Putinism

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This article is about the political ideology of Vladmir Putin. For aphorisms or catch-phrases known as "Putinisms", see Public image of Vladimir Putin § Putinisms.
Vladimir Putin in a rally in Sevastopol before the 2018 Russian presidential election
Владимир Путин (22-09-2021) (cropped) 2.jpg
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Putinism (Russian: путинизм, romanized: putinizm) is the social, political and economic system of Russia formed during the political leadership of Vladimir Putin. It is characterized by the concentration of political and financial powers in the hands of "siloviks", current and former "people with shoulder marks", coming from a total of 22 governmental enforcement agencies, the majority of them being the Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, Armed Forces of Russia and National Guard of Russia.[1][2][3][4] According to Arnold Beichman, "Putinism in the 21st century has become as significant a watchword as Stalinism was in the 20th."[5]

The "Chekist takeover" of the Russian state and economic assets has been allegedly accomplished by a clique of Putin's close associates and friends[6] who gradually became a leading group of Russian oligarchs and who "seized control over the financial, media and administrative resources of the Russian state"[7] and restricted democratic freedoms and human rights. According to Julie Anderson, Russia has been transformed to an "FSB state".[8][9]

The term Putinism was first[10] used in the article by Andrey Piontkovsky published on 11 January 2000 in Sovetskaya Rossiya and placed on the Yabloko website on the same day. He characterized Putinism as "the highest and final stage of bandit capitalism in Russia, the stage where, as one half-forgotten classic said, the bourgeoisie throws the flag of the democratic freedoms and the human rights overboard; and also as a war, "consolidation" of the nation on the ground of hatred against some ethnic group, attack on freedom of speech and information brainwashing, isolation from the outside world and further economic degradation".[11][12]

Description[edit]

Sociologists, economists and political scientists emphasize different features of the system.

Characteristics of Putinism highlighted by publicists and journalists[edit]

  • Putin's personality cult,[13] through glorification in the media, the image of a "national hero",[14]
  • strong presidential power,[15] strengthened even in comparison with Yeltsin times,[16]
  • strong state control over property,[15]
  • elements of nepotism (cooperative “Ozero”),
  • reliance on siloviki (people from several dozen security agencies, many of whom worked with Putin before he came to power),
  • selective application of justice,[17][18] subjectively selective application of the law (“Everything is for the friends, the law is for the enemies”),[19]
  • relatively liberal but non-transparent financial and tax policies,[2]
  • “manual control” mode:[20][21][22] a weak technical government that does not have any political weight, with real control of the country from Presidential Administration,[20]
  • utmost secrecy of power and backstage making of key decisions,[20]
  • the authorities' dislike of freedom to express their opinion, censorship,[23]
  • strategic relations with The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, they say, the property interests of the church[24] and a policy of promoting clericalization of society.[25][26]
  • Pan-Russian variant of ultra-nationalism, shifting the Russians to the position of the dominant Aryan nation.[27]
  • In the international arena, Putinism is characterized by nostalgia for Soviet times and a desire to regain the situation before 1989 when the Soviet Union competed on a strong footing with United States in international affairs. Energy is used as an instrument of international politics (so-called “pipeline diplomacy”).[28]

Characteristics of Putinism highlighted by scientists[edit]

M. Urnov and V. Kasamara established among political scientists “direct signs of the departure of the current political system of Russia from the basic principles of competition policy”:[30]

  • centralization,[31] strong presidential power,[15] weakening of the political influence of regional elites and big business[30]
  • establishment of direct or indirect state control over the main television channels of the country, censorship;[30][32]
  • the ever-increasing use of the “administrative resource”[clarification needed] in elections at the regional and federal levels;[30][32]
  • the actual elimination of the system of separation of powers, the establishment of control over the judicial system;[30][32]
  • non-public style of political behavior[30][32]
  • monopolization of political power in the hands of the president[32]
  • priority of state interests over the interests of the individual, restriction of the rights of citizens,[32][31] Reprisals against civil society[31]
  • creating an image of a "besieged fortress", equating opposition activities with hostility[32] and ousting it from the political field[33]
  • Putin's personality cult,[34] the embodiment of state succession in it after a serious injury from the collapse of the USSR[33]
  • bureaucratic authoritarianism,[35] the presence of the ruling party merged with the bureaucratic apparatus[32][35]
  • state corporativism[35][34]
  • strong state control over property,[15]
  • aggressive foreign policy (jingoism)[31]
  • focus on order and conservative values[33]
  • ideology of national greatness[33]
  • Anti-Western sentiment[33]

Russian political scientist Andrey Piontkovsky argues that the ideology of Russian fascism is in many ways similar to German fascism (Nazism), while the speeches of President Vladimir Putin reflect similar ideas to those of Adolf Hitler.[36][37] Oleksii Danilov said during the Russian invasion of Ukraine that Putin's entourage said that the president's mental state was not normal — that he had a "leaky roof." Earlier, US intelligence said that their main task — to find out the truth about the mental state of the Russian leader.[38]

