armed groups in Mali form a complex and continually changing whole. The main armed parties at present are the *Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad* (MNLA – a Tuareg group), AQIM (a jihadist group) and the *Mouvement pour l'Unité et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest*

(MUJAO, a jihadist group).¹ The various parties have suffered heavy losses and are fragmented. Reports suggest that foreign jihadists have largely left Mali and that many Malian jihadists have blended back into the population. The recent merger between the MUJAO and an AQIM splinter group, and the cautious rapprochement between the MNLA and AQIM show that the jihadists are adapting to the new situation. Tensions still exist between the MNLA and the Malian army, particularly in the area around Kidal, where the authorities are mistrusted. There are also strong indications that groups from northern Mali have links with other terrorist organisations in the region such as Boko Haram in Nigeria. Developments in Mali and the region as a whole influence each other. The regional security situation therefore remains unstable, as demonstrated by the attacks in Algeria and Niger mentioned above.

Malian armed forces

Following a coup d'état by the Malian army in 1991, successive governments tried to weaken the army in order to reduce the risk of a repeat of that situation. Recruitment became a matter of political and family connections, with military appointments being purchased rather than achieved on merit. This seriously affected the quality of the army. Its combat capacity is minimal; morale and discipline are wanting; leadership is poor, and in some cases the command structure has broken down. The Malian government now realises that steps must be taken to enable the army to maintain Mali's territorial integrity independently. The army commanders and the government take a positive view of the necessary reforms. The EU training mission (EUTM Mali) is supporting the Malian government in translating this political will into action. President Keita has also appointed a civilian as Minister of Defence. This reflects the importance attached by the government to having a professional army under democratic control.

Police and justice sector

The internal security services consist of the National Police, the Gendarmerie and the National Guard. These services function poorly, if at all, and in some regions they are completely invisible. Even where they are present, corruption and nepotism are rife. Corruption is also widespread and deeply rooted in the justice sector. As access to the legal system is also limited (especially in the north), this results in a degree of impunity which has a destabilising effect on democratic institutions in Mali. The corruption is often financed from the illegal transshipment of drugs and arms. Combating corruption in the security services is therefore of crucial importance in stabilising the country. In this spirit, UNPOL (the police and judicial component of MINUSMA) is providing training and advice to the security services and strengthening the justice sector. In the longer term there is a need for further reform and structural enhancement of the police and justice sector.

Human rights

Since the occupation of northern Mali by rebel groups, various serious human rights violations have occurred. Following the outbreak of fighting last January, segments of the Malian army carried out acts of revenge and committed human rights violations (Parliamentary Papers 32735, no. 73). Over 200 suspects have been detained. The International Criminal Court has instituted an investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed since the violence started in 2012. The number of human rights violations has fallen since the signing of the preliminary agreement on 18 June 2013. Although Mali has ratified many human rights conventions, they have not all been incorporated into national legislation.

Women's rights in Mali are under threat. In traditional Malian culture, talking openly about violence against women is a social taboo. The new government's priorities in this field are as yet unclear. However, the wish of the Malian army commander to work with UN Women in preventing gender-based violence by the Malian armed forces is a welcome development.

¹ There are also various other, less prominent armed groups active in northern Mali, such as Ansar ed-Dine, the group led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and the *Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad*.

Humanitarian situation

Over five million people have been affected by the crisis in Mali. Almost 350,000 fled from the north to the south, where they were often taken in by relatives. As security has improved, the return of these displaced persons to the north has now started, particularly to the regions of Gao and Timbuktu. There are also still over 170,000 Malian refugees in neighbouring countries (70,000 in Mauritania, 50,000 in Niger and 50,000 in Burkina Faso). Finally, some 3.5 million people are faced with food insecurity, of whom 1.4 million need immediate food aid. The food security situation in northern Mali has worsened. At present, over 85 per cent of the population of the north are dependent on food aid, although the authorities are still not able to provide this service. In view of the continuing lack of safety outside the cities, the scope for the provision of humanitarian aid by organisations is very limited.

In 2013 the UN requires about \$477 million for humanitarian aid. Only 35% of this amount has been funded at present. Insecurity, drought and the growing number of returning displaced persons and refugees may cause the humanitarian situation to worsen in the near future. This may be exacerbated still further by the continuing undernourishment of young children. A coordination platform has been established to oversee the recovery of the affected areas. This platform is encouraging political dialogue with national authorities in order to safeguard the efficient transition from humanitarian to development aid. In addition to the regular humanitarian aid channelled through organisations such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN refugee organisation (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP), the Netherlands has made available €2 million for humanitarian aid in the Sahel this year. This contribution is being made through the World Food Programme. In 2012 the Dutch contribution for humanitarian aid in the Sahel was €20.1 million, of which €7.2 million was earmarked for Mali.

Development cooperation

Mali is one of the world's poorest countries. Its problems include high population growth, illiteracy, high rates of mother and child mortality and very high unemployment, particularly among young people. These problems are compounded by the adverse effects of food scarcity and cross-border crime. The Malian authorities are not able to deliver basic services to the population. Furthermore, the central government has, in practice, been absent from the northern part of the country since the 1990s, leaving the population marginalised. Mali has been a development cooperation partner of the Netherlands since the 1970s, and the European Union, too, has long been active in Mali as a donor.

