Washington
D.C., August 14,
2007 - A collection of newly-declassified
documents published today detail U.S. concern over Pakistan's
relationship with the Taliban during the seven-year period leading
up to 9-11. This new release comes just days after Pakistan's
president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, acknowledged that, "There
is no doubt Afghan militants are supported from Pakistan soil."
While Musharraf admitted the Taliban were being sheltered in
the lawless frontier border regions, the declassified U.S. documents
released today clearly illustrate that the Taliban was directly
funded, armed and advised by Islamabad itself.
Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National
Security Archive at George Washington University, the documents
reflect U.S. apprehension about Islamabad's longstanding provision
of direct aid and military support to the Taliban, including
the use of Pakistani troops to train and fight alongside the
Taliban inside Afghanistan. [Doc 17] The records
released today represent the most complete and comprehensive
collection of declassified documentation to date on Pakistan's
aid programs to the Taliban, illustrating Islamabad's firm commitment
to a Taliban victory in Afghanistan. [Doc 34].
These new documents also support and inform the findings of
a recently-released CIA
intelligence estimate characterizing Pakistan's tribal areas
as a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists, and provide new details
about the close relationship between Islamabad and the Taliban
in the years prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Declassified
State Department cables and U.S. intelligence reports describe
the use of Taliban terrorist training areas in Afghanistan by
Pakistani-supported militants in Kashmir, as well as Pakistan's
covert effort to supply Pashtun troops from its tribal regions
to the Taliban cause in Afghanistan-effectively forging and
reinforcing Pashtun bonds across the border and consolidating
the Taliban's severe form of Islam throughout Pakistan's frontier
region.
Also published today are documents linking Harakat ul-Ansar,
a militant Kashmiri group funded directly by the government
of Pakistan, [Doc 10] to terrorist training
camps shared by Osama bin Laden in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
[Doc 16]
Of particular concern was the potential for Islamabad-Taliban
links to strengthen Taliban influence in Pakistan's tribal regions
along the border. A January 1997 cable from the U.S. Embassy
in Pakistan observed that "for Pakistan, a Taliban-based
government in Kabul would be as good as it can get in Afghanistan,"
adding that worries that the "Taliban brand of Islam…might
infect Pakistan," was "apparently a problem for another
day." [Doc 20] Now ten years later, Islamabad
seems to be acknowledging the domestic complications that the
Taliban movement has created within Pakistan. A report produced
by Pakistan's Interior Ministry and obtained by the International
Herald Tribune in June 2007 warned President Pervez Musharraf
that Taliban-inspired Islamic militancy has spread throughout
Pakistan's tribal regions and could potentially threaten the
rest of the country. The document is "an accurate description
of the dagger pointed at the country's heart," according
to one Pakistani official quoted
in the article. "It's tragic it's taken so long to
recognize it."
Islamabad denies that it ever provided military support to
the Taliban , but the newly-released documents report that in
the weeks following the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996, Pakistan's
intelligence agency was "supplying the Taliban forces with
munitions, fuel, and food." Pakistan's Interservice Intelligence
Directorate was "using a private sector transportation
company to funnel supplies into Afghanistan and to the Taliban
forces." [Doc 15] Other documents also
conclude that there has been an extensive and consistent history
of "both military and financial assistance to the Taliban."
[Doc 8]
The newly-released documents also shed light on the complexity
of U.S. diplomacy with Pakistan as the State Department has
struggled to maintain the U.S.-Pakistan alliance amid concerns
over the rise of the Taliban regime. In one August 1997 cable,
U.S. Ambassador Thomas W. Simons advises, "Our good relations
with Pakistan associate us willy-nilly, so we need to be extremely
careful about Pakistani proposals that draw us even closer,"
adding that, "Pakistan is a party rather than just a mediator
[in Afghanistan]." [Doc 24] In another
1997 cable, the Embassy asserts that "the best policy for
the U.S. is to steer clear of direct involvement in the disputes
between the two countries [Pakistan and Iran], and to continue
to work for peace in Afghanistan." [Doc 22]
As to Pakistan's end-game in supporting the Taliban, several
documents suggest that in the interest of its own security,
Pakistan would try to moderate some of the Taliban's more extreme
policies. [Doc 8] But the Taliban have a long
history of resistance to external interests, and the actual
extent of Pakistani influence over the Taliban during this period
remains largely speculative. As the State Department commented
in a cable from late-1995, "Although Pakistan has reportedly
assured Tehran and Tashkent that it can control the Taliban,
we remain unconvinced. Pakistan surely has some influence on
the Taliban, but it falls short of being able to call the shots."
[Doc 7]
Highlights
- August 1996: Pakistan Intelligence (ISID) "provides
at least $30,000 - and possibly as much as $60,000 - per month"
to the militant Kashmiri group Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA). Despite
this aid, the group is reaching out to sponsors of international
terrorism including Osama bin Laden for additional support,
and may in the near future become a threat to Islamabad itself
as well as U.S. interests. HUA contacts have hinted they "might
undertake terrorist actions against civilian airliners."
[Doc 10]
- October 1996: A Canadian intelligence document released
by the National Security Agency and originally classified
Top Secret SI, Umbra comments on recent Taliban military successes
noting that even Pakistan "must harbour some concern"
regarding the Taliban's impressive capture of Kabul, as such
victory may diminish Pakistan's influence over the movement
and produce a Taliban regime in Kabul with strong links to
Pakistan's own Pashtuns. [Doc 14]
- October 1996: Although food supplies from Pakistan to the
Taliban are conducted openly through Pakistan's intelligence
agency, the ISID, "the munitions convoys depart Pakistan
late in the evening hours and are concealed to reveal their
true contents." [Doc 15]
- November 1996: Pakistan's Pashtun-based "Frontier Corps
elements are utilized in command and control; training; and
when necessary - combat" alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan.
