D6 - Welfare Economics

• Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences

  Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov

  Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.

  Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61

• Monetary Policy Tradeoffs Between Financial Stability and Price Stability

  Staff Working Paper 2016-49 Malik Shukayev, Alexander Ueberfeldt

  We analyze the impact of interest rate policy on financial stability in an environment where banks can experience runs on their short-term liabilities, forcing them to sell assets at fire-sale prices.

  Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Financial stability, Monetary policy framework, Transmission of monetary policy JEL Code(s): D, D6, D62, E, E3, E32, E4, E44, G, G0, G01

• Comparison of Auction Formats in Canadian Government Auctions

  Staff Working Paper 2009-5 Olivier Armantier, Nourredine Lafhel

  Using a rich sample of Canadian government securities auctions, we estimate the structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders. We find little evidence of asymmetries between participants at Canadian government nominal bond auctions.

  Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Debt Management, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44, D6, D63, G, G2, G28