In reaction to the coup d'état in 2012 donors suspended aid to the Malian authorities. This measure was intended as a signal to the Malian government 'business as usual' would not continue. The sanctions had a positive effect, helping to get the coup leaders to hand over power to a transitional civilian government and ensuring that elections would be held at a later date. However, the drawback of suspending aid has been that the worsened state of government finances has put further pressure on the delivery of basic services. In February 2013 the EU's Foreign Affairs Council agreed to a gradual and conditional resumption of EU aid through a 'state-building contract' of €225 million, of which a first tranche of €90 million was transferred last June. These funds are being used to support the priorities set out in the '*Plan pour la Relance Durable du Mali* (PRED) 2013-2014' formulated by the transitional Malian government, e.g. democratisation, elections and reconciliation, security, justice, basic services, water and infrastructure (also in the north of the country). During the international donor conference in Brussels on 15 May 2013, the PRED Plan was welcomed by the international community, and over €3 billion in aid was pledged, of which €1 billion consisted of new funds.

The Netherlands has been gradually and conditionally resuming bilateral aid to Mali, which had been suspended at the start of 2012 (Parliamentary Papers 32605, no. 122, April 2013). In the period 2013-2017 the Netherlands will provide aid to local and regional government bodies and civil society organisations in order to improve the provision of local services in the regions of Mopti, Segou, Gao and Timbuktu, particularly food security/water and sexual and reproductive

health and rights (SRHR). A security and rule of law programme is also being rolled out with a view to strengthening the local justice and security organisations that serve the interests of the public, including expanding access to justice. In this way, the Netherlands hopes to help tackle the root causes of the conflict, the culture of impunity, corruption within the justice and security sector, the gap between state and citizen, and the defective implementation of decentralisation processes.

In adopting this approach the Netherlands is putting lessons learned into practice. This means that the development cooperation programme will focus more on the northern part of the country and that security will play a more important role. Moreover, greater attention will be paid in the years ahead to promoting stability and sustainable development in the north. In fact, a start has already been made on this, as a result of the changed context.

Coherent approach

The complexity of the problems in Mali requires a comprehensive approach that incorporates defence, diplomacy and development (the 3Ds). Interventions relating to security, the rule of law, strengthening state structures, socioeconomic development and promoting the political process have to be coordinated. As its contribution will not be equally ambitious in all these fields, the Netherlands is seeking to coordinate its activities with those of its partners, such as the UN and the EU. Like the Netherlands, both these organisations are aiming to ensure that military and civilian capabilities are deployed in a highly integrated manner. Moreover, they have set themselves the goal of improving the coordination of the efforts of both multilateral and bilateral donors with respect to political and development cooperation. Examples of forums in which this coordination takes place and the Netherlands participates are the *Groupe de soutien et de suivi sur la situation au Mali* and donor conferences.

Mali is a development partner of the Netherlands. In recent decades the Netherlands has built up a strong position and an extensive network, which is also a source of goodwill, particularly in the regions with active development programmes. This should help to ensure that our efforts, as part of MINUSMA, are effective. The Netherlands will concentrate its efforts in Mali. However, if initiatives extending to the wider region are consistent with Dutch policy priorities and would result in value added, we will consider taking part in them.

Besides working to coordinate its efforts with those of other (multilateral) partners, the Netherlands will also study whether its contribution to MINUSMA can be linked to its other activities in Mali. It will examine, in particular, how MINUSMA and the policy on security and the rule of law can complement and strengthen one another (see operational aspects). The civilian experts to be offered to MINUSMA will be selected with this in mind. The Netherlands will also examine whether its civilian police officials and KMar officers can be deployed within UNPOL to Gao, where the Dutch embassy is already actively implementing its development programmes. The first project to be examined with this in mind involves support for the justice sector, which is an important part of the security and rule of law programme. Consideration will also be given to whether this programme should be modified or expanded by means of a greater emphasis on longer term reforms, in order to align it more closely with the police component of MINUSMA. By coordinating its contribution to MINUSMA with its bilateral development programme, the comprehensive character of the overall Dutch efforts in Mali is strengthened.

Various steps have recently been taken to improve the coordination of the Dutch and international efforts to achieve the initial stabilisation of Mali. For example, the Netherlands has made a financial contribution to the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission AFISMA, which has now been subsumed into MINUSMA. It is also making a financial contribution to the training of AFISMA troops through the United States' African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Programme. The Netherlands has made air transport capacity available for Operation Serval through European Air Transport Command (EATC). In addition, it has seconded a staff officer to the Belgian detachment taking part in EUTM Mali and a senior analyst to

MINUSMA's Joint Mission Analysis Cell. In relation to human security, the Netherlands is supporting the work of a local organisation in verifying human rights violations. It is also funding the training of Malian troops by UN Women on gender issues, the protection of women and children and international humanitarian law. The EUTM training modules on gender and human rights complement the training courses given by UN Women. Through its support for the Centre for Civilians in Conflict, the Netherlands is also assisting in the development of guidelines for preventing and addressing civilian harm during national and international military (peace) operations in Mali.

Regional dimension

The problems in Mali have a marked regional dimension. International terrorism and criminal networks extend far beyond national borders. These problems also affect neighbouring countries (particularly Mauritania, Niger and Algeria, but also Tunisia and Libya). The UN and the EU are trying to tackle the regional dimension of the problem in various ways and with varying degrees of success (for example, through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the EU's capacity-building mission EUCAP SAHEL Niger, the EU border management mission in Libya and programmes forming part of the EU's counterterrorism strategy for the Sahel). Both the UN and the EU have explained how they believe the regional problems should be tackled in their Sahel strategies. Despite differences of emphasis in these strategies, both organisations stress the importance of the link between security and development and attach great importance to a leading role for regional actors, especially for the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS).