[Doc 17]
- March 1998: Al-Qaeda and Pakistan government-funded Harakat
ul-Ansar (HUA) have been sharing terrorist training camps
in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for years [Link Doc 16],
and HUA has increasingly been moving ideologically closer
to al-Qaeda. The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad is growing increasingly
concerned as Fazlur Rahman Khalil, a leader in Pakistan's
Harakat ul-Ansar has signed Osama bin Laden's most recent
fatwa promoting terrorist activities against U.S. interests.
[Doc 26]
- September 1998 [Doc 31] and March 1999
[Doc 33]: The U.S. Department of State voices
concern that Pakistan is not doing all it can to pressure
the Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden. "Pakistan has
not been responsive to our requests that it use its full influence
on the Taliban surrender of Bin Ladin." [Doc
33]
- September 2000: A cable cited in The 9/11 Commission
Report notes that Pakistan's aid to the Taliban has reached
"unprecedented" levels, including recent reports
that Islamabad has possibly allowed the Taliban to use territory
in Pakistan for military operations. Furthermore the U.S.
has "seen reports that Pakistan is providing the Taliban
with materiel, fuel, funding, technical assistance and military
advisors." [Doc 34]
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Document
1 - [Excised] to Ron McMullen (Afghanistan Desk), "Developments
in Afghanistan," December 5, 1994, Unknown Classification,
1 p. [Excised]
Just as the Taliban are emerging as a major player in Afghanistan,
a source [name excised] is troubled over Pakistan's deep involvement
in Afghan politics and Pakistan's evident role in the Taliban's
recent military successes. His concerns include, "that
the GOP [Government of Pakistan] ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence]
is deeply involved in the Taleban take over in Kandahar and
Qalat," and that Pakistan's efforts to further its agenda
in Afghanistan will sabotage U.N. peace efforts currently being
led by Mahmoud Mesteri, Special Envoy for Afghanistan for the
U.N. Secretary General.
________________________________________
Document
2 - Islama 00975
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Northern Afghan Strongman
General Dostam Meets Taliban Representatives" January 29,
1995, Confidential, 2 pp. [Excised]
Unnamed Pakistani officials meeting in Islamabad with General
Abdul Rashid Dostum in December 1995 allegedly advise Dostum
to "not worry about the Taliban, because Pakistan can take
care of them." Dostum reportedly agrees to Pakistani requests
of cooperation with the Taliban in opening trade routes in Afghanistan
for Pakistan.
Dostum also meets with Taliban and Pakistani officials in Mazar-e-sharif
in December. He is told by Taliban officials that they have
"no territorial ambitions in the north and that Dostum
should not oppose them." Despite these promises, in May
1997 the Taliban would seize control of Mazar-e-sharif, taking
Dostum's properties and forcing him into exile.
________________________________________
Document
3 - State 243042
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "A/S Raphel's October
4 Meeting with Assef All on Afghanistan," October 13, 1995,
Confidential, 7 pp. [Excised]
Pakistan Foreign Minister Assef All tells U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State for South Asian Affairs Robin Raphel that "the
main Pakistani message to the [Rabbani] opposition was to unite
against the Kabul regime, but not to attack Kabul." Furthermore,
"All did not deny that Pakistan had significant contact
with and gave some support to the Taliban. However, he said
that little outside material support was necessary as the Tall
ban [sic] had widespread support throughout the Pashtun areas
of Afghanistan."
________________________________________
Document
4 - Islama 09675
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Pakistan Afghan Policy:
Anyone but Rabbani/Massoud - Even the Taliban," October
18, 1995, Confidential, 6 pp. [Excised]
Pakistan's Ambassador to Afghanistan Qazi Humayun tells American
officials in October that "Pakistan now finds itself in
the uncomfortable position of backing the Taliban." Pakistan's
already hostile relations with the Kabul-based Rabbani government
had recently grown dramatically worse as an angry mob destroyed
Pakistan's embassy in Kabul in September, injuring Ambassador
Humayun and killing one other Pakistani official. The Rabbani
government in Kabul claimed the mob was holding Pakistan responsible
for the Taliban take over of Herat. Humayun doubted such an
angry and well-organized mob could form in Kabul, a city with
weak ties to Herat, without being backed by the Rabbani government.
In a separate document U.N. officials independently agreed with
Humayun, claiming "the
loss of that city to the Taliban could not have provoked any
spontaneous outbursts."
Although admitting to supporting the Taliban, Ambassador Humayun
"opined that in many ways a Taliban government in Kabul
would be even worse than the present one. Adding that a state
under such ultra-conservative religious leadership would not
make a good neighbor."
________________________________________
Document
5 - USUN N 004283
USMission USUN (New York), Cable, "Letter of GOP Permrep
to SYG on Afghanistan," November 1, 1995, Unclassified,
3 pp.
A reproduction of an October 25, 1995 letter from Pakistan's
U.N. representative to the U.N. Secretary General on Afghanistan,
this cable is indicative of Pakistan's public statements regarding
its policy on Afghanistan. "We would like to once again
reaffirm the continued neutral stance maintained by Pakistan
in the Intra-Afghan rivalries. We continue to support the ongoing
efforts of the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference for peace and conciliation in Afghanistan."
Pakistan maintains that it is neutral in Afghan politics.
________________________________________
Document
6 - Islama 11049
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Russian
Embassy Official Claims Iran Interfering more than Pakistan,"
November 30, 1995, Confidential, 3 pp.
According to an unnamed official at the Russian Embassy in
Pakistan, the Pakistani government continues to provide the
Taliban with "modest financial assistance," logistics
support, fuel, military training and chooses to ignore a "booming
smuggling trade - mostly electronics," that creates huge
profits for the Taliban. In spite of this support from Pakistan,
the source claims the Taliban's funding mostly comes from Afghan
traders and that aid from Pakistan to the Taliban is much more
conservative than aid from Iran to the Rabbani government.
_________________________________________
Document
7 - State 291940
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Discussing Afghan Policy
with the Pakistanis," December 22, 1995, Confidential,
11 pp. [Excised]
State Department officials in Washington D.C. question the
wisdom of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy of supporting any group
opposed to the Kabul-based Rabbani government, including backing
the Taliban, a group that remains "an unknown quantity
to many of Afghanistan's neighbors and therefore much more frightening
than the status quo." Providing astute advice to the U.S.
