E52 - Monetary Policy
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How to Manage Macroeconomic and Financial Stability Risks: A New Framework
Monetary policy decisions need to consider all potential outcomes, not just the most likely path for the economy. This is especially true in the presence of elevated financial system vulnerabilities, which lead to increased downside risks for future growth. -
A Policy Framework for E-Money: A Report on Bank of Canada Research
We present a policy framework for electronic money and payments. The framework poses a set of positive questions related to the areas of responsibility of central banks: payments systems, monetary policy and financial stability. The questions are posed to four broad forms of e-money: privately or publicly issued, and with centralized or decentralized verification of transactions. This framework is intended to help evaluate the trade-offs that central banks face in the decision to issue new forms of e-money. -
Could a Higher Inflation Target Enhance Macroeconomic Stability?
Recent international experience with the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates has rekindled interest in the benefits of inflation targets above 2 per cent. We evaluate whether an increase in the inflation target to 3 or 4 per cent could improve macroeconomic stability in the Canadian economy. -
The Macroeconomic Effects of Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model
This paper estimates an open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Bayesian techniques to analyse the macroeconomic effects of the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) quantitative easing (QE) programme. Using data on government debt stocks and yields across maturities, we identify the parameter governing portfolio adjustment in the private sector. -
How Do Central Bank Projections and Forward Guidance Influence Private-Sector Forecasts?
We construct a 23-country panel data set to consider the effect of central bank projections and forward guidance on private-sector forecast disagreement. We find that central bank projections and forward guidance matter mainly for private-sector forecast disagreement surrounding upcoming policy rate decisions and matter less for private-sector macroeconomic forecasts. -
The Impacts of Monetary Policy Statements
In this note, we find that market participants react to an unexpected change in the tone of Canadian monetary policy statements. -
Evaluating Real GDP Growth Forecasts in the Bank of Canada Monetary Policy Report
This paper examines the quality of projections of real GDP growth taken from the Bank of Canada Monetary Policy Report (MPR) since they were first published in 1997. Over the last decade, it has become common practice among the central banking community to discuss forecast performance publicly. -
November 16, 2017 An Update on the Neutral Rate of Interest
The neutral rate serves as a benchmark for measuring monetary stimulus and provides a medium- to long-run anchor for the real policy rate. Global neutral rate estimates have been falling over the past few decades. Factors such as population aging, high corporate savings, and low trend productivity growth are likely to continue supporting a low global neutral rate. These global factors as well as domestic factors are exerting downward pres-sure on the Canadian real neutral rate, which is estimated to be between 0.5 to 1.5 per cent. This low neutral rate has important implications for monetary policy and financial stability. -
November 16, 2017 An Initial Assessment of Changes to the Bank of Canada’s Framework for Market Operations
The Bank of Canada made changes to several of the tools that make up its framework for operations and liquidity provision. These changes came about after a comprehensive re-view of the framework and are designed to help the Bank better achieve its objectives of reinforcing the target for the overnight rate and supporting the well-functioning of Cana-dian financial markets under normal market conditions. -
Communicating Uncertainty in Monetary Policy
While central banks cannot provide complete foresight with respect to their future policy actions, it is in the interests of both central banks and market participants that central banks be transparent about their reaction functions and how they may evolve in response to economic developments, shocks, and risks to their outlooks.