Russian Kyiv convoy

A Russian military vehicle captured by Ukrainian forces in 2014, eight years before the convoy formed

The Russian Kyiv convoy is a large column of Russian military vehicles stretching some 64 kilometres (40 mi) involved in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has been noted for initially threatening Kyiv, but then halting due to unclear reasons. Commentators have suggested that the large number of soldiers and vehicles may have issues with fuel and food shortages, and may also be delayed by attacks from the Ukrainian military. Some have seen the slow pace and the seemingly disorganised military formation as representative of Russia's problems in the war in general.

Background

Russia had reportedly hoped to take Kyiv rapidly and remove the Ukrainian government, allowing a pro-Russian government to be installed. Russia positioned a large force in Belarus, which crossed the border and invaded the north of Ukraine, while other forces attacked from Donbas, Luhansk and Crimea in the south.

Observations

Movements

Maxar Technologies first spotted the Kyiv convoy in satellite images on Monday 28 February 2022. The column of vehicles crossed into Ukraine from Belarus and moved south through Prybirsk, and then Ivankiv. The convoy was apparently heading towards Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, as part of preparation for the projected Battle of Kyiv, presumably with the aim of besieging and threatening Kyiv. However, according to a 7 March 2022 intelligence update from the UK Defence Ministry, "The main body of the large Russian column advancing on Kyiv remains over 30km from the centre of the city having been delayed by staunch Ukrainian resistance, mechanical breakdown and congestion." Time reported that by 1 March, it was 25 kilometres (16 mi) from the centre of the city, and it was then reported as stalling between 25 and 30 kilometres outside Kyiv.

Composition and size

On 2 March, the convoy was estimated to have held up to 15,000 troops. The formation itself is made of up a variety of military vehicles, which satellite footage shows vehicles parked three abreast across wider sections of the road. The convoy has been noted for its size, stretching about 65 kilometres (40 mi). Satellite photos of the convoy indicate the column is composed of Russian supply trucks, troops, weapons, and artillery. Reuters revised the size of the convoy, estimating it to be larger than previously considered, at 64 kilometres (40 mi) long, with The Independent estimating that it had grown to 64 kilometres (40 mi) long by 1 March, from its initial size estimate of 27 kilometres (17 mi).

Air cover

The convoy is protected by mobile anti-aircraft systems. It is not known how effective these are, because elsewhere, Ukrainian Baykar Bayraktar TB2 drones had successfully attacked and "destroyed three [Russian] SAM missile systems and four 152mm artillery pieces, along with more than 10 trucks and several tanks" by 1 March. The effectiveness of the Turkish-manufacted TB2 drones has been partly attributed to the Russian failure to achieve air supremacy in the opening phase of the war, as well as poor Russian coordination and communications. Ukrainian commanders were therefore considering using them against the convoy, but they had relatively few deployable TB2 drones, few military personnel were trained to operate them effectively, and Russian forces might be able to track them and shoot them down through their GPS signals. Moreover, by 3 March, aviation researcher Justin Bronk stated that Russian forces appeared to have moved more air defence systems forward, including around the column. Bronk argued that the convoy had thus become 'a very, very difficult target for the Ukrainian Air Force', because it was within reach of the S-400 missile systems along the Belarusian–Ukrainian border, excluding almost any conventional manned aircraft attacks on the convoy (except perhaps very low-level flying, visual-targeting operations).

Stall

A Russian armored column in the Kyiv region, 7 March 2022

The convoy stalled 8 days into the war, at approximately 30 kilometres (19 mi) from the centre of the city of Kyiv; as of 7 March 2022, according to US defence officials, the column had not moved at all for a few days.

There has been much discussion about why the convoy stalled. Overall, The UK Defence Ministry noted that by the 7 March, it had been "delayed by staunch Ukrainian resistance, mechanical breakdown and congestion. The column has made little discernible progress in over three days,"

• Fuel and food shortages: Much commentary theorises that the convoy is stalled due to fuel and food shortages. In the wider conflict, fuel and supply issues have been apparent, with trucks and vehicles running out of fuel leading to them being abandoned. In some cases, Russian soldiers had asked local Ukrainians for fuel for their vehicles.