Embassy in Pakistan, Washington advises "We see little
likelihood the Taliban would be willing to transfer power to
a transitional body acceptable to other Afghan powers. If so,
then an unrepresentative Tajik [Rabbani] regime in Kabul will
have been traded for an unrepresentative Pashtun [Taliban] authority.
Although Pakistan has reportedly assured Tehran and Tashkent
that it can control the Taliban, we remain unconvinced. Pakistan
surely has some influence on the Taliban, but it falls short
of being able to call the shots."
Although "Pakistan has followed a policy of supporting
the Taliban and [is] attempting to forge a military and political
alliance among the Kabul regime's opponents," the U.S.
does not support a Taliban takeover and is seeking to remain
a more neutral player. Unfortunately a strong U.S.-Pakistan
relationship has led "Tehran, Moscow and New Delhi [to]
assume incorrectly that the U.S. is party to Pakistan's support
for the Taliban and shares its antipathy for Rabbani and Masood….
Pakistani policy has undermined the credibility of our U.S.
support of the U.N. special mission."
___________________________________________
Document
8 - [Date and Title Unknown] Mori DocID: 800277
Secret, Noforn [Excised - Released by U.S. Central Command]
Unnamed and undated, this U.S. intelligence document confirms
that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with both financial and
military assistance, but speculates that because "Pakistan
fears a complete Taliban victory may incite irredentist aspirations
within its own Pashtun population [Pakistan] will likely attempt
to pressure the Taliban into moderating some of its policies."
Additionally, the document claims that Russia "has pledged
to use military force should the Taliban push into northern
Afghanistan," and that India continues to supply weapons
to anti-Taliban forces.
___________________________________________
Document
9 - Islama 01403
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban
Official Says Divisions Within Movement Growing; Predicts "Fight
with Iran,"" February 19, 1996, Confidential, 8 pp.
[Excised]
A Taliban official [name excised] discusses the Taliban perspective
regarding Pakistani aid to their cause. Claiming Pakistan has
only given the Taliban ammunition once, "at the very beginning
of the movement in 1994," the official explains that due
to recent military successes resulting in the seizure of materials,
including fuel and ammunition, the Taliban does not need direct
supplies from the Pakistanis. He provided one important insight
however, commenting that Pakistan "used Afghan traders
to channel money to the Taliban, avoiding wherever possible
a direct link with the movement." Pakistan has previously
denied providing the Taliban with large sums of aid, instead
asserting the movement remained primarily supported by Afghan
traders. This Taliban official implies that Afghan traders supporting
the Taliban may actually only be serving as a conduit for Pakistani
government funding.
___________________________________________
Document
10 - DI TR 96-008
Central Intelligence Agency, "Harakat ul-Ansar: Increasing
Threat to Western and Pakistani Interests," August 1996,
Secret, 4 pp. [Excised]
Possibly in an effort to avoid being placed on the list of
state sponsors of terrorism, Pakistan is withdrawing some of
its monetary support to Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA), which the CIA
describes as "as Islamic extremist organization that Pakistan
supports in its proxy war against Indian forces in Kashmir."
The CIA is concerned over HUA's recent increase in its use of
terrorist tactics against western targets and civilians and
its efforts to reach out to sponsors of international terrorism
such as Osama bin Laden and Mu'ammar Qadhafi, who "may
further encourage the group to attack US interests."
ISID (Pakistan's Inter-services Intelligence Directorate) "provides
at least $30,000 - and possibly as much as $60,000 - per month
to the HUA," but "antigovernment sentiment among HUA
leaders is already strong and could grow further" if Islamabad
further isolates the group by decreasing support. HUA's recent
shift from its limited focus on India to include western targets
may indicate the group will also start to aim at Islamabad as
"a senior HUA leader has publicly advocated an Afghan-style
change of government in Pakistan that would remove the political,
bureaucratic, and military hierarchies."
One further interesting note in the document is that "HUA
contacts of Embassy New Delhi have hinted that they might undertake
terrorist actions against civilian airliners."
____________________________________________
Document
11 - NID 96-0229CX
National Intelligence Daily, Central Intelligence Agency, Monday,
September 30, 1996, Top Secret, 5 pp. [Excised]
Four days after the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the CIA comments
on the Taliban's mixed policies regarding terrorist organizations
operating in Taliban-controlled territory, noting that the "Taliban
has tolerated some terrorist groups while shutting down others."
"Taliban has closed militant training camps associated
with Prime Minister Hikmatyar, factional leader Sayyaf, and
Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami. Taliban has not closed other camps
associated with Usama bin Ladin, Hizbi Islami (Khalis), Paskistan's
Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam, and Harakat ul-Ansar, including the HUA's
main training camp in Khowst."
____________________________________________
Document
12 - Peshaw 00916
U.S. Consulate (Peshawar), Cable, "Afghan-Pak Border Relations
at Torkham Tense" October 2, 1996, Confidential, 6 pp.
[Excised]
A "reliable contact of the consulate" [name excised]
witnessed "30-35 sealed ISI trucks and 15-20 fuel tankers"
waiting to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border at Torkham.
"Between afternoon tea with the officers in charge of the
'ISI convoy' and recognizing the type of vehicle license plate
numbers on the convoy vehicles, [name excised] was very certain
of the convoy's affiliation." The cable does not specify
what was contained in the ISI trucks or where after entering
Afghanistan the convoy was heading.
___________________________________________
Document
13 - Islama 08637
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Foreign
Secretary Mulls over Afghanistan," October 10, 1996, Confidential,
2 pp.
Pakistan Foreign Secretary Najamuddin Shaikh insists that in
spite of the rumors, Pakistani aid to the Taliban is not increasing
and that Pakistan continues to push the Taliban to cooperate
with other factions in Afghanistan rather than unilaterally
conquer the country. U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Thomas W. Simons
comments that the Foreign Secretary "went to great pains
to reassure us that Pakistan is not throwing its chips in with
the Taliban. In any case, [the U.S.] will continue to urge Pakistan
to avoid the temptation of siding with the Taliban, but instead
work to persuade the Taliban that a durable peace is possible
only through genuine national reconciliation involving all Afghanistan's
ethnic and religious groups."