Countries in the region are actively involved. As a representative of ECOWAS, Burkina Faso has taken a leading role in mediating between Bamako and the rebels. The AU played a coordinating role in the establishment of *Groupe de soutien et de suivi sur la situation au Mali* and the organisation of the donor conference in Addis Ababa last January. As regards security, the AU and ECOWAS member states have been the main troop contributors, first to AFISMA and now to MINUSMA. The Sahel countries are working together on food security through the Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS). In the security field Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger have taken a first step by establishing a joint chiefs of staff committee in Algeria. So far, however, this cooperation has proved relatively ineffective. This is why another priority in the approach taken by the UN and the EU is the encouragement of more far-reaching security cooperation between the Sahel countries and the countries of North Africa. This is being done through political mediation. Bert Koenders, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mali, is playing a very active role in initiating and maintaining the political dialogue between the countries and organisations concerned. The UN should make active use of its convening power. This is something for which the Netherlands is pressing in the appropriate forums.

Operational concept and organisation of MINUSMA

Bert Koenders, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mali (SRSG), is head of MINUSMA. The military operations are led by the Rwandan Force Commander Jean Bosco Kazura. The mission has an authorised strength of 11,200 military personnel, 1,440 police and justice officials (UNPOL), and civilian staff (number still unknown). Once it is fully operational, MINUSMA will be the UN's fourth-largest mission. MINUSMA is clearly still in the process of being set up, and its organisational structure has not yet been formalised. MINUSMA aims to create cohesion through the multidimensional and decentralised structure of its organisation. The support for political processes must be combined with more 'robust' rules of engagement for the benefit of stabilisation and with longer-term development processes such as the reform of the security institutions. The mission has its head office in Bamako and regional offices in Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The widespread support for the mission is evident from the diversity of the countries making a contribution. For example, China is contributing armed units (for the first time in a UN context).

After it was set up on 1 July 2013, the mission was immediately plunged into the preparations for the presidential elections and the political negotiations in Ouagadougou. Now that a new Malian

government has taken office, MINUSMA will be able to coordinate its strategic plans with the government's policy priorities. The SRSG expects the Integrated Strategic Framework, which is designed to align the aims of MINUSMA and the UN organisations operating in Mali, to be completed by early 2014. Removing the root causes of the conflict through structural development is not within MINUSMA's remit. That is the responsibility of the Malian government, acting with the support of UN organisations and other donors. The mission has drawn up a military concept of operations and a civilian mission concept and submitted them to the headquarters in New York. AFISMA troops became part of MINUSMA on 1 July 2013. To date, most progress has been made in rolling out the military component of the mission, although this is not yet complete. MINUSMA will not be completely deployed until the first quarter of 2014 at the earliest.

MINUSMA has a strong human rights mandate. The human rights unit is focusing on transitional justice, investigating human rights violations and building the capacity of the Malian authorities in this area (including the prison system, investigative experts, judges and prosecutors, and access to justice). MINUSMA will also support the Malian Human Rights Commission. Various activities have already been started. The cooperation with civil society organisations is going well. MINUSMA's role in the reconciliation process must still be defined, depending on the priorities of the new government. MINUSMA nonetheless intends to provide support at both national and local level for Malian institutions with a reconciliation mandate, by making available financial and technical resources and working through the SRSG.

The Malian authorities have primary responsibility for protecting the country's civilian population. However, in its supporting role MINUSMA has a mandate to use all necessary means to protect civilians. The mandate is based on two elements, namely the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and the protection of women and children affected by armed conflict (including sexual violence). An example of the importance attached by the mission to the protection of civilians is the position of the Protection of Civilians Unit within MINUSMA – directly under the SRSG. Responsibility for protecting women and children affected by armed conflict has been assigned to two independent units. In addition, a Protection of Civilians Risk Advisor has been attached to the staff of the force commander.

Gender is a priority for MINUSMA. The mission's gender unit concentrates mainly on formulating policy to boost the participation of women in the political process and to incorporate the gender dimension into security sector reforms and transitional justice (i.e. the benefits of having women involved in the reconciliation process). In this connection, MINUSMA is working closely with a network of women's leaders and with the new government. In addition, UN Women is focusing on the more development-related aspects of gender in Mali (e.g. improving access to education and health care for girls and women and reducing domestic and sexual violence).

Challenges

MINUSMA's objectives in relation to stabilisation, emergency aid and the organisation of elections seem feasible in the short-term. However, achieving its long-term objectives for the reconciliation process, the re-establishment of state authority and the professionalisation of the security sector will require staying power and will depend on external factors, such as the determination of the Malian authorities and the commitment of the various segments of the population. The cooperation between the new government and MINUSMA in these areas will be shaped in the period ahead, resulting in a number of strategic documents dealing with such issues as the reform of the police and justice sector.