• Weather, terrain, and congestion: Other media suggests that vehicles are bogged, triggering traffic jams. There has been wide evidence that Russian vehicles are unable to travel across muddy or boggy terrain. In this case, the terrain appears not to have frozen solid due to the mild winter this year. Social media has widely published images of heavy tracked vehicles that Russian soldiers abandoned after getting trapped in the mud. This issue is particularly notable in the northern Ukraine, made worse as the Rasputitsa, the seasonal thaw during springtime, takes hold in more areas.
• Ukrainian attacks: Others have suggested it is because of attacks from Ukrainian military, however there was little information about this. There were some suggestions that the column had been attacked either by artillery, Turkish made drones, or ground ambushes.
• Tyres and maintenance: Poor maintenance of vehicles and cheap tyres resulting in failure after long periods of inactivity has also been suggested as a reason for the convoy's stalling. Trent Telenko, previously a Pentagon staff specialist and military history writer, and Karl Ruth, government advisor and economist both supported the tyres and maintenance theory, with Telenko also noting that that the Russian army "simply cannot risk them off-road during the [mud season]."
• Waiting: Other commentary has theorised the convoy is simply waiting to set up a forward base of operations.
• Overall bad planning and disorganisation: Janes theorised that overall Russian unpreparedness for the invasion of Ukraine, tied with the fact that Russia has not operated at this scale since WW2, has resulted in communications problems, and different units not being able to work together, and the stall and apparent disorganisation of the Kyiv armoured column was a result of this.

Strategic analysis

Commentary discussing the column soon after its appearance assumed it was a column that would enter Ukraine, move south to Kyiv and then encircle it with a siege.

On 3 March 2022, CNN cited former Finnish defence intelligence expert Martti Kari in saying that, strategically, the stalled column presented two main threats to its ongoing campaign. Firstly that the column, now stalled, could be an easy target suffering attacks that may eventually destroy it. Secondly the stalled column, as the situation got worse for those within it, would cause morale problems clearly not just for those in the column, but other Russian troops that heard of its plight.

Some commentary has indicated that the troops in the convoy contained many supply trucks, and the soldiers in the convoy survived by eating the supplies in the trucks, which the convoy had intended to deliver to other units. Some have seen its plodding pace and logistical issues as emblematic of Russia's efforts in the war in general.

The column was either anticipated to form part of a planned siege of Kyiv, with the vehicles and troops fanning out to take up their positions, or it may have been a supply convoy to replenish food and ammunition to troops already engaged in the area, or the aim may have been to set up a forward base of operations for attacks on Kyiv.

Ukrainian engagements

The ABC reported on 3 March that ground attacks with anti-tank weapons had destroyed numerous vehicles. It noted that the attacking forces had deliberately attacked the start of the column, destroying vehicles there. This in turn had created a roadblock, with the vehicles not being able to proceed, which in turn stalled the whole convoy as it could not then move any closer to Kyiv. On 11 March, a senior U.S. defence official stated that Ukrainian forces had made several attacks on the convoy with ground fire, such as shoulder-fired FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles delivered by Western countries. Strategic attacks have contributed to the stalling of the convoy, with destroyed elements within the convoy "essentially creating a roadblock" and creating traffic jams that prevented the convoy from proceeding. Ukrainian units operating in Kyiv have set up various obstacles and road blocks in its anticpated path, including using "parking trams, buses and large vehicles."

Ukrainian snipers have engaged troops from their position and killed individual Russian soldiers. High-level Russian officials at the convoy have been killed by Ukrainian snipers. On 3 March, Major General Andrey Sukhovetsky, deputy commander of the Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District, was killed by Ukrainian sniper fire when he ventured to the front of the stalled 64 kilometres (40 mi)-long military convoy northwest of Kyiv. At that point, he was the highest-ranking Russian official killed so far in the Ukrainian invasion.

Redeployment of some elements

By 11 March 2022, some elements had broken off and deployed into firing positions. While the bulk of the convoy remained on the road, some parts, including artillery, had left the main column, and started taking up positions near Hostomel. Some parts of the convoy took up positions in Lubyanka, and nearby forests. The US Department of Defense, in an overall summation of a lack of progress of the Russian forces, on March 16 said that the Russian Convoy north of Kyiv was still stuck in place, and had not progressed.