___________________________________________
Document
14
Privy Council Office (PCO) [Ottawa, Canada] [Released by the
U.S. National Security Agency], "IAC Intelligence Assessment
- IA 7/96," "Afghanistan: Taliban's Challenges, Regional
Concerns, October 18, 1996," Top Secret - SI, Umbra, 12pp.
[Excised]
A Canadian intelligence document released by the National Security
Agency summarizes the situation in Afghanistan a month after
the Taliban takeover of Kabul and accurately projects that the
Taliban's recent acquisition of the capital "could now
more starkly divide [Afghanistan] into two distinct parts -
Pakistan-supported Pushtun/Taliban forces in control of Kabul
and most of the country, and Tajik/Uzbek/Shia forces of Dostam,
Masood, and the Hezb-i-Wahdat's Karim Khalili in the Panjshir
Valley and north."
Pakistan is isolated in its support of the Taliban advance,
as "there is clear signs that, aside from Pakistan, Afghanistan's
near neighbors - Russia, Iran, India, and the Central Asian
countries - harbour real concerns over the regional impact of
the Taliban's accession to power." However, even Pakistan
"must harbour some concern" regarding the Taliban's
impressive capture of Kabul, as it may diminish Pakistan's influence
over the movement and may over time produce a Taliban regime
in Kabul with strong links to Pakistan's own Pashtuns, perhaps
eventually calling "for creation of a 'greater Pushtun
nation."
To India's dismay, Kashmiri militants will likely be encouraged
by the Taliban's recent successes, as many "see their struggle
as much in a religious as seccessionist [sic] perspective."
The Top Secret SI, Umbra classification designates the information
in the document originating from highly-sensitive communications
intelligence. UMBRA is the highest-level compartment of Special
Intelligence (SI). For more information see previous Archive
posting, "The
National Security Agency Declassified".
___________________________________________
Document
15
From [Excised] to DIA Washington D.C. [Excised], Cable "[Excised]/Pakistan
Interservice Intelligence/ Pakistan (PK) Directorate Supplying
the Taliban Forces," October 22, 1996, Secret, 1 p. [Excised]
This U.S. Intelligence Information Report concludes that the
ISI is much more involved with the Taliban than Pakistani officials
have been telling U.S. diplomats. U.S. intelligence indicates
that the ISI "is supplying the Taliban forces with munitions,
fuel, and food. The Pakistan Interservice Intelligence Directorate
is using a private sector transportation company to funnel supplies
into Afghanistan and to the Taliban forces." Although food
supplies from Pakistan to the Taliban are conducted openly,
"the munitions convoys depart Pakistan late in the evening
hours and are concealed to reveal their true contents."
The document does not comment on whether Pakistani officials
have been concealing this information from the U.S. or if the
ISI, Pakistani intelligence, has been keeping its support of
the Taliban hidden from other Pakistani government offices,
in effect causing Pakistani diplomats to pass along false information
to the U.S.
___________________________________________
Document
16 - Islama 001054
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Pakistan Counterterrorism:
Ambassador's Meeting with [Excised] on State Sponsor Designation,"
February 6, 1997, Secret, 1 p. [Excised]
The U.S. Embassy confronts an unnamed Pakistani official on
the unsettling triangle possibly developing between Harakat
ul-Ansar (HUA), Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Both bin Laden
and the HUA have been granted sanctuary in Afghanistan and are
linked with terrorist training camps in Khost, near Afghanistan's
border with Pakistan. The U.S. fears there could be "a
linkup between HUA, an organization Pakistan supported and bin
Laden; it could have very serious consequences."
The Pakistani official replied that the "HUA had been
under very strong scrutiny for "more than a year,"
and there had been "positive progress" in monitoring
and controlling its activities. The HUA, he maintained, was
under "enough control" that its activities would not
create problems for Pakistan. Similarly he continued, "we
won't allow our territory to be used by Osama bin Laden for
such activities."" According to the official, Islamabad
is in control and the ISID (Inter-services Intelligence Directorate)
does not operate in Afghanistan on a separate agenda that is
independent of Islamabad's policies.
___________________________________________
Document
17
From [Excised] to DIA Washington D.C., "IIR [Excised] Pakistan
Involvement in Afghanistan," November 7, 1996, Confidential,
2 pp. [Excised]
Similar to the October 22, 1996 Intelligence
Information Report (IIR), this IIR reiterates how "Pakistan's
ISI is heavily involved in Afghanistan," but also details
different roles various ISI officers play in Afghanistan. Stating
that Pakistan uses sizable numbers of its Pashtun-based Frontier
Corps in Taliban-run operations in Afghanistan, the document
clarifies that, "these Frontier Corps elements are utilized
in command and control; training; and when necessary - combat.
Elements of Pakistan's regular army force are not used because
the army is predominantly Punjabi, who have different features
as compared to the Pashtun and other Afghan tribes."
According to the document, Pakistan's Frontier Corps provide
some of the combat training in Kandahar or Herat provided to
Pakistani madrassa students that come to Afghanistan to fight
with the Taliban. The parents of these students apparently know
nothing regarding their child's military involvement with the
Taliban "until their bodies are brought back to Pakistan."
___________________________________________
Document
18 - Islama 09517
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban Deny
They Are Sheltering HUA Militants, Usama bin Laden," November
12, 1996, Confidential, 7pp.
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Thomas W. Simons Jr. and the Taliban's
"Acting Foreign Minister," Mullah Ghaus discuss the
presence of Osama bin Laden and Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA), Kashmiri-based
anti-India militants training in Taliban-controlled areas of
Afghanistan. Responding to media reports that HUA militants
are training in "two camps vacated by "Afghan Arab"
militants in Afghanistan's Paktia (Khost) province near the
Afghan-Pakistan border, and intelligence reports that bin Laden
"is in or near the Taliban-controlled city of Jalalabad,
in Nangarhar province," Ambassador Simons expresses strong
concern that the Taliban seemingly are developing policies to
shelter terrorists. Ghaus flatly denies that HUA militants or
bin Laden are in Taliban territory, "There are no foreigners
in Khost province - only Taliban," and "bin Laden
was invited to Afghanistan by (Hezb-I-Islami Leader and ousted
Prime Minister) Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar left Kabul when we took
it over. Maybe bin Laden went with him," "I assure
you that [bin Laden] is not in areas controlled by Taliban administration.