The qualitative aspects of MINUSMA's operations require attention. One way in which the mission is investing in quality is by assisting AFISMA troops with the human rights due diligence policy in the context of their merger with MINUSMA and by providing human rights training for the MINUSMA forces. AFISMA's transition to MINUSMA has not yet fulfilled the mission's quantitative needs in full. The build-up to full military capacity has been delayed by the withdrawal of part of the Nigerian contingent. Some countries have yet to take a decision on a possible contribution. In

its start-up phase, the mission is also faced with a number of logistical challenges and a shortage of 'force enablers' such as transport helicopters, which would give the mission the flexibility of action required in such a large country as Mali. The support for the civilian aspects of the mission will be outsourced by the UN on a commercial basis. The UN has actively approached other countries with a view to obtaining transport helicopters for military action. The mission is first concentrating on the major population centres. Depending on the available capacity it will then extend its operations to smaller towns. The emphasis is on north-eastern Mali (the Gao region), where there is and will continue to be a relatively large French footprint.

Coordination

The various missions currently operating in the region coordinate their security-related activities. This is being done, for example, through the exchange of liaison officers, daily consultations and the joint planning of operations. To ensure security and the rule of law in the long term it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of the National Police, the Gendarmerie, the National Guard and the judicial authorities. MINUSMA will make a contribution to this, but the EU too is studying whether it can provide assistance alongside its other efforts in the region (EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUBAM Libya and the EU's counterterrorism strategy for the Sahel).

Operation Serval was mounted as a response to the acute security threat. As MINUSMA continues its build-up, France will scale back its operation in the next few months. However, Serval will remain available as a parallel force, as agreed between France and the UN. France will also continue to concentrate on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, as recorded in a bilateral agreement with Mali.

The main task of EUTM Mali is training and reorganising the Malian army, including revising and strengthening the command structure. To guarantee not only the operational but also the institutional capacity of the armed forces, the international community is working to strengthen civilian control of the army, mainly through EUTM Mali. The EU will shortly be discussing a possible extension of the EUTM mandate, including the training of extra battalions. Once the Malian army has been brought up to an acceptable standard it could, in due course, take over the tasks currently being performed by Serval and MINUSMA. The success of EUTM Mali is, in this sense, a factor in determining the possibilities for scaling back the military component of MINUSMA.

Operational aspects

Deployment of KMar and National Police personnel

The Dutch contribution to UNPOL will consist of appointments to the staff of UNPOL, the Directorate-General of the *Police Nationale* and the security institutions. In all, about 30 Dutch candidates (20 KMar officers and 10 National Police officers) can be put forward for the various positions. How many are ultimately appointed and what their assignment will entail depends on the selection process at UNPOL.

The Netherlands will examine whether its contribution to UNPOL can be concentrated in the Gao region, where the security and rule of law programme is being rolled out. Mixed teams of police and KMar are envisaged, with the police supporting the National Police and the KMar supporting the Gendarmerie and the National Guard. The aim is to help in the joint wide-ranging development of the security services in the Gao region.

The Dutch police contribution to MINUSMA will involve developing community policing, access to justice, police/judicial cooperation and border management related to combating transnational crime, including drug smuggling. In case of an UNPOL request, Dutch officials will join the staff of the transnational crime unit and the gender unit. These contributions will be of importance in gathering more information about cross-border criminal flows, including the smuggling of drugs, arms and people. In addition, gender is one of the main spearheads of Dutch policy. The main

task of the Dutch officers assigned to the colleges of the National Police and the Gendarmerie will be to advise the staff units and develop general training concepts and curricula.

Military contribution to the intelligence operations

To maximise the effectiveness of MINUSMA, and building on experiences from other UN missions, the UN has decided to develop a substantial intelligence capability. The Netherlands can make a significant contribution to this niche capability, and this contribution will be structured in such a way that elements can be transferred to other member states once the Dutch contribution is scaled back or phased out. The UN will then be responsible for the replacement.

A coherent contribution to the entire intelligence capability will create a recognisable national contribution, which will not be fragmented among various locations and parts. The Netherlands will establish a strong intelligence position for itself, which will benefit other units within MINUSMA and the Dutch contribution as a whole.

The All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) will have a total staff of 230, of whom 70 will be provided by the Netherlands. The unit is responsible for gathering, processing and analysing information on the basis of which the MINUSMA military command can issue orders to its units. The information which is gathered and analysed by the ASIFU comes from reconnaissance units, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and other sources. The Dutch contribution to the ASIFU will consist of two components: firstly, the commander of the unit and a number of staff officers assigned to the ASIFU unit in Bamako (mainly involved in analysis) and, secondly, a large proportion of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) company in Gao (mainly concerned with intelligence gathering).

To boost the ASIFU's position, the Netherlands will also provide a reconnaissance unit of about 90 special forces personnel. Their primary task will be to gather intelligence by carrying out long-range patrols which require a considerable degree of self-reliance. The reconnaissance unit will thus act as one of ASIFU's sensors. The analysis of the intelligence by the ASIFU will form the basis for the plans of the Force Commander's staff. The members of the reconnaissance unit could conceivably carry out other tasks as well, but the consent of the Chief of Defence (CDS) would then be required for each operation. These tasks could include operations that reduce the risks for other MINUSMA units, such as the dismantling of hidden arms and logistics caches and the arrest of opponents. The presence of the Dutch reconnaissance unit means that the Force Commander will have high-grade military capabilities at his disposal, which can be deployed in areas that would not be accessible to regular units. As this is a clearly demarcated contribution, the work of the reconnaissance unit could be taken over by another country if the Netherlands were to decide to end its contribution.