According to experts, Putin's behavior is becoming more volatile and irrational. They made an assumption, that protracted isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic could influence Putin's mental health. In March 2022, CNN, citing two unnamed senior officials in the US administration, said that for the past few days, Russian President Putin has been in an extremely angry state over the West's harsh sanctions on the Russian economy.[38]

Putin's mental health had been questioned long before the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in April 2014, in an interview with journalists Boris Nemtsov called Putin a mental patient. This statement was used as the basis for initiation of criminal proceeding against Nemtsov but, eventually, the case was requalified to administrative offence.[39] In 2016, there was the request to initiate a procedure, provided by the article 92 of the Constitution of Russia, aimed at the termination Putin's presidential authority on his mental illness ground. The negative response to this request was appealed to the court but the administrative claim was dismissed in 2017.[40]

Silovik influence[edit]

Main article: Silovik

A sociological investigation unveiling the phenomena was done in 2004 by Olga Kryshtanovskaya, who determined the proportion of siloviks in the Russian political elite to be 25%.[1] In Putin's "inner circle" which constitutes about 20 people, the amount of siloviks rises to 58%, and fades to 18–20% in Parliament and 34% in the Government.[1] According to Kryshtanovskaya, there was no capture of power as Kremlin bureaucracy has called siloviks in order to "restore order". The process of siloviks coming into power allegedly started in 1996, Boris Yeltsin's second term. "Not personally Yeltsin, but the whole elite wished to stop the revolutionary process and consolidate power."[1]

When silovik Vladimir Putin was appointed Prime Minister in 1999, the process was boosted. According to Kryshtanovskaya, "Yes, Putin has brought siloviks with him. But that's not enough to understand the situation. Here's also an objective aspect: the whole political class wished them to come. They were called for service... There was a need of a strong arm, capable from point of view of the elite to establish order in the country."[1]

Kryshtanovskaya has also noted that there were people who had worked in structures "affiliated" with the KGB/FSB. Structures usually considered as such are the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Governmental Communications Commission, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Press Agency News and others. "The itself work in such agencies doesn't involve necessary contacts with special services, but makes you think about it."[41] Summing up numbers of official and "affiliated" siloviks she got an estimate of 77% of such in the power.[1]

Putin's amendments to the Russian Constitution of 2020[edit]

With Putin's signing an executive order on 3 July 2020 to officially insert the amendments into the Russian Constitution, they took effect on 4 July 2020.[42]

Vladimir Pastukhov, a Russian political scientist, advocate and honorary senior research associate of the University College London's School of Slavonic and East European Studies, and Alexander Podrabinek, a Soviet dissident, journalist and Russian human rights defender, state that Russia has been taking on the characteristics of a totalitarianism as a result of the constitutional amendments. This is reflected in incremental but steady and aggressive process of the seizing of full control over public and private life, and de facto criminalization of any opposition and dissidence.[43][44]

History[edit]

Intelligence state[edit]

Main article: Counterintelligence state

According to former Securitate general Ion Mihai Pacepa, "In the Soviet Union, the KGB was a state within a state. Now former KGB officers are running the state. They have custody of the country's 6,000 nuclear weapons, entrusted to the KGB in the 1950s, and they now also manage the strategic oil industry renationalized by Putin. The KGB successor, rechristened FSB, still has the right to electronically monitor the population, control political groups, search homes and businesses, infiltrate the federal government, create its own front enterprises, investigate cases, and run its own prison system. The Soviet Union had one KGB officer for every 428 citizens. Putin's Russia has one FSB-ist for every 297 citizens."[45][46]

"Under Russian Federation President and former career foreign intelligence officer Vladimir Putin, an "FSB State" composed of chekists has been established and is consolidating its hold on the country. Its closest partners are organized criminals. In a world marked by a globalized economy and information infrastructure, and with transnational terrorism groups utilizing all available means to achieve their goals and further their interests, Russian intelligence collaboration with these elements is potentially disastrous", said politologist Julie Anderson.[8]

Former KGB officer Konstantin Preobrazhenskiy shares similar ideas. When asked "How many people in Russia work in FSB?", he replied: "Whole country. FSB owns everything, including Russian Army and even own Church, the Russian Orthodox Church... Putin managed to create new social system in Russia".[47]

"Vladimir Putin's Russia is a new phenomenon in Europe: a state defined and dominated by former and active-duty security and intelligence officers. Not even fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union – all undoubtedly much worse creations than Russia – were as top-heavy with intelligence talent", said intelligence expert Marc Gerecht.[48]

Corporation-state[edit]

Main article: Corporatism

Andrei Illarionov considers the political system in Russia as a variety of corporatism. According to Illarionov, a former advisor of Vladimir Putin, this is a new socio-political order, "distinct from any seen in our country before". He said that members of the Corporation of Intelligence Service Collaborators took over the entire body of state power, follow an omerta-like behavior code, and "are given instruments conferring power over others – membership “perks”, such as the right to carry and use weapons".[49]