This is an objective of our movement."
Ghaus insinuates that the Taliban would be more willing to
do something about terrorist entities operating in Afghanistan
if the U.S. provided them with funding.
According to The
9/11 Commission Report (pp. 63-65) when bin Laden first
returned to Afghanistan in May 1996 he maintained ties to Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar as well as other non-Taliban and anti-Taliban political
entities. However by September 1996 when Jalalabad and Kabul
had both fallen to the Taliban, bin Laden had solidified his
ties to the Taliban and was operating in Taliban-controlled
areas of Afghanistan. Furthermore the 9/11 Commission Report
observes that, "it is unlikely that Bin Laden could have
returned to Afghanistan had Pakistan disapproved. The Pakistani
military intelligence service probably had advance knowledge
of his coming, and its officers may have facilitated his travel…
Pakistani intelligence officers reportedly introduced bin Laden
to Taliban leaders in Kandahar, their main base of power, to
aid his reassertion of control over camps near Khowst, out of
an apparent hope that he would now expand the camps and make
them available for training Kashmiri militants."
___________________________________________
Document
19 - Islama 009994
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Afghanistan: British Journalist
Visits Site of Training Camps; HUA Activity Alleged," November
26, 1996, Confidential, 4pp.
An unnamed British journalist reports to the U.S. Embassy that
her visit to two terrorist training camps in Paktia province,
near the Afghan-Pakistan border on November 14, 1996 revealed
that both camps appear occupied, and her "Taliban sources"
advise that "one of the camps is occupied by Harakat-ul-Ansar
(HUA) militants," the Pakistan-based Kashmiri terrorist
organization. Whether or not HUA's presence in training camps
in Afghanistan is known or supported by Islamabad or Pakistani
intelligence is not commented on in the document. The reporter's
sources inform her that the other camp is occupied by "assorted
foreigners, including Chechens, Bosnian Muslims, as well as
Sudanese and other Arabs."
____________________________________________
Document
20 - Islama 00436
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Scenesetter for Your Visit
to Islamabad: Afghan Angle," January 16, 1997, Confidential,
12pp. [Excised]
A background document for an upcoming visit of Assistant Secretary
of State for South Asia Robin Raphel, the cable summarizes the
political and military state of affairs in Afghanistan. Pages
7-9 address Afghan-Pakistan relations, concisely observing that
"for Pakistan, a Taliban-based government in Kabul would
be as good as it can get in Afghanistan." As Pashtuns opposed
to India, the Taliban permit Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA) the Kashmir-based
militant anti-Indian group to use Taliban-controlled military
training camps in Khost near the Afghan-Pakistan border. The
document observes that Islamabad probably understands that supporting
the Taliban increases the strength of extremist Muslim political
movements within Pakistan, but "probably believes the Taliban
will eventually become more moderate," and considers the
overall extremist issue "a problem for another day."
Regarding support, "Pakistani aid to the Taliban is more
significant and probably less malign than most imagine."
Military aid is probably moderate, "consistent with the
Pakistani military's budget realities," and that military
advice "may be there, but is probably not all that significant
since the Taliban do quite well on their own." On the other
hand, "Pakistani political and diplomatic support is certainly
significant," as sources have informed the U.S. Embassy
that Islamabad plays an "overbearing role in planning and
even executing Taliban political and diplomatic initiatives."
Pakistan also grants the "Taliban free access to the Pakistani
market to buy whatever they want, including subsidized wheat
flour. This is an enormous advantage over the other factions"
fighting for political control in Afghanistan.
___________________________________________
Document
21 - Islama 01873
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Official Informal for
SA Assistant Secretary Robin Raphel and SA/PAB," March
10, 1997, Confidential, 13pp. [Excised]
Updating Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs
Robin Raphel on the situation in Afghanistan, the Embassy advises
that fighting is more than likely to continue as Iran and Russia
continue to supply Ahmed Shah Massoud in the north, while "Pakistan
appears to be reviewing its Afghan policy, but important agencies,
such as ISID [Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate], still
appear committed to and even supportive of a Taliban victory.
The Taliban continue to protect Osama bin Laden, although "some
high-level Taliban say they would send him to Saudi Arabia if
it would accept him." Furthermore, the Taliban "appear
to have worked out some sort of deal - perhaps brokered by the
ISID - that allows Harakat-ul-Ansar, the Kashmiri militant group,
to use camps in Khost, and they have not followed through on
a promise to allow a U.S. team to visit these camps."
The Embassy recommends a policy of "limited engagement
to try to "moderate and modernize" the Taliban."
Full engagement would be against American interests as it would
associate Washington with a "movement we find repugnant,"
however a failure to engage the Taliban at all would further
isolate Afghanistan.
___________________________________________
Document
22 - Islama 02001
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan and Sectarian
Violence Contribute to a Souring of Pakistan's Relations with
Iran," March 13, 1997, Confidential, 16 pp. [Excised]
Discussing the detrimental impact of Pakistan's support for
the Taliban movement in Afghanistan on Pakistan's relationship
with Iran, American officials conclude "the best policy
for the U.S. is to steer clear of direct involvement in the
disputes between the two countries [Pakistan and Iran], and
to continue to work for peace in Afghanistan." Providing
a history of strained relations between the nations over Afghanistan,
the document comments that "Pakistan has consistently denied
that it is the Taliban's godfather, although GOP [Government
of Pakistan] officials in private sometimes acknowledge that
they have close links and are providing them with foodstuffs
and fuel."