The Ministry of Defence is also providing a unit of four Apache combat helicopters. With their high quality sensors, the Apaches are ideally suited to the task of gathering information for the ASIFU. The four helicopters will considerably strengthen intelligence-gathering operations. They can also be used to deter armed groups and provide fire support. The Apaches will help to protect Dutch personnel and represent the 'escalation dominance' of the Dutch contribution. If the Netherlands were to decide to withdraw, this combat helicopter unit could also be replaced by that of another country.

Other matters

The geographical focus of the deployment will be on the Gao region where the UN has the greatest need for information and intelligence and where the French have large quantities of materiel and personnel present for Operation Serval. Cooperation with the French units on operations and logistics is well possible.

The Ministry of Defence is able to deliver the units for the Dutch contingent quickly, and it has sufficient capacity and staying power to guarantee participation in the longer term. The Dutch

contingent will be phased in gradually in consultation with MINUSMA, depending on the capacity of MINUSMA and the partner countries to provide the required facilities.

MINUSMA is helping the Malian authorities to strengthen their legitimacy and re-establish their authority over the entire territory of Mali. The mandate and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) allow the mission sufficient scope to carry out its duties.

Size of the contribution

The military contribution consists of 240 military personnel in operational positions (ASIFU (70), reconnaissance unit (90), individual police officers (20 KMar), armed helicopter personnel (60)) and 128 personnel for the protection of sensitive equipment and logistical support. The planning is based on the provision of logistical support by the UN, as described in the UN guidelines for troop-contributing countries. This will be augmented by support from Operation Serval. As usual, a unit will be added at the start of the operation to facilitate the deployment of the Dutch contribution. Assuming that the UN does indeed provide the required logistical support, a contribution of 368 military personnel plus some 10 civilian police officials and a number of civilian experts is foreseen. The size of the Dutch military contingent is motivated by the desire to make a coherent contribution to the intelligence capability, in order to guarantee a sufficient level of self-protection and support and to have an actual impact on the mission's effectiveness.

Command structure

The Dutch military units are under the command of the Force Commander in Bamako. Around ten Dutch officers from the three modules referred to above will form part of the staff of the Force Commander, and hold one or two key positions. In this way, the Netherlands can exercise direct influence at all times over the performance of operations. The deployment of Dutch military personnel is not subject to any caveats. However, the most senior Dutch officer (red card holder) on the staff of the Force Commander may, on behalf of the Chief of Defence, reject a command given by the Force Commander to Dutch units. The Chief of Defence retains full control at all times and may therefore resume command of the Dutch units if necessary. This procedure has been adopted in part as a result of lessons learned from previous missions.

Medical services

In Bamako the military personnel can obtain medical care in a UN-funded hospital. In Gao a Chinese facility is foreseen, which provides hospital-level medical care. Dutch nationals can also make use of the French medical facility in Gao. In addition, the Dutch unit in Gao will have its own medical capacity in the form of general military nursing staff and a military doctor (level of a general practitioner). Medical evacuation in the Gao region is guaranteed by Operation Serval. This means that the delivery of timely and high quality medical assistance is assured. In the initial phase of the mission, the Netherlands will monitor whether the setting up of the UN's planned medical facilities is going according to plan and whether the facilities meet Dutch standards.

Operational risks

Security

The Dutch units will operate from Bamako and Gao. For the time being, there is no threat of a large-scale armed conflict. However, there is a threat of terrorist activity. The threat level is assessed as moderate in Bamako and Gao, but as higher in the surrounding areas. The possibility of brief, intense fighting in the region of Gao, where the Dutch will be deployed, cannot be excluded. Although the Dutch contribution is to the intelligence capability of the mission, Dutch military personnel could conceivably be exposed to violence or involved in combat operations. This factor has been taken into account in the composition of the military contingent, thereby guaranteeing sufficient capacity for self-protection. The size of the military contingent is therefore determined by the wish to make a coherent contribution and the proper robustness for self-protection.

Health

The health risks are high as a consequence of poor standards of local hygiene and the extreme climatological conditions. To mitigate the risks, all Dutch military personnel will be vaccinated, take additional hygiene measures and undergo an acclimatisation programme.

IED threat

Armed jihadist groups have the capacity to place improvised explosive devices (IEDs). For the time being, the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) considers the possible use of IEDs by jihadist groups to be only a moderate threat. During visits to the mission area it became apparent that the local population helps in the search for IEDs. The present threat level does not warrant extra personnel and materiel. The reconnaissance unit will, however, include some IED experts. If the threat increases, additional IED experts will be dispatched from the Netherlands.

Force protection

The force protection measures provide for a multi-layered response and sufficient escalation dominance. If Dutch units are attacked by armed groups, they will be sufficiently robust to protect themselves initially. Operations will be coordinated daily to take account of the latest threat assessment. Additionally, the unit may also call in the assistance of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), set up by MINUSMA for situations of this kind. If these options are insufficient, MINUSMA can also seek the assistance of the French Operation Serval, which also has a QRF and combat helicopters in Gao.

Participation by other countries

As MINUSMA is in the build-up phase, the information about the contributions of other countries is still liable to change. Western military contributions to MINUSMA are being made by Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Non-Western military contributions are being made by Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. African countries in particular are strongly represented in the mission: by far the largest troop contributors are Chad, Senegal, Togo, Niger and Nigeria. The Netherlands, with its force of 368 military personnel, will be the largest western contributor to MINUSMA. This is closely connected with the nature of the chosen contribution. The next largest Western contributors are France and Germany, which are each deploying 150 military personnel. In terms of the total European military effort in Mali, the Dutch contribution ranks behind that of France (2,360) and before that of Germany (330).