According to Illarionov, this "Corporation has seized key government agencies – the Tax Service, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament, and the government-controlled mass media – which are now used to advance the interests of [Corporation] members. Through these agencies, every significant resource of the country – security/intelligence, political, economic, informational and financial – is being monopolized in the hands of Corporation members".[49]

Members of the Corporation created an isolated caste. A former KGB general said that "a Chekist is a breed... A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's siloviki. Marriages between siloviki clans are also encouraged."[50]

Single-party bureaucratic state[edit]

Russian politician Boris Nemtsov and commentator Kara-Murza define Putinism in Russia as "a one party system, censorship, a puppet parliament, ending of an independent judiciary, firm centralization of power and finances, and hypertrophied role of special services and bureaucracy, in particular in relation to business".[51]

State gangsterism[edit]

Main article: Mafia state

Political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky considers Putinism as "the highest and culminating stage of bandit capitalism in Russia”.[52] He believes that "Russia is not corrupt. Corruption is what happens in all countries when businessmen offer officials large bribes for favors. Today's Russia is unique. The businessmen, the politicians, and the bureaucrats are the same people. They have privatized the country's wealth and taken control of its financial flows."[53]

Such views are also shared by politologist Julie Anderson who said the same person can be a Russian intelligence officer, an organized criminal, and a businessman.[8] She also cited former CIA director James Woolsey who said: "I have been particularly concerned for some years, beginning during my tenure, with the interpenetration of Russian organized crime, Russian intelligence and law enforcement, and Russian business. I have often illustrated this point with the following hypothetical: If you should chance to strike up a conversation with an articulate, English-speaking Russian in, say, the restaurant of one of the luxury hotels along Lake Geneva, and he is wearing a $3,000 suit and a pair of Gucci loafers, and he tells you that he is an executive of a Russian trading company and wants to talk to you about a joint venture, then there are four possibilities. He may be what he says he is. He may be a Russian intelligence officer working under commercial cover. He may be part of a Russian organized crime group. But the really interesting possibility is that he may be all three and that none of those three institutions have any problem with the arrangement."[54]

According to political analyst Dmitri Glinski, "The idea of Russia, Inc.--or better, Russia, Ltd.--derives from the Russian brand of libertarian anarchism viewing the state as just another private armed gang claiming special rights on the basis of its unusual power." "This is a state conceived as a "stationary bandit" imposing stability by eliminating the roving bandits of the previous era."[6]

In April 2006, the effective privatization of the customs sphere infuriated Putin himself, where businessmen and officials "merged in ecstasy".[55]

Ideology[edit]

The following observers discuss the ideology of new Russian political elite. Politologist Irina Pavlova said that chekists are not merely a corporation of people united to expropriate financial assets. They have long-standing political objectives of transforming Moscow into the Third Rome and ideology of "containing" the United States.[56] Columnist George Will emphasized the nationalistic nature of Putinism. He said that "Putinism is becoming a toxic brew of nationalism directed against neighboring nations, and populist envy, backed by assaults of state power, directed against private wealth. Putinism is national socialism without the demonic element of its pioneer...".[57] According to Illarionov, the ideology of chekists is Nashism ("ours-ism"), the selective application of rights".[49]

In 2010, Peter Sucia, the American historian and The National Interest contributor, was one of the first publicists to explicitly describe Putin as a leader who's sincerely convinced in his fascist values as righteous. Sucia wrote: "Some historians and economists have noted that fascism is actually an anti-Marxist form of socialism, especially as it favors class collaboration and supports the concept of nationalism — the latter being something that Marxists could never support. A diehard Marxist leader wouldn't get on a plane and fly halfway around the world to try and win support for the Olympics to be hosted in his country, even his hometown. But a tried and true Fascist might do so".[58][59]

In February 2021, Vladimir Putin linked his own personal thought and ideology to that of Lev Gumilyov, stating that he too believed in 'passionarity', the rise and fall of societies as described by this theory and specifically that Russia was a nation 'has not yet attained its highest point', with an 'infinite genetic code'.[60][61][62]

International support[edit]

In the European Union, Putinism has been supported by far-right politicians, including Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Giorgia Meloni and a far-right party Alternative for Germany.

Marine Le Pen and Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 24 March 2017

See also[edit]

Russia:

Other individuals:

References[edit]

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    Van Herpen compares in detail the many and often surprising parallels that exist between Putin’s regime and that of Weimar Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, indicating the presence of strong Fascist elements in contemporary Russia.
    However, this is tempered by other elements that show a resemblance with the Bonapartism from Napoleon III’s France and the post-modern populism of Silvio Berlusconi, creating a hybrid system which can be labelled ‘Fascism-lite’. Although ‘Putinism’ has a softer face than Mussolinian Fascism, it still contains a hard core of ultra-nationalism, militarism, and neo-imperialism.
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Further reading[edit]

External links[edit]

  • The dictionary definition of Putinism at Wiktionary
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