___________________________________________
Document
23 - Islama 06882
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Pakistanis
to Regulate Wheat and Fuel Trade to Gain Leverage Over Taliban,"
August 13, 1997, Confidential, 9 pp. [Excised]
Partially as an effort to gain more leverage over the Taliban,
but also as a means to restrain drug trafficking and increase
revenue, Pakistan has placed stricter regulations on wheat and
fuel trade with Afghanistan and plan to demand hard currency
in exchange for wheat instead of accepting "powder,"
or drug payments. Although Pakistani officials claim that these
new regulations are an effort to exert greater influence the
Taliban, Pakistan continues to unilaterally back the Taliban
takeover of Afghanistan. U.S. officials inquiring into the selling
of Pakistani wheat in areas of Afghanistan not controlled by
the Taliban are told, "the GOP [Government of Pakistan]
is only dealing with the Taliban," and that Pakistan's
"objective is not political, but economic and narcotics-related."
Note: the document refers to regulating wheat and POL trade.
POL stands for Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants.
___________________________________________
Document
24 - Islama 007343
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: [Excised]
Briefs Ambassador on his Activities. Pleads for Greater Activism
by U.N." August 27, 1997, Confidential, 5 pp. [Excised]
(Previously released and included in previous Archive posting,
"The
Taliban File Part III", March 19, 2004.)
The source for this information remains excised throughout
the document, but describes efforts to encourage multi-ethnic
negotiations in Afghanistan that would work towards establishing
a durable peace in the region. Pakistan urges the U.S. to back
the "vacant seat policy," regarding Afghan representation
at the U.N., and Taliban representatives Mullah Hassan and Mullah
Jalil promise the source that if U.N. Special Envoy Lakhdar
Brahimi returns to Afghanistan, Mullah Omar will meet with him,
but due to "the schedule" he was not able to meet
with Brahimi during his most recent trip.
According to the source, the Massoud-led anti-Taliban alliance
is weak and "if the Taliban would simply cease all military
activity, the alliance would fall apart." He later adds
that the Taliban will successfully take over the country, but
"when faced with the challenge of governing the entire
country, [the Taliban] will yield to technocrats."
U.S. Ambassador Thomas W. Simons admits that "Pakistan
has a 'privileged association' with the Taliban, but not control
over them; Iran, and perhaps Uzbekistan and Russia have similar
privileged associations with other parties to the conflict.
But where does that lead us in terms of practical steps?"
The Ambassador advises, "Our good relations with Pakistan
associate us willy-nilly, so we need to be extremely careful
about Pakistani proposals that draw us even closer. For, at
the second level, Pakistan is a party rather than just a mediator."
Regarding Pakistani aid to the Taliban, the Ambassador shows
little interest in discussing the accuracy of the 20 million
rupee estimate given by the ISI, responding that such a figure
"did not include access to Pak wheat and POL [Petroleum,
Oil and Lubricants], or the trucks and busses full of adolescent
mujahid crossing the frontier shouting 'Allahu Akbar' and going
into the line with a day or two of training."
___________________________________________
Document
25
- United Nations Outgoing Code Cable - Special Mission U.N.SMA
(U.N. Special Mission to Afghanistan), "Present Pakistani
Initiatives in Afghanistan" October 30, 1997, [Classification
Unknown], 3 pp.
(Previously released and included in previous Archive posting,
"The
Taliban File Part III", March 19, 2004.)
Head of U.N. special mission to Afghanistan (U.N.SMA) Norbert
Holl and Pakistan's special envoy on Afghanistan, Iftikhar Murshid,
discuss a meeting between Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
and Mullah Rabbani, a senior-ranking Taliban official. The Prime
Minister gets Rabbani to agree to a collective meeting of the
various warring factions in Afghanistan, and declares it a breakthrough
as Rabbani didn't insist on addressing the POW issue before
meeting. Murshid is less optimistic, as "the POW issue
had always come up in the final instance and that therefore
omitting it at this time should not be overestimated."
Pakistan is pressuring the U.S. and U.N. to vacate the anti-Taliban
alliance from Afghanistan's U.N. seat. Holl feels Pakistan would
never agree to an oil embargo against Afghanistan, even though
such an embargo is a proposed step intended to compel cooperation
among the Afghan factions, something Pakistan claims to support.
Although the Taliban's supplies of POL, (Petroleum, Oil and
Lubricant supplies) are subsidized by Saudi Arabia, Holl believes
"Pakistan would never agree to impede the POL transit."
Rather than isolate the Taliban in order to endorse compromise,
"GOP [Government of Pakistan] would sign a new contract
with the Taliban today, 30 October, for the supply of 600,000
tons of wheat."
___________________________________________
Document
26 - Islama 01805
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: [Excised]
Describes Pakistan's Current Thinking" March 9, 1998, Confidential,
9 pp. [Excised]
(Previously released and included in previous Archive posting,
"The
Taliban File Part III", March 19, 2004.)
In a March 9, 1998 meeting between the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad's
Deputy Chief of Mission Alan Eastham and a source who appears
to be Pakistan Foreign Ministry official Iftikhar Murshed, the
officials review several Afghan-related issues including U.S.
concerns over Osama bin Laden's recent fatwa. The U.S. embassy
is concerned over Pakistan's connection to bin Laden's statement,
as the fatwa was signed by Fazlur Rahman Khalil, a leader in
Pakistan's Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA). The source claims Iran is
a great influence in northern Afghanistan, while "downplaying
the Pakistani leverage on the Taliban." He maintained that
the Taliban has "more than enough ammunition," and
"no arms and ammunition from the Pakistani government have
gone over the border in the past three or four months."
Even though the source claims "Pakistan has 'little leverage
over the Taliban,'" he provides the State Department with
some of its first details on how "Pakistan was in the business
of providing arms-related supplies to the Taliban… [and]
could refuse to provide the Taliban fuel since the Taliban load
up their planes in Pakistan." Pakistan provides support
to the Taliban, but has little, if any control over their actions.
"If Pakistan held up wheat consignments to the Taliban,
the Taliban would say 'what the hell! We can smuggle enough
wheat into Afghanistan to feed ourselves.'"