Responsible withdrawal, monitoring and evaluation

Responsibility for measuring the progress of the mission, determining strategy and adopting operational objectives rests with the UN. In keeping with the Integrated Mission Planning Process applicable to every UN mission, MINUSMA will present an Integrated Strategic Framework at the earliest possible date (expected in early 2014), setting out in detail the strategy, plan of action, aims and indicators. In accordance with the UN rules for result-based management, the mission will carry out context analyses and take baseline measurements. The Malian authorities and other local actors will be closely involved in this. The analysis and measurements performed by the Netherlands in the context of its bilateral development cooperation efforts will, if possible and relevant, be shared with the UN. Every three months the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon will report to the Security Council on the situation in Mali and the progress made by MINUSMA (and hence by the Netherlands, as part of the mission).

In 2015 we will assess the planning and operationalisation of MINUSMA's intelligence capability. The aim of the Dutch contribution to this capability is to enhance its effectiveness and thus contribute to the success of the mission as a whole. Dutch activities will be organised in such a way that they can be transferred to other countries upon termination of the contribution.

Strengthening the Malian police and justice sector will presumably take more time. An important factor in determining whether this aspect of the Dutch contribution can be responsibly terminated is its link with projects and programmes that will continue after the Netherlands has withdrawn from the mission. Steps will therefore be taken to align the security and rule of law programme, which is part of the Dutch development cooperation programme in Mali, with the activities of MINUSMA and the Dutch contribution to the police and justice sector. In this way the government hopes to preserve the results of the Dutch contribution to MINUSMA and build on them even after termination of the contribution.

After termination of the Dutch contribution, the House will, as is customary in such cases, be sent a final evaluation drawn up under the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Security and Justice and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation.

Funding

The estimated additional expenditure for the military contribution to MINUSMA amounts to €51 million a year. In addition, expenditure for the care and aftercare of military personnel is expected to be approximately €2 million. In 2014 there will be extra additional expenditure for the deployment of the mission, estimated at €11.5 million. This will bring the total additional expenditure on MINUSMA in 2014 to €64.5 million, on the assumption that full logistical support is provided by the UN. If the UN is unable to provide full logistical support in time, the additional expenditure for MINUSMA can increase by a maximum of €10 million. Consultations on this issue will be held with the UN. The total would in that case amount to a maximum of €74.5 million in 2014.

The additional expenditure for 2015 amounts to €53 million, once again assuming that the UN is by this time able to provide full logistical support. If that is not the case, the additional expenditure for MINUSMA in 2015 may increase by a maximum of €10 million, bringing the total to €63 million.

On the basis of the initial mandate the estimated additional expenditure in 2016/2017 will total €19.5 million. This covers the additional expenditure for redeployment and repair of materiel.

The additional expenditure for the military contribution will come from the International Security Budget and is therefore chargeable to the Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). For this purpose, the International Security Budget will be increased in 2014 in the Spring Budget Memorandum, through the year-end margin of the HGIS, by the amount of the underspend on the estimated expenditure on crisis management operations in 2013 within the HGIS. In accordance with the system already described to the House in the letter of 12 July 2013, the resources required for this mission in 2014 are being transferred, pursuant to an initial supplementary budget act, within the HGIS from the foreign trade/development cooperation budget to the defence budget. As is the case with UN missions, the Netherlands is eligible for a refund from the UN of part of the additional expenditure. This has not been taken into account in the above estimates. By bringing forward this refund through a cash transfer within the HGIS, scope can be created, if necessary, for extending existing missions.

The expenditure for the deployment of civilian police officials amounts to approximately €2 million on an annual basis. This is chargeable to the HGIS provision for civilian crisis management missions and the deployment of police officials on the budget of the Ministry of Security and Justice.

The expenditure for the civilian experts is expected to amount to a maximum of €2 million on an annual basis. These costs will be met from the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

APPENDIX B - TOP CONTRIBUTORS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

**Table 1 – United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Top 10 Contributors by Percentage
(Based on effective rates of assessment²¹⁵ adopted by the United Nations General Assembly)**

Rank	2013	2014–2015 ²¹⁶	2016
1	United States of America 28.38%	United States of America 28.36%	United States of America 28.57%
2	Japan 10.83%	Japan 10.83%	China 10.29%
3	France 7.22%	France 7.21%	Japan 9.68%
4	Germany 7.14%	Germany 7.14%	Germany 6.39%
5	United Kingdom 6.68%	United Kingdom 6.68%	France 6.31%
6	China 6.64%	China 6.64%	United Kingdom 5.80%
7	Italy 4.45%	Italy 4.45%	Russian Federation 4.01%
8	Canada 2.98%	Canada 2.98%	Italy 3.75%
9	Spain 2.97%	Spain 2.97%	Canada 2.92%
10	Australia 2.07%	Australia 2.07%	Spain 2.44%

²¹⁵ According to the United Nations [Committee on Contributions](#): “Assessment is a term used for the amount of money that the General Assembly determines should be assessed to finance the approved appropriation, which is shared among Member States to pay for the expenses of the Organization.” With regard to contributions for peacekeeping operations, the General Assembly decided in its resolution [55/235](#) that from July 2001. “the rates of assessment for peacekeeping operations should be based on the scale of assessments for the regular budget of the United Nations, with an appropriate and transparent system of adjustments based on levels of Member States.”

