C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

• Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences

  Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov

  Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.

  Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61

• Information Sharing and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks

  Staff Working Paper 2016-63 Sofia Priazhkina, Frank H. Page

  This paper presents a model of strategic buyer-seller networks with information exchange between sellers. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers can share access to buyers for a negotiated transfer. We study how this information exchange affects overall market prices, volumes and welfare, given different initial market conditions and information sharing rules.

  Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Working Papers Topic(s): Economic models, Firm dynamics, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C7, C71, C78, D, D2, D21, D4, D43, D8, D85, L, L1, L13

• Labour Shares and the Role of Capital and Labour Market Imperfections

  Staff Discussion Paper 2009-2 Lena Suchanek

  In continental Europe, labour shares in national income have exhibited considerable variation since 1970. Empirical and theoretical research suggests that the evolution of labour markets and labour market imperfections can, in part, explain this phenomenon.

  Content Type(s): Staff Research, Staff Discussion Papers Topic(s): Economic models, Financial Institutions, Labour markets JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, E, E2, E25, J, J6, J64