According to the source, Afghanistan's border with Pakistan
can be controlled by Pakistan if the Pakistani government chooses
to do so, as "Pakistan, in the past, has shown that it
can control this border. In fact, there are only just over 40
"jeepable" border crossing points. These points could
be monitored if the Baluchistan and the North-West frontier
provincial governments got serious about the issue of smuggling."
___________________________________________
Document
27
- Islama 004546
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Afghanistan: [Excised]
Criticizes GOP's Afghan Policy; Says It Is Letting Policy Drift,"
June 16, 1998, Confidential, 2 pp
(Previously released and included in previous Archive posting,
"The
Taliban File Part III", March 19, 2004.)
A Pakistan government source who is "a longtime and bitter
political opponent of [Pakistani Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif"
laments on the lack of a firm "sense of direction"
in Pakistan's Afghan policy and the failure of the Pakistani
government to take serious efforts to control its border with
Afghanistan. According to the source, who appears to be former
Interior Minister Nasrullah Babar, "the Bhutto government's
efforts in regard to Afghanistan could be criticized on many
fronts, but "at least the policy was coherent - we tried
to build the Taliban up and then tried to push them to negotiations
(in October 1996) after they captured Kabul." Under the
"Nawaz Sharif government, there has never been a sustained
effort to bring the factions to the bargaining table."
The source "personally supported the deployment of ISI
officers operating out of the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul, and
from Herat, Kandahar, and the Jalalabad consulates." By
operating out of these diplomatic posts, the government of Pakistan
could better monitor the activities of the ISI in Afghanistan.
He suggests that ties between Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns
are strengthening, which may pose a threat to the continued
sovereignty of Afghan government in Kabul.
Although the source is biased against Nawaz Sharif the document
notes that his points nevertheless "reverberate because
they have been underscored by more neutral observers who agree
that the present government is letting its Afghanistan policy
drift. The result is confusion as evidenced by the GOP's [Government
of Pakistan's] declaratory policy, which is in favor of negotiations,
and a countervailing policy of ISI support for the Taliban."
___________________________________________
Document
28
- Islama 05010
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Bad News on Pak Afghan
Policy: GOP Support for the Taliban Appears to be Getting Stronger"
July 1, 1998, Confidential, 2 pp. [Excised]
(Previously released and included in previous Archive posting,
"The
Taliban File Part III", March 19, 2004.)
According to a variety of Pakistani officials and journalists,
including Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan has "regressed to a point
where it is as hard-line as ever in favor of the Taliban."
Pakistani government officials have given up "the pretense
of supporting the U.N. effort," and have become unabashedly
pro-Taliban. The Pakistani government, including the Prime Minister,
recently approved six million dollars in additional aid to the
Taliban over the next six months. The U.S. considers the additional
funding a regressive step as the "trend-line had generally
been in a more positive direction."
Rashid reports that he heard comments from Pakistani officials
arguing that "the Taliban are capable of taking over all
of Afghanistan; their regime is qualitively (sic) better for
the Afghan people than that of their opponents; [and] the outside
world should try to understand the Taliban mind-set before condemning
them on such issues as human rights etc.." Such opinions
are echoed by another Pakistani source whose name is excised
in the document, "If it were not for the war, the Taliban
would be making progress on women's issues. They would be making
such progress now, but the U.N. has failed to help them, despite
Taliban requests." The same source also commends the Taliban
for bringing stability to Afghanistan while explaining how "the
Northern Alliance is totally unreliable. They refuse to keep
their word."
The cable speculates the spike in pro-Taliban Pakistani feeling
can be attributed to the political fallout of recent nuclear
testing and increased regional tension. These developments have
increased Pakistan's need for a pro-Pakistan, anti-India regime
in Kabul.
___________________________________________
Document
29 - Islama 05535
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "In Bilateral Focussed
(sic) on Afghanistan, GOP Reviews Pak/Iran Effort; A/S Inderfurth
Expresses U.S. Concerns About the Taliban" July 23, 1998,
Confidential, 16 pp. [Excised]
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl
Inderfurth meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Shamshad
Ahmed discusses joint Pakistan/Iran talks on the peace effort
in Afghanistan and Pakistan's role in Afghanistan. During the
meeting, "Ahmed denied that the GOP [Government of Pakistan]
is providing anything but "oil and wheat" to the Taliban.
In addition, he asserted that the type of assistance that was
given by Pakistan to the Taliban was also provided [to] the
northern factions."
___________________________________________
Document
30 - Islama 005964
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Evidence
Not There to Prove Assertions that Pak Troops Have Been Deployed
to Assist Taliban in the North," August 6, 1998, Confidential,
5 pp. [Excised]
There is no evidence to support claims that recent Taliban
military victories are the result Pakistani troop participation
in Taliban battles. Members of the Northern Alliance told the
U.S. Embassy that it "was inconceivable that the Taliban
could 'do it all on their own,'" but U.S. efforts to substantiate
these claims failed to produce supporting evidence. Although
the participation of large numbers of Pakistani troops seems
unlikely, it remains possible that Pakistani military advisors
were involved in training Taliban fighters. Taliban ranks furthermore
continue to be filled with Pakistani nationals (an estimated
20-40 percent of Taliban soldiers are Pakistani according to
the document), which further solidifies Pakistan-Taliban relations,
even though this does not indicate not outward or official Pakistani
government support. Osama bin Laden is mentioned as supporting
pro-Taliban Arab fighters from an office in Herat.
___________________________________________
Document
31 - Islama 07242
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Tensions
Reportedly Mount Within Taliban as Ties With Saudi Arabia Deteriorate
Over Bin Ladin," September 28, 1998, Secret, 8 pp. [Excised]
Primarily discussing the Taliban's firm opposition to surrender
Osama bin Laden and Saudi Arabia's recently failed attempts
to negotiate bin Laden's expulsion from Afghanistan, the document
concludes with the following thoughts from U.S. Ambassador to
Pakistan William Milam, "If Pakistan - the Taliban's closest
international supporter - throws in its weight behind Saudi
Arabia on the bin Laden issue, the pressure on the Taliban may
become unbearable. As of this time, Pakistan has not yet made
its position clear."