²¹⁶ For 2014 and 2015, the United Nations published [combined rates](#).

APPENDIX C – CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

The following chart sets out selected Canadian contributions to international peace operations since its early years of participation.

Date	Event
1947	Canada sends a contingent of military observers to join the United Nations (UN) Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) .
1948	Canadian troops participate in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East.
1949	Canada supports the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) .
1950	Canada sends a contingent to participate in the UN Military Operations in Korea (UNMOK) .
1953	Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel participate in the UN Command Military Armistice Commission (UNMAC) in South Korea.
1956	Lester B. Pearson, Minister for External Affairs, champions a proposal to send the first official “peacekeeping” force to the Sinai Peninsula as part of the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) . Canadian General E.L.M. “Tommy” Burns serves as UNEF’s first commanding officer. For his efforts, Lester Pearson is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957.
1958	Canada participates in the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) .
1960	Canadian troops support the UN Mission in Congo (ONUC) .
1962	Canada sends military personnel to join the UN Security Force (UNSF) in West New Guinea .
1963	Canada participates in the UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) .

1964	Canada joins the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) .
1965	Canada sends a contingent to serve as part of the UN India–Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) .
1965	Mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic.
1973	Canada participates in the Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) in the Sinai Peninsula.
1974	Canada sends troops to the Golan Heights to support the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) .
1978	Canada joins the UN Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) .
1978	Canada contributes to the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) .
1980	Canada participates in the Commonwealth Election Commission Observer Group Rhodesia/Zimbabwe .
1985	Canada initiates its participation in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace.
1988	Canada participates in the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) .
1988	Canada contributes to the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) .
1989	Canada joins the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) .
1989	Canada joins the UN Transition Assistance Group Namibia .

1991	Canada joins the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) .
1991	Canada contributes to the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) .
1991	Canada joins the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) .
1992	Canada participates in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) .
1992	Canada supports the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) .
1992	Canada sends troops to participate in the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I, II) .
1992	Canada provides support for the UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) .
1992	Canada participates in the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBIH) .
1992	Canadian troops contribute to the European Union Force in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUFOR) following NATO stabilization efforts.
1993	Canada contributes to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) .
1993	Canada sends a contingent to participate in the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) .
1994	Canada deploys military personnel to monitor the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti in support of UN Military Observer Group Dominican Republic (MOGDR) .
1994	Canada joins the Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group (South Africa) .

1995	Canada joins the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) .
1995	Canada sends troops to join the UN Preventive Deployment Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPREDEP) .
1995	Canada sends troops to participate in the UN Confidence Restoration Organization in Croatia (UNCRO) .
1996	Canada contributes to the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) .
1996	Canada supports the UN Transitional Authority for Eastern Slovenia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) .
1996	Canada participates in the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) .
1997	Canada joins the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA).
1997	Canada provides one member to the Standby-High-Readiness Brigade Operation VIKING (SHIRBRIG) planning element in Denmark.
1997	Canada supports the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) .
1997	Canada contributes to the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) .
1999	Canada joins the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) .
1999	Canada participates in the UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) .
1999	Canada supports the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) .

2000	Canada joins the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) .
2003	Canada participates in the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) .
2003	Canada contributes to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) .
2004	Canada supports the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) .
2004	Canada joins the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) .
2004	Canada participates in the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) .
2006	Canada supports the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) .
2008	Canada assists the EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) .
2008	Canada joins the UN Assistance Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) .
2010	Canada provides support for the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) .
2015	Canadian police officers are deployed to participate in the EUAM Ukraine mission.

APPENDIX D – FATALITIES IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Date	Mission	Number of Fatalities	Number of Canadian Fatalities
2010–present	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)	102	0
2006–2012	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	17	0
2005–2011	United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	60	1
2004–present	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	143	2
2004–present	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	184	9
2002–2005	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)	21	0
2000–2008	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	20	0
1999–present	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	55	2
1999–2010	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)	161	1
1999–2005	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	192	0
1999–2002	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	0	0
1998–2000	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	2	0
1997–2000	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)	7	0
1997	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)	0	0
1997	United Nations Mission Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)	0	0
1996–1997	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)	1	0
1995–2002	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)	12	0
1995–1999	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)	4	1
1993–1996	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	27	1

1993–1996	United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)	9	1
1993–1995	United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	154	0
1993–1994	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)	0	0
1992–1995	United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	167	11
1992–1994	United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	26	0
1992–1993	United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)	6	1
1992–1993	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	82	1
1991–2003	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)	18	0
1991–1995	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	5	0
1991–1995	United Nations Angola Verifications Mission II (UNAVEM II)	5	0
1991–1992	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)	0	0
1989–1992	United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	1	0
1989–1990	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	19	0
1988–1991	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	1	0
1988–1990	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	0	0
1974–present	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	46	4
1973–1979	Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)	51	0
1965–1966	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)	0	0
1965–1966	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	0	0
1964–present	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	183	29
1963–1964	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)	0	0

1962–1963	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF)	0	0
1960–1964	United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	250	3
1958	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	0	0
1956–1967	First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)	110	53
1949–present	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	11	1
1948–present	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	50	2

APPENDIX E – WITNESSES

Monday, May 30, 2016

	The Honourable Harjit Singh Sajjan, P.C., M.P., Minister of National Defence
<i>Global Affairs Canada</i>	Mark Gwozdecky, Assistant Deputy Minister, International Security and Political Affairs
<i>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</i>	Hervé Ladsous, Head of Department

Monday, June 13, 2016

	The Honourable Peter MacKay, P.C., former Minister of National Defence
	The Honourable David Pratt, P.C., former Minister of National Defence

Monday, June 20, 2016

<i>Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute</i>	Colin Robertson, Vice-President, and Fellow, School of Public Policy, University of Calgary
<i>As an individual</i>	Elinor Sloan, Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science, Carleton University
<i>Embassy of Sweden to Canada</i>	H.E. Per Sjögren, Ambassador
<i>Conference of Defence Associations Institute</i>	Major General (Ret'd) Daniel Gosselin, Chair of the Board
<i>As individuals</i>	Colonel (Ret'd) Charles Davies
	Colonel (Ret'd) Michael P. Cessford
<i>Conference of Defence Associations</i>	Tony Battista, CEO
<i>As an individual</i>	Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Jim Cox
<i>Conference of Defence Associations</i>	Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Denis Rouleau, Chair

As individuals

Dan Ross, Former Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel),
National Defence

Major-General (Ret'd) James R. Ferron, Vice-President,
Capability Development, Carillon Canada Inc.

Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Glenn Davidson, Former Ambassador of
Canada to Syria and Afghanistan

Monday, September 19, 2016

As individuals

Jane Boulden, Associate Dean of Arts, Royal Military College of
Canada (by video conference)

Walter Dorn, Professor and Chair, Master of Defence Studies
Programme, Royal Military College of Canada and Canadian
Forces College

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) D. Michael Day, Fellow, Canadian
Global Affairs Institute

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Charles Bouchard

Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) the Honourable Roméo Dallaire

Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) David Last, Associate Professor,
Royal Military College

David Bercuson, Director, Centre for Military, Security and
Strategic Studies, University of Calgary (by video conference)

Naval Association of Canada

Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Drew Robertson

As an individual

James A. Boutilier, Adjunct Professor, Pacific Studies, University
of Victoria

Navy League of Canada

Navy Captain (Ret'd) Harry Harsch, Vice President, Maritime
Affairs

Tuesday, September 20, 2016

*Office of the Auditor General of
Canada*

Michael Ferguson, Auditor General of Canada

<i>Office of the Ombudsman for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces</i>	Gordon Stock, Principal Gary Walbourne, Ombudsman
<i>The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)</i>	Kwezi Mngqibisa, Coordinator and Consultant, Somalia Initiative (by video conference)
<i>As an individual</i>	Major General (Ret'd) Lewis Mackenzie
<i>Royal Canadian Legion</i>	Major General (Ret'd) Richard Blanchette, Chairman, Defence and Security Committee Charls Gendron, Secretary, Defence and Security Committee
<i>Canadian Association of Veterans in United Nations Peacekeeping</i>	Major (Ret'd) Wayne Mac Culloch, National President
<i>Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association</i>	Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Louis Cuppens, Special Advisor
<i>Royal Norwegian Embassy in Ottawa</i>	Her Excellency Anne Kari Hansen Ovind, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Norway
<i>As an individual</i>	Carolyn McAskie, Former Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Burundi (ONUB)
Wednesday, September 21, 2016	
<i>National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces</i>	Major-General Jean-Marc Lanthier, Commander, Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Healey, Commander, Peace Support Training Centre
<i>Parliamentary Centre</i>	Petra Andersson-Charest, Director of Programs
<i>CANADEM</i>	Paul LaRose-Edwards, Executive Director
<i>National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces</i>	General Jonathan Vance, Chief of the Defence Staff

	Lieutenant-General Christine Whitecross, Commander, Military Personnel Command
<i>National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces</i>	Commodore Brian Santarpia, Director General, Plans, Strategic Joint Staff
<i>Reserves 2000</i>	Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) John Selkirk, Executive Director
<i>Institut militaire de Québec</i>	Brigadier General (Ret'd) Richard Giguère, President (by video conference)

FACT-FINDING MISSION TO NEW-YORK - OCTOBER 24, 2016

<i>Center on International Cooperation</i>	Dr. Alexandra Novosseloff
<i>Department of Field Support, United Nations</i>	Under-Secretary-General Atul Khare
<i>Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations</i>	Assistant Secretary-General El Ghassim Wane
<i>Former Members of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</i>	Ian Martin Ameerah Haq Oliver Ulich
<i>International Peace Institute</i>	Lesley Connelly
<i>Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations</i>	Marc-André Blanchard, Ambassador and Permanent Representative Michael Grant, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative Brig.-Gen. J.J.M. Girard, Military Advisor
<i>Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations</i>	Peter Lehmann Nielsen, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative Col. Karsten Kolding, Military Advisor

Permanent Mission of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the United Nations

Semungus H. Gebrehiwot
Gen. Dgife Bedi, Military Advisor

Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations

Col. James Kenennana, Military Advisor

Permanent Mission of Senegal to the United Nations

Gorgui Ciss, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative

Col. El Hadji Issa Faye, Military Advisor

Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations

Col. Peter Öberg, Military Advisor

Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations

Hedda Samson, Counselor, Head of Political Affairs Section

Charlotte van Baak, First Secretary, Deputy Head of Political Affairs Section

Col. Norbert Moerkens, Military Advisor

UN Women

Nahla Valji, Deputy Chief, Peace and Security Section, UN Women