___________________________________________
Document
32 - Islama 01320
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban
Seem to Have Less Funds and Supplies This Year, But the Problem
Does Not Appear to be that Acute," February 17, 1999, Confidential,
2 pp. [Excised]
Suffering under sanctions imposed in response to nuclear weapons
testing in May 1998, Pakistan has reduced aid to the Taliban,
although sources indicate Pakistan "continued to write
a check worth a million or so dollars every couple of months."
This decrease in support is not a political move by Pakistan,
but appears to be a purely budgetary decision. Unlike certain
other documents on Pakistan aid to the Taliban, this cable reports
that there is little evidence of direct military aid from Pakistan
to the Taliban, as Pakistan only admits to sending flour and
fuel.
Additionally Saudi Arabia, concerned over the Taliban's sheltering
of Osama bin Laden, has been successful in reducing private
Saudi donations flowing into Afghanistan. However the Taliban,
through their access to drug trafficking, income from transit
taxes, and continued, although limited support from Pakistan
as well as the "capture of a fair amount of equipment during
their successful late 1998 military campaign," does not
seem to be in any immediate trouble from the recent decrease
in funding from Pakistan. The cable also mentions that Osama
"bin Ladin has also provided the Taliban with some money,
but probably not enough to make a significant difference in
their case balance."
The Taliban's main opponent, Ahmed Shah Masoud continues to
be very well funded, from Iranian, Russian, Uzbek and Tajik
sources and although the Taliban show no immediate sign of weakening
from the drop in funding, U.S. Ambassador Milam notes that "slight
variations in funding and supplies can mean the difference between
victory and defeat" in such small-scale, low-tech conflicts
such as the war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban.
__________________________________________
Document
33
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl F.
Inderfurth to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, "Pushing
for Peace in Afghanistan," March 25, 1999 [approx], Secret,
6pp.
Despite diplomatic approaches, continued fighting in Afghanistan
is likely as Pakistan continues to provide aid to the Taliban
in their quest for complete control of Afghanistan, while Iran
and Russia support Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Northern Alliance.
Pakistan's alliance with the Taliban is stronger than Iran or
Russia with Masoud as "Iran and Russia are more likely
to end diplomatic and covert support to Masood than Pakistan
would be to end its support to the Taliban."
The document portrays a slightly stronger Pakistan-Taliban
alliance than previous declassified State Department materials.
Pakistan not only provides aid to the Taliban, but "will
continue to seek and support a Taliban military victory."
Pakistan is an isolated country in international dealings on
Afghanistan. The UN's informal "Six-Plus-Two" group
overseeing efforts to diffuse the conflict in Afghanistan includes
the six nations with borders along Afghanistan - China, Iran,
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - as well
as the two mediating powers Russia and the U.S., but according
to the document may as well be changed to an ""Eight
Minus One" (Pakistan) process, emphasizing the isolation
of Pakistan."
Furthermore, "Pakistan has not been responsive to [American]
requests that it use its full influence on the Taliban surrender
of Bin Ladin." The Department believes "that Pakistan
can do more, including cutting POL supplies that mostly flow
into Afghanistan from Pakistan." "Continued Pakistani
resistance and/or duplicity" may lead the U.S. to push
for U.N. Security Council involvement, or for the inclusion
of India in the "Six-Plus-Two" negotiations.
Current U.S. policy towards Afghanistan consists of supporting
diplomatic approaches such as "Six-Plus-Two," and
doing what is possible to moderate the behavior of the Taliban.
"At the end of the day, we may have to consider the Taliban
to be an intrinsic enemy of the U.S. and a new international
pariah state. We are not there yet and we do not want to be
there. We will continue our policy of trying to mitigate Taliban
behavior where and when its ill advised policies cross our path."
___________________________________________
Document
34 - State 185645
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Pakistan Support for
Taliban," Sept. 26, 2000, Secret, 4pp. [Excised]
Responding to reports that Islamabad may be allowing the Taliban
to use territory in Pakistan for military operations, in September
2000 an alarmed U.S. Department of State observes that "while
Pakistani support for the Taliban has been long-standing, the
magnitude of recent support is unprecedented."
In response Washington orders the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad
to immediately confront Pakistani officials on the issue and
to advise Islamabad that the U.S. has "seen reports that
Pakistan is providing the Taliban with materiel, fuel, funding,
technical assistance and military advisors. [The Department]
also understand[s] that large numbers of Pakistani nationals
have recently moved into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban,
apparently with the tacit acquiescence of the Pakistani government."
Additional reports indicate that direct Pakistani involvement
in Taliban military operations has increased.
In an effort to promote a cease-fire and discourage Pakistan
from continuing its efforts to support a military solution to
the conflict in Afghanistan by arming the Taliban, Washington
candidly states that the U.S. will not accept a Taliban military
victory in Afghanistan, but clarifies that the U.S. is "not
divorced from reality," recognizing that a solution must
be found through a broad-based peace process which includes
all relevant Afghan political factions, including the Taliban.
The U.S. does not "believe that Masood is the answer."
Note: This document is cited in The
9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 6, Footnote 68 as "DOS
cable, State 185645, "Concern that Pakistan is Stepping
up Support to Taliban's Military Campaign in Afghanistan,"
Sept. 26, 2000."
__________________________________________
Document
35
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl
W. Ford, Jr. to Secretary of State Colin Powell, "Pakistan
- Poll Shows Strong and Growing Public Support for Taleban,"
November 7, 2001, Unclassified, 3pp [Excised]
A poll compiled by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research after September 11, 2001, but before
the commencement of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan,
shows the Pakistani public has become more pro-Taliban than
it was before the September 11 attacks. As the Musharraf government
begins to implement policies distancing Pakistan from its longstanding
alliance with the Taliban, the Pakistani public is becoming
more sympathetic to the Taliban.
Note
1. See Human Rights Watch Report Afghanistan,
Crisis
of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling
the Civil War. July 2001. Vol. 13, No. 3 (C). See also
"Letter of GOP Permrep
to SYG on Afghanistan," November 1, 1995.